Well, that's easier said than done. Strictly speaking,
everyone wants to avoid unfavorable engagements, but actually doing so is very difficult when facing a capable adversary. USW (and to a lesser extent, ASW) is one domain in which we've retained most of our advantages over the PLAN, and that will continue being true for - at least - most of this decade.
As far a chokepoints go, it's a double edged sword. In the same way that 1IC chokepoints don't only affect the PLA, expeditionary chokepoints don't only affect the US. Anything worth sinking is worth protecting, and until 09V comes online, 09IIIBs are still extremely vulnerable to USN USW/ASW outside of the 2IC.
Just speaking from my own (comparatively limited) experience specifically dealing with USW CONEMPs, their largest contribution is achieved by operating in the blue waters between the 1IC and 2IC. This is especially true if the PLAN pursues SL(ASh)BMs roughly similar to our own I-CPS procurement (which we know is, at a minimum, being seriously explored). Relevant to that, we are expecting future PLAN SSNs to host a new, relatively large VLS/CLS system to employ these new munitions, which aligns with prior talk from the grapevine about a 1.2 meter diameter, 1500nm-class range AShBM being developed by the PLAN.
This is a very impactful capability uplift, and it's something we're seriously concerned about over here. With such a munition, PLAN SSNs within the 1IC become viable ASuW shooters for surface targets out to Guam. When patrolling between the 1IC and 2nd IC, with effective C3, they create the threat of unknown-axis AShBM salvos from well outside a USN formation's organic ASW coverage. As long as the 09IIIBs operate within range of land-based or surface-based ASW support, USN SSNs pose a significantly reduced threat to the 09IIIBs, with the caveat that some degree of attrition would be a near-certainty.
Beyond ASuW, if the munition is capable of prosecuting ashore targets, things open up even further.
View attachment 104469
This is a quick and dirty visual of what 1500nm standoffs from Misawa, Guam, and Darwin look like. With some caveats, PLAN SSNs with SLBMs alter these locations' threat profile from primarily single-axis, medium to long response window threats (with H-6K/KD-20 salvos being particularly "visible") to include unknown-axis, short response window SLBM salvos. This also has outsized effects even beyond the actual SSN. It's difficult to overstate how much impact the threat geometry has on an IAMDS, so introducing the need to detect, track, cue, launch, prosecute, and assess incoming munitions (especially BMs) from multiple axes simultaneously (with potentially minimal reaction time) will impose its own "virtual attrition" on an IAMDS compared to single-axis threats.
Not great.
To make things worse, as more capable SSNs begin to enter service (and as crew proficiency solidifies), it will become feasible to operate beyond the 2IC (and therefore beyond PLAN/AF support). Once this happens, we start to have serious issues.
View attachment 104471
This is a similar low-effort visual as the last, but for Pearl, SD, Bremerton, and Eielson.
At the moment, sans AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES, there is practically nothing in the way of an AMDS integral to these installations. I'm sure it goes without saying that PLA fires being able to reach out and touch us on our home turf is uh... sub-optimal.
While it would be vastly more challenging - if possible at all - to conduct dynamic ASuW with these munitions at this kind of distance (due to C3 and targeting limitations), the traditional SSN threat remains. This threat requires us to pull away forces that could be contributing to 7FLT operations, and to instead task them with ASW operations under 3FLT.
Beyond ASuW (again), the STW element also poses tremendous implications. Pearl, SD, and Bremerton are
very juicy targets, and the ability to successfully destroy or disable CVNs (and ofc the myriad of CRUDES not underway) in port is the kind of game-changer that Xi Jinping probably asked Santa for Christmas. As it stands, there's just not much we can really do about a concerted attack like this, assuming we don't have extensive prior knowledge.
In order to rectify this threat before it truly matures, we will need to stand up an extensive IAMDS capable of defending our critical installations from multiple axes simultaneously, and with minimal reaction time. That's no small task. Alternatively, we could maintain AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES patrols in the vicinity of these targets, but that would come at the cost of more (badly needed) major surface combatants not available for operations in 7FLT.
Altogether, unless we're content to just
watch as we experience Tora Tora Tora with Chinese Characteristics, these new threat vectors will slowly force us to make difficult, undesired decisions/tradeoffs in order to address them.
(smh, I wish the PLA just stayed on defense. it's sooo much more fun when you can hit the other guy but he can't hit you)
