09III/09IV (093/094) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[tphuang]

Two possibilities:
1. Each 093B only has a single line of VLS tubes, arranged along the centerline of the sub, thus granting longer launch tubes; or
2. Each 093B has twin, parallel lines of VLS tubes, but with shorter launch tubes, leading to shorter-range missiles than what is desired.

The idea of the first possibility would be somewhat similar to North Korea's Sinpo-C SSB. I know this example ain't ideal (considering the originally small-size of the sub and the missile tubes taking up coning tower space), but this is the closest example that I could get.
The idea of the second possibility would be somewhat close to South Korea's Dosan Ahn Changho-class SSKs.

There is also the factor of keeping the production line from idling. A production line on idle could mean the loss of construction workers (as they won't get paid for doing nothing). There is also the operational skills required for handling construction of these kinds of subs that needs to be continuously refreshed and evolved.

I gotta say. Chill. Patch just came back. Please do not blitz him with so many questions.

I think it pretty much has to be twin parallel lines of VLS. Otherwise, it's going to take so much space on the 093B. Even a 8 cell VLS (4 rows) would take up 5 meters at least and probably is a good compromise. Depending on whether they want to have large coned shape sonar in the front or a half coned shaped sonar + torpedo on the bottom, they may not have that much space.

Also keep in mind that the hump on 093A is used to store the TAS rail. Therefore, the bump will need to be extended a little bit if you want to have decent size/length TAS. On top of that, you can run into issues where the hull itself is not as hydrodynamic.

I don't really understand about this, but why the need for a "mini-nuke" SS(K)Ns for coastal defense? Wouldn't 039C (or its rumored successor 039D/041) be more than sufficient for the task?

Well, they probably want to have something operate further out than that.

Keep in mind there are real limitations to SSKs. You need to snorkel once every couple of days for ventilation. You can't move above 8 knots for any sustained period even for the latest SSKs. AIP engine itself generates noise. You have to raise to periscope depth to fire torpedoes.

With greater power from a mini-nuke, a lot of these concerns go away. Although, I would say its pretty hard to find the balance between reactor size + cost and also noise level. Maybe with a really small nuclear reactor in there and lower expectations for endurance/speed than your usual SSN, it wouldn't need as much of the engine room machines that cause a lot of noise.

do you know how long it would take to build 8x 093B ?

Well, they did say double nuclear fleet size in 2 to 3 years. I assume they all get launch by early 2025

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

I think it pretty much has to be twin parallel lines of VLS. Otherwise, it's going to take so much space on the 093B. Even a 8 cell VLS (4 rows) would take up 5 meters at least and probably is a good compromise. Depending on whether they want to have large coned shape sonar in the front or a half coned shaped sonar + torpedo on the bottom, they may not have that much space.

Also keep in mind that the hump on 093A is used to store the TAS rail. Therefore, the bump will need to be extended a little bit if you want to have decent size/length TAS. On top of that, you can run into issues where the hull itself is not as hydrodynamic.

Understood. Many thanks for the clarification!

Well, they probably want to have something operate further out than that.

Keep in mind there are real limitations to SSKs. You need to snorkel once every couple of days for ventilation. You can't move above 8 knots for any sustained period even for the latest SSKs. AIP engine itself generates noise. You have to raise to periscope depth to fire torpedoes.

With greater power from a mini-nuke, a lot of these concerns go away. Although, I would say its pretty hard to find the balance between reactor size + cost and also noise level. Maybe with a really small nuclear reactor in there and lower expectations for endurance/speed than your usual SSN, it wouldn't need as much of the engine room machines that cause a lot of noise.

Interesting development, to say the least.

So, if my understanding is correct:
1. The "mini-nuke"-class sub can function more like a smaller, lighter SSNs with only torpedo tubes, plus with smaller crew complement, shorter endurance and operating closer to Chinese coastlines like the 039/A/B/Cs. Whereas;
2. The 093A/G/B-class sub can function like a larger, heavier SS(K)Ns with a mix of torpedo tubes and VLS tubes, plus with larger crew complement, longer endurance and operating further out from Chinese coastlines.

On the other hand, do you know which shipyard(s) is/are responsible for building these "mini-nuke" subs?

Because in a prior @Maikeru post, he/she did mention regarding the possibility of the rumored Olympics-class sub spotted in the Yangtze last February as being the "mini-nuke" sub. Given if the Olympics-class sub is indeed nuclear-powered, could that mean Wuchang is now capable of building nuclear-powered boats?

I gotta say. Chill. Patch just came back. Please do not blitz him with so many questions.

Uhh... I didn't flood Patch with questions, although I did quote a number of his posts. Maybe you confused me with someone else?

 

[tphuang]

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[tphuang]

I’m assuming Americans have a SOSUS net in Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel with stations on Japanese and Philippine islands. Any Chinese sub that travel through those waterways will be tailed.

Until the US actively intervenes, i don’t see China attacking the SOSUS land components. China may secretly do a Nord Stream on the underwater components though. Don’t know if China can get the entire network though.

So, I wouldn't know the operational side of things about this. There are real questions on when and how US military may get involved. Based on that and level of presence of Chinese ASW assets, I will venture to guess that 093B can get through SOSUS net without getting tailed, because it would just be too dangerous for US SSN to follow Chinese subs when there are many MPAs, Z-20s and TAS equipped ships around. And I think we can also assume that Japanese MPAs wouldn't dare to operate close to a large Chinese fleet that's within 500 nm from mainland. Of course, things can work out very different from this.

But based on our discussion about how critical that first wave of attack is, I think it's very important for 093B to venture into Phillipine Sea or into Sea of Japan so that they can attack from different axis. I think that's one thing Patch has stressed.

From this aspect, I completely agree with @Patchwork_Chimera point that 093B brings real meaningful capability improvements. H-6K isn't a world beater, but it has been procured in large quantities and have been very useful for PLA. 093B probably won't be procured on a similar scale, but it should be very effective.

 

[Mohsin77]

The very features of making an SSN viable as a naval warfighting platform - quietness, stealthiness, and the ability to disappear and reappear at any time the captain desires - Pretty much grant SSNs certain levels of immunity when compared to the likes of surface warships.

Wait... no one said anything about any "immunity" for SSNs. Patch was specifically talking about "friendly controlled" waters, which means that you have aircover overhead etc. SSNs have zero immunity under territory with modern/robust enemy ASW overhead.

SSNs (or any platform) are not silver bullets. they need to work within a system and be properly employed, or they will get deleted.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

Wait... no one said anything about any "immunity" for SSNs. Patch was specifically talking about "friendly controlled" waters, which means that you have aircover overhead etc. SSNs have zero immunity under territory with modern/robust enemy ASW overhead.

SSNs (or any platform) are not silver bullets. they need to work within a system and be properly employed, or they will get deleted.

The word "immunity" is just myself expanding on the topic of SSNs armed with long-range strike missiles.

I was thinking that apart from the relative safety of friendly waters, the mobility and stealthiness of SSNs could also allow them to become more flexible in their deployment for land-attack missions by sailing in deep, vast open waters of the Pacific, thus making it more difficult and challenging for the opposing forces to expect and defend against.

Besides, Patch did mention about the future threat posed by Chinese SSNs against targets on Hawaii and the West Coast of CONUS. So how would Chinese SSNs be launching their long-range missiles at these locations without ever leaving the safety of the Chinese home waters?

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

The word "immunity" is just myself expanding on the topic of SSNs armed with long-range strike missiles.

I was thinking that apart from the relative safety of friendly waters, the mobility and stealthiness of SSNs could also allow them to become more flexible in their deployment for land-attack missions by sailing in deep, vast open waters of the Pacific, thus making it more difficult and challenging for the opposing forces to expect and defend against.

Besides, Patch did mention about the future threat posed by Chinese SSNs against targets on Hawaii and the West Coast of CONUS. So how would Chinese SSNs be launching their long-range missiles at these locations without ever leaving the safety of the Chinese home waters?

@Mohsin77 In particular, for the last paragraph of my above post, I was talking about this:

Just speaking from my own (comparatively limited) experience specifically dealing with USW CONEMPs, their largest contribution is achieved by operating in the blue waters between the 1IC and 2IC. This is especially true if the PLAN pursues SL(ASh)BMs roughly similar to our own I-CPS procurement (which we know is, at a minimum, being seriously explored). Relevant to that, we are expecting future PLAN SSNs to host a new, relatively large VLS/CLS system to employ these new munitions, which aligns with prior talk from the grapevine about a 1.2 meter diameter, 1500nm-class range AShBM being developed by the PLAN.

This is a very impactful capability uplift, and it's something we're seriously concerned about over here. With such a munition, PLAN SSNs within the 1IC become viable ASuW shooters for surface targets out to Guam. When patrolling between the 1IC and 2nd IC, with effective C3, they create the threat of unknown-axis AShBM salvos from well outside a USN formation's organic ASW coverage. As long as the 09IIIBs operate within range of land-based or surface-based ASW support, USN SSNs pose a significantly reduced threat to the 09IIIBs, with the caveat that some degree of attrition would be a near-certainty.

Beyond ASuW, if the munition is capable of prosecuting ashore targets, things open up even further.

This is a quick and dirty visual of what 1500nm standoffs from Misawa, Guam, and Darwin look like. With some caveats, PLAN SSNs with SLBMs alter these locations' threat profile from primarily single-axis, medium to long response window threats (with H-6K/KD-20 salvos being particularly "visible") to include unknown-axis, short response window SLBM salvos. This also has outsized effects even beyond the actual SSN. It's difficult to overstate how much impact the threat geometry has on an IAMDS, so introducing the need to detect, track, cue, launch, prosecute, and assess incoming munitions (especially BMs) from multiple axes simultaneously (with potentially minimal reaction time) will impose its own "virtual attrition" on an IAMDS compared to single-axis threats.

Not great.

To make things worse, as more capable SSNs begin to enter service (and as crew proficiency solidifies), it will become feasible to operate beyond the 2IC (and therefore beyond PLAN/AF support). Once this happens, we start to have serious issues.

This is a similar low-effort visual as the last, but for Pearl, SD, Bremerton, and Eielson.

At the moment, sans AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES, there is practically nothing in the way of an AMDS integral to these installations. I'm sure it goes without saying that PLA fires being able to reach out and touch us on our home turf is uh... sub-optimal.

While it would be vastly more challenging - if possible at all - to conduct dynamic ASuW with these munitions at this kind of distance (due to C3 and targeting limitations), the traditional SSN threat remains. This threat requires us to pull away forces that could be contributing to 7FLT operations, and to instead task them with ASW operations under 3FLT.

Beyond ASuW (again), the STW element also poses tremendous implications. Pearl, SD, and Bremerton are very juicy targets, and the ability to successfully destroy or disable CVNs (and ofc the myriad of CRUDES not underway) in port is the kind of game-changer that Xi Jinping probably asked Santa for Christmas. As it stands, there's just not much we can really do about a concerted attack like this, assuming we don't have extensive prior knowledge.

Sorry for the broken post, I didn't manage to insert the quote of Patch's post before clicking on the "Reply" button.

And @Patch I don't mean to be disrespectful by quoting your post. I hope you don't mind.

 

[Mohsin77]

The word "immunity" is just myself expanding on the topic of SSNs armed with long-range strike missiles.

I was thinking that apart from the relative safety of friendly waters, the mobility and stealthiness of SSNs could also allow them to become more flexible in their deployment for land-attack missions by sailing in deep, vast open waters of the Pacific, thus becoming more difficult and challenging for the opposing forces to expect and defend against.

Besides, Patch did mention about the future threat posed by Chinese SSNs against targets on Hawaii and the West Coast of CONUS. How would Chinese SSNs be launching their long-range missiles at these locations without ever leaving the safety of the Chinese home waters?

"Controlled waters" <> (does not equal) "Home waters".

If you delete/block/evade the enemy's ASW capability (which itself depends on its own support system), their 'home waters' become your 'friendly territory'. All these platforms have to be considered as part of a complex/interconnected/dynamic system, and it's those systems which are at war, not the platforms.

BTW, as for attacking Pearl, Patch has also talked about shipping containers loaded with CMs as a potentially "decisive" attack vector that the USN is actually worried about.

 

[Biscuits]

"Controlled waters" <> (does not equal) "Home waters".

If you delete/block/evade the enemy's ASW capability (which itself depends on its own support system), their 'home waters' become your 'friendly territory'. All these platforms have to be considered as part of a complex/interconnected/dynamic system, and it's those systems which are at war, not the platforms.

BTW, as for attacking Pearl, Patch has also talked about shipping containers loaded with CMs as a potentially "decisive" attack vector that the USN is actually worried about.

Pushing mass manufacture of land based hypersonic weapons is one part. "Conventional" high accuracy ballistic missiles is another. Air force and navy expansion is another. Next generation drone warfare and the H-20 is another. Employing asymmetric weapons such as shipping container based CM, why not? And now, a large and sophisticated SSN force will be a further component.

By themselves, each wonder weapon are by definition prone to failure. When combined together, it becomes a whole system that puts nothing to chance. The invader will have nowhere to hide no matter where in Asia he comes, as long as it is within reasonable range to the mainland.

It's a spending strategy China can use because in order to counter it, you will need to outspend and then create countermeasures to every "special item". And no one can throw around the same size of economy as China. Even if some countries can get their spending up to higher % of gdp, the general efficiency of the Chinese arms industry means that de facto, they will get more results than almost anyone else for the same price.

 

[AndrewS]

Pushing mass manufacture of land based hypersonic weapons is one part. "Conventional" high accuracy ballistic missiles is another. Air force and navy expansion is another. Next generation drone warfare and the H-20 is another. Employing asymmetric weapons such as shipping container based CM, why not? And now, a large and sophisticated SSN force will be a further component.

By themselves, each wonder weapon are by definition prone to failure. When combined together, it becomes a whole system that puts nothing to chance. The invader will have nowhere to hide no matter where in Asia he comes, as long as it is within reasonable range to the mainland.

It's a spending strategy China can use because in order to counter it, you will need to outspend and then create countermeasures to every "special item". And no one can throw around the same size of economy as China. Even if some countries can get their spending up to higher % of gdp, the general efficiency of the Chinese arms industry means that de facto, they will get more results than almost anyone else for the same price.

It's not just about outspending to counter China's moves as there are physical limitations imposed by geography.

Whilst China has ample strategic depth with large numbers of rear-area bases and easy resupply, the US only has a handful of bases available beyond the 1st Island Chain.

Even if the US wanted to field equivalent systems, there's nowhere to put them.