I’m curious where you got those ideas such as ‘land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo’. From SIOP-64 to OPLAN-8010, I can only find that they always emphasize 2nd strike is a task for delivery systems “with very strong survivability” as well as using “rapid reaction and accurate systems” for 1st strike “because ALPHA targets are time-sensitive”. IMO those doctrines are completely opposite to your assertion, I will appreciate if you can provide any documents about it.I can't say I know exactly what scenario you are envisioning, but system-wide deception jamming of modern, high gain, frequency agile AESAs such as LPAR that make up a non-insignificant portion of the systems (and an even higher portion of overall sensor footprint) employed by the PLA in the BMEW role... is a monstrous task. Not only would this require a huge jammer ERP to overwhelm such a massive, high gain, and EP-wrapped target, but it would also have to be done from a platform (or operational system, depending on scope) with the EW suite necessary to keep up with LPAR's frequency hopping, and generate many false returns per EA platform, and those false returns would have to mimic either/both ballistic contacts as well as VLO strategic airpower. I'm not sure how much you've read as far as modern EMSO and the physical constraints on it, but this is quite outside the realm of feasibility. Even to intermittently create false returns on a handful of systems would require a very sizeable number of EA sorties to be generated and employed along probable threat axes (after all, a Trident II return coming from Xinjiang would be highly peculiar, whereas a B-21 ingressing from the north/northeast is very reasonable), which presents a problem in that most of these BMEWRs, due to these probably threat axes and targets, are not exactly sticking their neck out. I would be quite surprised if the US could, ostensibly in peacetime if your suggestion of jamming every couple of weeks is to imply deception about capability rather than degradation of capability of their early warning network, but especially in wartime - generate sorties inland enough to conduct EA missions against the LPAR in Xinjiang lol. I personally just find this idea entirely imprudent, confusing in purpose, and almost undoubtedly unfeasible on a sheer logistical basis.
You say "anti-stealth radar provides not-so-enough warning time even with 1 stage verification." I'm curious where you get this information from. Assuming an ongoing conventional war escalates into a nuclear war, Everything about a thousand nautical miles East of Beijing will be positively blanketed in sensors, and can be regarded as essentially PLA stomping ground, barring an unlikely Russia-esque overestimation of PLA equipment or some loony tunes scenario in which the US has the entirety of INDOPACCOM and PACAF up and at 'em as the conflict's starting pistol fires. Furthermore, even if the PLA is rolled back to defending its own and near-periphery airspace, there is still a very modern, sizable counter-air complex in place to prosecute even LO/VLO targets (cruise missiles, even Tomahawk, have a nasty small RCS; but developments in AEW&C, dense coverage and sizeable proliferation of modern AESA EWR/FCRs, and ample GBAA and modern aircraft all make them very viable targets regardless). Furthermore, strategic aviation has been the second-stringer in the US's triad for quite some time now. Even assuming the PLA *didn't* have the ability to simply surveil US Airbases (notably, ones hosting STRATCOM toys), Trident IIs have historically been envisioned as the ones kicking the door down in a first strike, while aircraft and land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo.
I'm surprised you think so poorly of the PLA, while maintaining such strikingly surface level knowledge of US Nuclear CONOPs haha
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