China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

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SEAD

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I can't say I know exactly what scenario you are envisioning, but system-wide deception jamming of modern, high gain, frequency agile AESAs such as LPAR that make up a non-insignificant portion of the systems (and an even higher portion of overall sensor footprint) employed by the PLA in the BMEW role... is a monstrous task. Not only would this require a huge jammer ERP to overwhelm such a massive, high gain, and EP-wrapped target, but it would also have to be done from a platform (or operational system, depending on scope) with the EW suite necessary to keep up with LPAR's frequency hopping, and generate many false returns per EA platform, and those false returns would have to mimic either/both ballistic contacts as well as VLO strategic airpower. I'm not sure how much you've read as far as modern EMSO and the physical constraints on it, but this is quite outside the realm of feasibility. Even to intermittently create false returns on a handful of systems would require a very sizeable number of EA sorties to be generated and employed along probable threat axes (after all, a Trident II return coming from Xinjiang would be highly peculiar, whereas a B-21 ingressing from the north/northeast is very reasonable), which presents a problem in that most of these BMEWRs, due to these probably threat axes and targets, are not exactly sticking their neck out. I would be quite surprised if the US could, ostensibly in peacetime if your suggestion of jamming every couple of weeks is to imply deception about capability rather than degradation of capability of their early warning network, but especially in wartime - generate sorties inland enough to conduct EA missions against the LPAR in Xinjiang lol. I personally just find this idea entirely imprudent, confusing in purpose, and almost undoubtedly unfeasible on a sheer logistical basis.

You say "anti-stealth radar provides not-so-enough warning time even with 1 stage verification." I'm curious where you get this information from. Assuming an ongoing conventional war escalates into a nuclear war, Everything about a thousand nautical miles East of Beijing will be positively blanketed in sensors, and can be regarded as essentially PLA stomping ground, barring an unlikely Russia-esque overestimation of PLA equipment or some loony tunes scenario in which the US has the entirety of INDOPACCOM and PACAF up and at 'em as the conflict's starting pistol fires. Furthermore, even if the PLA is rolled back to defending its own and near-periphery airspace, there is still a very modern, sizable counter-air complex in place to prosecute even LO/VLO targets (cruise missiles, even Tomahawk, have a nasty small RCS; but developments in AEW&C, dense coverage and sizeable proliferation of modern AESA EWR/FCRs, and ample GBAA and modern aircraft all make them very viable targets regardless). Furthermore, strategic aviation has been the second-stringer in the US's triad for quite some time now. Even assuming the PLA *didn't* have the ability to simply surveil US Airbases (notably, ones hosting STRATCOM toys), Trident IIs have historically been envisioned as the ones kicking the door down in a first strike, while aircraft and land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo.

I'm surprised you think so poorly of the PLA, while maintaining such strikingly surface level knowledge of US Nuclear CONOPs haha
I’m curious where you got those ideas such as ‘land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo’. From SIOP-64 to OPLAN-8010, I can only find that they always emphasize 2nd strike is a task for delivery systems “with very strong survivability” as well as using “rapid reaction and accurate systems” for 1st strike “because ALPHA targets are time-sensitive”. IMO those doctrines are completely opposite to your assertion, I will appreciate if you can provide any documents about it.
 
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SEAD

Junior Member
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I can't say I know exactly what scenario you are envisioning, but system-wide deception jamming of modern, high gain, frequency agile AESAs such as LPAR that make up a non-insignificant portion of the systems (and an even higher portion of overall sensor footprint) employed by the PLA in the BMEW role... is a monstrous task. Not only would this require a huge jammer ERP to overwhelm such a massive, high gain, and EP-wrapped target, but it would also have to be done from a platform (or operational system, depending on scope) with the EW suite necessary to keep up with LPAR's frequency hopping, and generate many false returns per EA platform, and those false returns would have to mimic either/both ballistic contacts as well as VLO strategic airpower. I'm not sure how much you've read as far as modern EMSO and the physical constraints on it, but this is quite outside the realm of feasibility. Even to intermittently create false returns on a handful of systems would require a very sizeable number of EA sorties to be generated and employed along probable threat axes (after all, a Trident II return coming from Xinjiang would be highly peculiar, whereas a B-21 ingressing from the north/northeast is very reasonable), which presents a problem in that most of these BMEWRs, due to these probably threat axes and targets, are not exactly sticking their neck out. I would be quite surprised if the US could, ostensibly in peacetime if your suggestion of jamming every couple of weeks is to imply deception about capability rather than degradation of capability of their early warning network, but especially in wartime - generate sorties inland enough to conduct EA missions against the LPAR in Xinjiang lol. I personally just find this idea entirely imprudent, confusing in purpose, and almost undoubtedly unfeasible on a sheer logistical basis.

You say "anti-stealth radar provides not-so-enough warning time even with 1 stage verification." I'm curious where you get this information from. Assuming an ongoing conventional war escalates into a nuclear war, Everything about a thousand nautical miles East of Beijing will be positively blanketed in sensors, and can be regarded as essentially PLA stomping ground, barring an unlikely Russia-esque overestimation of PLA equipment or some loony tunes scenario in which the US has the entirety of INDOPACCOM and PACAF up and at 'em as the conflict's starting pistol fires. Furthermore, even if the PLA is rolled back to defending its own and near-periphery airspace, there is still a very modern, sizable counter-air complex in place to prosecute even LO/VLO targets (cruise missiles, even Tomahawk, have a nasty small RCS; but developments in AEW&C, dense coverage and sizeable proliferation of modern AESA EWR/FCRs, and ample GBAA and modern aircraft all make them very viable targets regardless). Furthermore, strategic aviation has been the second-stringer in the US's triad for quite some time now. Even assuming the PLA *didn't* have the ability to simply surveil US Airbases (notably, ones hosting STRATCOM toys), Trident IIs have historically been envisioned as the ones kicking the door down in a first strike, while aircraft and land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo.

I'm surprised you think so poorly of the PLA, while maintaining such strikingly surface level knowledge of US Nuclear CONOPs haha
“sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo” also seems not true.
C6B3521D-7C19-4BC1-A5A5-DFA69C42A98E.jpeg
Notice task ALFA+BRAVO(aiming at only military targets) can destroy 70% economic targets.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
I would contest this. You say "minus drag" but that's a bit like saying you can bake a cake with an ice cube, minus the heat. Aerobraking is a principal component of de-orbiting any spacecraft, and it's the reason that it takes an extra gigantic fuel tank and two extra solid rocket boosters to get a Space Shuttle to orbit, but only about 300m/s of dV in the OMS to get back home. Orbital bombardment systems do have a myriad of issues, and are *generally* not a very efficient system of deterrence, but the sheer kinematics are not really one of them.
Ok, I am not an expert on this, so this is just from my understanding. Aero braking is indeed an important part of deorbiting but you'll need more dV for accuracy and flight control. Using aero braking alone is inaccurate because there is large uncertainty in upper atmospheric density and due to high orbital speeds, even a small time error in choosing when to deorbit, translates to a large distance error.

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Ballistic missile trajectories are suborbital and will naturally intersect the atmosphere without any additional dV, so timing of reentry is known and the missile will roughly land around the target. Only the aerodynamic forces will affect accuracy rather than both the timing of reentry and aerodynamics.

I’m curious where you got those ideas such as ‘land based ICBMs contribute much of the sheer volume of munitions needed to generate an effective counterforce/countervalue salvo’. From SIOP-64 to OPLAN-8010, I can only find that they always emphasize 2nd strike is a task for delivery systems “with very strong survivability” as well as using “rapid reaction and accurate systems” for 1st strike “because ALPHA targets are time-sensitive”. IMO those doctrines are completely opposite to your assertion, I will appreciate if you can provide any documents about it.
If they can't take out all the silos simultaneously then they do indeed contribute to the number of weapons that can be fired in retaliation. As long as there's multiple silo fields separated sufficiently geographically and redundant communication connection between them it works.
 

SEAD

Junior Member
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There is no dedicated AShBM So I will put it here China has completed the Yaogan series of surveillance satellite network according to Henri K It was decades long effort Nowhere to hide for CVBG. Another thing China has experimented with socalled agile satellite who can change their orbit. Now where is our friend SEAD who said china need thousand of satellite to cover certain area. Or China DOES Not has the necessary surveillance system?. The original is in French so Google translation is here
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The Yaogan-30 constellation has already been the subject of two
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, but this should be the last: following the launch of the seventh trio of satellites, the constellation now has six evenly distributed orbital planes. She has thus reached her full capacity and final form.

The six orbital planes of the constellation
Having only six orbital planes with seven launches might seem odd. As pointed out in a
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, the third and fourth launches injected their satellites into the same orbital plane, and created a "train" of five satellites that follow each other very closely. This makes it possible to have an extremely high revisit rate when this train passes over a region of interest.




A satellite out of service​

The other peculiarity of the constellation is that one of the satellites of the sixth group is out of service, or at least its propulsion system is: Yaogan 30T (international designator 2020-021C) is not correctly positioned in its orbital plane. Normally the three satellites in the same plane are phased at 120° from each other, to maximize constellation coverage. On the other hand, Yaogan 30T and 30S are currently very close to each other, which makes one of the two redundant.

The one with the problem is Yaogan 30T, as can be seen in this graph comparing the sixth group's orbital elements:
View attachment 88381
Evolution over time of the number of revolutions per day for the 6th group


The 30T satellite has not made any maneuvers since it has been in orbit, and therefore performs more revolutions per day around the Earth than the other two. This means that its position in the orbital plane is constantly changing, and the fact that it is currently near 30S is just a coincidence. He will move away from it over time.

We can compare with what happens in the case of a group whose three satellites are perfectly functional, as is the case for the last launch:
View attachment 88382
Evolution over time of the number of revolutions per day for the 7th group


The satellites were launched together and therefore at the beginning the curves are confused. Then they used their thrusters to maneuver and each had a different number of revolutions per day. This allowed them to position themselves on a different sector of the orbit. They let this position drift until the 120° phase between the satellites was reached, then froze their orbital configuration by maneuvering again so that they all had exactly the same number of revolutions per day. This ensures that they stay synchronized in their orbit.

It is possible that China will eventually replace the satellite that is out of order, because it would improve the coverage offered by the constellation, making it more regular with fewer interruptions. This would be a good opportunity for one of China's new small launchers like the CZ-11 rocket, since a single Yaogan-30 type satellite represents a small payload.

Cover
Speaking of coverage, let's look at what the constellation can do. Given its inclination, it is optimized for observing the environment close to China, in particular the approaches to its Pacific coast. Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, is therefore a very representative area of interest, especially since the recent rearmament efforts of the Republic of China with the United States have heightened tensions in the region.

Based on the 3D models of the satellites broadcast by Chinese television, they do not appear to carry radar or imaging systems, so they are probably used for electronic intelligence, with perhaps a communication function as well. This kind of sensors generally need to see their target under an angle of incidence of at least 5°. Based on this assumption, we can calculate the coverage of Taipei over a 24-hour period:
View attachment 88383
In cyan, the coverage periods.


We see that the coverage is almost constant, with the longest interruption lasting around 30 minutes, and most interruptions lasting 10 minutes every half hour. The following video shows satellite positions and coverage opportunities (in the form of a purple link between the satellite and the ground):


Plans for the future​

This rate of revisiting is already the highest among all known constellations in China or elsewhere, but the middle country does not intend to stop there, as Academician Li Deren explains in a
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“The first step is to provide local (local) coverage from the South China Sea to the North China region . This requires about 20 remote sensing satellites and 1-3 communications satellites in geostationary orbit to achieve 15 minute temporal resolution. High-resolution target images and sub-meter navigation and positioning accuracy are sent to users' mobile phones and other intelligent terminals;

The second stage is the regional coverage of China and neighboring countries along the Belt and Road. This requires a hundred remote sensing satellites. Among them, half of the remote sensing satellites are optical satellites and the other half are radar satellites to guarantee the broadcasting of images day and night, plus 150 communication satellites;

The third step is global . To achieve a worldwide service, it is estimated that 200 remote sensing satellites and 300 communication satellites will be required. The service index is the time resolution of 5 minutes, that is, the required image target is found within 5 minutes, the resolution and navigation accuracy reach 0.5 m, and the time processing and communication in orbit is less than 1 minute before being delivered to the user's mobile phone. »


Yaogan-30 is the first stage, with 21 satellites optimized for the Chinese coastline. However, it does not reach a revisit every 15 minutes, so Mr. Deren may be talking about another constellation that will be launched in the near future. The use of geostationary satellites as relays, so as to minimize the latency of the system, can on the other hand already be implemented on Yaogan-30.

Li Deren also explains that future developments will combine the traditionally separate functions of communication, Earth observation and positioning into a single system, and data will be sent directly to end-users' phones to minimize latency and maximize their impact:


" The perceived data will be intelligently processed to provide users with the function of PNTRC, P representing the position, N the navigation route, T the time, R the image remote sensing [Remote sensing], and C the communication, it that is, this information can be sent to the receiving device in your hand. "

This plan looks like two drops of water to American ambitions to acquire a multi-layered military constellation to ensure communications, anti-ballistic missile warning and Earth observation. Given the extent of Chinese investment in the field, there is no doubt that they will manage to develop an equivalent system, and that therefore we have not finished hearing about large constellations of Chinese satellites.
I doubt if you have got the difference between ships and aircrafts… I thought there’s no need to explain it because it’s just some pre-K maths but it seems I’m wrong.

For ships,(leave alone side swing mode) if your scanning width is 10nm, you need 20min interval. For aircrafts, the interval must be less than 1min. The previous task is ok for a constellation with around 100 satellites but for the latter one you need literally thousands.

if you use side-swinging, it can reduce the interval for a CERTAIN point so interval less than 10min for a 100-satellites constellation is possible, but for exchange, it loses the ability to monitor a whole region.

btw I assumed everyone here had ever read Henri K’s blog but it seems I’m wrong again.
 

SEAD

Junior Member
Registered Member
I think TELs in underground tunnels may be more survivable than SSBNs actually. Not sure how vulnerable to high-yield EPWs the whole tunnel system (e.g. "underground great wall") is, but I think it should be survivable. And you can dig many hidden exits so the US doesn't know where the launchers will pop up and fire from so they can't "seal them in" by destroying all of those. It's basically a way to ensure your missiles can't be destroyed at all.
The standard plan might be “digging many UNFINISHED hidden exits” because any completed exit is easy to be detected.

We know it because US MX program also discussed about deep tunnels in details.
 

Kalec

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The standard plan might be “digging many UNFINISHED hidden exits” because any completed exit is easy to be detected.

We know it because US MX program also discussed about deep tunnels in details.
I don't think China has a plan for many deep tunnel shelter. If you are gonna build the tunnel…… I mean why don't put that money and another 10 silos, after all you can't move tunnels anywhere else either.
 

SEAD

Junior Member
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I don't think China has a plan for many deep tunnel shelter. If you are gonna build the tunnel…… I mean why don't put that money and another 10 silos, after all you can't move tunnels anywhere else either.
They actually don’t have a plan because they have ever had thousands of kilometers of tunnels :p

They had spent 20-30 years and incalculable resources to build those tunnels.
 

Kalec

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They actually don’t have a plan because they have ever had thousands of kilometers of tunnels :p

They had spent 20-30 years and incalculable resources to build those tunnels.
Compared to tunnel shelters, DF-41 should be deployed on the road in high alert in case of emergency. Satellite ain't magic wand, it is hard to hide a aircraft carrier but not the same for TEL.
 

SEAD

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Compared to tunnel shelters, DF-41 should be deployed on the road in high alert in case of emergency. Satellite ain't magic wand, it is hard to hide a aircraft carrier but not the same for TEL.
There’s no signal for such a dramatic change since their training and infrastructures are all based on those tunnels in last 20 years so there would be many things to do if they want to deploy all of them on the road now. I mean it’s possible to deploy a few TELs on road to make US strike plan more complex/less reliable but for the main part I cannot imagine. After all, the tunnels are very safe, maybe the safest place in the world.
 
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FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
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Compared to tunnel shelters, DF-41 should be deployed on the road in high alert in case of emergency. Satellite ain't magic wand, it is hard to hide a aircraft carrier but not the same for TEL.
There are likely to be both on road and in shelter TELs. We already see satellite images of dirt roads and cleared launch areas. Those are likely to be service roads for TELs that allow them to travel on road near their patrol areas.

The other part is that even hitting the doors of the tunnels won't permanently stop the TELs as long as only the doors were destroyed, and protected the rest of the tunnel. With digging and metal cutting equipment from the inside, you can tunnel through the rubble within a few days and get the TELs on the road for retaliation. You can dig 20 m per day commercially.
 
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