09III/09IV (093/094) Nuclear Submarine Thread

[TK3600]

Isnt jl2a in service long ago.

 

[AndrewS]

Strictly, this one isn't me as a primary source. I've just heard it down the grapevine from a friend I trust, so I'd caution you not to take it as gospel.

As far as 093Bs go, supposing this procurement info is indeed accurate, I would presume that the 093Bs will provide the PLAN with an opportunity to expand the qualified pool of SSN personnel, hone their tactical proficiency at operating capable SSNs in the MIDPAC, and optimize their overall Deployment > Employment > Sustainment complex for the quantity of SSNs and force-wide OPTEMPO they are aiming for.

These 093Bs are reasonably capable SSNs for what it's worth (nothing like the original 093, though certainly no SSN-21), and I consider their procurement in support of the above goals to be a prudent use of time and resources while the initial 09V is in its teething period.

Also, hello again to everyone. Some fairly large stuff is in the works with Rick, Y8s, Toaster, and a few others pitching in, so I asked for (and got!) the green light from my leash-holder to hang around here again. Just uh, I'd request that folks be mindful about what information they ask for, going forward

I expect this construction covers the 2021-2025 period?

As for the Type-093 submarines, you would want them conducting long-distance patrols. And in the event of a conflict, they would avoid any ships with ASW capabilities and focus on soft targets on land or ships at distant chokepoints.

So being relatively noisy is workable
.

 

[tphuang]

Doing some low level OSINT, we get the following off Weibo from Lyman and a few other on this topic. You can make your own assessment on their credibility. Let's just I find his belief that 093B is comparable to early VA class to be quite laughable.

其实5月份第1艘093B已经下水，第2艘也快了，一个月内下水。首批8艘，大直径垂发，全电泵推

So the one that we saw last year was 093B and the second one will launch soon. 8 093B in this batch, large diameter VLS, integrated full electric propulsion (IFEP).
I think we are going to have to wait to verify the VLS part since the sub itself didn't seem larger than 093A, so I'm not sure where the room for VLS comes from.

上面那个厂房有6条轨道，长度较短只有288米，不能同时组装2条2万吨SSBN，只能同时组装2条8000~10000吨SSN，共可组装12条

下面那个厂房只有4条轨道，但每条轨道间距较大，长度更长为310米，能同时组装两条2万吨的SSBN。同时也能组装两条SSN。下水浮箱极限载重为25,000吨。

He agrees with others that you can produce 12 SSNs on the upper factory and 8 SSNs/SSBNs in lower factory (due to wider railing).

093B上的垂发就是图二320艇上的新垂发。直径约1.3米，能发射直径1.2米的反舰弹道导弹。

这是中国海军的第2款或第3款舰载反舰弹道导弹，直径约1.2米，长约10米，射程3000公里左右。

This is the more interesting part. SSN VLS with 1.3m diameter and can launch 1.2m diameter ASBM. 2nd/3rd generation ASBM -> 1.2m diameter, 10m length and 3000km range. It goes without saying that this is quite the punch even if it has to be launched from periscope depth. Again, I'm questioning 093B having a VLS. Maybe it has a small one.

不过老外马上要再次惊讶和恐惧了。因为葫芦岛的093B正在大批量生产，批次8艘，095也开工了。如果未来某年，中国一年下水6~8艘核潜艇，我一点也不会惊讶

093B mass production has started and the work for first 095 has started. Might be able to launch 6 to 8 SSNs a year. I think if they actually put 20 in the facilities, then the max launching speed is 10 a year. I think it's there is the larger limiting factor of training and finding crew members and supporting staff to operate and sustain that many nuclear subs. Which is probably why 093B production started now. They needed an interim class to build up numbers before 095s are mass produced.
8 093B + 8 earlier 093s is a decent size force for training and sustainment. No reason they can't have all 8 launched by 2025.

 

[tphuang]

From someone else in June

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有消息透露，海军093 b型攻击型潜艇将开启下饺子模式，将在近2-3年使我海军攻击型核潜艇数量翻翻，将使我海军水下核力量长期偏弱的问题得到一定改善。
早前美国海军专家也通过卫星照片显示，位于大陆北方的辽宁葫芦岛的渤海船舶重工的船厂正在进行大幅扩建厂房、新建船坞工作。目前，该船厂的厂房容积显著扩大，这似乎和2015年兴建的船坞相同，都是为了打造新一代的核潜艇的目的。
美国专家认为，新些体形巨大的干船坞是如此之大，大到足以同时开工建造两艘核潜艇，一旦建造完成，加上新近完工的另一个干船坞，渤海船舶重工就能同时打造4艘潜艇。

Expecting 093B to be mass produced now and double SSN size in 2 to 3 years.


Interesting enough, the guy that was the deputy chief for 419 (a later 093A variant boat) is going to be the deputy captain for CV-18

 

[tphuang]

十三五中国海军总共下水了 7艘054a，12艘052D，8艘055，2艘071，2艘075，1艘002。水下有2艘094，1艘093a，5艘039B，1艘039C。

十四五据pop3爆料，将要下水 20艘054a，>4艘054B，12艘052D，8艘055，>2艘071，>2艘075，1艘003。

水面舰艇增量不多，主要在护卫舰，未来五年海军军费增长的大头主要是水下。

至少批量建造8艘093B，下一代095也将下水。039C批量建造，下一代小堆艇也将下水。

2020年中国军费12,680亿，按照年均7%的增长幅度。十四五中国军费总增量14790亿。

按照2017年中国军费占比42%为装备费，以海军军费占30%的保守计算，十四五中国海军装备费增量为1864亿。水上增量约为500亿，水下增量约为1,400亿。可新增20艘以上093B，还有10艘以上039C和小堆艇。水下力量的增长会令美国感到恐惧。

但想要更大规模的下饺子，特别是航母，还需加军费。

So he seems to be into making these sweeping statement from a top level, so take this with a grain of salt.

From surface fleet point of view, same number of 052D and 055 and possibly more budget on 071/075/carrier. 054A/054B got more production in 14/5 > 13/5

So, the expectation is that with large procurement budget for navy, the additional money is likely to lead to large scale underwater production. At least 8 093B and 1 095, many 039C + mini-nuke to be launched in 14/5 (so by 2025).

Based on his calculation, underwater procurement can increase by 140 billion RMB, which is enough for 20 093B, 10+ 039C and mini-nuke. Now keep in mind that I don't think he is factoring in inflation very well here, but I think 8 093B by 2025 is minimum expectation. Probably wait until 15/5 before 095 mass production starts. It's not out of the realm of possibility that they mass produce 095 and 093B at the same time in order to just build up numbers while they sort out problems in 095.

The mini-nuke rumor has been around for a while. Again, this is kind of crazy, so we will have to wait and see.

 

[tphuang]

one last thing. One of the popular Weibo account posted this

大黑鱼产房再次出现大规模土木工程，最新西方民用遥感图上新了，自己去找图。种种迹象表明，史上最波澜壮阔的大黑鱼养殖活动已经开始。[doge]随便发个图保命

after the hi Sutton post. I think anyone with some connection in PLA watching community have been hinted that a major nuclear sub expansion has started.

 

[BoraTas]

Well, that's easier said than done. Strictly speaking, everyone wants to avoid unfavorable engagements, but actually doing so is very difficult when facing a capable adversary. USW (and to a lesser extent, ASW) is one domain in which we've retained most of our advantages over the PLAN, and that will continue being true for - at least - most of this decade.

As far a chokepoints go, it's a double edged sword. In the same way that 1IC chokepoints don't only affect the PLA, expeditionary chokepoints don't only affect the US. Anything worth sinking is worth protecting, and until 09V comes online, 09IIIBs are still extremely vulnerable to USN USW/ASW outside of the 2IC.

Just speaking from my own (comparatively limited) experience specifically dealing with USW CONEMPs, their largest contribution is achieved by operating in the blue waters between the 1IC and 2IC. This is especially true if the PLAN pursues SL(ASh)BMs roughly similar to our own I-CPS procurement (which we know is, at a minimum, being seriously explored). Relevant to that, we are expecting future PLAN SSNs to host a new, relatively large VLS/CLS system to employ these new munitions, which aligns with prior talk from the grapevine about a 1.2 meter diameter, 1500nm-class range AShBM being developed by the PLAN.

This is a very impactful capability uplift, and it's something we're seriously concerned about over here. With such a munition, PLAN SSNs within the 1IC become viable ASuW shooters for surface targets out to Guam. When patrolling between the 1IC and 2nd IC, with effective C3, they create the threat of unknown-axis AShBM salvos from well outside a USN formation's organic ASW coverage. As long as the 09IIIBs operate within range of land-based or surface-based ASW support, USN SSNs pose a significantly reduced threat to the 09IIIBs, with the caveat that some degree of attrition would be a near-certainty.

Beyond ASuW, if the munition is capable of prosecuting ashore targets, things open up even further.

View attachment 104469

This is a quick and dirty visual of what 1500nm standoffs from Misawa, Guam, and Darwin look like. With some caveats, PLAN SSNs with SLBMs alter these locations' threat profile from primarily single-axis, medium to long response window threats (with H-6K/KD-20 salvos being particularly "visible") to include unknown-axis, short response window SLBM salvos. This also has outsized effects even beyond the actual SSN. It's difficult to overstate how much impact the threat geometry has on an IAMDS, so introducing the need to detect, track, cue, launch, prosecute, and assess incoming munitions (especially BMs) from multiple axes simultaneously (with potentially minimal reaction time) will impose its own "virtual attrition" on an IAMDS compared to single-axis threats.

Not great.

To make things worse, as more capable SSNs begin to enter service (and as crew proficiency solidifies), it will become feasible to operate beyond the 2IC (and therefore beyond PLAN/AF support). Once this happens, we start to have serious issues.

View attachment 104471

This is a similar low-effort visual as the last, but for Pearl, SD, Bremerton, and Eielson.

At the moment, sans AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES, there is practically nothing in the way of an AMDS integral to these installations. I'm sure it goes without saying that PLA fires being able to reach out and touch us on our home turf is uh... sub-optimal.

While it would be vastly more challenging - if possible at all - to conduct dynamic ASuW with these munitions at this kind of distance (due to C3 and targeting limitations), the traditional SSN threat remains. This threat requires us to pull away forces that could be contributing to 7FLT operations, and to instead task them with ASW operations under 3FLT.

Beyond ASuW (again), the STW element also poses tremendous implications. Pearl, SD, and Bremerton are very juicy targets, and the ability to successfully destroy or disable CVNs (and ofc the myriad of CRUDES not underway) in port is the kind of game-changer that Xi Jinping probably asked Santa for Christmas. As it stands, there's just not much we can really do about a concerted attack like this, assuming we don't have extensive prior knowledge.

In order to rectify this threat before it truly matures, we will need to stand up an extensive IAMDS capable of defending our critical installations from multiple axes simultaneously, and with minimal reaction time. That's no small task. Alternatively, we could maintain AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES patrols in the vicinity of these targets, but that would come at the cost of more (badly needed) major surface combatants not available for operations in 7FLT.

Altogether, unless we're content to just watch as we experience Tora Tora Tora with Chinese Characteristics, these new threat vectors will slowly force us to make difficult, undesired decisions/tradeoffs in order to address them.

(smh, I wish the PLA just stayed on defense. it's sooo much more fun when you can hit the other guy but he can't hit you)

This kind of "big picture" (I don't know a better definition) analysis is what is sorely lacking from internet discussions. For example this post changed my mind about sub fired land attack missiles. It seems forcing the adversary to re-orient their air defense assets in a way that is less optimal to counter your main vector of operations is their main utility.

 

[Maikeru]

So he seems to be into making these sweeping statement from a top level, so take this with a grain of salt.

From surface fleet point of view, same number of 052D and 055 and possibly more budget on 071/075/carrier. 054A/054B got more production in 14/5 > 13/5

So, the expectation is that with large procurement budget for navy, the additional money is likely to lead to large scale underwater production. At least 8 093B and 1 095, many 039C + mini-nuke to be launched in 14/5 (so by 2025).

Based on his calculation, underwater procurement can increase by 140 billion RMB, which is enough for 20 093B, 10+ 039C and mini-nuke. Now keep in mind that I don't think he is factoring in inflation very well here, but I think 8 093B by 2025 is minimum expectation. Probably wait until 15/5 before 095 mass production starts. It's not out of the realm of possibility that they mass produce 095 and 093B at the same time in order to just build up numbers while they sort out problems in 095.

The mini-nuke rumor has been around for a while. Again, this is kind of crazy, so we will have to wait and see.

Just thinking the "mini-nuke" seems unlikely in itself but perhaps it refers to large scale production of the small coastal sub we saw going down the Yangtze in February 2022, dubbed 'Olympics class'?

 

[drowingfish]

Well, that's easier said than done. Strictly speaking, everyone wants to avoid unfavorable engagements, but actually doing so is very difficult when facing a capable adversary. USW (and to a lesser extent, ASW) is one domain in which we've retained most of our advantages over the PLAN, and that will continue being true for - at least - most of this decade.

As far a chokepoints go, it's a double edged sword. In the same way that 1IC chokepoints don't only affect the PLA, expeditionary chokepoints don't only affect the US. Anything worth sinking is worth protecting, and until 09V comes online, 09IIIBs are still extremely vulnerable to USN USW/ASW outside of the 2IC.

Just speaking from my own (comparatively limited) experience specifically dealing with USW CONEMPs, their largest contribution is achieved by operating in the blue waters between the 1IC and 2IC. This is especially true if the PLAN pursues SL(ASh)BMs roughly similar to our own I-CPS procurement (which we know is, at a minimum, being seriously explored). Relevant to that, we are expecting future PLAN SSNs to host a new, relatively large VLS/CLS system to employ these new munitions, which aligns with prior talk from the grapevine about a 1.2 meter diameter, 1500nm-class range AShBM being developed by the PLAN.

This is a very impactful capability uplift, and it's something we're seriously concerned about over here. With such a munition, PLAN SSNs within the 1IC become viable ASuW shooters for surface targets out to Guam. When patrolling between the 1IC and 2nd IC, with effective C3, they create the threat of unknown-axis AShBM salvos from well outside a USN formation's organic ASW coverage. As long as the 09IIIBs operate within range of land-based or surface-based ASW support, USN SSNs pose a significantly reduced threat to the 09IIIBs, with the caveat that some degree of attrition would be a near-certainty.

Beyond ASuW, if the munition is capable of prosecuting ashore targets, things open up even further.

View attachment 104469

This is a quick and dirty visual of what 1500nm standoffs from Misawa, Guam, and Darwin look like. With some caveats, PLAN SSNs with SLBMs alter these locations' threat profile from primarily single-axis, medium to long response window threats (with H-6K/KD-20 salvos being particularly "visible") to include unknown-axis, short response window SLBM salvos. This also has outsized effects even beyond the actual SSN. It's difficult to overstate how much impact the threat geometry has on an IAMDS, so introducing the need to detect, track, cue, launch, prosecute, and assess incoming munitions (especially BMs) from multiple axes simultaneously (with potentially minimal reaction time) will impose its own "virtual attrition" on an IAMDS compared to single-axis threats.

Not great.

To make things worse, as more capable SSNs begin to enter service (and as crew proficiency solidifies), it will become feasible to operate beyond the 2IC (and therefore beyond PLAN/AF support). Once this happens, we start to have serious issues.

View attachment 104471

This is a similar low-effort visual as the last, but for Pearl, SD, Bremerton, and Eielson.

At the moment, sans AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES, there is practically nothing in the way of an AMDS integral to these installations. I'm sure it goes without saying that PLA fires being able to reach out and touch us on our home turf is uh... sub-optimal.

While it would be vastly more challenging - if possible at all - to conduct dynamic ASuW with these munitions at this kind of distance (due to C3 and targeting limitations), the traditional SSN threat remains. This threat requires us to pull away forces that could be contributing to 7FLT operations, and to instead task them with ASW operations under 3FLT.

Beyond ASuW (again), the STW element also poses tremendous implications. Pearl, SD, and Bremerton are very juicy targets, and the ability to successfully destroy or disable CVNs (and ofc the myriad of CRUDES not underway) in port is the kind of game-changer that Xi Jinping probably asked Santa for Christmas. As it stands, there's just not much we can really do about a concerted attack like this, assuming we don't have extensive prior knowledge.

In order to rectify this threat before it truly matures, we will need to stand up an extensive IAMDS capable of defending our critical installations from multiple axes simultaneously, and with minimal reaction time. That's no small task. Alternatively, we could maintain AEGIS BMD equipped CRUDES patrols in the vicinity of these targets, but that would come at the cost of more (badly needed) major surface combatants not available for operations in 7FLT.

Altogether, unless we're content to just watch as we experience Tora Tora Tora with Chinese Characteristics, these new threat vectors will slowly force us to make difficult, undesired decisions/tradeoffs in order to address them.

(smh, I wish the PLA just stayed on defense. it's sooo much more fun when you can hit the other guy but he can't hit you)

i dont think Hawaii, SD etc are relevant, if those targets are hit then its a much bigger problem than just a few ships or fleets.

also you seem to be suggesting here that the Chinese intend to use SLBM as means ASuW? wouldnt that risk miscalculation that they might be nuclear armed?

 

[AndrewS]

So he seems to be into making these sweeping statement from a top level, so take this with a grain of salt.

From surface fleet point of view, same number of 052D and 055 and possibly more budget on 071/075/carrier. 054A/054B got more production in 14/5 > 13/5

So, the expectation is that with large procurement budget for navy, the additional money is likely to lead to large scale underwater production. At least 8 093B and 1 095, many 039C + mini-nuke to be launched in 14/5 (so by 2025).

Based on his calculation, underwater procurement can increase by 140 billion RMB, which is enough for 20 093B, 10+ 039C and mini-nuke. Now keep in mind that I don't think he is factoring in inflation very well here, but I think 8 093B by 2025 is minimum expectation. Probably wait until 15/5 before 095 mass production starts. It's not out of the realm of possibility that they mass produce 095 and 093B at the same time in order to just build up numbers while they sort out problems in 095.

140 Bn RMB is roughly $22 Bn
If we use estimate the Type-039C cost, then 10 would come to at least $3 Bn based on the export figures.

That would mean $19 Bn for 20x Type-093B and the mini-nuke.
So a single Type-093B would cost less than $1 Billion.
That actually sounds about right to me.

Just for comparison, the Virginia comes in at $3 Bn, which is 3x more