Australian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
- Status
Blackstone
Brigadier
In the real world, nations that truly feel threatened by its neighbors would spend lots of money to defend itself, so a defense strategy that calls for tiny increases in near-term spending and large increases towards the end of the decade long strategy suggests Canberra either doesn't see China as a real threat to Australia's security, or doesn't feel it could realistically do much about it.
I see Australia's latest defense white paper as little more than rearranging the deck chairs and kicking the can down the road to future governments.
Brumby
Major
The security assessment are laid out in the document and the planned programs are a reflection of it based on what Australia can afford. Whether the plans are realistic and sufficient is beyond my pay grade to make as I don't have privy to intelligence and classified materials. You are entitled to your opinion.
The increasing spending towards the later years is simply maths because spending has to be increased to match the corresponding big ticket items that would be coming on stream in later years such as the F-35's, submarines, future frigates and OPV's.
Care to rationalise your statement.
Blackstone
Brigadier
Let's take a big picture look at some publicly available facts, figures, and analysis:
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said global average defense spending is 2.3% of GDP, and Australia is currently at 1.8%
- According to Australia's 2016 Defense White Paper, the country plans to reach 2.0% GDP by 2021
- The White Paper also listed increasing security concerns in ECS, SCS, areas north of Australia, and with Islamic terrorism
The reason I said Australia's new defense paper is little more than rearranging the deck chairs and kicking the can down the road is because the new paper merely repeats old proposals, with greater focus on the maritime dimension, but no additional resources; i.e., rearranging the deck chairs. The Turnbull administration isn't calling for 2% GDP this year or next, but in 5 years (when it may or may not be in office). To be clear, let's have a look at past defense papers:
- Increasing defense spending to 2% GDP was first announced in the 2000 defense paper, so wishing for bigger defense budgets is nothing new
- According to SIPRI, Australia averaged 1.8% GDP for defense spending for the last 15 years, and it's not at all clear it could or would spend more
- New frigates, submarines, and amphibian ships were listed in the 2009 defense white paper, and there's nothing new in the 2016 version; no new platforms, and no additional money (beyond the 2% GDP)
Brumby
Major
I did not say Australia did not align its spending with the listed challenges. I said I am not qualified to make that judgement. You are the one saying Australia is not spending enough relative to the challenges. Can you please read what is said before responding as this creates redundant effort. If you are making such claims, you should be justifying such a view. I don't see how a measure of defence spending against GDP can conclude either way. Humour me.
The new white paper basically affirms what was initially reflected in the 2009 white paper in terms of requirements with future frigates and submarines with quantification of numbers and spending scope in the new paper. It is a refinement of requirements with passage of time given that the platform replacements are targeted for the 2020 to 2040 period. Kicking the can means deferring decisions. For example, if the 2009 paper reflects investments in submarine or decison points but were not made then you might have a case. Please point out to me what decisions or investments were deferred to qualify as kicking the can.
An interesting take from Lowy on the Australian Defence White Paper below
Key points from the analysis include:
"The 2016 Defence White Paper's failure to clarify the order of Australia's strategic priorities represents a clear flaw." [aka Core homeland defence versus expeditionary anti-terrorist capabilities versus maritime security building]
...
"The US-led order that has underpinned strategic stability in Asia over the past 40 years is fast disintegrating"
...
"For the first time the 2016 Defence White Paper leaves open the prospect of an end to US primacy in the Western Pacific."
...
"However, paragraph 2.35 offers a startling projection of regional military expenditures to 2035, when China has clearly eclipsed the US. Its inclusion in the Defence White Paper is significant."
...
"But to frame thinking about China as 'newly powerful' is to commit the very gravest error, one that could lead to catastrophic miscalculation when assessing China's resolve. For the Chinese, theirs is the greatest civilisation to have ever existed – the core of a Sino-centric world order lasting 1800 years. From Beijing's point of view, the dominance of Western powers is but a blip on the long annals of the Middle Kingdom, and China's rise is merely the natural correction to the rightful longstanding norm.
The implication of the 2016 Defence White Paper is that if China merely constrains its ambition and accepts the 'established rules-based order' as imposed by the more enlightened foreign powers, then peace and stability can prevail.
But herein lays the immutable truth about the great-power rivalry unfolding on Australia's doorstep: China views itself not as newly emerging, but as re-emerging. This means China's ambition is not based on grandiose fantasies but on reclaiming past glories and overcoming recent humiliations. That's a very different proposition to what the 'newly powerful' label so condescendingly implies."
...
"Conclusion
I'll conclude this lengthy review by referencing the to CSIS in Washington, where he noted President's Xi's expressed desire to avoid the 'Thucydides Trap'.
This is a reference to the tendency throughout history for conflict to erupt when an established power is faced with a rising power. In describing the cause of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides provides this timeless explanation: 'It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.'
Turnbull told his American audience that he believed President Xi's sincerity with regard to avoiding the Thucydides Trap, and that China should therefore refrain from provocations that might lead to conflict.
But what the Prime Minister failed to mention was that the Peloponnesian War broke out when the established power (Sparta) declared war on the rising power (Athens), not the other way around. Therefore, when President Xi speaks of avoiding the Thucydides trap, he wants America to peaceably give ground.
It is beyond question that the American-led global order has been unambiguously good for Australia and the world. The US has been a more restrained, universalist, and inclusive hegemon than any historical comparator. It is no accident the American era coincides with unprecedented advancements in every metric of human progress. But we must be honest with ourselves. China's determination to expel the US from Asia is absolute, and the 'established rules-based order' is coming to an end."
Key points from the analysis include:
"The 2016 Defence White Paper's failure to clarify the order of Australia's strategic priorities represents a clear flaw." [aka Core homeland defence versus expeditionary anti-terrorist capabilities versus maritime security building]
...
"The US-led order that has underpinned strategic stability in Asia over the past 40 years is fast disintegrating"
...
"For the first time the 2016 Defence White Paper leaves open the prospect of an end to US primacy in the Western Pacific."
...
"However, paragraph 2.35 offers a startling projection of regional military expenditures to 2035, when China has clearly eclipsed the US. Its inclusion in the Defence White Paper is significant."
...
"But to frame thinking about China as 'newly powerful' is to commit the very gravest error, one that could lead to catastrophic miscalculation when assessing China's resolve. For the Chinese, theirs is the greatest civilisation to have ever existed – the core of a Sino-centric world order lasting 1800 years. From Beijing's point of view, the dominance of Western powers is but a blip on the long annals of the Middle Kingdom, and China's rise is merely the natural correction to the rightful longstanding norm.
The implication of the 2016 Defence White Paper is that if China merely constrains its ambition and accepts the 'established rules-based order' as imposed by the more enlightened foreign powers, then peace and stability can prevail.
But herein lays the immutable truth about the great-power rivalry unfolding on Australia's doorstep: China views itself not as newly emerging, but as re-emerging. This means China's ambition is not based on grandiose fantasies but on reclaiming past glories and overcoming recent humiliations. That's a very different proposition to what the 'newly powerful' label so condescendingly implies."
...
"Conclusion
I'll conclude this lengthy review by referencing the to CSIS in Washington, where he noted President's Xi's expressed desire to avoid the 'Thucydides Trap'.
This is a reference to the tendency throughout history for conflict to erupt when an established power is faced with a rising power. In describing the cause of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides provides this timeless explanation: 'It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.'
Turnbull told his American audience that he believed President Xi's sincerity with regard to avoiding the Thucydides Trap, and that China should therefore refrain from provocations that might lead to conflict.
But what the Prime Minister failed to mention was that the Peloponnesian War broke out when the established power (Sparta) declared war on the rising power (Athens), not the other way around. Therefore, when President Xi speaks of avoiding the Thucydides trap, he wants America to peaceably give ground.
It is beyond question that the American-led global order has been unambiguously good for Australia and the world. The US has been a more restrained, universalist, and inclusive hegemon than any historical comparator. It is no accident the American era coincides with unprecedented advancements in every metric of human progress. But we must be honest with ourselves. China's determination to expel the US from Asia is absolute, and the 'established rules-based order' is coming to an end."
Last edited:
Blackstone
Brigadier
You're also not qualified to make judgements on all sorts of forum-related topics, and yet it never stopped you from rendering your opinions in the past. But, somehow this is different, right mate? As for measuring defense spending, I take a reasonable person's perspective and say nations that feel threaten by others would spend the money necessary to address their concerns. The fact Australia is spending at the same GDP levels as 2000 through 2014 tells me they don't feel threatened enough by China's reemergence to redirect their domestic priorities to pay for new military spending.
In other words, Canberra doesn't seriously believe China would either threaten the Australia homeland or impede its maritime commerce, so the consideration for Parliament is whether to join foreign adventures as solutions looking for problems.
Kicking the can down the road means delaying decision in hopes the problem would go away, or for someone else to make decisions. Australia's year 2000 defense white paper called for raising defense spending to about 2% GDP, 16 years later, defense is still at about 1.8% GDP. The ships and submarines from 2009 paper are still waiting for someone to make the final decisions. That's kicking the can down the road.
then you just blamed Jian Zemin wrongly. He didn't "resurrect" anything, I assure you because my generation was educated before his administration so as anybody older than me. And my parents were born in the 1930s.
Blackstone
Brigadier
Brumby
Major
When a claim or assertion is made without basis it is term unsubstantiated or unfounded. When we do then one should be prepared to defend that position or opinion. Yes I do make judgments but on this occasion I clearly said I am unable to do so as to whether Australia is investing sufficiently in its security given its threat assessment. You view it differently and hence I am challenging you to substantiate your view because matching defence spending to GDP is simply superficial even if you insist it is a reasonable person's view. Defence spending programs are based on threat assessments, a determination of what assets and spending are required to address those threats and gamed against different scenarios and their probabilities. Unless you have access to intelligence and security information, you just can't make any determination of threshold requirements let alone adequacy. As an example, in the 2016 white paper Australia has deemed necessary to increase its submarine force from 6 to 12. How did it get to this number? At a simplistic level if I were to speculate, it would be from deterrent patrols to some form of participation in blockade of SLOC. There could be multitudes of scenarios leading to determination of force structure. As an example :
There are 4 potential choke points leading from and to the SCS. If a blockade was to be established around those choke points, then using the 1/3 rule a minimum of 12 submarines in the force would be required. Alternatively a short term surge requirement might require 6 if the plan is to extend the patrols deep into the SCS. I do not know what considerations or scenarios are in the Australian defence plans and neither do you. So how is it possible for you to determine that Australia is not spending enough to address those issues. You don’t even know what conditions are considered relative to that threat assessment.
The period between 2000 to 2014 is not even relevant because Australia’s view of China during that period was threat neutral. It is only in the 2016 white paper that the increasing threat in the SCS was highlighted.
As a starter, during that period, there were 6 different prime ministers and a change of government three times besides the 2009 global financial crisis. There are multitude of reasons that could have an impact on plans. As I previously asked you, are there any specific action points in the 2009 paper and since that supports your assertion that what is reflected in the 2016 are simply kicking the can. For example, were there any decisions regarding the submarine plans that were called for in 2009 but not made?
- Status