SamuraiBlue
Captain
Historically if Hugh White was to take his position during the cold war or eve of WW2 he would have been branded a light headed opportunist at best and traitor at worst case scenario.
Hugh White is a pro-Australia ex-government official, and I don't take his views as either pro or anti anyone. He looks at the world as it is and not as he wished it was, and he base his strategic thoughts accordingly. If anything, he prefers American primacy over other choices.Hugh White has always been a pro PRC advocate so his opinion piece will always be biased as such.
I read his book, The China Choice, and it was a refreshing change from the usual neoconservative and liberal imperalists points-of-view among current Beltway Mandarins.Here is an opinion piece he had written three years ago.
(It seems as if I can't edit my reply above so am adding another post)
Basically just because a trade partner is opposing another trade partner does not mean you have to choose one all the way. That is not how diplomacy works and he should know better being a professor of strategic international relationship.
I understand what you mean but don't understand a professor would use such tactics to convey his argument unless he has some ulterior motives.Actually it is a false choice dilemma, a fallacious reasoning which unfortunately is frequently used as an argument.
(It seems as if I can't edit my reply above so am adding another post)
Basically just because a trade partner is opposing another trade partner does not mean you have to choose one all the way. That is not how diplomacy works and he should know better being a professor of strategic international relationship.
Personally I think it is a little doubtful if Japan would eventually do anything to suspend work or development on the submarines, even if Australia didn't support Japan in a future hypothetical Japan-China disagreement... but the sheer size of the Australia-China economic relationship means considering the risks and benefits of each choice is prudent.
The items Australia exports are all natural resources meaning any nation would requires them and will fill the void.
On the otherhand I doubt PRC will find another single source to fill the gap if PRC were to sever relationship with Australia.
I think the main criticism of Hugh White's argument is in the false choices of either or rather than shades of relationship as often reflected in complex geopolitical structures.
I don't think that's how the market would work -- if trade relations between China and Australia were cut off, Australia would have to offload excess capacity (and it would likely cause substantially lowered prices of the rest of its other similar natural exports as well), whereas China would go hunting for natural resources elsewhere.
It would obviously hurt both sides of the economic relationship, but who it hurts more is another question -- i.e.: how much of China's natural resource demand is filled by Australian imports (and how much of those Australian imports could be replaced by imports from elsewhere), and how much of Australia's GDP is dependent on exports to China (and how much of Australia's exports to China could be offloaded elsewhere with acceptable degradations in GDP)
But even ignoring the issue of "who would be hurt more" if the trade relationship between Australia and China were cut off, I think it is quite indisputable that China is without a doubt Australia's largest trading partner, and thus Australia should be interested in handling its affairs with China carefully, including whether it wants to get into a strategic partnership with a nation that may have a chance of entering in a state of confrontation with China.
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I see, but in the article about the submarines, is he not making an argument that is essentially touting the importance of the complex geopolitics in the region and arguing against Australia making what he believes is an "either or rather" choice?
That is to say, he's arguing that a submarine deal with Japan would be making an "either or rather" decision to strategically ally with Japan and would thus put Australia up against China if Japan and China came to disagreement (given the belief that Japan's willingness to share its sub tech is dependent on an Australian strategic partnership).
Thus he's against making a deal that would essentially tie Australia with another nation in a strategic manner -- and that it would be safer in a geopolitical sense to go for a European sub which allows Australia to keep its strategic choices more open to respond to the complex geopolitical structures in the region?
Or if I had to simplify this, I think he's saying:
Japanese sub choice: results in inevitable degradation of Australia's relationship with China while increasing Australia's relationship with Japan, if Japan and China come into conflict. If Australia does not degrade its relationship with China and support Japan, it risks hindering its submarine programme.
European sub choice: results in an ability for Australia to choose to maintain or degrade its relationship with China, and to control its degree of cooperation with Japan, if Japan and China come into conflict. In this case, whatever choice Australia makes with its relationship with both China and Japan, its submarine programme should not be affected.