AUKUS News, Views, Analysis.

tygyg1111

Major
Registered Member
There seems to be one gigantic flaw with this position. I think it's fine and even responsible for powers to be concerned about what a growing superpower might do as it gains more ability to exert its strength. However, it's a terrible idea to navigate this superpower by provoking it. So far, Australia has been lucky that China is almost infinitely patient and hasn't gotten too upset so far, but what the hell would Australia do if China decided to bear a grudge?
They provoke because in their hearts they are not yet ready to accept an inferior position. As long as the US stands and retains it's global standing, all Anglos believe that they share the same status by association. Thus, countries like Australia see themselves as at least China's equals, because the US currently is.
When the US loses it's position, there will be a short duration of teeth gnashing, before acceptance sets in. At that time, for Australia at least, there will be a reconciliation of all the lessons put upon them in the last 15 years, and they will face reality and admit "we were wrong".
 

4Tran

Junior Member
Registered Member
They provoke because in their hearts they are not yet ready to accept an inferior position. As long as the US stands and retains it's global standing, all Anglos believe that they share the same status by association. Thus, countries like Australia see themselves as at least China's equals, because the US currently is.
When the US loses it's position, there will be a short duration of teeth gnashing, before acceptance sets in. At that time, for Australia at least, there will be a reconciliation of all the lessons put upon them in the last 15 years, and they will face reality and admit "we were wrong".
The dumbest part about all of this is that China doesn't even want Australia to be in an inferior position to begin with. China is perfectly happy buying Australian goods and resources. So the whole "China is a threat" thing is made up by Australian politicians to score domestic points. And even with all this, China still doesn't care, and won't care as long as Australia is happy making money.

But that all changes if there's a conflict in the Western Pacific. What the Australians are unwilling to think about is that if they become belligerent, they lose regardless of the outcome of such a conflict. Obviously if they lose, then China is going to be able dictate terms. But even if they win, then their biggest customer has just suffered a big loss and will be unable to buy as much Australian goods!
 

Blitzo

General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
I think it's worth acknowledging that the consensus position actually aligns with the vast majority of its critics on a number of basic points.

1. Concern about how China may exercise its preponderant power in decades to come, including in ways that undermine or directly threaten our interests.

I was just able to catch the second half of a debate held by the Lowy Institute on "How to Defend Australia," and on reflection after seeing it, I think the word "interests" is something that Australia needs to properly define for itself.
At present, Australian "interests" is too nebulous, and feels to me like "preserve as much of the immediate post cold war balance of power that Australia enjoyed as possible" -- rather than identifying key areas of interfacing/disagreements with the PRC that Australia views as within its actual core interests that they absolutely cannot compromise on, versus others which it may view as "nice to have".

Things like "securing Australian trade routes" or wanting to "deter Chinese aggression in the region" are ultimately vague and may have many diplomatic offramps before having to commit to a military structure in pursuit of a strategic confrontation. Unsaid other things (but their silence speaks volumes) include Australia's actual position on what they would do in various permutations of a Taiwan conflict, as well as what is Australia's actual position wrt the CPC which rules the PRC and the CPC's legitimacy both as a government but also more importantly as a political system.


2a. Acknowledging that the United States is the only entity that is capable of effectively balancing against the potential exercise of that power in the Asia-Pacific region.
2b. Concluding, therefore, that Australia should seek to maintain good relations with the United States, and that we should welcome USA's continued engagement in the region.
3. Looking beyond the United States, that Australia's interests are served by (1) maintaining a capable defence force, (2) engaging with other regional nations such as Japan and Indonesia, (3) supporting international institutions that, at least in theory, constrain the behaviour of states according to principles that have been mutually agreed upon.

Different folks will place different weights on these things. But in considering where the real divergences come from, there are meaningful differences in how one assesses the threat potential of China. In part that depends on how just broadly or narrowly one conceives of Australia's national interests, but there are also clear ideological dimensions to those differences in threat perception. But I actually think the greater divergence is not in relation to perceptions of China, but in relation to perceptions of the United States and the role that it plays in the dynamic system.

If you believe that Australian interests always align with those of the United States, that the actions of the United States are always determined by rational and virtuous men on the basis of sober and sagacious advice derived from an accurate and complete apprehension of reality, that the United States is an essentially quiescent "status quo" power that seeks nothing more than to continue to preside benevolently over an inherently stable world order, then you will inevitably conclude that the risk of major conflict in the Asia-Pacific emerges solely in proportion to the appetite for such from the PRC and, therefore the closer association we have with the United States, the better. If you do not believe these things, then you may come to very different conclusions about the sources of potential conflict in the international system and where our interests lie in relation. I notice that talk of the United States as a "status quo" power has disappeared from the conversation in recent times. I can't imagine why.

Hugh White writes about our "post-American future" because he believes that the United States will ultimately yield a sphere of influence to China in the Asia-Pacific. White asserts that America's fundamental security interests are not threatened by the rise of China as they were by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, in large part because there is little prospect of China dominating Eurasia as the Soviet Union otherwise threatened to do post-1945. White proceeds to question the balance of power between the United States and China, the material foundations of American power and its commitment, or lack thereof, to preserving that balance of power. Much of the essay, however, is devoted to exploring the balance of resolve, using the war in Ukraine as an extended analogy. He concludes that the balance of resolve in most plausible conflict scenarios favours China, in large part due to the risk of nuclear escalation, as in Ukraine. So: interests, power, resolve, nukes. The meat and potatoes of realist thought.

One of the standard critiques of realist thought is that it fails to reckon with the internal dynamics of nations. In my view, it is precisely when accounting for the internal dynamics of the United States that the risk of major, potentially catastrophic conflict emerges most clearly. Donald Trump is clearly a unique individual but, also as clearly, he is not a "black swan" event in American politics, but a particular expression of various underlying dynamics, trends, interests and tensions within the American political system, at least some of which will outlast him. I have often written here about American mythology, by which I mean the set of American ideas, narratives, perceptions, values and commitments that have endured and evolved from the pre-history of the United States to the present day, arguably reaching their most rigid apotheosis in the triumphalism and unbounded ambition that followed the end of the Cold War. Of course many of these ideas ultimately emerge from the broader western intellectual milieu, and are reflected to a lesser degree in my own nation. I use the word "mythology" quite consciously, in the secular sense of "religion by another name", because I think that the manner in which many of these ideas are held (extremely tightly, as unexamined, talismanic articles of faith that are highly resistant to mere evidence) justifies that comparison.

Specifically, I don't believe that the ideas that Americans have come to have about themselves and their nation can actually recognise and accommodate the rise of China to material equality or superiority, and so I think we should be increasingly concerned about the potential behaviour of the United States as the balance of power continues to evolve. Graham Allison's articulation of the "Thucidydes Trap" received a lot of coverage a few years back, but most of that coverage all but skipped over one of the two key dynamics that he identified: "it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." To be clear, I don't believe that the United States will actively seek war with China. More plausible routes to conflict involve dynamic interactions with third parties (such as Taiwan or the Philippines) exercising their own agency, coupled with a certain ambivalence in Washington to the prospect of conflict, and a corresponding inability to act (or refrain from acting) in ways that are contrary to one's mythological self-image. The realist narrative from John Mearsheimer about the road to war in Ukraine provides a sobering analogy, for those willing to recognise it.

Much of this is logical and is well written, but without a clear cut and harsh review of what Australia's actual interests are, I fear that it won't help Australia very much.

I would add also that the lack of Australian thinktank writers who have a comprehensive and up to date view of PLA matters and PLA advancements, probably doesn't help the situation whether it is in terms of considering what Australian interests can viably be, nor for procuring the most sensible military hardware and strategy once a set of interests are actually defined.
 

TK3600

Colonel
Registered Member
Every argument against China can be attributed to US. The very incentive to use US to balance China, can turn around to say use China to balance increasingly invasive US that subverts Australian politics. So frankly, I am not buying it. US is posing an existential threat to Australia threatening to harvest everything it has, controlling the media and their politicians. There is no concern at all.

So ultimately the balancing super power is just a cope, a lie. There is no 5head strategy involved, it is just basic xenophobia.
 

Lethe

Captain
Just a few recent AUKUS and AUKUS-adjacent tidbits.

The Australian media has
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that a US Congressional Research Service paper on the Virginia-class program includes language that openly contemplates Washington not transferring Virginia-class submarines to Australia, in large part owing to the possibility that we may not actually be prepared to use them against China over Taiwan. This kind of language (and proposed "division of labor" alternative that conveniently leaves Australia with no sovereign capability) has actually been present for some years now, but to be fair it is elaborated in greater depth in this latest revision. Australian government response to this has been to
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and to declare that we are all the way with LBJ DJT.

The Commonwealth and South Australian governments
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to build future AUKUS submarines:

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced that the Commonwealth would make a $3.9 billion "down payment" towards the work at Osborne, with the rest of funding to "flow continuously" over the rest of the shipyard's construction, due to be complete in 2040.

On top of enabling works worth $2 billion, construction has already started on a fabrication area worth $5 billion and a Skills and Training Academy worth $500 million.

The shipyard's developer, Australian Naval Infrastructure (ANI), a company owned by the federal government, estimated the next stage, an outfitting area, would cost $8 billion to build, while an area for consolidation, testing, launching and commission would cost more than $15 billion.

The state government estimated at least 4,000 workers would design and build the submarine construction yard, while 5,500 workers would support nuclear-powered submarine production at its peak.

Former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, under whom the previous Attack-class deal with France was negotiated, has long declared that AUKUS is the road to Australia having no submarine capability. Implicit in this claim is the notion that the program to extend the life of each of the six existing Collins-class submarines by another decade is going to fail spectacularly.

Given the public admissions to date ("high risk"), apparent vacillations over just what this life-extension program will encompass -- vacillations apparently driven by the need to adhere to a 2-year drumbeat for each boat -- and the fairly dismal record of similar recent life-extension projects abroad (Ticonderoga, Type 23), that the Collins LOTE may not go well has always seemed rather plausible. Despite the Collins LOTE ostensibly kicking off
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, updates have been increasingly thin on the ground.
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ASC’s acting chief executive Alex Walsh said the scope and planned duration of the refits was yet to be finalised and would be heavily influenced by “the material condition” of the first boat, HMAS Farncomb, when it was removed from the water later this year.

“We have received the advanced planning letter from the commonwealth with their aspirations of the work that they would like to see done,” Mr Walsh told a Senate Estimates hearing under questioning by Greens’ senator David Shoebridge.

“We have responded with what the impacts would be on the schedule and the scope, and now we’re in the process with the commonwealth of that discussion around what scope will actually be executed and therefore the schedule.”

The scale and timing of the works will have a direct bearing on whether the government can maintain a submarine capability while it works to acquire nuclear boats under its so-called “optimal pathway”.

Asked whether the upgrades were still expected to take two years per boat, Mr Walsh said: “That very much depends on the decisions made by the commonwealth around the scope which we actually conduct.”

He said ASC was still in discussions with the government on the issue, and the timetable could also be adjusted to ensure sufficient submarine availability.

Asked whether the LOTE program was achievable amid widespread concern over the engineering challenges of working on 30-year-old submarines, Mr Walsh replied: “Yes.”

Well, I'm reassured. Aren't you reassured? Everything is going to be just fine. After all, Richard Marles and Anthony Albanese have declared that we are on the "optimal pathway". For a proposal that has been kicking around in one form or another for around a decade now, negotiating the scope and schedule of life-extension work and relation to future submarine availability mere months before the first boat comes out of the water sounds very optimal to me.

P.S. Australia currently has six Collins-class boats, that replaced six Oberon-class boats. Prior to AUKUS, the plan was to expand the inventory to twelve SSKs, since cut back to "at least eight" nuclear-powered submarines. I've been wondering how closely Hugh White was tied to that earlier expansion of Australia's ambitions. The future inventory goal of 12 SSKs was first officially articulated in the 2009 Defence White Paper (one can think of this as Australian equivalent of US Quadrennial Defense Review), but the first public articulation of that number I can find from a relevant figure is from former defence minister and former leader of the opposition Kim Beazley, in
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(just after Labor had assumed government, though under Kevin Rudd rather than Kim Beazley). Hugh White is widely credited as the lead author of the previous 2000 Defence White Paper, but had been out of government for some years by the time all this rolled around, mostly kicking around as inaugural Director of the newborn ASPI. Yet in a previous age, White had been an advisor to... Kim Beazley. In his subsequent public writings, White has consistently advocated for the considerable expansion of Australia's submarine inventory (he envisions 18-24 "modest" SSKs) at the cost of surface combatants. It seems likely that at least the Ghost of Hugh White was "in the room" when these first tentative post-Collins steps were contemplated. Relatedly,
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2020 article from Graeme Dobell provides a good account of the post-Collins, pre-AUKUS machinations. That we did not go on to build a "Son of Collins" some years ago stands out as a sliding doors moment for the nation.
 
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Lethe

Captain
You know the world has gone askew when a pair of ex-ASPI thinkwarriors end up sounding like radical leftists in their critique of the Australian government's rhetorical positioning on the current US-Iran war and Washington's belligerence on the world stage more broadly.

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. If pressed for time, the scandalous conclusion is from 38:55.

Putting this in the AUKUS thread because, as Shoebridge and Hellyer note, that project has become the concrete expression of the strategic straightjacket we have imposed upon ourselves.

(A stylistic comment: if dry satire is your preferred form of commentary, these guys deliver in spades.)
 
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vincent

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Moderator - World Affairs
You know the world has gone askew when a pair of ex-ASPI thinkwarriors end up sounding like radical leftists in their critique of the Australian government's rhetorical positioning on the current US-Iran war and Washington's belligerence on the world stage more broadly.

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. If pressed for time, the scandalous conclusion is from 38:55.

Putting this in the AUKUS thread because, as Shoebridge and Hellyer note, that project has become the concrete expression of the strategic straightjacket we have imposed upon ourselves.

(A stylistic comment: if dry satire is your preferred form of commentary, these guys deliver in spades.)
I noticed they keep on yapping "rules-based order" and has zero mention of "international law"
 

Lethe

Captain
Looking for the latest news on the Collins LOTE program, I instead found
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recent AUKUS overview article by USN (ret.) Captain James E. Fanell. You remember this guy, right? He
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a decade ago for being
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on the whole China Threat thing.

In any case, while a fairly unobjectionable article in most respects, what made me laugh were the repeated references to Chinese propaganda campaigns aimed at undermining support for AUKUS:

And Australians should expect the PRC to unleash a full-throated propaganda campaign in social media and elsewhere, not just against the AUKUS deal, but also playing up the threat of having nuclear-powered submarines. This and other facets of the CCP’s “cognitive warfare” campaign will be used to defeat the agreement and drive a wedge between Australia and her allies in America and the UK.

Don't worry about if USN can produce enough submarines to meet its own needs, don't worry about the state of the UK nuclear submarine industry, don't question if the AUKUS arrangement actually makes sense for Australia, or if we're really willing and able to make the investments necessary to bring it to fruition. Don't worry about the credibility of our remaining submarine capability between now and *handwaves* decades hence. Just worry about CCP propagandists leveraging all of the above to undermine support for our shared glorious enterprise!

....

Reading through the transcript of a
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, the following exchanges between Senator David Shoebridge (Greens, NSW) and Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, Director-General of the Australian Submarine Agency, also made me laugh:

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: Vice Admiral Mead, a nuclear submarine partner that can't keep its own submarines in the water is not a long-term good bet for Australia for the AUKUS project, is it? If they can't keep their own submarines in the water, how are they a good long-term bet for us?

Vice Adm. Mead: As I said, I'm not going to be drawn on the integrity of the current UK nuclear force. It is highly classified as to what it does. Those patrols of what it does are highly classified and highly sensitive.

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: I'm not asking about where it goes. I'm pointing out that they never go anywhere.

Vice Adm. Mead: What I'm saying there is that very few people have access to the information of the submarine patrols—how often they spend at sea, what they do at sea, their length of time, their op tempo, the maintenance. I don't have—

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: You only need to look at satellite images, because they stay in port so long that just regular photographs taken by standard commercial satellites are showing how long these boats are in port. It's not a state secret. They're quite big, they're metal, they sit on the top of the water and they don't move. This isn't a state secret.

[.....]

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: I get it. 'Full steam ahead,' et cetera. Vice Admiral Mead, have you seen the statements of now retired Rear Admiral Mathias, a former director of nuclear policy with the UK Ministry of Defence? He also led, in fact, a 2010 review, I think, into the UK Trident nuclear weapons system. He is a person with an intimate knowledge and long professional—I see you grinning—background with AUKUS. This is what he said—

Vice Adm. Mead: I know what he said.

[.....]

Vice Adm. Mead: I'm not going to be drawn on individuals who make comments. There are lots of them, and I welcome those comments. I read the same articles that you read, Senator. In fact, I've probably got the same reading list that you do.

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: I doubt you do. I seriously doubt you do, because last time we had a discussion about—

CHAIR: Senator, I'll remind you about what was said earlier, just a few minutes ago, about treating all witnesses with the same respect.

Senator SHOEBRIDGE: I'm happy to share my reading list with you later.
 
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Lethe

Captain
In 2011, RAND published a series of "lessons learned" reports on the industrial history of recent American, British, and Australian submarine programs. The
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provides a general overview, while the remaining three volumes focus on the programs of each nation in turn:

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Makes for interesting background reading in relation to AUKUS.

I recently picked up Andrew Fowler's book on AUKUS, Nuked: The Submarine Fiasco that Sank Australia's Sovereignty. The immediate impetus is that I am hoping to learn just how early in the genesis of AUKUS was the transfer of Virginia-class submarines to Australia first contemplated, and therefore to derive just how far the Virginia production schedule has slipped since that point.

I've also ordered Haynes' Astute Class Nuclear Submarine Owner's Workshop Manual (lol) as it apparently offers the most comprehensive account of that program's troubled development history that is publicly available, thereby perhaps shedding some light on the challenges that may await the future SSN-AUKUS.
 
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