Shilao and Ayi's analysis of 2021 report to congress, most of it is to do with strategic force:
The thing that jumped out at both myself (see my joke earlier in this thread about Hu Xijin being promoted to a member of CMC) and them are this bit:
There is very little doubt what this is referring to, they are referring to this article:
The first line of which says:
中国需要在较短的时间里将核弹头数量扩大到千枚的水平,包括至少要有100枚东风-41战略导弹。
"China needs to expand the number of warheads to a thousand in a short amount of time, including at least 100 DF-41 strategic missiles".
Last year's report I think said something like "China has 200 warheads and will be increasing to 250 in five years" or some nonsense like that. Now in this year's report:
Isn't it nice that they admit they really screwed up with the warhead numbers in last years report. But you see what they're doing here is instead of just telling Congress the new 1000 number, they're trying to ease people into it with the "700 by 2027" thing.
Shilao suggests another way from which DoD could have arrived at this number. They think China is building 350 new, really big silos. Given they are really big and can fit DF-41 or bigger ICBM which would mean MIRV, let's say 3 warheads each. When PLARF eventually fill up all these silos that would arrive at... 1050 warheads, look at that.
But what this is saying is the 200 or 250 or 300 or whatever number DoD has been quoting in previous years they know it's bullshit, and they have suspected that China's warhead count might have gone up to potentially 4 figures. But without any basis for a new number they have nothing to work on. Now that Hu Xijin have quoted the 1,000 warhead number they are immediately jumping onto that as "official, reliable, CPC approved" source.
What this says to me is DoD's intelligence on PLARF is
extremely bad, so much so that an article written by a tabloid editor is immediately their most reliable source. Or alternatively if you go by the silo/MIRV count theory then they didn't know anything until those civilian think tanks told them new silos were being built in the hundreds.
Let's look at another interesting part of the report:
Well that's interesting about DF-27. I too have heard rumours (I believe it was from cjdby forum) that a DF-27 is being worked on which consists of a DF-26 booster mated to the DF-ZF HGV of DF-17, creating basically a super long range DF-17. Doing a quick search on google yields these sources:
What is the Chinese Equivalent of a THAAD? HQ-19 perhaps HQ-19 Anti-Ballistic Missile Interceptor
www.sinodefenceforum.com
Haha look at that, we've gone full circle with that second one. But us members here talking about rumours we heard about on Chinese forums is one thing, if you're going to put DF-27 into a report for congress it had better be a real thing. But given what we've discussed above with that 1000 warhead theory does it seem like DoD have agents inside PLARF that could tell them about upcoming missiles? I kind of doubt it.
I am therefore coming to the conclusion that... DoD probably doesn't know much more than us here about PLARF.
PS: DoD if you are reading, why don't you just outsource next year's report to us sinodefence here. We'll do it for half the price and that money can go into forum maintenance fund. I have heaps of dubious Chinese rumours (eg: 北星之光 super ICBM) that we can put into the report to score more funding.