China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[FairAndUnbiased]

Such radars are sensitive to many kinds of jamming and decoys. This weakness roots in its extremely low band width and complicated channel.
More band width means more information you can use to confront cheating, simpler channel means less guessing the algorithm needs to make when explaining the signal. That’s a fundamental problem.

How do you jam an OTH radar from far away? Most planes cannot even carry a RF source of equivalent frequency. And then they'd be radiators.

I am not RF engineer, so can you explain what the effect of the channel is?

A major attack also wouldn't be a single plane. 1 contact moving towards your silos at 300 kph? Maybe it's noise. 5? 10? 20? Even if it is noise, you still should send interceptors to look and cue AWACs and high resolution radars.

 

[SEAD]

You were given answers but you don't like them. But by all means, keep believing thousands of B-21s will instamagically teleport over the silo fields.

Your “answer” is a sand castle and millions/ billions lives depend on that. Anymore absurd assert can I hear in this forum?

 

[montyp165]

How do you jam an OTH radar from far away? Most planes cannot even carry a RF source of equivalent frequency. And then they'd be radiators.

I am not RF engineer, so can you explain what the effect of the channel is?

A major attack also wouldn't be a single plane. 1 contact moving towards your silos at 300 kph? Maybe it's noise. 5? 10? 20? Even if it is noise, you still should send interceptors to look and cue AWACs and high resolution radars.

In addition, if OTH radars and similar detection systems were so easily bypassed or neutralized the US itself wouldn't bother fielding them or keeping them up to date either, so dismissing said systems fielded by China (or Russia) is essentially tantamount to American Imperialist apologia.

 

[SEAD]

How do you jam an OTH radar from far away? Most planes cannot even carry a RF source of equivalent frequency. And then they'd be radiators.

I am not RF engineer, so can you explain what the effect of the channel is?

A major attack also wouldn't be a single plane. 1 contact moving towards your silos at 300 kph? Maybe it's noise. 5? 10? 20? Even if it is noise, you still should send interceptors to look and cue AWACs and high resolution radars.

Just an example: imagine you have detected a noise source and you want to ban it. It’s easy to modify the antenna pattern to filter it in space domain for any normal phase array controlled radar. However for the channel HF sky-wave radar facing, this operation is much more complex since the channel is always changing and you don’t exactly know where the real signal is from in the next second.

another example: imagine decoys such as MALD. Radar can distinguish them from real aircrafts based on many signals, but all those signals need band width. That’s why typical recognition methods such as micro-motion normally works in very high—e.g. X—band. Without bandwidth, no fancy algorithm can help you and you can get 1000x band width by moving from HF to X band.

the jammer doesn’t need to be as powerful as the radar. For radar, the decay of signal is 4 power of distance while its 2 for jammer.

there should be thousands of fake targets, absolutely.

 

[Jason_]

Your “answer” is a sand castle and millions/ billions lives depend on that. Anymore absurd assert can I hear in this forum?

What exactly is your argument? Because you seems to be contradicting yourself when you suggest decoys and ECM as a counter to OTH radars, except that the existence of decoys and ECM would reveal the presence of an attack, thus preventing the hypothetically B-2/21 from successfully performing the first strike.

 

[SEAD]

In addition, if OTH radars and similar detection systems were so easily bypassed or neutralized the US itself wouldn't bother fielding them or keeping them up to date either, so dismissing said systems fielded by China (or Russia) is essentially tantamount to American Imperialist apologia.

IMO US/Russia silos are used for the first strike but China holds NFU policy. It’s also not reasonable to explain it by simply assuming China will give up NFU because their TEL/SSBN is obviously not enough for the second strike in a full scale nuclear war.

 

[SEAD]

What exactly is your argument? Because you seems to be contradicting yourself when you suggest decoys and ECM as a counter to OTH radars, except that the existence of decoys and ECM would reveal the presence of an attack, thus preventing the hypothetically B-2/21 from successfully performing the first strike.

The problem is about false positive, not false negative. If you find thousands of targets in your radar screen twice a week, you will never launch your missile basing on this warning system. Again, that’s all about how much can you trust the warning, not about “can detect”.

could we go back to the OBS hypothesis? I would be happy to hear any criticism about that rather than teaching an undergraduate subject.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

The problem is about false positive, not false negative. If you find thousands of targets in your radar screen twice a week, you will never launch your missile basing on this warning system. Again, that’s all about how much can you trust the warning, not about “can detect”.

could we go back to the OBS hypothesis? I would be happy to hear any criticism about that rather than teaching an undergraduate subject.

That's something I can comment on. No. It takes the same energy loss to deorbit an object as it did to put the object there in orbit, minus drag.

Ordinary ICBM warheads are not in orbit. Their trajectory intersects with the earth. An orbital warhead must change it's trajectory from one not intersecting earth to one that does. That requires an engine.

So instead of launching just a warhead you must launch an engine and fuel (1000 kg for even a small engine, no fuel) with sufficient delta V to deorbit the warhead, a positioning system, and the warhead itself.

Much less energy is required for a non orbital trajectory than an orbital one. Much less energy is required for an orbital trajectory than one that goes to orbit then deorbits controllably.

 

[Jason_]

The problem is about false positive, not false negative. If you find thousands of targets in your radar screen twice a week,

Why would you find thousands of targets in your radar screen twice a week? The airspace near the missile silos are restricted.

you will never launch your missile basing on this warning system.

No one said launching the missile. The warning system passes the information to other radars, air defenses, interceptor squadrons, etc. for the next stages of verification.

could we go back to the OBS hypothesis? I would be happy to hear any criticism about that rather than teaching an undergraduate subject.

No because your hypothesis that China's silo houses FOBS is entirely based on the wildly speculatively claim that US bombers can bypass China's early warning system. Thus, refuting the claim that US bombers can bypass China early warning system simultaneously refutes the hypothesis that the silos houses FOBS.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

Why would you find thousands of targets in your radar screen twice a week? The airspace near the missile silos are restricted.

No one said launching the missile. The warning system passes the information to other radars, air defenses, interceptor squadrons, etc. for the next stages of verification.

No because your hypothesis that China's silo houses FOBS is entirely based on the wildly speculatively claim that US bombers can bypass China's early warning system. Thus, refuting the claim that US bombers can bypass China early warning system simultaneously refutes the hypothesis that the silos houses FOBS.

FOBS is possible because you can launch it at the lowest energy orbit and then apply a small retrograde burn to deorbit, using a relatively small. You don't worry about drag destabilizing the orbit. It still vastly reduces payload relative to standard warhead.

A full OBS for long term warhead storage on the scale of decades much more difficult.