China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread

[AndrewS]

I would not use the supposed accuracy of the first test as a measure for how accurate the operational system is intended to be.

After all, as the first flight test, it very well may have only needed to be accurate enough to be recovered in a practical manner.

Yes, it is only the 1st test, so we should expect to see a vast improvement in accuracy

I would not be surprised if the eventual operational system was accurate enough to be used as a conventional non-nuclear weapon, even though its most likely primary payload would be a strategic nuclear weapon.

But if US BMD efforts remain limited, I don't see many HGVs being produced and armed with 2 stage nuclear weapons for MAD
So there would be more HGVs for conventional and tactical nuclear strike

 

[sinophilia]

"For now".
When the PLA would have been in early planning to significantly increase their ICBM force and nuclear deterrent force sometime last decade, would they believe that the US would remain still and not seek to greatly diminish their vulnerability to China's new enlarged and more credible ICBM force?

They knew that the US was further along in their BMD capabilities (including ICBMs) than any other nation -- surely they would have operated under the assumption that an enlargement of their ICBM force would have seen the US seek to counter that advantage to an unknown but significant degree.
That is to say, I believe as part of the PLA's enlargement of their ICBM/nuclear deterrent force, they would have operated under the assumption that the US would seek to develop and procure in increased numbers, the capability to mitigate US vulnerability to China's enlarged ICBM/nuke force. Operating under that assumption, means they would naturally seek to pursue technologies and systems capable of evading US mitigation efforts to ensure the newly established mutual vulnerability remains.

Well, where are the programs that are going to field thousands of interceptors? They don't exist. I guess you mean you think it's possible decades from now? Because there is nothing on the horizon.

My comments are only limited to your statement that they will likely field a BMD system that could significantly reduce the number of successful warheads that a country like China could use against them. I haven't spoken about what this means for Chinese procurement practices at all.

I am just wondering where you get this belief that American BMD will be so successful in significantly reducing a Chinese nuclear strike. Are you talking about 5 years from now? 10 years? 20 years? It can't be any of those, it must be further out then but how much further out and why do you think their procurement practices will change where they suddenly choose to buy thousands or tens of thousands of ICBM-defenders.

 

[Blitzo]

Well, where are the programs that are going to field thousands of interceptors? They don't exist. I guess you mean you think it's possible decades from now? Because there is nothing on the horizon.

My comments are only limited to your statement that they will likely field a BMD system that could significantly reduce the number of successful warheads that a country like China could use against them. I haven't spoken about what this means for Chinese procurement practices at all.

I am just wondering where you get this belief that American BMD will be so successful in significantly reducing a Chinese nuclear strike. Are you talking about 5 years from now? 10 years? 20 years? It can't be any of those, it must be further out then but how much further out and why do you think their procurement practices will change where they suddenly choose to buy thousands or tens of thousands of ICBM-defenders.

I am saying, that I believe the development of the IC-HGV was to hedge and preempt against the real possibility of the US developing a more robust ICBM-BMD capability.

Yes, naturally such a system if it is pursued would not be likely to emerge in its early forms until 10 years from now, assuming it is properly funded and development well and assuming they do not hit technical snags.

However that is the point of why China would pursue the IC-HGV, to provide a guarantee that they can preempt any BMD counters that the US could have pursued.

If the US does not pursue ICBM BMD in a substantial manner, then I wouldn't be surprised if the scale of procurement of the IC-HGVs would be smaller as well, and/or they would start looking into the alternative secondary roles for IC-HGVs that other people have mentioned.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

The ability of having their most modern IRBMs capable of being hot swapped between nuclear and conventional warheads is not necessarily indicative of them considering a tactical use of nuclear weapons, but could be far more likely that they recognize they need to retain a capable IRBM nuclear deterrent that can be activated when necessary (after all there are multiple nations in DF-26 range in which nuclear retaliation may be necessary for).

I agree with this. I'm trying to deduce motives - by which I mean assigning probabilities to a set of missions - from technological capability and I don't think that's valid. The evidence we have supports both interpretations; my preferred interpretation of tactical nuclear warfighting and yours of strategic deterrence against nearby countries. I can't claim one is likelier than the other.

A better argument to make is that in general, China is developing the capabilities to prosecute the types of mission that I have in mind. Whether it's actually going to and if so, when, is not a question that can be answered with any evidence we're ever going to get.

But you are talking about an entirely different subject to me -- I am trying to determine what the most likely, primary role of this new IC-HGV would be when it first enters service in an operational form.

If that's the question you're asking then I believe the answer you give is wrong. This issue is not analogous to the DF-26 one where I conceded your point; I believe your thinking on this particular question is flawed. Specifically, I think strategic bombardment is not going to be a role for this weapon because of its limitations.

You still have not addressed what I wrote in my last post -- if you are at the stage of targeting US strategic/ICBM level BMD infrastructure, the level of the conflict would have reached such a state that we cannot reasonably model or predict what US intentions or responses may be, from where we are sitting.

I think I can. I actually think that strikes against US BMD should be done in the opening phases of a conflict; if China has decided that it's going to be a real fight, then it should launch strikes against BMD sites as an opening move to establish unambiguously that there's no possibility whatsoever that the US can get away with a first strike.

There's very little guesswork needed about US reactions: Without it's BMD, it moves from a belief in "non-equal MAD" or the viability of a first strike (whether that belief is well-founded or not is immaterial) to a belief in equal MAD. That's a grave affront to the US. It's going to tear its hair out and bounce off the walls, but in the end it's not going to escalate beyond that because it's not worth dying over. It's not going to reach for its pistol in a fist-fight because it knows that it will get one in its skull as well.

I wrote that the primary, most likely first role of an IC-HGV would be as an "ICBM with much more success to penetrate opfor BMD".

None of what you wrote above counters what I wrote.

It does. Your theory necessitates that a sizeable fraction of the Chinese strategic arsenal (for simplicity let's say all) is going to be these IC-HGVs. Using trajectories like the test did or other suboptimal trajectories cuts the weapon's payload drastically. By going this route, you've essentially halved the Chinese strategic arsenal for ability to penetrate BMD. The much more logical choice would be to retain the strategic arsenal in ICBMs (double the payload of your scenario) and attack the BMD directly with a much smaller number of IC-HGVs.

Let me reiterate again -- there are many roles that an IC-HGV could be potentially used for, in the longer term future.
Sure, this includes maybe conventional strikes against CONTUS, or even first launch tactical nukes against CONTUS, or using IC-HGVs as weapons to help degrade US strategic BMD capabilities, these are all possible roles that cannot be ruled out going into the longer term future.
But, I am arguing that the overwhelmingly most likely role of the IC-HGV that the PLA would be interested in, is as a nuclear delivery vehicle to operate as an intercontinental nuclear delivery vehicle with much greater success of penetrating enemy BMD, than what conventional ICBMs can attain.

I disagree that the most likely role is strategic bombardment. I don't think it's even a likely role for the weapon for reasons of physics - not politics, not the strategic environment now or in the future, and not the doctrinal thinking of CMC members.

Furthermore, if we're being as conservative as you usually are, we can't assume we even have a weapon with a most likely use. We just have a proof of concept (which we can't be sure even succeeded) that might never make it into production.

 

[plawolf]

So, my impression is that developing the ICBM ranged HGV in context of China's increase in its overall nuclear arsenal size+credibility, is why I think the IC-HGV system is likely to be nuclear oriented.

The increase of China's ICBMs, new silos and DF-41s, upcoming new SSBNs and stealth bombers, imo all suggests to a desire to develop a more credible and capable nuclear deterrent and one which is more difficult to defend against.

An IC-HGV system would be entirely consistent with the pursuit of a more credible and capable nuclear deterrent system, in light of US BMD pursuits at all levels of the spectrum (including against ICBMs).
Putting it another way, an IC-HGV system is being pursued to ensure that if the effectiveness of China's conventional ICBM force is diminished due to an emerging BMD capability, that a resilient nuclear delivery method will be retained to ensure vulnerability.

IC-HGV would make sense if China was retaining its minimal credible deterrence strategy, and would almost certainly have started development for that purpose.

However, the scale and scope of China’s nuclear modernisation as well as clear political messages being sent by well connected individuals makes it clear that China has not decided it needs full MAD and is well on course to achieve that with traditional means.

China’s new silo fields and all the rest are not to future proof against possible future US BMD advances, but to give the US the unmistakable and unambiguous message that China can not achieve MAD. If and when the US upgrades it’s BMD, China would expand its conventional nuclear forces in kind to maintain MAD, and frankly the US would have to be stupid to get sucked into an arms race in that area against China.

In that context, IC-HGVs adds basically nothing to the table, because if you are launching hundreds of missiles with thousands of warheads, no BMD is going to come close to making any meaningful difference.

If you are suggesting that the IC-HGV would have a conventional role and would be used against CONTUS as a conventional strike weapon... That is a very, very niche capability and frankly for it to be viable, it would require both China and the US to fully understand that launches of such a weapon cannot be interpreted as a nuclear attack.

The option to play dumb is only available if you have escalation dominance and isn’t afraid to go to the next level. With MAD, there is no escalation advantage for anyone, so there is no reason to rush up the escalation ladder but every reason to wait and see. Especially if the incoming strike was limited meaning your second strike capabilities are not at risk if you delay your response until after impact to know what you need to respond to.

It is not impossible, but I think that the integration of an ICBM ranged HGV as a conventional strike weapon against the US would be such a massive reorientation of PLA of assessments of risk and strategy, that we need some kind of significant hints to consider it to be a likely use of the weapon.

That is to say, at this stage I think the most reasonable null hypothesis for this IC-HGV weapon is that it is intended primarily as a nuclear delivery system.
I am certainly open to the idea of it having a conventional role, or even it being exclusively conventional in relation to nations like the US, but I think it would be a significant enough departure against existing PLA strategy (seeking the capability to conduct conventional strikes against CONTUS, and with intercontinental ranged weapons no less), that we need some level of hint or some allusions to suggest that is what they are pursuing.

So you don’t think China finally deciding to commit to achieving MAD doesn’t represent a massive paradigm shift in terms of both China’s threat assessment and existing strategy?

The way I see it, Beijing has concluded that it can no longer trust the old assurances that the US will not seek to proactively provoke conflict out of its own self interest, or be easily deterred by the prospect of massive civilian casualties from even a single successful nuclear weapon detonation counterattack.

Its first priority is to achieve MAD to safeguard itself against nuclear blackmail by the US. The second level objectives after that most basic of goals have been reached is to limit the damage to the Chinese economy in the event of a direct shooting war between the US and China.

Frankly you will have to be an idiot to think the US will not use the cover of an armed conflict to do as much damage to China’s economic heartland as it could.

While the Chinese military might be able to effectively defend themselves against direct attacks by American forces, the same cannot be said of soft civilian infrastructure all over China. China is simply too vast, even if the PLA devoted itself entirely to trying to defend civilian infrastructure, it will not have remotely enough man and assets to defend even a fraction of targets worth hitting.

This is where IC-HGV, or indeed any reliable conventional strike option against CONUS targets become invaluable. Because the only way to effectively deter the US from going to town attacking Chinese civilian infrastructure is if China makes it clear it can and will respond in kind against equivalent targets on CONUS itself.

If America wants to send tomahawks against Chinese factors, China will fire IC-HGVs at LockMart and Boeing. And that’s how you stop America from targeting your civilian infrastructure to start with and keep the fight clean.

 

[Blitzo]

I agree with this. I'm trying to deduce motives - by which I mean assigning probabilities to a set of missions - from technological capability and I don't think that's valid. The evidence we have supports both interpretations; my preferred interpretation of tactical nuclear warfighting and yours of strategic deterrence against nearby countries. I can't claim one is likelier than the other.

A better argument to make is that in general, China is developing the capabilities to prosecute the types of mission that I have in mind. Whether it's actually going to and if so, when, is not a question that can be answered with any evidence we're ever going to get.

I would argue that for something as significant as "nuclear doctrine including use of nukes in a tactical role" -- you need some sort of evidence to overthrow the existing null hypothesis.
I'm not going to rule out the idea, and sure, it can be kept in mind, but there is no evidence to suggest it at this stage outside of academic discussion of hypothteicals.

IMO, changing nuclear doctrine is one of those things where discussion about it has to be preceded with a higher threshold of evidence than we usually have for PLA watching.

If that's the question you're asking then I believe the answer you give is wrong. This issue is not analogous to the DF-26 one where I conceded your point; I believe your thinking on this particular question is flawed. Specifically, I think strategic bombardment is not going to be a role for this weapon because of its limitations.

I will reply to this below.

I think I can. I actually think that strikes against US BMD should be done in the opening phases of a conflict; if China has decided that it's going to be a real fight, then it should launch strikes against BMD sites as an opening move to establish unambiguously that there's no possibility whatsoever that the US can get away with a first strike.

There's very little guesswork needed about US reactions: Without it's BMD, it moves from a belief in "non-equal MAD" or the viability of a first strike (whether that belief is well-founded or not is immaterial) to a belief in equal MAD. That's a grave affront to the US. It's going to tear its hair out and bounce off the walls, but in the end it's not going to escalate beyond that because it's not worth dying over. It's not going to reach for its pistol in a fist-fight because it knows that it will get one in its skull as well.

No, you are massively overreaching here.

What kind of conflict scenarios could the PLA seek to conduct a strike against US strategic BMD capabilities? At what stage of the conflict are they in, what are the losses that each side has already suffered? What is the territories occupied or lost? What is the level of strategic alert each side is at? What are the conventional and nuclear forces that each side has lost or retained at this point?

That is all something I've come up with on the fly, in about half a minute, relatively superficial, without much depth, but it even starts to demonstrate the extent of the unknowns.
Then, take all of the above unknowns, and ask yourself -- if China conducted a HGV strike against US strategic BMD capabilities, do you think you can model how the US would respond from where we are sitting?

It does. Your theory necessitates that a sizeable fraction of the Chinese strategic arsenal (for simplicity let's say all) is going to be these IC-HGVs. Using trajectories like the test did or other suboptimal trajectories cuts the weapon's payload drastically. By going this route, you've essentially halved the Chinese strategic arsenal for ability to penetrate BMD. The much more logical choice would be to retain the strategic arsenal in ICBMs (double the payload of your scenario) and attack the BMD directly with a much smaller number of IC-HGVs.

Halving the payload/throw weight of China's overall strategic arsenal does not halve the "ability to penetrate BMD," because the whole point of IC-HGV is that it has a much more successful capability to penetrate BMD.
That is to say, the probability of success of an ICBM to penetrate BMD versus the probability of success of IC-HGV to penetrate the same BMD is not equal.

As I've repeatedly said, I'm not against the idea of IC-HGVs being used against BMD. But I'm saying that the first primary role would likely be as nuclear delivery vehicles first.
If the deterrence value of your ICBM force is contingent on the ability to degrade or destroy enemy BMD with IC-HGVs first, why not just seek to overwhelm the BMD with a combination of IC-HGVs and ICBMs together?

I disagree that the most likely role is strategic bombardment. I don't think it's even a likely role for the weapon for reasons of physics - not politics, not the strategic environment now or in the future, and not the doctrinal thinking of CMC members.

Furthermore, if we're being as conservative as you usually are, we can't assume we even have a weapon with a most likely use. We just have a proof of concept (which we can't be sure even succeeded) that might never make it into production.

I agree that this IC-HGV might not even become an operational weapon.
However, if this concept does become an operational weapon, I believe that from where we currently stand, the most likely primary role of it would be as a nuclear delivery vehicle for strategic deterrent purposes.

 

[Blitzo]

IC-HGV would make sense if China was retaining its minimal credible deterrence strategy, and would almost certainly have started development for that purpose.

However, the scale and scope of China’s nuclear modernisation as well as clear political messages being sent by well connected individuals makes it clear that China has not decided it needs full MAD and is well on course to achieve that with traditional means.

China’s new silo fields and all the rest are not to future proof against possible future US BMD advances, but to give the US the unmistakable and unambiguous message that China can not achieve MAD. If and when the US upgrades it’s BMD, China would expand its conventional nuclear forces in kind to maintain MAD, and frankly the US would have to be stupid to get sucked into an arms race in that area against China.

In that context, IC-HGVs adds basically nothing to the table, because if you are launching hundreds of missiles with thousands of warheads, no BMD is going to come close to making any meaningful difference.

I agree that China is seeking full scale MAD, which is why I believe they would have developed IC-HGVs as a way of ensuring MAD in case the US decided to pursue a robust BMD capability.

If the US does not pursue a robust BMD capability, then I believe the PLA's procurement of IC-HGV will be of smaller scale and/or may look into additional secondary roles for it.

The option to play dumb is only available if you have escalation dominance and isn’t afraid to go to the next level. With MAD, there is no escalation advantage for anyone, so there is no reason to rush up the escalation ladder but every reason to wait and see. Especially if the incoming strike was limited meaning your second strike capabilities are not at risk if you delay your response until after impact to know what you need to respond to.

So, as I have repeatedly written, the idea of using IC-HGVs for these kind of roles (such as conventional strikes against CONTUS) cannot be ruled out.
I fully agree it is a possibility.

But I am very uncomfortable with the way that they are being confidently spoken of as if they are likely or given assumptions for how these nation states may react, and then using those questionable assumptions about how they may react at the political and strategic level to justify these hypothetical roles described.

I will adapt what I wrote to Zeak, and apply it here:
"What kind of conflict scenarios could the PLA seek to conduct a conventional IC-HGV strike against CONTUS? At what stage of the conflict are they in, what are the losses that each side has already suffered? What is the territories occupied or lost? What is the level of strategic alert each side is at? What are the conventional and nuclear forces that each side has lost or retained at this point?"

Those are all very baseline questions, and very much unknowns, and I think we are massively overreaching if we think we can model behaviours for those kind of hypothetical scenarios, and use those as a bases for justifying that the IC-HGV system will serve as China's "newest, and as yet, only effective conventional strike option against high value targets on CONUS itself".

Let me reiterate -- I don't think we can rule out the possibility that the IC-HGVs into the future may have a conventional strike role against CONTUS.
It is indeed something we need to consider.
But we are too far away from the level of strategic deterrence and MAD that China has in service to even start entertaining how each side might react.

Maybe once the PLA has filled up its new missile silos with CONTUS ranged ICBMs, augmented its TEL ICBM force, and has a robust fleet of survivable SSBNs with CONTUS ranged SLBMs (i.e.: established a sufficient credible level of MAD), then we can start thinking about how the US at the high political and strategic levels of decision making, would react to hypothetical IC-HGV conventional strikes against CONTUS.

However I think it is too early right now.

So you don’t think China finally deciding to commit to achieving MAD doesn’t represent a massive paradigm shift in terms of both China’s threat assessment and existing strategy?


The way I see it, Beijing has concluded that it can no longer trust the old assurances that the US will not seek to proactively provoke conflict out of its own self interest, or be easily deterred by the prospect of massive civilian casualties from even a single successful nuclear weapon detonation counterattack.

Its first priority is to achieve MAD to safeguard itself against nuclear blackmail by the US. The second level objectives after that most basic of goals have been reached is to limit the damage to the Chinese economy in the event of a direct shooting war between the US and China.

Frankly you will have to be an idiot to think the US will not use the cover of an armed conflict to do as much damage to China’s economic heartland as it could.

While the Chinese military might be able to effectively defend themselves against direct attacks by American forces, the same cannot be said of soft civilian infrastructure all over China. China is simply too vast, even if the PLA devoted itself entirely to trying to defend civilian infrastructure, it will not have remotely enough man and assets to defend even a fraction of targets worth hitting.

This is where IC-HGV, or indeed any reliable conventional strike option against CONUS targets become invaluable. Because the only way to effectively deter the US from going to town attacking Chinese civilian infrastructure is if China makes it clear it can and will respond in kind against equivalent targets on CONUS itself.

If America wants to send tomahawks against Chinese factors, China will fire IC-HGVs at LockMart and Boeing. And that’s how you stop America from targeting your civilian infrastructure to start with and keep the fight clean.

I absolutely believe that China committing to MAD (or at least, significantly enhanced nuclear deterrent capability) is a significant massive paradigm in terms of China's threat assessment and existing strategy.

And the only reason that we can have the ability to talk about MAD, is because of the demonstrated infrastructure and systems that we now have clear evidence of.
I do not believe that level of political and strategic posture is something we could have talked about or entertained prior to having significant evidence of it.

Similarly, I do not think we yet have the evidence or preconditions yet to talk about PLA conventional intercontinental strikes against CONTUS as part of its doctrine. That is a significant change and expansion in its strategy and the geopolitical balance that exists, and I think a significant threshold similarly must be reached before it can be considered as a likely doctrine.

 

[ZeEa5KPul]

@Bltizo I'm getting the feeling we've both occupied our respective bunkers and there's no budging either of us at this point. You wouldn't be surprised to know that I don't think your questions are unknowns, I have answers to every one of them and they're exactly the maximalist ones. However, I would like to comment on what you wrote to plawolf:

Maybe once the PLA has filled up its new missile silos with CONTUS ranged ICBMs, augmented its TEL ICBM force, and has a robust fleet of survivable SSBNs with CONTUS ranged SLBMs (i.e.: established a sufficient credible level of MAD), then we can start thinking about how the US at the high political and strategic levels of decision making, would react to hypothetical IC-HGV conventional strikes against CONTUS.

That is what I consider to be precisely the point of this buildup. Yes, establishing genuine MAD is a worthy goal in and of itself, but the real goal is filling out the missing rungs in China's escalation ladder. I think this is all following a simple, clear, and very logical plan that I can elaborate on if anyone's interested.

Similarly, I do not think we yet have the evidence or preconditions yet to talk about PLA conventional intercontinental strikes against CONTUS as part of its doctrine. That is a significant change and expansion in its strategy and the geopolitical balance that exists, and I think a significant threshold similarly must be reached before it can be considered as a likely doctrine.

What are some examples of what you'd consider evidence sufficient to clear this threshold?

 

[Blitzo]

@Bltizo I'm getting the feeling we've both occupied our respective bunkers and there's no budging either of us at this point. You wouldn't be surprised to know that I don't think your questions are unknowns, I have answers to every one of them and they're exactly the maximalist ones.

I commend you for recognizing that your positions are the maximalist ones, but I truly wonder why you take up those positions.

However, I would like to comment on what you wrote to plawolf:

That is what I consider to be precisely the point of this buildup. Yes, establishing genuine MAD is a worthy goal in and of itself, but the real goal is filling out the missing rungs in China's escalation ladder. I think this is all following a simple, clear, and very logical plan that I can elaborate on if anyone's interested.

What are some examples of what you'd consider evidence sufficient to clear this threshold?

So, I fully agree that the intention of being able to attain MAD (or, increasing mutual vulnerability is a better term for it, let's say MV), and their current nuclear expansion, is a reflection to be able to try and narrow the difference in escalation capability between China and the US, in turn providing China more options to meet the US on the escalation ladder -- and that may or may not include conventional strikes against CONTUS.

However, I am not comfortable at this point in time for us to talk about a future whereby China has "attained MAD/MV" and is now implementing a doctrine where it can use conventional intercontinental ranged systems to conduct conventional strikes against CONTUS, primarily because of time.

Time -- that is to say, it will take a significant amount of time for China to attain the nuclear capabilities to such a state whereby something close to MAD/MV can be attained WRT the US, in terms of warheads, nuclear delivery vehicles, and survivability of said delivery vehicles.

I personally think it will take 10-15 years for true equivalent MAD/MV to be attained.
I believe that is quite a long time, and factors such as the US does not either expand its own nuclear arsenal, or more importantly develop additional weapons or systems that mitigates the effectiveness of China's nuclear delivery systems.
In addition to US countermeasures, shifting or intensifying US alliance systems, evolving US nuclear doctrine in response to China's increased nuclear arsenal (such as more prevalent US willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to conventional strikes on CONTUS), all may place significant pressure on how viable it is for China to conduct conventional strikes against CONTUS.

I would be much more comfortable talking about such notions at least once the bulk of the new incoming nuclear delivery systems are in service and when it is obvious that something resembling MAD/MV is inevitable and unavoidable and on the cusp of entering service.
There is a reason why I hold nuclear weapons to this standard, it is because of its strategic and political level effects. Other systems, even big ticket ones, like stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, and SSNs, are ones that I am willing to personally give much more leeway.
But I believe ICBMs and nuclear warheads are in a class of their own, and if people are discussing a hypothetical new doctrine (i.e.: conventional intercontinental strikes against CONTUS) that requires a prerequisite of having a MAD/MV state in place to be even viable in the first place -- then I believe it is prudent and necessary to have the discipline to wait for that capability to be largely in place and inevitable, before talking about said new doctrine.

Otherwise, I think it is getting too high off one's own supply.

 

[enroger]

I commend you for recognizing that your positions are the maximalist ones, but I truly wonder why you take up those positions.




So, I fully agree that the intention of being able to attain MAD (or, increasing mutual vulnerability is a better term for it, let's say MV), and their current nuclear expansion, is a reflection to be able to try and narrow the difference in escalation capability between China and the US, in turn providing China more options to meet the US on the escalation ladder -- and that may or may not include conventional strikes against CONTUS.

However, I am not comfortable at this point in time for us to talk about a future whereby China has "attained MAD/MV" and is now implementing a doctrine where it can use conventional intercontinental ranged systems to conduct conventional strikes against CONTUS, primarily because of time.

Time -- that is to say, it will take a significant amount of time for China to attain the nuclear capabilities to such a state whereby something close to MAD/MV can be attained WRT the US, in terms of warheads, nuclear delivery vehicles, and survivability of said delivery vehicles.

I personally think it will take 10-15 years for true equivalent MAD/MV to be attained.
I believe that is quite a long time, and factors such as the US does not either expand its own nuclear arsenal, or more importantly develop additional weapons or systems that mitigates the effectiveness of China's nuclear delivery systems.
In addition to US countermeasures, shifting or intensifying US alliance systems, evolving US nuclear doctrine in response to China's increased nuclear arsenal (such as more prevalent US willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to conventional strikes on CONTUS), all may place significant pressure on how viable it is for China to conduct conventional strikes against CONTUS.

I would be much more comfortable talking about such notions at least once the bulk of the new incoming nuclear delivery systems are in service and when it is obvious that something resembling MAD/MV is inevitable and unavoidable and on the cusp of entering service.
There is a reason why I hold nuclear weapons to this standard, it is because of its strategic and political level effects. Other systems, even big ticket ones, like stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, and SSNs, are ones that I am willing to personally give much more leeway.
But I believe ICBMs and nuclear warheads are in a class of their own, and if people are discussing a hypothetical new doctrine (i.e.: conventional intercontinental strikes against CONTUS) that requires a prerequisite of having a MAD/MV state in place to be even viable in the first place -- then I believe it is prudent and necessary to have the discipline to wait for that capability to be largely in place and inevitable, before talking about said new doctrine.

Otherwise, I think it is getting too high off one's own supply.

MAD is not equivalent to nuclear parity, China does not have to match the US warhead for warhead to achieve MAD, They just need to credibly guarantee unacceptable damage to the US. Say if they can guarantee enough warheads to land on top 50 population centers it constitute unacceptable damage, IMO China has that capability already.

Now let me take a step back and say China does not have MAD. Since you're speculating the role of IC-HGV in the context of a possible future where US has ramped up their ABM interceptors to orders of magnitude of what they have now; Wouldn't it be fair for me to speculate the role of IC-HGV in a possible future where China has achieved MAD status? Considering the price tag on those ABM system I'd say it is much easier for China in ramp up ICBMs than for US to ramp up interceptors.

Policy wise; China can simply announce any attack on Chinese homeland will be met with proportional response in the form of IC-HGV be it conventional or nuclear. This policy is plain and simple, easy to understand and perfectly credible.

Place yourself in the position of US decision maker, say you decide to ignore the warning and attack Chinese homeland anyway, afterward you see a solitary ICBM launch towards you, would you just trigger a standard response knowing MAD is assured or would you rather wait and see?