Instead, they may have sought more sophisticated nuclear development and employment policies. At the same time, China may be concerned that the US reemphasis on low-yield nuclear weapons in recent years indicates a lower threshold for nuclear use. China could de-escalate a nuclear conflict on its own terms by responding symmetrically or proportionately to limited US nuclear employment. Accurate theater-range nuclear missiles, such as the DF-21 and DF-26, could hold US military bases, carrier groups, or Guam under threat."
The only problem with that is by the time the US uses tactical nukes, those targets will have already been annihilated by China's conventional missiles. So they won't remain as available targets for retaliation. The US will probably use tactical nukes only when all its assets/forces in Asia have been wiped out by the PLARF (as I predict will easily and rapidly happen), leaving it no conventional options. Therefore China will have no choice but to choose more strategic targets to retaliate against, I think a small nuke against the city on Guam (not Andersen AFB), or maybe Hawaii, is likely.