AUKUS News, Views, Analysis.

Andy1974

Senior Member
Registered Member
The S9G reactor in the US Virginia class uses 93% enriched uranium. The PWR2 reactor in the UK Astute class uses 97.3% enriched uranium. This is far beyond the enrichment level needed for a practical nuclear weapon. If Australia has such reactors, then, at least in theory, might they not be able to break open a reactor and use the fissile material to create a nuclear weapons core to insert into a waiting nuclear weapon? For practical purposes, would not Australia's possession of weapons grade fissile material combined with Tomahawks make them considered a nuclear armed state? What implications does this deal have for international norms regarding nuclear proliferation?

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If they buy Rolls Royce rectors they are completely sealed and can’t be refueled, so in theory they could come up with something like keeping the reactors under British ownership? Doesn’t stop them doing as you suggest though, but might get around some “rules”.
 

FireyCross

New Member
Registered Member
This comment reminded me that foolish men discuss opinions and wise men discuss data. There is too much opinion being discussed here and not enough data. Let's change it a bit.

America's interst in AUKUS is obvious so I will focus on the other two countries.
I am impressed! Great work.
 

Helius

Senior Member
Registered Member
The S9G reactor in the US Virginia class uses 93% enriched uranium. The PWR2 reactor in the UK Astute class uses 97.3% enriched uranium. This is far beyond the enrichment level needed for a practical nuclear weapon. If Australia has such reactors, then, at least in theory, might they not be able to break open a reactor and use the fissile material to create a nuclear weapons core to insert into a waiting nuclear weapon? For practical purposes, would not Australia's possession of weapons grade fissile material combined with Tomahawks make them considered a nuclear armed state? What implications does this deal have for international norms regarding nuclear proliferation?

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This is exactly the loophole to the non-proliferation treaty AUKUS is exploiting now. The problem is not just the obvious danger of proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material by non-nuclear weapon states, but the broader implication of undermining non-proliferation and arms control efforts worldwide (Iran, NK. Hello??), which the Anglo Three, in their overzealous drive to put China down, clearly didn't care about any of it enough to even give it a moment's thought.

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During the Wednesday call with Campbell and Doshi, some officials and experts raised concerns that Australian vessels would need to run on highly enriched uranium fuel, something that could potentially deepen nuclear proliferation threats and weaken arms control. Other nonproliferation experts said the decision to share nuclear technology with Australia sets a dangerous precedent for international nonproliferation, even when the technology is being shared with a trusted democratic ally. Top-of-the-line, nuclear-powered U.S. submarines are fueled by highly enriched uranium that is typically not replaced during its life cycle. But such uranium is only produced by a handful of nations, including the United States and United Kingdom, and nonproliferation experts are reluctant to see Pandora’s box flung open.
But James Acton, an expert on nuclear policy with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said there is currently a “theoretical loophole” in the global Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty—the cornerstone of international nonproliferation—regarding nuclear submarines. The treaty does not bar states without nuclear weapons from obtaining nuclear technology for submarines, something that would fall outside IAEA inspections and safeguarding.
No non-nuclear state has ever used that loophole—until, apparently, now. The problem, Acton said, is not with Australia but how other countries less friendly to the United States might try to follow suit. “I’m not worried about Australia proliferating. I’m worried about the precedent this sets,” Acton said.
There is now going to be a non-nuclear weapons state with a possible large quantity of directly weapons-usable nuclear material not under [IAEA] safeguards,” Acton said. “And I worry this is a precedent that other states will seek to exploit. At the top of my list of concerns here is Iran.”
 
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FireyCross

New Member
Registered Member
Isn't the S9G a sealed unit as well? I can't see even the Americans being willing to openly start supplying the HE uranium needed for refuelling. Even for the Americans, that'd be a bit too much when it comes to pissing all over non-proliferation.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
Isn't the S9G a sealed unit as well? I can't see even the Americans being willing to openly start supplying the HE uranium needed for refuelling. Even for the Americans, that'd be a bit too much when it comes to pissing all over non-proliferation.

The point is less that Australia might scrap their brand new subs to make nukes with their reactors (they can do that easily enough with civilian nuclear power plants if they really wanted nukes without wasting hundreds of billions for scrap metal, which is what SSNs without their reactors will be)but rather that if China was sufficiently pissed off, it could use this exact same precedent to effectively sell nukes to America’s enemies.

Hey Cuba, wanna buy some retired Han class SSNs from China?

How about you Iran and Saudi Arabia? We will sell you both a couple boats each to keep it fair.

Since we ran out of retired Han subs, how about we retrofit a Song/yuan with a nuclear reactor? It shouldn’t matter that the SSK can still fully function if you strip out the nuclear reactor since you signed on this piece of paper here that you won’t do it! If a pinky swear from the Aussies is good enough for the Brits and Americans, the same is good enough for China. Hell, China can do mad volumes with a minimally modified SSK with retrofitted nuclear reactor AIP.

Hell, Russia might have just found the solution to their soviet SSN rush fleet problem here. No need to spend vast amounts decommissioning them, just sell them to whoever wants nukes.
 

Helius

Senior Member
Registered Member
I wonder if Iran can now enrich to 95% if they say it’s for a sub reactor.
If they completely tear apart the JCPOA and go: "sanctions be damned!", then sure. Iran has been enriching uranium beyond the agreed limit of 3.67% nowadays anyway.
 

Andy1974

Senior Member
Registered Member
The point is less that Australia might scrap their brand new subs to make nukes with their reactors (they can do that easily enough with civilian nuclear power plants if they really wanted nukes without wasting hundreds of billions for scrap metal, which is what SSNs without their reactors will be)but rather that if China was sufficiently pissed off, it could use this exact same precedent to effectively sell nukes to America’s enemies.

Hey Cuba, wanna buy some retired Han class SSNs from China?

How about you Iran and Saudi Arabia? We will sell you both a couple boats each to keep it fair.

Since we ran out of retired Han subs, how about we retrofit a Song/yuan with a nuclear reactor? It shouldn’t matter that the SSK can still fully function if you strip out the nuclear reactor since you signed on this piece of paper here that you won’t do it! If a pinky swear from the Aussies is good enough for the Brits and Americans, the same is good enough for China. Hell, China can do mad volumes with a minimally modified SSK with retrofitted nuclear reactor AIP.

Hell, Russia might have just found the solution to their soviet SSN rush fleet problem here. No need to spend vast amounts decommissioning them, just sell them to whoever wants nukes.
Yes, I get it now, very clever.

I had thought that the AUKUS sub deal might involve a decommissioning site down under, far, far away from the UK, where we can dump all our old boats/reactors.
 

Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
This is a story of geopolitically driven military procurement gone mad.

Australia is an island nation whose very survival is dependent upon its ability to access strategic sea lines of communication (SLOCs) so that critical commerce links can operate on a sustained basis. In short, if any nation or group of nations were to cut off Australia’s sea links to the rest of the world, the country would eventually wither away and die.

Despite its impressive land mass, Australia is a relatively small nation, with a population of just under 26 million (making it 55th in world rankings) with a GDP of US$1.3 trillion (13th in the world.) The 2021 defense budget had Australia spending 2.1% of its GDP, or around AU$44.6 billion. Just under AU$16 billion of this was spent on the Australian Navy, which is comprised of nearly 50 commissioned vessels and over 16,000 personnel...


The beauty of the US-UK proposal is that there are no messy details attached – how much the program will cost, how Australia will operate advanced nuclear power systems when it has no indigenous nuclear power experience to draw upon, and, perhaps most importantly, how Australia plans on manning eight large submarines when it can barely field four crews for its existing Collins-class fleet?

Moreover, beyond the US-dictated operational premise of “challenging the Chinese,” the record is silent on how the acquisition of large nuclear-powered submarines will advance Australian national security. It is the silence and maneuverability which made the Collins-class submarine such a potentially lethal weapon. Any Australian fleet equipped with nuclear submarines will find it difficult to operate in the shallow waters that define the majority of the SLOCs they will be required to defend. Moreover, the noise and bulkier configuration of a nuclear-powered submarine will mean any future Australian force will be far less capable when it comes to killing a modern naval opponent, and far more likely to be detected and destroyed.

The reality is the US-UK offer to provide Australia with nuclear submarines is little more than domestic politics projected onto a theoretical geopolitical map of the US’ making. Australia was facing a fiscal crisis due to the exploding budget associated with the French-designed replacement for the Collins-class submarine, one that could threaten to bring down the government of Scott Morrison. Boris Johnston remains desperate for a platform from which he can project an image of UK geopolitical relevance. And Biden is in desperate need of being able to do the same for an American constituency reeling after the humiliation of losing a 20-year conflict in Afghanistan.

But the fact remains that the US has no meaningful military counter to China, the UK is not capable of sustaining any credible military presence in the Pacific, and Australia cannot afford to acquire and operate a force of eight nuclear-powered attack submarines. The Australian nuclear submarine project is a dangerous joke that only further exacerbates the existing geopolitical crisis with China by injecting a military dimension which will never see the light of day.

Scott Ritter


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Dante80

Junior Member
Registered Member
For practical purposes, would not Australia's possession of weapons grade fissile material combined with Tomahawks make them considered a nuclear armed state?
Short answer, no. For pretty much the same reasons Brazil getting the Álvaro Alberto class will also not be considered a NWS as per NPT.
 
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