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TerraN_EmpirE

Tyrant King
The Chinese Yuan would have to be offered and considered a real practical and NATO compatible option for them to have a chance.
The Australian Navy placed a number of strict standards and systems integration requirements on the Collins replacement program. Including use of US Made fire control and management systems, this precluded any chance of Chinese or Russian bidding as they would need access to those systems and standards. As long as Australia remains a NATO compliant state and the Australian Navy insists on using shared American systems the PRC who is not a NATO alliance or Compliment state or American ally they would be prevented from bidding on a contract that requires such. Ergo your argument is invalid.
 
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It will be interesting to see what these new FFGs are capable of...is there already a spec for them?

How will they compare to the Anzacs. I have to say that the upgrades going into the Anzacs are making them very capable.
related:
DCNS Targets Australian Frigate Tender
Rand Corp., a think tank, is due to conclude a short list of competitors this month for Australia’s tender for nine frigates to replace the Anzac warship, Hervé Boy, DCNS business development manager, said March 16.

An announcement of a “short list of two or three” candidates is due later this month in Australia’s Sea 5000 Future Frigate Program, he told journalists as DCNS formally handed over the Languedoc, a Frégate MultiMission or multimission frigate, to the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR), the international program manager.

The Languedoc handover took place as the stealthy frigate took to sea for a brief cruise in heavy rain and strong wind off the coast of southern France, with Navy Seals sailing close by in an Ecume rigid inflatable commando boat and an NH90 naval helicopter flying over.

OCCAR delivered the frigate to Direction Générale de l’Armement, the French procurement office, which in turn will hand the warship over to the French Navy.

Canada is also among the export prospects for DCNS, as Ottawa seeks to acquire 15 frigates, of which 12 would be multipurpose and three air defense versions, he said.

The Australian frigate program, estimated to be worth AUS $20 billion (US $15.2 billion), would replace eight Anzac frigates. DCNS is pitching an extended-range version of its frigate, which could be 6,000 to 7,000 tons, and could be 5 to 6 meters longer than the 6,000-ton standard version built for the French Navy and sold to Egypt and Morocco.

Morocco and Egypt have each bought one FREMM vessel, with the latter expected to sign contracts this year for two more Gowind corvettes under options, to add to the four already acquired.

A Thales Sea Fire radar would be fitted on the extended-range version.

DCNS is also offering Australia its planned intermediate frigate, as the FREMM is much bigger than the Anzac, which displaces around 3,500 tons, Boy said. The intermediate warship could be around 4,200 tons, and could be extended 3, 6 or 9 meters to displace up to 4,600 tons, depending on the requirement and budget.

Also competing is Navantia with a design based on the F-100 hull; BAE with the Type 26 frigate; and Fincantieri with the Italian version of FREMM.

New Zealand is also looking to buy two frigates, and there is speculation Wellington might pick the same warship as selected by Australia, as Canberra could build locally and then sail two vessels to its island ally.

In December, France granted DCNS a study contract for the intermediate frigate, Boy said.

French procurement chief Laurent Collet-Billon has said a launch contract for the intermediate frigate is due to be signed this year. France is due to order five intermediate frigates.

The intermediate frigate is still under study and while the planned vessel would be armed with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and surface-to-air systems, the weapon set would not be identical to the heavier FREMM warship.

There is stiff competition in the Canadian planned order, attracting close attention from Britain, which is buying the BAE Systems Type 26; Damen of Netherlands; Fincantieri of Italy; Navantia of Spain; and ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems of Germany.

France also hopes to sell frigates to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Collet-Billon has said. DCNS declined to comment.

The Languedoc is the third FREMM frigate for the French Navy, which will receive six of the vessels in the standard version by 2019, and then two air defense variants in 2021 and 2022. The latter would have a more powerful Herakles radar and a longer-range Aster 30 missile for air defense, and the cruise missile would be removed, said Anne Bianchi, DCNS FREMM program director.

The frigate is armed with a naval cruise missile, which delivers a “deep strategic strike capability” with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers, a French Navy operations officer said in the operations room, which manages the combat management system. There is a powerful ASW capability with the Captas 4 variable-depth sonar, and a helicopter equipped with sonar sensor.

There is also high automation in weapons and sensors with a flexible combat management system that can be easily upgraded, he said.

There is interoperability as the Aquitaine, the first of series, sailed with the US Task Force 50, which was commanded by the French Navy Charles de Gaulle nuclear power aircraft carrier, he said. The French vessels are equipped with NATO standard datalinks.

The frigate’s combat systems include electronic warfare, Herakles multifunction radar, cruise missiles, Aster and Exocet MM40 missiles, and MU 90 torpedoes.
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from my armchair in one of the malls in Prague: excellent choice! :) I would expect huge saving(s) if combined with purchasing the French subs
 

FORBIN

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
MH-60R replace S-70

Australian ‘Romeo’ helicopters hone anti-submarine warfare skills with HMAS Rankin

Royal Australian Navy’s naval aviation 725 Squadron based at naval air station HMAS Albatross, has been conducting anti-submarine warfare exercises with submarine HMAS Rankin, off Jervis Bay, during the past two weeks.
Navy’s latest anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the MH-60R Seahawk ‘Romeo’ maritime combat helicopters conducted a number of sonar dipping activities to locate the submarine, localise and track it.
Commanding Officer 725 Squadron, Commander Matthew Royals said it had been an intensive period of training.
“This is the first time we’ve done a ‘DIPEX’ in the Royal Australian Navy since 1994. The interaction between Rankin and 725 Squadron during the exercise was excellent and we have learnt a lot from an air crew and maintenance perspective,” he said.
The single propeller submarine HMAS Rankin moves silently on electric power supplied to the propulsion motor by banks of batteries, which makes them challenging to locate.
“While our Collins class submarines are very stealthy, the sonar buoys and airborne low frequency sonar we use are highly developed,” Commander Royals said.
The MH-60R was the Australian Navy’s next generation submarine hunter and anti-surface warfare helicopter. According to the Navy, it is equipped with a sophisticated sensor suite, torpedoes and air-to-surface missiles.
While the training was valuable for the aviators, it was also an important exercise for Rankin.
“For the submariners, it’s an opportunity to hear what noise our equipment makes so they can identify it and practice avoidance techniques,” Commander Royals said.

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Australian-Romeo-helicopters-HMAS-Rankin.jpg

 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
If we strike a deal with Japan, we're buying more than submarines

Asian power politics must be factored into any defence contract decisions.

Many people in Canberra think we should partner with Japan to build our new submarines, whether or not they offer the best boats for the money, because Japan's bid is much more than a commercial deal. It's the basis for a closer strategic commitment as well, so they think we'd get two birds with one stone.

But there are big risks in this, both to our submarine capability and to our relations with Japan. We need to understand those risks before taking a decision.
...
We must be quite clear about this. Tokyo expects that in return for its help to build our submarines, it would receive not just many of billions of dollars, but clear understandings that Australia will support Japan politically, strategically and even militarily against China. That is why Japan is bidding.
...
Faced with this, they think Beijing will back off. Then America's leadership in Asia would be restored, and everything would return to the way it used to be before China got stroppy. In other words, supporters of an alliance with Japan are sure it would never be tested, because simply creating it would help ensure that China's threat would disappear. And if that happens, it matters much less whose submarines we buy, because they won't be needed.
...
It's much more likely that China will not be deterred by any messages we send through buying submarines and building an alliance with Japan. Instead, it will keep claiming more political and strategic weight in Asia, and tensions will keep rising. And what would an alliance with Japan mean then? Is it wise for us to commit ourselves to support Japan against China if, as is quite likely, strategic tensions between them keep growing?
...
These are not hypothetical questions. In the new power politics of the Asian Century, they are very real, and we have to take them seriously because they are certainly taken seriously in Tokyo. An alliance of the kind Tokyo clearly seeks would mortgage Australia's relationship with China, and indeed our entire future in Asia, to the troubled future of China-Japan relations. This is, quite obviously, not in our interests.
...
In reality, no matter what Tony Abbott might believe, Australia is not going to give Japan the strategic support it wants. We are very unlikely to seriously jeopardise our links with Beijing to do Japan any favours – let alone go to war with China at Japan's behest. So we would let Japan down.

And that has huge implications for the submarine deal. Japan is only willing to share its ultra-sensitive submarine secrets because it expects us to be its close ally. If we don't give Japan what it expects from the deal, we won't get what we expect from it: unstinting help to make sure our submarines project succeeds.

What kind of co-operation will we get from Japan if in say, five or 10 years, with the project well under way but no subs yet delivered, Japan faces a confrontation with China and we don't give it the support it expects? Why wouldn't Japan walk away from the project, or start putting tight limits on what it is willing to share with us?

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Brumby

Major
If we strike a deal with Japan, we're buying more than submarines

Asian power politics must be factored into any defence contract decisions.

Many people in Canberra think we should partner with Japan to build our new submarines, whether or not they offer the best boats for the money, because Japan's bid is much more than a commercial deal. It's the basis for a closer strategic commitment as well, so they think we'd get two birds with one stone.

But there are big risks in this, both to our submarine capability and to our relations with Japan. We need to understand those risks before taking a decision.
...
We must be quite clear about this. Tokyo expects that in return for its help to build our submarines, it would receive not just many of billions of dollars, but clear understandings that Australia will support Japan politically, strategically and even militarily against China. That is why Japan is bidding.
...
Faced with this, they think Beijing will back off. Then America's leadership in Asia would be restored, and everything would return to the way it used to be before China got stroppy. In other words, supporters of an alliance with Japan are sure it would never be tested, because simply creating it would help ensure that China's threat would disappear. And if that happens, it matters much less whose submarines we buy, because they won't be needed.
...
It's much more likely that China will not be deterred by any messages we send through buying submarines and building an alliance with Japan. Instead, it will keep claiming more political and strategic weight in Asia, and tensions will keep rising. And what would an alliance with Japan mean then? Is it wise for us to commit ourselves to support Japan against China if, as is quite likely, strategic tensions between them keep growing?
...
These are not hypothetical questions. In the new power politics of the Asian Century, they are very real, and we have to take them seriously because they are certainly taken seriously in Tokyo. An alliance of the kind Tokyo clearly seeks would mortgage Australia's relationship with China, and indeed our entire future in Asia, to the troubled future of China-Japan relations. This is, quite obviously, not in our interests.
...
In reality, no matter what Tony Abbott might believe, Australia is not going to give Japan the strategic support it wants. We are very unlikely to seriously jeopardise our links with Beijing to do Japan any favours – let alone go to war with China at Japan's behest. So we would let Japan down.

And that has huge implications for the submarine deal. Japan is only willing to share its ultra-sensitive submarine secrets because it expects us to be its close ally. If we don't give Japan what it expects from the deal, we won't get what we expect from it: unstinting help to make sure our submarines project succeeds.

What kind of co-operation will we get from Japan if in say, five or 10 years, with the project well under way but no subs yet delivered, Japan faces a confrontation with China and we don't give it the support it expects? Why wouldn't Japan walk away from the project, or start putting tight limits on what it is willing to share with us?

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This article has been debated and beaten to death 5 pages ago.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
Glad to see that Australia is ordering more P-8A Poseidon aircraft.

I think people will be interested in reading what this US Navy pilot, who was traine don and then operated the P-3C Orion has to say after he transitioned to the P-8A Poseidon.

I am taking the portion of the article focused on his comments about the P-8A. A lot of the article relates his expereiences with the P-3C.

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793376108617282121.jpg

Fox Trot Alpha said:
Following a few deployments with the P-3C, my squadron transitioned to the new P-8A Poseidon. The P-8A is derived from the Boeing 737. The aircraft features a Boeing 737-800 fuselage mated to 737-900 wings and is equipped with raked wingtips optimized for low altitude flight and long endurance. In place of a cargo hold, the aircraft boasts additional fuel tanks and a weapons bay. The reliability, speed, and sensor capabilities equate to a significant improvement over the legacy aircraft (the P-3). In the Poseidon, the Navy married advanced sensors and communications connectivity with a modern, highly reliable and efficient airframe that already existed on the commercial marketplace.

If I sound like a Poseidon lover, well then consider me guilty. I am, and admit it honestly. The aircraft is powerful, reliable, and easy to fly. It was a challenge transitioning from a straight wing turboprop to a high altitude, swept wing jet, but I personally found the P-8A to be intuitive and comfortable to fly. The largest difference is not in flight characteristics, but rather in how the pilot interfaces with the aircraft. The P-3C is flown hands-on, with little if any automation. In the Poseidon, the pilot utilizes the Flight Management Computer and a highly advanced coupled autopilot to fly the jet. Whether flying on airway routes or positioning the aircraft to employ sensors, the Poseidon utilizes high levels of automation. This is not harder or easier than flying hands-on, simply different, and requires a different approach.

The tougher part about the jet is acting as a tactical operator and employing the sensors of the aircraft. The P-8A is revolutionary when it comes to sensor management, data fusion, and connectivity. The challenge for operators is not having insufficient sensor performance, but rather how to manage so many capable sensors, process the information, and transmit actionable data to commanders through a variety of communications networks and datalinks.

The P-8A boasts five mission crew workstations, all of which feature dual reconfigurable touchscreen displays and data entry keyboards. The ability to do any job from any workstation makes load sharing possible and is indeed critical to success during a mission. For example, during an information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions we might have extra electronic warfare operators in the seats scanning for radar emitters while another operator scans the radar and maps where those emitters are located. Conversely, during an ASW mission we can place extra acoustic operators in the seats to interpret sonar signals and track a submarine. The flexibility is extremely impressive.

I won't claim the P-8A does everything better than the P-3C. For one, the controls feel very different between the two aircraft. I find the P-3C to be a bit crisper on the controls, especially at low altitude and in the landing pattern. This isn't surprising, given the Orion's thick, straight wing and the swept wing and spoilers on the Poseidon. Also, the lack of a Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) aboard the P-8A is a drawback.

Many folks ask if I feel less comfortable with two engines in the P-8A rather than four in the P-3C. Realistically, I'll take Poseidon any day. The reliability of the CFM-56 turbofans on the jet is generations ahead of the T-56 turboprops on the Orion. CFM-56 shutdown rates are on the order of three per million flight hours. In fact, P-8A has been flying for more than three years and has yet to have an in-flight engine shutdown. I'll take the reliability of the P-8A every time over the P-3C.

Overall, I've found the P-8A allows crew-members to focus more on tactical employment and getting every ounce of performance out of the jet's sensors and weapons. While the Orion is a very safe airplane statistically, it was designed in another age with different design philosophies. It's very hands-on and user intensive especially for pilots and flight engineers. Because of the fact that the P-3C is honestly trying to break, catch on fire, or generally kill you during any given flight, we have to devote a great deal of energy simply to operating it safely. This isn't a hit on the P-3C, any airplane of that generation is like that, and the fact that some of these birds are over 40 years old is a testament to the engineers who designed them and our maintainers who keep them flying. Because reliability is baked into the P-8, we can focus more on tactical effectiveness. The result is higher situational awareness (SA) and much better mission performance in the new jet.

So, current plans call for:

U.S. Navy : 122 P-8A Poseidon Aircraft
India Navy: 012 P-8I Neptune Aircraft
Australia : 012 P-8A Poseidon Aircraft
U.K.: ----- 009 P-8A Poseidon Aircraft

I expect we will see more P_8 orders. Bnoth from these countries, and from other countries who will transition away from existing P-3s onto the P-8 as time goes on.

793550415343331107.jpg

Right now the following nations are operating P-3c that could tranistion to the P-8:

South Korea: 16 aircraft
Brazil: 12 Aircraft
Germany: 8 Aircraft
Norway: 6 Aircraft
New Zealand: 6 Aircraft
Greece: 6 Aircraft
Chile: 4 Aircraft

How many will? Only time wil tell.
 
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