Why the Joint Strike Fighter is a calamity in progress
Winslow Wheeler
May 10, 2012
The United States is making a gigantic investment in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, billed by its advocates as the next - by their count the fifth - generation of air-to-air and air-to-ground combat aircraft.
Claimed to be near invisible to radar and able to dominate any future battlefield, the F-35 will replace most of the air-combat aircraft in the inventories of the US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and at least nine foreign allies (including Australia), and it will be in those inventories for the next 55 years.
It's no secret, however, that the program - the most expensive in American history - is a calamity.
Last month, we learned that the Pentagon has increased the price tag for the F-35 by another $US289 million - just the latest in a long string of cost increases - and that
the program is expected to account for a whopping 38 per cent of Pentagon procurement for defence programs, assuming its cost will grow no more.
How bad is it? A review of the F-35's cost, schedule, and performance - three essential measures of any Pentagon program - shows the problems are fundamental and still growing.
First, with regard to cost, the F-35 is simply unaffordable. Although the plane was originally billed as a low-cost solution, major cost increases have plagued the program throughout the last decade.
Last year, Pentagon leadership told Congress the acquisition price had increased another 16 per cent, from $US328.3 billion to $US379.4 billion for the 2457 aircraft to be bought. Not to worry, however - they pledged to finally reverse the growth.
The result?
This February, the price increased another 4 per cent to $US395.7 billion and then even further in April. Don't expect the cost overruns to end there: The test program is only 20 per cent complete, the Government Accountability Office has reported, and the toughest tests are yet to come.
Overall, the program's cost has grown 75 per cent from its original 2001 estimate of $US226.5 billion - and that was for a larger buy of 2866 aircraft.
Hundreds of F-35s will be built before 2019, when initial testing is complete. The additional cost to engineer modifications to fix the inevitable deficiencies that will be uncovered is unknown, but it is sure to exceed the $534 million already known from tests so far.
The total program unit cost for each individual F-35, now at $US161 million, is only a temporary plateau. Expect yet another increase in early 2013, when a new round of budget restrictions is sure to hit the Pentagon, and the F-35 will take more hits in the form of reducing the numbers to be bought, thereby increasing the unit cost of each plane.
A final note on expense: The F-35 will actually cost multiples of the $US395.7 billion cited above. That is the current estimate only to acquire it, not the full life-cycle cost to operate it.
The current appraisal for operations and support is $US1.1 trillion - making for a grand total of $US1.5 trillion, or more than the annual GDP of Spain.
And that estimate is wildly optimistic: It assumes the F-35 will only be 42 per cent more expensive to operate than an F-16, but the F-35 is much more complex.
The only other "fifth generation" aircraft, the F-22 from the same manufacturer, is in some respects less complex than the F-35, but in 2010, it cost 300 per cent more to operate per hour than the F-16. To be very conservative, expect the F-35 to be twice the operating and support cost of the F-16.
Already unaffordable, the F-35's price is headed in one direction - due north.
Running behind schedule
The F-35 isn't only expensive - it's way behind schedule. The first plan was to have an initial batch of F-35s available for combat in 2010. Then first deployment was to be 2012. More recently, the military services have said the deployment date is "to be determined." A new target date of 2019 has been informally suggested in testimony - almost 10 years late.
If the F-35's performance were spectacular, it might be worth the cost and wait. But it is not. Even if the aircraft lived up to its original specifications - and it will not - it would be a huge disappointment. The reason it is such a mediocrity also explains why it is unaffordable and, for years to come, unobtainable.
In discussing the F-35 with aviation and acquisition experts - some responsible for highly successful aircraft such as the F-16 and the A-10, and others with decades of experience inside the Pentagon and years of direct observation of the F-35's early history - I learned that the F-35's problems are built into its very DNA.
The design was born in the late 1980s in the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon agency that has earned an undeserved reputation for astute innovation.
It emerged as a proposal for a very short takeoff and vertical-landing aircraft (known as "STOVL") that would also be supersonic. This required an airframe design that - simultaneously - wanted to be short, even stumpy, and single-engine (STOVL), and also sleek, long, and with lots of excess power, usually with twin engines.
President Bill Clinton's Pentagon bogged down the already compromised design concept further by adding the requirement that it should be a multirole aircraft - both an air-to-air fighter and a bomber.
This required more difficult tradeoffs between agility and low weight, and the characteristics of an airframe optimised to carry heavy loads. Clinton-era officials also layered on "stealth," imposing additional aerodynamic shape requirements and maintenance-intensive skin coatings to reduce radar reflections.
They also added two separate weapons bays, which increase permanent weight and drag, to hide onboard missiles and bombs from radars. On top of all that, they made it multiservice, requiring still more tradeoffs to accommodate more differing, but exacting, needs of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.
Finally, again during the Clinton administration, the advocates composed a highly "concurrent" acquisition strategy. That meant hundreds of copies of the F-35 would be produced, and the financial and political commitments would be made, before the test results showed just what was being bought.
This grotesquely unpromising plan has already resulted in multitudes of problems - and 80 per cent of the flight testing remains.
A virtual flying piano, the F-35 lacks the F-16's agility in the air-to-air mode and the F-15E's range and payload in the bombing mode, and it can't even begin to compare to the A-10 at low-altitude close air support for troops engaged in combat.
Worse yet, it won't be able to get into the air as often to perform any mission - or just as importantly, to train pilots - because its complexity prolongs maintenance and limits availability.
The aircraft most like the F-35, the F-22, was able to get into the air on average for only 15 hours per month in 2010 when it was fully operational. (In 2011, the F-22 was grounded for almost five months and flew even less.)
This mediocrity is not overcome by the F-35's "fifth-generation" characteristics, the most prominent of which is its "stealth." Despite what many believe, "stealth" is not invisibility to radar; it is limited-detection ranges against some radar types at some angles.
Put another way, certain radars, some of them quite antiquated, can see "stealthy" aircraft at quite long ranges, and even the susceptible radars can see the F-35 at certain angles. The ultimate demonstration of this shortcoming occurred in the 1999 Kosovo war, when 1960s vintage Soviet radar and missile equipment shot down a "stealthy" F-117 bomber and severely damaged a second.
The bottom line: The F-35 is not the wonder its advocates claim. It is a gigantic performance disappointment, and in some respects a step backward. The problems, integral to the design, cannot be fixed without starting from a clean sheet of paper.
It's time to face the facts: The F-35 is an unaffordable mediocrity, and the program will not be fixed by any combination of hardware tweaks or cost-control projects. There is only one thing to do with the F-35: Junk it. America's air forces deserve a much better aircraft, and the taxpayers deserve a much cheaper one. The dustbin awaits.
Winslow Wheeler is director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Centre for Defence Information. Previously, he worked for 31 years on national security issues for Republican and Democratic senators on Capitol Hill and for the Government Accountability Office. He is editor of the anthology The Pentagon Labyrinth: 10 Short Essays to Help You Through It.
Foreign Policy
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