China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[FairAndUnbiased]

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Still 350. There's a bunch of questionable assumptions like JL-2 is unitary, and DF-41 is only 3x MIRV. Don't know what to conclude besides China's count is already higher, probably more like 450 or something already.

I analyzed this before. I pointed out that they still count DF-4 and H-6 dumb bombs which they've admitted was data from the 70s written in reports from the 90s.

 

[Temstar]

I analyzed this before. I pointed out that they still count DF-4 and H-6 dumb bombs which they've admitted was data from the 70s written in reports from the 90s.

Hmmm... does that mean it also include the KB-1 tactical hydrogen bomb?

 

[clockwork]

Hans is, along with SFA Agent Chang, serving in silence. Remember, China always has 350 warheads by definition

I'm starting to think this is true lmao. Their own subtotals are literally higher in part due to the 2 new 094s but they refuse to update the total. The arms control types are so desperate to sandbag things they'll even ignore arithmetic I guess.

How true is their estimate that the new fields will be operational at 2025 the earliest though? I was hoping for at least most of those silos to be filled and a LOW posture beginning to be implemented by the end of 2023 at the latest.

 

[clockwork]

At Jilantai

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1461156381399019520

Also how come nobody's replying to this? Seemed pretty huge to me, so they're basically acknowledging those silos, not trying to hide them at all anymore. And did we know PLARF units based in Jilantai were fielding the 41 already or is that an additional revelation?

 

[Temstar]

@Deino

 

[Temstar]

I'm starting to think this is true lmao. Their own subtotals are literally higher in part due to the 2 new 094s but they refuse to update the total. The arms control types are so desperate to sandbag things they'll even ignore arithmetic I guess.

How true is their estimate that the new fields will be operational at 2025 the earliest though? I was hoping for at least most of those silos to be filled and a LOW posture beginning to be implemented by the end of 2023 at the latest.

The JL-2 comment got me curious so I grabbed the chart from this year and last for a side by side comparison:

2020:



2021:

The numbers in bracket means in the process of entering service but not yet operational. So here you can see what they did is they just took last years DF-41 and JL-2 numbers and said "yep, they're in service now, look at how accurate we were last year". As far as they are concerned China added 78 new warheads + launch vehicles into operational status.

Dubious assumptions aside, for 2021 they then didn't provide any estimate for upcoming weapons such as the silo based DF-41 or any new ALBM other than "it's coming". For silo based DF-41 the year 2025 is quoted, which I believe is also the figure quoted by the congress report not long ago (in which it said China will have 800 warheads in 2025 and 1000 in 2027).

 

[Blitzo]

Because it is my deeply held belief that those are the methods that will bring China victory.

Then you should be taking a more minimalist/pessimistic position, which will allow you to appreciate the capabilities that the PLA would need to ensure victory.
By taking a maximalist position, you are assuming that the PLA will roll a "six" every time for every strategic decision and weapons procurement that they make, and assuming that in the real world, that would be the case.
Instead, if you took a more neutral position (the equivalent of rolling a three or four), or a minimalist/pessimistic position (rolling a one), you would recognize the requisite capabilities they would need to ensure victory even if their strategic decisions and weapons procurements don't end up as successful as they intended.

Avoid adopting positions where you can "achieve victory" and instead think about realistic ways in which defeat or failure may emerge instead. Don't get comfortable.

That is to say, think about what capabilities one would need to be capable of achieving victory even if one rolls only "two" or "three" (or even a "one") every time. The more you do so, the higher the guarantee of victory.

If the nuclear dynamics were strictly bilateral, i.e., if it were just the US and China I would give this point more weight. But as I mentioned previously, Russia has been roped into this whether it likes it or not (and I suspect it's the latter). Russia's response is a significant (I would even say severe) constraining factor in America's reaction to China's buildup. Although Russia isn't exactly rolling in money these days and would be loathe to go on a major buildup of its own, it's perfectly capable of doing so given its vast nuclear industry and massive stockpile of fissile material.

I doubt America wants to play a game where every new warhead it builds is matched by a new Russian and a new Chinese one.

See what I wrote above about rolling sixes and ones.

Seems reasonable, although I would put it closer to 10 than 15. On the subject, have you heard anything recently about the DF-45?

I don't expect it to emerge in the earliest service-able state until 2030, and naturally would take a number of years for a large number of them to be built.

Writing what I advocate China do to US allies who involve themselves in a war between the US and China would probably violate the rules of the forum. But at this point I'm sure it's not hard to guess.

Given the rapidly escalating costs US allies would pay if they helped the US, I'm dubious of the view that they would intensify their alliance with America. I have the old-fashioned view that the most important factor a country considers when it thinks about going to war is whether or not it's going to win. US allies doubt more with each passing day that they're on the winning side - if I were them I would start looking for the exits.

I wrote about a number of things, including US alliances, US nuclear posture, US countermeasures, and that trying to account for all of them together would be difficult and cannot reasonably allow us to project at this point in time, the extent and degree of success of Chinese MAD/MV over the given period of time needed to achieve it.

I agree that conventional IC-HGV strikes against the US is a quaint idea, which is why I don't advocate it. I have a 1 kiloton minimum on an IC-HGV - that's just price of admission. A conventionally armed IC-HGV is a pea shooter.

If you are suggesting that China would be willing to use a IC-HGV tactical nuke in a first nuclear use strike against CONTUS (even "only" military targets), that is a significant degree of escalation even higher than the idea of using IC-HGVs in a conventional role and is frankly so far beyond what we can model I don't even know how to approach it.

 

[clockwork]

I don't expect it to emerge in the earliest service-able state until 2030

What's the basis of this assessment, why would it take China so long to develop such a missile or build silos intended for them now if so? I really don't think it'll be any trouble for China to simply enlarge the DF-41.
I also heard a Chinese superheavy solid fueled orbital booster

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, immediate thought was if it could be adapted for silos in an ICBM role.

 

[Blitzo]

The counter to the US pursuing a more robust BDM capability is more conventional ICBMs, not IC-HGV.

That is because the economics and physics involved makes an arms race between ICBM and BMD massively favours the ICBMs.

That is the kind of arms race China would gladly get into with the US. And I think this shift in power dynamics is something very few people are grasping. China isn’t afraid to go into direct, head-to-head competition with the US anymore, and will actively push the US into such direct competition where China holds the advantage.

Yes, China holds a trump card in IC-HGV, but when would it play that as its opening hand, before any chips are even on the table; when instead it can keep that back and bait the US into piling more and more chips in first?

I think there is a difference between our lines of thinking.

I believe that maintaining equal MAD/MV and ensuring MAD/MV is the fundamental basis of all other strategies that China may pursue.
In that sense, it absolutely makes sense to put its best card (i.e.: IC-HGV) in a mission where maintaining MAD/MV is its initial, most important primary role.

Once they are capable of maintaining that MAD/MV, then other missions for the IC-HGV can gradually open up as the strategic and geopolitical environment requires it.
I've been fairly consistent in saying I believe the primary and most important role of the IC-HGV is to ensure and guarantee MAD/MV.

You seem to be missing the point that the whole game is to be vague about such things to maximise deterrence.

The only thing China may make clear is that it’s IC-HGVs are not nuclear armed. Beyond that, it will maintain a deliberate policy of strategic ambiguity about precisely what the trigger point for China launching them at CONUS will be.

Personally, I think China will use them if the UA starts to go after civilian infrastructure to dissuade future such attacks. But will not launch even if targets on mainland China are hit, so long as those targets are purely military. However, by not making that clear, there is a decent chance the US military would hold off from even trying to hit purely military targets on mainland China for fear of triggering an escalation that will see critical targets on CONUS hit.
You seem to be getting stuck on semantics. It doesn’t matter what the precise trigger point is for China to use such weapons conventionally. The only thing that matters is that China had a credible means of hitting targets on CONUS with such weapons.

A core part of that credibility criteria involves being willing and able to use said weapons, and that is precisely what you loose if you make them nuclear. Since then you are not just choosing to strike at targets on CONUS, you are also crossing the nuclear threshold.

I cannot see how the conditions and prerequisites for the PLA to be willing to use those weapons is not equally as important as being willing to use those weapons or even possessing those weapons in the first place.

China’s new ICBM silo fields will be operational before IC-HGVs

I must ask then, just when do you think the new silo fields would become operational and when do you think the same for IC-HGVs?

I expect the new ICBM fields may reach near full intended capacity in 10 years, I expect initial operationalized IC-HGVs to enter service in limited numbers perhaps in 5-8 years.

I expect reliable MAD/MV to be attained in 10-15 years.
By procuring a limited number of IC-HGVs that are technologically mature, they are capable of ensuring MAD and pre-empting any systems that the US may pursue to provide a more hard counter to PLA ICBMs and placing equivalent MAD/MV into doubt.

And just how do you expect to get evidence for any of those conditions you set out?

For strategic weapons systems, foreign intelligence/military reports are actually not a bad metric.
That, with a combination of Chinese credible rumour sources +/- state media hints, give us a fair assessment -- and is also the same way we currently use to assess Chinese strategic weapons systems readiness.

 

[Blitzo]

What's the basis of this assessment, why would it take China so long to develop such a missile or build silos intended for them now if so? I really don't think it'll be any trouble for China to simply enlarge the DF-41.
I also heard a Chinese superheavy solid fueled orbital booster

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, immediate thought was if it could be adapted for silos in an ICBM role.

That's like saying DF-41 is "just" an enlarged DF-31A.

It's a new ICBM, and significantly heavier than DF-41, and it will take time for it to be developed, and put into service. 10 years is fairly reasonable to go through all of the requisite and necessary tests.