i think that usa can't significantly increase their abm capabilities without serious financial problems. It's not credible for USA to search such hegemony against china (a superpower more powerful than ussr at his peak by USA same words). It is a delusion
China Ballistic Missiles and Nuclear Arms Thread
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I think the PLA is closer to embracing the idea of tactical nuclear warfighting than most people realize. The strongest evidence for that is the DF-26 field swapping of nuclear/conventional warheads and the fact that all units practice both missions (it's essentially the same mission but PLA publications make a point of stressing the interchangeability).
If China suffers significant enough damage to its homeland and industry, I wouldn't at all rule out the possibility of tactical nuclear strikes on the US homeland in retaliation. Once again, I make two points about this since people are hung up on the N word and the "inviolability" of America:
1. This would be in retaliation to American strikes on China itself.
2. An expanded strategic arsenal prevents American escalation past this level. Yeah, America would have just gotten punched in the face, but it wouldn't be too eager to follow that up with a bullet to its head.
That's actually where America's other capabilities would be helpful. Even if China destroyed America's entire BMD infrastructure in an instant, there would still be MAD since America's SSBNs would still be intact and functional. Once again, a resentful and wounded America would not escalate to civilization-ending strikes if it doesn't face an existential threat, which it wouldn't even without BMD.
Ultimately, people don't want to die in a nuclear conflagration.
ICBMs are much more efficient weapons. To heft a payload ~12,000 km along the minimum energy ballistic trajectory, the rocket has to have a delta-v (the speed to which the rocket must accelerate its payload) of 7.5 km/s. An orbital trajectory requires something like 7.9 km/s. That's a much bigger difference than a naïve comparison suggests. It reduces the payload the rocket can carry by something like half. That's not something that can be overcome by clever design, it's a fundamental physical limitation.
You're sacrificing a lot of payload by going to IC-HGV, which is why I think this is a scalpel for very specific missions (among them DEMD).
Since we're discussing a subject I've spent some CPU cycles pondering, I'm going to go a bit OT for a second and bounce some of my thoughts off you, dear reader. There's an angle to China's nuclear buildup that I haven't seen considered: By establishing a genuine MAD relationship between China and the US, Russia is automatically roped into the equation. If America has to spend all or a very high proportion of its arsenal in an all out nuclear war with China that devastates both countries, guess who's sitting pretty while all this is happening? Who wins at the end of this exchange?
Of course, this would be anathema to an America obsessed with its hegemony, so it would have to target Russia as well so it doesn't just scoop up what's left of the world. An analogous argument would hold if Russia and the US got into a nuclear total war. The politics of the situation links Russian and Chinese nuclear strategy in ways they weren't before, whether they want it or not.
Of course, this would be anathema to an America obsessed with its hegemony, so it would have to target Russia as well so it doesn't just scoop up what's left of the world. An analogous argument would hold if Russia and the US got into a nuclear total war. The politics of the situation links Russian and Chinese nuclear strategy in ways they weren't before, whether they want it or not.
Yes it's true, I've seen the situation being described in the below simple relationship:
How the US see current warhead count in event of nuclear war:
10 > 7 + 1
Should be pretty obvious who's who in that equation. The "+" reflects geopolitical reality that Russia and China are in a much closer relationship than either of them are with the US. They are comfortable because their warheads outnumber both China and Russia put together
What the US see the future:
10 < 7 + 5
Once China expands her strategic deterrence US is now out numbered. Yet despite this Russia and China still maintains the moral upper ground when it comes to disarmament talks because both have individually less warhead than the US.
I hate to do this but... akshually, Russia has more nuclear weapons than the US. Not enormously many more, but still. In your example they would both be pretty much 10 and 10. China didn't even merit being included in the relationship and America could treat both completely independently.
By virtue of its buildup, that's no longer the case. Even if the Chinese arsenal ultimately stops at just half America's (which I certainly hope it won't), the scale of devastation China would be able to inflict means America can't assume it would emerge from a nuclear war with China more or less unscathed.
I don't like that it took this long for China to finally ramp up, but I'll admit it has some merit. China now has a much smaller mountain to climb owing to decades of arms control talks, and I think the best path forward is to quickly ramp up to ~1,500 warheads (the number China and Russia are allowed to deploy, the rest of their warheads are in storage) and then slow down the buildup after that. At that point China might enter into these negotiations and see what it can squeeze out of America - if nothing, then it's still all good. Just keep cranking out the plutonium.
The ability of having their most modern IRBMs capable of being hot swapped between nuclear and conventional warheads is not necessarily indicative of them considering a tactical use of nuclear weapons, but could be far more likely that they recognize they need to retain a capable IRBM nuclear deterrent that can be activated when necessary (after all there are multiple nations in DF-26 range in which nuclear retaliation may be necessary for).
"I wouldn't rule out the possibility" is very different to "we can consider this as a strong likelihood".
If you want to argue that in the future at some point, perhaps China would consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons against CONTUS in a first strike role, and you are arguing it is a "possibility" -- then sure, I agree with you. The possibility of it is above zero, and into the more distant future I would be surprised if the CMC didn't consider it as an option for certain contingencies.
But you are talking about an entirely different subject to me -- I am trying to determine what the most likely, primary role of this new IC-HGV would be when it first enters service in an operational form.
You still have not addressed what I wrote in my last post -- if you are at the stage of targeting US strategic/ICBM level BMD infrastructure, the level of the conflict would have reached such a state that we cannot reasonably model or predict what US intentions or responses may be, from where we are sitting.
All of this is my way of saying -- sure, HGVs could be used against strategic level BMD infrastructure (again, the possibility is not zero), but do you think you can claim to argue that countering BMD infrastructure would be the primary, most likely role of this new IC-HGV?
I wrote that the primary, most likely first role of an IC-HGV would be as an "ICBM with much more success to penetrate opfor BMD".
None of what you wrote above counters what I wrote.
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Let me reiterate again -- there are many roles that an IC-HGV could be potentially used for, in the longer term future.
Sure, this includes maybe conventional strikes against CONTUS, or even first launch tactical nukes against CONTUS, or using IC-HGVs as weapons to help degrade US strategic BMD capabilities, these are all possible roles that cannot be ruled out going into the longer term future.
But, I am arguing that the overwhelmingly most likely role of the IC-HGV that the PLA would be interested in, is as a nuclear delivery vehicle to operate as an intercontinental nuclear delivery vehicle with much greater success of penetrating enemy BMD, than what conventional ICBMs can attain.
^ The above underlined part is the totality of my position, and has to be taken as a whole. Please read the whole thing a few times, then consider if the argument as a whole is one that you agree or disagree with.
Ok. Here are the deployment options as I see them
1. HGV only. The Kinetic Energy would be equivalent to 2-3 tonnes of TNT. Used proportionately on the Continental USA in the event of the Chinese homeland being attacked. Launched singly or in small salvoes. After impact, it avoid further escalation into the nuclear realm
2. HGV with tactical (say 1-10kiloton) single-stage nuclear warhead. Launched singly or in small salvoes. By this point, it's a warning that this is the last step before a full-scale nuclear exchange. I'm assuming large scale attacks have already occurred on targets in mainland China
3. HGV with strategic 2-stage nuclear warhead. Assuming HGVs can only deliver half the payload that a pure ICBM can, along with the heavier warhead weight, it would be for ABM defended targets once the world has gone MAD. Production numbers would be dependent on the state of US BMD
My gut says they would be developing with Option 3 in mind
Whilst a 2 stage fusion warhead is the heaviest payload, it has the lowest requirement for HGV impact accuracy
We've seen the 1st test at 40km off target
But if Option 3 has already been developed, then improvements in accuracy automatically mean Option 2 and then potentially Option 1 become available. But there's no guarantee that this is technically feasible yet
1. HGV only. The Kinetic Energy would be equivalent to 2-3 tonnes of TNT. Used proportionately on the Continental USA in the event of the Chinese homeland being attacked. Launched singly or in small salvoes. After impact, it avoid further escalation into the nuclear realm
2. HGV with tactical (say 1-10kiloton) single-stage nuclear warhead. Launched singly or in small salvoes. By this point, it's a warning that this is the last step before a full-scale nuclear exchange. I'm assuming large scale attacks have already occurred on targets in mainland China
3. HGV with strategic 2-stage nuclear warhead. Assuming HGVs can only deliver half the payload that a pure ICBM can, along with the heavier warhead weight, it would be for ABM defended targets once the world has gone MAD. Production numbers would be dependent on the state of US BMD
My gut says they would be developing with Option 3 in mind
Whilst a 2 stage fusion warhead is the heaviest payload, it has the lowest requirement for HGV impact accuracy
We've seen the 1st test at 40km off target
But if Option 3 has already been developed, then improvements in accuracy automatically mean Option 2 and then potentially Option 1 become available. But there's no guarantee that this is technically feasible yet
I would not use the supposed accuracy of the first test as a measure for how accurate the operational system is intended to be.
After all, as the first flight test, it very well may have only needed to be accurate enough to be recovered in a practical manner.
I would not be surprised if the eventual operational system was accurate enough to be used as a conventional non-nuclear weapon, even though its most likely primary payload would be a strategic nuclear weapon.
Russia is just not big enough to scoop up the rest of the world. It faces an EU which has roughly 10x the GDP for example
China in the early to mid 2010s was planning to increase my ICBM and nuclear deterrent force, do we believe that they would not have operated under the assumption that the US would seek to enhance their ICBM BMD capability, and that they would not have pursued more capable delivery vehicles capable of penetrating BMD as a natural dovetail with their increased ICBM force?
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