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Brumby said:

That is exactly the criticism of Hugh White which you are reinforcing and that is a decision to go with Japan is an either or choice. On the contrary, cogent arguments can be made that such a pathway does not necessarily result in such a skewed outcome for Australia. There will obviously be ebb and flow in relationships in any decision but that has always been the case at least in modern geopolitical relationships.

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Okay, I think I get what you mean now -- are you saying that if Australia made a decision to go with Japan for the submarines does not equate to an either/rather choice in siding with Japan and cutting ties off with China in the event of a Japan-China conflict?

If that is the case, then I would agree with you, because it may well be that Australia could manage to still get Japan to complete the work on the submarines without fully committing to Japan and cutting off China in event of a Japan-China conflict (or whatever degree of calibration Australia wants).


.... However, on the other hand, I do think it is logical to say that going with a European submarine option has a lower risk of influencing Australia's submarine development plans if Japan and China come to conflict in the near future -- compared to if Australia chose the Japanese submarine option.

So if I had to re phrase the concluding part of my last post, I think the point of Mr White's overall article can also sensibly be phrased in a way which removes the "either/rather" choice:

Japanese sub choice: presents a higher likelihood of Australia potentially having to degrade its relationship with China and increasing Australia's relationship with Japan, if Japan and China come into conflict (compared to the European sub choice). If Australia does not degrade its relationship with China and support Japan, there is a greater risk (compared to the European sub choice) that it may hinder its submarine programme.
European sub choice: results in a greater ability for Australia to choose to maintain or degrade its relationship with China, and to control its degree of cooperation with Japan, if Japan and China come into conflict (compared with the Japanese sub choice). In this case, whatever calibrations or decisions Australia makes with its relationship with both China and Japan, there is a far lower risk that its submarine programme will be affected, compared to the Japanese sub choice.


Reading Mr White's article again, I think it would be a mistake to claim that he is saying that Australia "must" make an either/or choice with regards to at potential Japan-China conflict if Australia bought Japanese submarines (and I regrettably made that mistake in my last post as well) --- but rather I think he is saying that a European submarine choice means Australia does not have to consider a potential Japan-China conflict (and Australia's relationship to both countries in event of a conflict) to a degree as high as if it had bought Japanese submarines.
Or, putting it another way -- I think Mr White is saying that buying European submarines would present Australia with more strategic flexibility in regards to conducting its relationship with Japan as well as China in the future (especially in event of a Japan-China conflict), compared to buying Japanese submarines. Furthermore, given Japan's overtures to Australia in regards to connecting the submarine tender to a strategic relationship, considering the possibility of the two being connected I think is a realistic and prudent option to think about (as Mr White does).



edit:
I think the key phrase in his article is this: "If we don't give Japan what it expects from the deal, we won't get what we expect from it: unstinting help to make sure our submarines project succeeds. " -- and I think the key word in relation to our discussion is the word "if".

--

The bottom line I see is Mr White is pointing out the stark potential differences in the affect on Australia's potential relationship with Japan and China, depending on whether Australia goes with a Japanese sub or a European sub. And I think that is a bottom line which cannot really be denied.


I also do of course acknowledge that he is only making an argument from the perspective of the submarine programme and Australia's relationship with China and Japan, and it does not seek to address whether the Japanese submarine option is more economically or technically feasible or if it meets Australia's criteria better than its European competitors.

My two cents to Mr. White's opinion is select an equipment based on function and quality of the product and not lodge some random political possibilities. It's RAN that is going to operate the subs not Japanese agents. Once ownership is handed over to Australia it's Australia's sub not Japan's so you would want the best equipment money can buy and not tipsy toe around some problem to be shafted down the second option.

Like Iceman said in TOP Gun "The plaque for the alternates is down in the ladies room."

SamuraiBlue said:

My two cents to Mr. White's opinion is select an equipment based on function and quality of the product and not lodge some random political possibilities. It's RAN that is going to operate the subs not Japanese agents. Once ownership is handed over to Australia it's Australia's sub not Japan's so you would want the best equipment money can buy and not tipsy toe around some problem to be shafted down the second option.

Click to expand...

Not quite.
Simply giving a finished product to another nation's military does not mean it is a done deal -- the ability to support and upgrade the product is a key part of any weapons transfer.
Many nations have made weapons deals and been unable to keep those weapons effective due to insufficient spare parts, logistics support, or upgrades to keep them relevant, due to a falling out in the relationship between the buyer nation and the seller nation. Buying the world's most advanced weapon from a seller but then being unable to operate them effectively due to

That is why future political possibilities in any relationship are a very big factor for any sort of weapons deal, if the change in the relationship can influence the future operation and support of the weapon in question.
That is a consideration for any nation making any sort of weapons deal, and is an issue for Australia to consider in its submarine procurement as well.

Bltizo said:

Okay, I think I get what you mean now -- are you saying that if Australia made a decision to go with Japan for the submarines does not equate to an either/rather choice in siding with Japan and cutting ties off with China in the event of a Japan-China conflict?

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I think it is ungrounded to be presumptive that Australia will be somewhat less than neutral in any potential Japan-China conflict because of the submarine procurement. I think such a view is rather simplistic given that such decisions are typically driven by much more complex set of issues in the decision making process. The notion that Australia is potentially bound to a particular pathway as advocated by Mr. White is what I considered to be a false dilemma narrative.

Bltizo said:

If that is the case, then I would agree with you, because it may well be that Australia could manage to still get Japan to complete the work on the submarines without fully committing to Japan and cutting off China in event of a Japan-China conflict (or whatever degree of calibration Australia wants).

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I agree that there are inherent risk that Japan may leverage such a relationship to its advantage but these are risk that can be mitigated and the onus is on Australia to address them adequately as part of a robust procurement process.

Bltizo said:

.... However, on the other hand, I do think it is logical to say that going with a European submarine option has a lower risk of influencing Australia's submarine development plans if Japan and China come to conflict in the near future -- compared to if Australia chose the Japanese submarine option.

Click to expand...

There is clearly an argument to be had that selecting a European partner would be less politically sensitive but this would be one of many factors that Australia need to consider as part of its due diligence effort.

Bltizo said:

So if I had to re phrase the concluding part of my last post, I think the point of Mr White's overall article can also sensibly be phrased in a way which removes the "either/rather" choice:

Japanese sub choice: presents a higher likelihood of Australia potentially having to degrade its relationship with China and increasing Australia's relationship with Japan, if Japan and China come into conflict (compared to the European sub choice). If Australia does not degrade its relationship with China and support Japan, there is a greater risk (compared to the European sub choice) that it may hinder its submarine programme.
European sub choice: results in a greater ability for Australia to choose to maintain or degrade its relationship with China, and to control its degree of cooperation with Japan, if Japan and China come into conflict (compared with the Japanese sub choice). In this case, whatever calibrations or decisions Australia makes with its relationship with both China and Japan, there is a far lower risk that its submarine programme will be affected, compared to the Japanese sub choice.

Click to expand...

I think they are valid questions that need to be addressed but whether eventually one option presents a greater risk given a set of contingent events would have to be considered against a set of mitigating steps as part of any contractual arrangements. Australia would have to be satisfied that it doesn't become a victim of circumstance by being diligent upfront in structuring any arrangements.

Bltizo said:

Reading Mr White's article again, I think it would be a mistake to claim that he is saying that Australia "must" make an either/or choice with regards to at potential Japan-China conflict if Australia bought Japanese submarines (and I regrettably made that mistake in my last post as well) --- but rather I think he is saying that a European submarine choice means Australia does not have to consider a potential Japan-China conflict (and Australia's relationship to both countries in event of a conflict) to a degree as high as if it had bought Japanese submarines.
Or, putting it another way -- I think Mr White is saying that buying European submarines would present Australia with more strategic flexibility in regards to conducting its relationship with Japan as well as China in the future (especially in event of a Japan-China conflict), compared to buying Japanese submarines. Furthermore, given Japan's overtures to Australia in regards to connecting the submarine tender to a strategic relationship, considering the possibility of the two being connected I think is a realistic and prudent option to think about (as Mr White does).

Click to expand...

The problem I have with the narrative is not about an additional consideration but that such a pathway bounds Australia in a certain inextricable pathway.

Brumby said:

I think it is ungrounded to be presumptive that Australia will be somewhat less than neutral in any potential Japan-China conflict because of the submarine procurement. I think such a view is rather simplistic given that such decisions are typically driven by much more complex set of issues in the decision making process. The notion that Australia is potentially bound to a particular pathway as advocated by Mr. White is what I considered to be a false dilemma narrative.


I agree that there are inherent risk that Japan may leverage such a relationship to its advantage but these are risk that can be mitigated and the onus is on Australia to address them adequately as part of a robust procurement process.


There is clearly an argument to be had that selecting a European partner would be less politically sensitive but this would be one of many factors that Australia need to consider as part of its due diligence effort.


I think they are valid questions that need to be addressed but whether eventually one option presents a greater risk given a set of contingent events would have to be considered against a set of mitigating steps as part of any contractual arrangements. Australia would have to be satisfied that it doesn't become a victim of circumstance by being diligent upfront in structuring any arrangements.


The problem I have with the narrative is not about an additional consideration but that such a pathway bounds Australia in a certain inextricable pathway.

Click to expand...

I don't think Mr White is seeking to make an argument that choosing to go with the Japanese submarine would bound Australia in a certain "inextricable pathway", only that there is a significant likelihood of the deal being associated with expectations of Australia having some sort of strategic partnership with Japan (which the Japanese side has pushed for), compared to a European submarine option.

The vagueness of whatever that sort of strategic partnership could mean is another matter -- for instance, Australia might be able to negotiate with Japan in a way that any sort of strategic partnership gives Australia more leeway -- but I think considering the real possibility of such a partnership influencing a Japanese option submarine programme and potentially limiting Australia's future strategic flexibility vis-a-vis its relationship with both China and Japan is a significant area to consider for Australia. [i.e.: the vagueness of what that strategic partnership could mean is an area of concern itself]

But I think overall we are in general agreement regarding the important underlying point, which is that Australia needs to consider the important factor of being able to execute its submarine programme while retaining a sufficient degree of strategic flexibility.

Bltizo said:

Not quite.
Simply giving a finished product to another nation's military does not mean it is a done deal -- the ability to support and upgrade the product is a key part of any weapons transfer.
Many nations have made weapons deals and been unable to keep those weapons effective due to insufficient spare parts, logistics support, or upgrades to keep them relevant, due to a falling out in the relationship between the buyer nation and the seller nation. Buying the world's most advanced weapon from a seller but then being unable to operate them effectively due to

That is why future political possibilities in any relationship are a very big factor for any sort of weapons deal, if the change in the relationship can influence the future operation and support of the weapon in question.
That is a consideration for any nation making any sort of weapons deal, and is an issue for Australia to consider in its submarine procurement as well.

Click to expand...

It's going to be constructed in Australia by Australians. Basically it's a license product. Up grades are done on the license owner's consent not the license issuer's.
Japan had developed various domestic upgrades on US Licenses and have even sold the modification back to the US like the AEGIS monitor system.

SamuraiBlue said:

It's going to be constructed in Australia by Australians. Basically it's a license product. Up grades are done on the license owner's consent not the license issuer's.
Japan had developed various domestic upgrades on US Licenses and have even sold the modification back to the US like the AEGIS monitor system.

Click to expand...

I'm not very clear regarding the specificities of licensing and transfer of technology and supportability in the RAN' submarine competition requirements.

That said, even if completion of the contract would mean Australia is able to fully build, support and upgrade their submarines without Japanese assistance or consent, a remaining area of concern which Mr White did allude to is whether any change in a political relationship in the middle of the programme could influence the completion of the programme. That too has also occurred quite a few times in history between nations when a relationship has soured as a contract was being fulfilled.



The point I'm making is that it is very prudent to consider the political relationships between the buyer and seller in a weapons deal, and it cannot be ignored.

Bltizo said:

That said, even if completion of the contract would mean Australia is able to fully build, support and upgrade their submarines without Japanese assistance or consent, a remaining area of concern which Mr White did allude to is whether any change in a political relationship in the middle of the programme could influence the completion of the programme.

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Jesus, this can happen with every deal. A power of dumb arguments - there's a high risk that Japanese will start leaving Earth for Mars starting in 2030 and what will Australia do in such situation?

Brumby said:

That is exactly the criticism of Hugh White which you are reinforcing and that is a decision to go with Japan is an either or choice. On the contrary, cogent arguments can be made that such a pathway does not necessarily result in such a skewed outcome for Australia. There will obviously be ebb and flow in relationships in any decision but that has always been the case at least in modern geopolitical relationships.

Click to expand...

Problem with your statement is it doesn't address Hugh White's real world either/or scenario where a conflict or conflicts between China and Japan over the Diaoyu islands affecting Australia's submarine purchase. He rightly pointed out if Australia refuses to take sides in a Diaoyu conflict, Japan might delay submarine deliveries or even cancel them. Either way, Australia might not receive expected submarines at the appointed time. It's a legit point of view.

SamuraiBlue said:

My two cents to Mr. White's opinion is select an equipment based on function and quality of the product and not lodge some random political possibilities. It's RAN that is going to operate the subs not Japanese agents. Once ownership is handed over to Australia it's Australia's sub not Japan's so you would want the best equipment money can buy and not tipsy toe around some problem to be shafted down the second option.

Like Iceman said in TOP Gun "The plaque for the alternates is down in the ladies room."

Click to expand...

Two unanswered question from your statement are 1) if Australia refuses to take sides between China and Japan, would Tokyo delay or scrap delivery of submarines? And 2) even if Australia receives the submarines, what about post-delivery technical support? It's not unreasonable to think Japan might play submarine hardball to influence Australian policies.