China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[Kabir]

This is why it is meaningless to engage in debate with people living in fantasy world.

We can't strike north Korea because Seoul is in range of their artillery, have you ever looked at a map?

USA allowed itself to become a nuclear strike target because they were worried about South Koreans?

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Do western people think rest of the world is as dumb as them? Or they play plain stupid dumb to irritate others?
This conversation is over.

 

[VioletsForSpring]

This is why it is meaningless to engage in debate with people living in fantasy world.

USA allowed itself to become a nuclear strike target because they were worried about South Koreans?

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Do western people think rest of the world is as dumb as them? Or they play plain stupid dumb to irritate others?
This conversation is over.

No, we invested heavily into BMD to prevent singular north Korean ICBMS as a response to the furthering nuclear program. Nothing in that article goes against what I said anyway.

 

[plawolf]

I think there is a difference between our lines of thinking.

I believe that maintaining equal MAD/MV and ensuring MAD/MV is the fundamental basis of all other strategies that China may pursue.

When has China ever had have equal MAD against the US? How can it be the fundamental basis of all other strategies when China never before had that capability?

China is expanding its nuclear deterrent because it feels minimal credible deterrence is no longer sufficient to guarantee deterrence. However, there is a massive spectrum between minimum credible deterrence and guarantee MAD, and frankly I don’t think you need full MAD to be able to effectively deter the US from reckless nuclear adventurism.

That is to say that while I am no longer confident that the answer will always be ‘no’ if the US is asked if it is worth it to trade LA for China; I do think that it is not unreasonable to think that the answer will remain always ‘no’ when the price is higher but still far lower than ‘the destruction of every American city’. Precisely how many American cities is too many will be a matter of fierce debate and will probably be a moving target that increases as Chinese national power does. However, right now and for the next generation at least, I find it hard to believe any US leader would accept the destruction of the top 100 US cities. Which is basically what China’s new silo fields should be able to achieve, even with BMD and a US first strike.

In that sense, it absolutely makes sense to put its best card (i.e.: IC-HGV) in a mission where maintaining MAD/MV is its initial, most important primary role.

Once they are capable of maintaining that MAD/MV, then other missions for the IC-HGV can gradually open up as the strategic and geopolitical environment requires it.

The problem is that if you start off with it in a nuclear role, you effectively taint it with that role. Thereby massively increase the risks of misunderstandings if and when you do use them in a conventional role.

If the other side says they consider any use of IC-HGVs as a nuclear first strike even after you said you removed the nuclear warheads from them, it puts pressure and risk on you for when you want to actual use these in a conventional way.

Sure, you can always call their bluff, but when the costs of getting it wrong are so high, do you really want to increase the risks by even the smallest bit?

I've been fairly consistent in saying I believe the primary and most important role of the IC-HGV is to ensure and guarantee MAD/MV.

And I have always said that it was not needed to archived guaranteed MAD.

China’s new silo fields alone would be more than enough to achieve MAD against existing US BMD. Unless and until the US starts to build new BMD interceptor fields with thousands of interceptors, China doesn’t need anything more to achieve MAD. H20 and 096s are the back ups and safety margin. Throwing IC-HGVs into that mix is just massive overkill and a waste of China’s only conventional strike option against CONUS targets

I cannot see how the conditions and prerequisites for the PLA to be willing to use those weapons is not equally as important as being willing to use those weapons or even possessing those weapons in the first place.

They are important, but frankly immaterial to the nature of this debate. I see IC-HGVs as being used as deterrence and retaliation weapons against the US trying to use the cover of any military conflict to cause damage to China’s civilian infrastructure that fall well short of China’s nuclear retaliation threshold, as has been every clearly and precisely spelled out in its NFU policy.

The precise trigger point for their use is not relevant to the argument that they should be used for conventional strike as opposed to being relegated to the strategic nuclear arsenal, where to be frank, they will never ever be actually used, because that’s the best and only sane outcome when it comes to nuclear weapons.

I expect the new ICBM fields may reach near full intended capacity in 10 years, I expect initial operationalized IC-HGVs to enter service in limited numbers perhaps in 5-8 years.

I expect reliable MAD/MV to be attained in 10-15 years.
By procuring a limited number of IC-HGVs that are technologically mature, they are capable of ensuring MAD and pre-empting any systems that the US may pursue to provide a more hard counter to PLA ICBMs and placing equivalent MAD/MV into doubt.

Good, our timeline expectations are not wildly off. But I think where we differ is in what is needed to achieve effective deterrence, how important that is and future proofing priorities.

While you seem to think only guaranteed full MAD will do, and needs to be achieved today. I just don’t see it. Far from it in fact.

China is not really threatening anything expect American homogeny. It makes zero sense for America to launch a nuclear war of pure choice against China to preserve US homogeny only to come out with a handful of cities still not glassed.

Nuclear war against China only makes sense for America if it comes out of it with China destroyed but America still the most powerful country on the planet. Loosing LA would be acceptable, loosing even the top 10 US cities would not.

As for future proofing, well as I said, that is what the H20 and 096 SSBNs are for. With more silo fields always an option.

Unless and until the US starts to massively expanded its BMD capabilities in proportion to the size and scale of China’s silo field increase, BMD is an irrelevance given the scale of China’s conventional nuclear expansion.

And to be frank, even if China wants to use IC-HGVs for nuclear delivery, it would still makes absolute sense for China start with them as conventional only. Because it is in China’s best interest to want the US to massively expand its BMD because that is an arms race that massively favours China, and because Chinese IC-HGVs will totally invalidate US BMD, so they more resources they sink into that the better.

For strategic weapons systems, foreign intelligence/military reports are actually not a bad metric.

Least bad =\= good.

That, with a combination of Chinese credible rumour sources +/- state media hints, give us a fair assessment -- and is also the same way we currently use to assess Chinese strategic weapons systems readiness.

And what state media hints have been given that IC-HGV will be nuclear armed?

 

[ougoah]

When has China ever had have equal MAD against the US? How can it be the fundamental basis of all other strategies when China never before had that capability?

China is expanding its nuclear deterrent because it feels minimal credible deterrence is no longer sufficient to guarantee deterrence. However, there is a massive spectrum between minimum credible deterrence and guarantee MAD, and frankly I don’t think you need full MAD to be able to effectively deter the US from reckless nuclear adventurism.

That is to say that while I am no longer confident that the answer will always be ‘no’ if the US is asked if it is worth it to trade LA for China; I do think that it is not unreasonable to think that the answer will remain always ‘no’ when the price is higher but still far lower than ‘the destruction of every American city’. Precisely how many American cities is too many will be a matter of fierce debate and will probably be a moving target that increases as Chinese national power does. However, right now and for the next generation at least, I find it hard to believe any US leader would accept the destruction of the top 100 US cities. Which is basically what China’s new silo fields should be able to achieve, even with BMD and a US first strike.


The problem is that if you start off with it in a nuclear role, you effectively taint it with that role. Thereby massively increase the risks of misunderstandings if and when you do use them in a conventional role.

If the other side says they consider any use of IC-HGVs as a nuclear first strike even after you said you removed the nuclear warheads from them, it puts pressure and risk on you for when you want to actual use these in a conventional way.

Sure, you can always call their bluff, but when the costs of getting it wrong are so high, do you really want to increase the risks by even the smallest bit?

And I have always said that it was not needed to archived guaranteed MAD.

China’s new silo fields alone would be more than enough to achieve MAD against existing US BMD. Unless and until the US starts to build new BMD interceptor fields with thousands of interceptors, China doesn’t need anything more to achieve MAD. H20 and 096s are the back ups and safety margin. Throwing IC-HGVs into that mix is just massive overkill and a waste of China’s only conventional strike option against CONUS targets



They are important, but frankly immaterial to the nature of this debate. I see IC-HGVs as being used as deterrence and retaliation weapons against the US trying to use the cover of any military conflict to cause damage to China’s civilian infrastructure that fall well short of China’s nuclear retaliation threshold, as has been every clearly and precisely spelled out in its NFU policy.

The precise trigger point for their use is not relevant to the argument that they should be used for conventional strike as opposed to being relegated to the strategic nuclear arsenal, where to be frank, they will never ever be actually used, because that’s the best and only sane outcome when it comes to nuclear weapons.


Good, our timeline expectations are not wildly off. But I think where we differ is in what is needed to achieve effective deterrence, how important that is and future proofing priorities.

While you seem to think only guaranteed full MAD will do, and needs to be achieved today. I just don’t see it. Far from it in fact.

China is not really threatening anything expect American homogeny. It makes zero sense for America to launch a nuclear war of pure choice against China to preserve US homogeny only to come out with a handful of cities still not glassed.

Nuclear war against China only makes sense for America if it comes out of it with China destroyed but America still the most powerful country on the planet. Loosing LA would be acceptable, loosing even the top 10 US cities would not.

As for future proofing, well as I said, that is what the H20 and 096 SSBNs are for. With more silo fields always an option.

Unless and until the US starts to massively expanded its BMD capabilities in proportion to the size and scale of China’s silo field increase, BMD is an irrelevance given the scale of China’s conventional nuclear expansion.

And to be frank, even if China wants to use IC-HGVs for nuclear delivery, it would still makes absolute sense for China start with them as conventional only. Because it is in China’s best interest to want the US to massively expand its BMD because that is an arms race that massively favours China, and because Chinese IC-HGVs will totally invalidate US BMD, so they more resources they sink into that the better.

Least bad =\= good.

And what state media hints have been given that IC-HGV will be nuclear armed?

You do make some compelling points.

It comes down to the actual status of these factors mentioned and the price of building massive reserves of LM or whatever boosters IC HGVs.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

Then you should be taking a more minimalist/pessimistic position, which will allow you to appreciate the capabilities that the PLA would need to ensure victory.

I don't mean "maximalist" in an optimistic sense as in I always think things will go China's way, or that it will make sixes on every roll - I mean it in the sense of what you would consider the most brazen, reckless, even psychotic actions (I should state that they are none of these things, but they might appear so at first glance). For instance, I think the BMD radars should be hit on day one of the conflict when China has suffered no losses whatsoever. To use a chess analogy, hitting the BMD with IC-HGVs is 1.e4; it's the opening move.

Why do I advocate such a provocative step? To make sure American decisionmakers understand right off the bat that they have no shield. Not even a crappy imaginary one. Any kind of nuclear escalation or blackmail on their part is only going to end one way for them. America should also understand that nothing it has is sacrosanct, and that if it dares to hit China's homeland then it's going to suffer grievous losses in turn.

Of course, China needs full MAD for this to function, so I don't advocate adopting my policies in the near term. My thinking and strategies are for 2035+. What I advocate for China dealing with a conflict between now and then is not to get into one.

In the interest of clarity, I'll state the assumptions I make about the timeframe I consider:
1. China will continue reasonable economic growth between now and 2035, comfortably meeting President Xi's stated goal of doubling the economy between now and then (an implied average rate of growth per annum of 4.7%). China will then have an economy of $53.2 trillion in PPP. Even keeping the 1.4% of GDP China spends on defense, that's the equivalent of $745 billion in today's money.
2. China's military modernization will continue between now and then. I expect the PLAN 6 aircraft carriers by then, with their attendant escort fleets (I go by your estimate). 500+ J-20s and 300+ J-XYs. A lot more DF-26s, DF-17s, and other theatre ballistic missiles, the nuclear submarine yard at Huludao cranking out at full steam, etc. I expect that by 2035, China will be able to win a full-scale conventional war against the US and its allies in the western Pacific with at least 50/50 odds.
3. By 2035, I expect China to deploy at least as many strategic nuclear warheads as the US and Russia do (~1,500) in various modes (silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs) and have a fully developed LoW system. I don't expect H-20s to carry strategic weapons - I expect its role to be confined to conventional and tactical nuclear bombardment. I expect China will have a significantly smaller reserve of non-deployed warheads than the US or Russia.

I think these are quite conservative assumptions. I've even rolled a couple of ones there (1.4% of GDP on defense remains unchanged, no wild buildup of Chinese nuclear weapons like the US and USSR did during the '50s and '60s). At that time I think it's reasonable to assume that China will change its NFU to NFU* - no first use of strategic nuclear weapons and a much lower threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

I wrote about a number of things, including US alliances, US nuclear posture, US countermeasures, and that trying to account for all of them together would be difficult and cannot reasonably allow us to project at this point in time, the extent and degree of success of Chinese MAD/MV over the given period of time needed to achieve it.

I think it's ultimately a question of money and cumulative investment in military capabilities. While specifics are impossible to discern, I think the scenario I gave above (especially the economic one) indicates that China's relative position by 2035 will be vastly superior to the one it has today.

While I don't know what policies the CMC of 2035+ will adopt, I know that doctrines to effectively employ burgeoning Chinese capabilities and degrade American ones exist: I stated them.

If you are suggesting that China would be willing to use a IC-HGV tactical nuke in a first nuclear use strike against CONTUS (even "only" military targets), that is a significant degree of escalation even higher than the idea of using IC-HGVs in a conventional role and is frankly so far beyond what we can model I don't even know how to approach it.

Approach it with the same mindset America approached the problem of deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe following WWII. It knew it didn't have any means of doing it conventionally, so it decided to use tactical nuclear weapons to offset this deficiency. Likewise, China has no means of attacking the US conventionally with anywhere near the volume the US can attack China because of its proximate bases - so in addition to destroying those bases, China should offset this asymmetry with tactical nuclear weapons. Yes, really, first use of tactical nuclear weapons on American soil. American soil is not sacrosanct.

And no, not only strictly military targets, but dual use civilian/military infrastructure as well. Basically, whatever type of target America thinks is permissible to strike in China.

 

[AndrewS]

Approach it with the same mindset America approached the problem of deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe following WWII. It knew it didn't have any means of doing it conventionally, so it decided to use tactical nuclear weapons to offset this deficiency. Likewise, China has no means of attacking the US conventionally with anywhere near the volume the US can attack China because of its proximate bases - so in addition to destroying those bases, China should offset this asymmetry with tactical nuclear weapons. Yes, really, first use of tactical nuclear weapons on American soil. American soil is not sacrosanct.

And no, not only strictly military targets, but dual use civilian/military infrastructure as well. Basically, whatever type of target America thinks is permissible to strike in China.

After China has enough weapons for MAD (with some combination of ICBMs and IC-HGVs), I think it is credible for China to threaten a proportional response against the US homeland, if mainland China is attacked.

And that would include tactical nukes as well as conventional nukes
The US would have no choice but to honour that stated Chinese nuclear doctrine

There's a reason why the US military is very careful about avoiding a direct conflict with the Russian military

 

[Blitzo]

When has China ever had have equal MAD against the US? How can it be the fundamental basis of all other strategies when China never before had that capability?

China is expanding its nuclear deterrent because it feels minimal credible deterrence is no longer sufficient to guarantee deterrence. However, there is a massive spectrum between minimum credible deterrence and guarantee MAD, and frankly I don’t think you need full MAD to be able to effectively deter the US from reckless nuclear adventurism.

That is to say that while I am no longer confident that the answer will always be ‘no’ if the US is asked if it is worth it to trade LA for China; I do think that it is not unreasonable to think that the answer will remain always ‘no’ when the price is higher but still far lower than ‘the destruction of every American city’. Precisely how many American cities is too many will be a matter of fierce debate and will probably be a moving target that increases as Chinese national power does. However, right now and for the next generation at least, I find it hard to believe any US leader would accept the destruction of the top 100 US cities. Which is basically what China’s new silo fields should be able to achieve, even with BMD and a US first strike.

China has never had equal MAD against the US, which is my entire point.
I feel like we've missed some kind of vital step here.

Let me explain my thoughts.
Premise 1: all geopolitical and strategic doctrine and the options available to a nation depends on a variety of factors, one of which is the state of the nuclear doctrine and capability they have.

Premise 2: China's nuclear capability and doctrine that they sought to pursue, was one of relative "minimal deterrence" until about the mid 2010s. In other words, China's geopolitical and strategic doctrine and options (i.e.: including the ability to match escalation in conflict, and the way in which they could conduct conventional warfare and/or hypothetical conventional strikes against CONTUS) was limited by the doctrine and capability of their nuclear forces.

Premise 3: Some time in the mid 2010s, a decision was made to significantly increase the capability of their nuclear forces and also adjust their doctrine, the physical evidence of which we are starting to see now. That expansion of their nuclear forces and the adjustment of their nuclear doctrine, is most likely a desire to achieve something approaching that of MAD/MV with regards to the US -- which is a strategic balance that China has never had with the US before. By attaining MAD/MV (which they previously did not have), their scope for overall geopolitical and strategic doctrine and options available to them will greatly increase.

Premise 4: After attaining MAD/MV, China would likely seek to also maintain MAD/MV to ensure that the state of MAD/MV cannot be effectively countered. That is where I believe the IC-HGV comes in, as the greatest risk to an increased PLA ICBM force is if the US chooses to embark on a herculean effort to build a credible and viable BMD force against ICBMs, which could reduce the efficacy of PLA ICBMs to such an extent that equal MAD/MV is put into doubt. Therefore, pursuing IC-HGVs are a hedge to ensure that the newly attained MAD/MV is maintained.

The problem is that if you start off with it in a nuclear role, you effectively taint it with that role. Thereby massively increase the risks of misunderstandings if and when you do use them in a conventional role.

If the other side says they consider any use of IC-HGVs as a nuclear first strike even after you said you removed the nuclear warheads from them, it puts pressure and risk on you for when you want to actual use these in a conventional way.

Sure, you can always call their bluff, but when the costs of getting it wrong are so high, do you really want to increase the risks by even the smallest bit?

And I have always said that it was not needed to archived guaranteed MAD.

China’s new silo fields alone would be more than enough to achieve MAD against existing US BMD. Unless and until the US starts to build new BMD interceptor fields with thousands of interceptors, China doesn’t need anything more to achieve MAD. H20 and 096s are the back ups and safety margin. Throwing IC-HGVs into that mix is just massive overkill and a waste of China’s only conventional strike option against CONUS targets

Isn't this a bit of a chicken and egg question?

You think that it is more important for the IC-HGV to be capable of being used in a conventional role, and therefore it is too risky to be used in a nuclear role.
I think it is more important for the IC-HGV to be used in a nuclear role first to ensure MAD/MV can be maintained, and any other roles for it becomes secondary.

They are important, but frankly immaterial to the nature of this debate. I see IC-HGVs as being used as deterrence and retaliation weapons against the US trying to use the cover of any military conflict to cause damage to China’s civilian infrastructure that fall well short of China’s nuclear retaliation threshold, as has been every clearly and precisely spelled out in its NFU policy.

The precise trigger point for their use is not relevant to the argument that they should be used for conventional strike as opposed to being relegated to the strategic nuclear arsenal, where to be frank, they will never ever be actually used, because that’s the best and only sane outcome when it comes to nuclear weapons.

The ability of the US to conduct large scale conventional strikes against China is a massive advantage that they will not relinquish just because China has a number of conventional IC-HGVs capable of striking CONTUS.

Good, our timeline expectations are not wildly off. But I think where we differ is in what is needed to achieve effective deterrence, how important that is and future proofing priorities.

While you seem to think only guaranteed full MAD will do, and needs to be achieved today. I just don’t see it. Far from it in fact.

China is not really threatening anything expect American homogeny. It makes zero sense for America to launch a nuclear war of pure choice against China to preserve US homogeny only to come out with a handful of cities still not glassed.

Nuclear war against China only makes sense for America if it comes out of it with China destroyed but America still the most powerful country on the planet. Loosing LA would be acceptable, loosing even the top 10 US cities would not.

As for future proofing, well as I said, that is what the H20 and 096 SSBNs are for. With more silo fields always an option.

Unless and until the US starts to massively expanded its BMD capabilities in proportion to the size and scale of China’s silo field increase, BMD is an irrelevance given the scale of China’s conventional nuclear expansion.

And to be frank, even if China wants to use IC-HGVs for nuclear delivery, it would still makes absolute sense for China start with them as conventional only. Because it is in China’s best interest to want the US to massively expand its BMD because that is an arms race that massively favours China, and because Chinese IC-HGVs will totally invalidate US BMD, so they more resources they sink into that the better.

I'm not saying that "guaranteed full MAD" needs to be achieved today, rather I am saying that China is seeking "guaranteed full MAD" to be attained sometime in the near future, and they desire the increase array of strategic options that it will provide for them once they achieve it, as well as the ability to ensure they continue to enjoy the benefits of "guaranteed full MAD" -- which is why the IC-HGV is being developed, primarily as a hedge against risks of US countermeasures against the enlargement of their conventional ICBM force.

The four premises I laid out at the beginning of the post are basically the long and short of my position.

Least bad =\= good.

Well it's the same metric we've been using to estimate Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities for decades now, so it's the best we have, which is frankly the same principle we use to do PLA watching as a whole.

And what state media hints have been given that IC-HGV will be nuclear armed?

State media has not even given hints that the weapon is an IC-HGV or even a weapon, they are claiming it's a hypersonic vehicle.
The whole discussion about whether it will be nuclear armed or conventionally armed is all a discussion that we are having.

 

[Blitzo]

I don't mean "maximalist" in an optimistic sense as in I always think things will go China's way, or that it will make sixes on every roll - I mean it in the sense of what you would consider the most brazen, reckless, even psychotic actions (I should state that they are none of these things, but they might appear so at first glance). For instance, I think the BMD radars should be hit on day one of the conflict when China has suffered no losses whatsoever. To use a chess analogy, hitting the BMD with IC-HGVs is 1.e4; it's the opening move.

Why do I advocate such a provocative step? To make sure American decisionmakers understand right off the bat that they have no shield. Not even a crappy imaginary one. Any kind of nuclear escalation or blackmail on their part is only going to end one way for them. America should also understand that nothing it has is sacrosanct, and that if it dares to hit China's homeland then it's going to suffer grievous losses in turn.

Of course, China needs full MAD for this to function, so I don't advocate adopting my policies in the near term. My thinking and strategies are for 2035+. What I advocate for China dealing with a conflict between now and then is not to get into one.

In the interest of clarity, I'll state the assumptions I make about the timeframe I consider:
1. China will continue reasonable economic growth between now and 2035, comfortably meeting President Xi's stated goal of doubling the economy between now and then (an implied average rate of growth per annum of 4.7%). China will then have an economy of $53.2 trillion in PPP. Even keeping the 1.4% of GDP China spends on defense, that's the equivalent of $745 billion in today's money.
2. China's military modernization will continue between now and then. I expect the PLAN 6 aircraft carriers by then, with their attendant escort fleets (I go by your estimate). 500+ J-20s and 300+ J-XYs. A lot more DF-26s, DF-17s, and other theatre ballistic missiles, the nuclear submarine yard at Huludao cranking out at full steam, etc. I expect that by 2035, China will be able to win a full-scale conventional war against the US and its allies in the western Pacific with at least 50/50 odds.
3. By 2035, I expect China to deploy at least as many strategic nuclear warheads as the US and Russia do (~1,500) in various modes (silo-based and road-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs) and have a fully developed LoW system. I don't expect H-20s to carry strategic weapons - I expect its role to be confined to conventional and tactical nuclear bombardment. I expect China will have a significantly smaller reserve of non-deployed warheads than the US or Russia.

I think these are quite conservative assumptions. I've even rolled a couple of ones there (1.4% of GDP on defense remains unchanged, no wild buildup of Chinese nuclear weapons like the US and USSR did during the '50s and '60s). At that time I think it's reasonable to assume that China will change its NFU to NFU* - no first use of strategic nuclear weapons and a much lower threshold for the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

I think it's ultimately a question of money and cumulative investment in military capabilities. While specifics are impossible to discern, I think the scenario I gave above (especially the economic one) indicates that China's relative position by 2035 will be vastly superior to the one it has today.

While I don't know what policies the CMC of 2035+ will adopt, I know that doctrines to effectively employ burgeoning Chinese capabilities and degrade American ones exist: I stated them.

Approach it with the same mindset America approached the problem of deterring a Soviet invasion of Europe following WWII. It knew it didn't have any means of doing it conventionally, so it decided to use tactical nuclear weapons to offset this deficiency. Likewise, China has no means of attacking the US conventionally with anywhere near the volume the US can attack China because of its proximate bases - so in addition to destroying those bases, China should offset this asymmetry with tactical nuclear weapons. Yes, really, first use of tactical nuclear weapons on American soil. American soil is not sacrosanct.

And no, not only strictly military targets, but dual use civilian/military infrastructure as well. Basically, whatever type of target America thinks is permissible to strike in China.

If everything you described in the last few pages is meant to reflect an intention for what the role of the IC-HGV is in 2035 and is dependent on MAD/MV being achieve first, then I refer back to my previous post -- let's wait to see if they can achieve MAD/MV first, in that time frame.

That itself is a pretty big six roll you have assumed to begin with.

The entire reason I believe the use of the IC-HGV will be primarily intended for strategic nuclear delivery as its first role, is entirely because I believe that in 2035, there could be systems developed that may meaningfully mitigate the effectiveness their newly built fleet of conventional ICBMs, and that they have developed IC-HGV as a way to hedge against it.
Continuing this dice roll analogy, I believe the development of the IC-HGV at this stage is a means of ensuring MAD/MV can be achieved/continued, if by 2035 the PLA's increased ICBM force rolls a "one" or a "two" in terms of its ability to effectively achieve MAD/MV.

 

[Suetham]

Not the full report but the translate of this page is about HGV

"AG organic defences provides formidable AA capabilities, with USAF/SF assets allowing detection and elimination of friendly ships and planes before releasing weapons on top of directing other assets to protect the Group, notably E-2 Hawkeyes and AEGIS ships. To strike at AA ships in the group, one must first penetrate the CAP. Within the terminal guidance phase, interception missiles can predict the paths of and destroy HGVs, thus an emphasis is put on improving HGV maneuverability and minimizing hostile prediction accuracy and interception rates. The HGV's movement timing can be calculated according to the flight envelope of the interceptor and data on earlier enemy interception. That last bit talks about the growing challenge CAG defence is and how the coordinated nature allows maximum destruction while..."

This concept of going beyond the CAP to accomplish target assignment is incorrect. A CSG has its rear area fully exposed, because the fighters and the E-2D act on the CVN's front lines, the 400 km range defensive bubble is provided by the Aegis ships, and another 30 km bubble around of CVN providing another layer of defense, this is the terminal phase. At most, a CAP would have a 180° view in front of it, so a long-range recon drone could bypass that CAP's line of sight at high altitude and penetrate the CSG's rear and provide firing solution for the ballistic missiles Chinese. The Soviets used a similar strategy, using anti-ship missile bombers penetrating the rear of a CSG.

 

[FairAndUnbiased]

No, we invested heavily into BMD to prevent singular north Korean ICBMS as a response to the furthering nuclear program. Nothing in that article goes against what I said anyway.

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and has already expended 10+ ICBMs in tests alone within the past 4 years. It seems like North Korea settled on Hwasong-15 as their mainstream 10000+ km class road mobile missile.

I'd estimate that they have at least 30 ICBMs and 10 IRBMs.