Chinese Internal Politics

Sinnavuuty

Senior Member
Registered Member
What's causing the rift about the Taiwan issue?
This is my opinion. I see that there is a factor of disagreement regarding the fait accompli in Taiwan, I see one part of the CMC in favor of an intervention for reunification while the other part of the CMC is uncertain about the intervention.

A Russian blogger focusing on China said this:
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Following the sudden disappearance and reappearance of Xi Jinping’s closest supporter Zhao Leji, opposition yellow publications began discussing the disappearance of the “Taiwan NDC chief,” deputy head of the Central Military Commission He Weidong, and predicting the defeat of Xi Jinping’s group.

The Chinese leader’s protégé, after successfully blockading Taiwan following Pelosi’s visit, was promoted to deputy commander of all armed forces.

On March 14, the general failed to attend an event dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Anti-Secession Law (the fight against Taiwanese separatism), which was attended by Chief of the General Staff Liu Zhengli.

With the disappearance of President Zhao Leji and the recent official arrest of the main proponent of the forcible annexation of Taiwan, Admiral Miao Hua (also a Fujian native and commander of the 31st Group Army), rumors have begun to circulate about a struggle against Xi Jinping’s group in the military, which supports the return of Taiwan. Recently, instead of Admiral Dong Jun, the new Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff Liu Zhenli, a leading candidate for the post of Defense Minister, has also begun to appear more frequently at official and international events. He Weidong has attended NPC sessions and also made a rare visit to Cuba for a military leader of his level (his partner in Xi Jinping’s campaign, Zhang Yuxia, a former army officer and compatriot of Xi Jinping, visited Vietnam). As I wrote in early November, there is likely to be an intensified struggle between the land and sea lobbies in the military leadership—all of whom are supporters and allies of Xi Jinping. However, infantryman Zhang Youxia is a candidate to leave the army leadership system at the 21st Congress in 2027 (preparations began in 2025), although he has unprecedented influence on the army and Xi Jinping - with Zhang Youxia's support, including Xi's coming to power, the military leader remained in the army leadership after 2022, despite reaching the age limit (I wrote about him in 2021 in "Chinese Power"). Zhang Youxia also retains the status of chief negotiator with the Russian Armed Forces and V. Putin on military cooperation issues. Most likely, it is about promoting Zhang Youxia's protected Liu Zhenli (also written about earlier) to the post of Minister of Defense and, in 2027, to Deputy CMC. The increased militarization of Taiwan and the continuation of the DPP's policy of breaking away from China also played a significant role - the blockade of the island (a purely naval operation) could be recognized as ineffective, and the priority could be shifted to large-scale actions by other branches of the military with the auxiliary role of the Navy. Including large-scale actions by the internal troops, to which the coast guard is subordinate.

Also recently, the commander of the "palace" army group, infantryman Zhang Yu-xia's protégé Fu Wenhua 付文化, was promoted to deputy commander of the internal troops (People's Armed Police).

Although He Weidong’s “disappearance” is indeed the replacement of the face of the army by Chief of the General Staff Liu Zhenli and the growth of Zhang Yuxia’s influence, the conclusions about the beginning of the defeat of Xi Jinping’s group or the abandonment of the Taiwan strategy are unfounded, especially against the background of the abrupt steps of the Taiwan leadership to abandon integration with the mainland and begin disintegration, as well as the recent naval exercises around Taiwan. Most likely, we are talking about a correction of the “victory through blockade” strategy – the use of internal troops may also mean the widespread use of human resources in a future.
 

Moonscape

Junior Member
Registered Member
I can buy that. I believe--contrary to Western news reports--Xi (and Wang Huning who's advising Xi) is actually quite careful re Taiwan and wants to delay armed reunification as long as possible to maintain domestic stability. Xi doesn't like to change policies even if changing circumstances otherwise warrant changing policies. See the unnecessary dragging out and messy end of Covid containment measures.

There's likely a growing faction both within the military and within the CPC more generally that want more immediate action on Taiwan since time is of the essence, given the steps the DPP is taking to permanently de-sinicize the Taiwan region.
 

Wrought

Junior Member
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PLA Factions and the Erosion of Xi’s Power Over the Military

I decided to post here because this may have political implications. Many are understanding that there is a political dispute within the PLA, on one side Xi Jinping trying to establish his control within the PLA through more centralized decision-making, while on the other side there is Zhang Youxia, advocating collective decision-making, garnering support from several other high-ranking officers.

What we have been seeing since last year is precisely a gradual loss of power by Xi in the PLA. Remember, if you want to control the PLA? Have the Political Commissar on your side. Miao Hua was by far Xi's biggest ally in the PLA and he was ousted, taking with him almost his entire network of protégés (Xi supporters too). Who replaced Miao Hua? Chen Hui, Zhang Youxia's longtime protégé. One pattern you notice is that Zhang's protégés are simply being spared or at least given a slight demotion, while Xi's allies are being ousted one by one, General by General. Now they want to replace Dong Jun (Shandong Gang, Xi's wife's protégé) with Li Zhonglin (PLGF Chief of Staff) and Zhang Youxia's political godson.

This piece was written by literal college students. No, seriously.

Brandon Tran is an international affairs and Chinese double major at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has interned with the Center for Naval Analyses, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Army War College, and been published in The Diplomat, Air University’s Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, the Modern War Institute, and more. Brandon hopes to commission as a military intelligence officer.

Gerui Zhang is an international affairs and Chinese double major at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He has interned with the Center for Naval Analyses. Gerui hopes to commission as a military intelligence officer.

I don't have anything against youth, and I've met plenty of smart young analysts in my time. But given the complete absence of hard evidence, any insider sources and/or credibility from such authors to make such claims is conspicuously absent. RUMINT is not HUMINT.
 

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
This piece was written by literal college students. No, seriously.



I don't have anything against youth, and I've met plenty of smart young analysts in my time. But given the complete absence of hard evidence, any insider sources and/or credibility from such authors to make such claims is conspicuously absent. RUMINT is not HUMINT.
Gerui Zhang went from China to the US to major in Chinese. That's how smart he is. That's like an Italian moving from Sicily to Detroit to learn how to make Pizza by working at Dominos.
 

zyklon

Junior Member
Registered Member
This piece was written by literal college students. No, seriously.



I don't have anything against youth, and I've met plenty of smart young analysts in my time. But given the complete absence of hard evidence, any insider sources and/or credibility from such authors to make such claims is conspicuously absent. RUMINT is not HUMINT.

HUMINT is generally speaking the least reliable type of intelligence. The thing about most HUMINT sources is that they're motivated by $, so they'll feed case officers all sorts of bullshit to keep the $ flowing.

Moreover, the MSS is known to dangle academics and businessmen in front of the CIA and DIA, as well as other FIS, who are then used to feed them the MSS' preferred narratives or even outright disinformation.

So wouldn't be surprised if these kids' "analysis" is in fact based on complete nonsense or even tabloid gossip from Hong Kong repackaged as intelligence by HUMINT sources looking to make a quick buck.
 

Sinnavuuty

Senior Member
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China’s unspoken question: who will succeed Xi Jinping?​


Yin Li, 62, and Chen Wenqing, 65, a former intelligence officer who now oversees China's legal system, seem to be good candidates.

I believe that Ding Xuexiang and Wang Huning are weak for different reasons, Ding because of a poor professional background and Wang because he has no career in regional administration.

In addition, there seems to be a clear division within the Party's affairs and it is becoming quite obvious: Li Qiang - Economy, Development and Society; Cai Qi - Party and National Security.

Although I think it is still premature to discuss Xi Jinping's succession. The main focus is on Xi Jinping's re-election in 2027 as party leader and in 2028 as head of the country - until 2032-2033, inclusive.

However, it is true that the election cycle has been launched not only for the leader, but also, firstly, for the future premier and, secondly, for the successor, who is expected to be appointed in 2027-2028 as vice-president of the PRC (according to the existing model). More precisely, in the next 2 years, the first round of the game of selecting a successor will take place - the "selection" of those who definitely will not enter, without getting into the Politburo.

The game of the successor may be complicated by a major administrative reform and the reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; for example, the post of Chairman of the Central Committee will appear, like Mao's, the post of General Secretary will become vacant, there will be a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, etc.

For now, the obvious successor is the party boss in Shanghai, Chen Jining. But he could, for example, be retained as premier in place of the current Li Qiang.

Otherwise, almost the entire Politburo youth group is ready for endless party games for the next two years, and then for Xi Jinping’s five-year plan.

…And he just didn’t leave in 2033. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao had many favorites and confidants for this role, from the military man Lin Biao to the head of the personal guard Wang Dongxing, who became Mao’s deputy (he ruled the party for 30 years) and could always replace him. There was Mao’s wife, the actress Jiang Qing, etc. For example, children—children in a hereditary monarchy—are the norm. There are people who are not on Xi’s side—that’s a completely different story.
 

Overbom

Brigadier
Registered Member
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China’s unspoken question: who will succeed Xi Jinping?​


Yin Li, 62, and Chen Wenqing, 65, a former intelligence officer who now oversees China's legal system, seem to be good candidates.

I believe that Ding Xuexiang and Wang Huning are weak for different reasons, Ding because of a poor professional background and Wang because he has no career in regional administration.

In addition, there seems to be a clear division within the Party's affairs and it is becoming quite obvious: Li Qiang - Economy, Development and Society; Cai Qi - Party and National Security.

Although I think it is still premature to discuss Xi Jinping's succession. The main focus is on Xi Jinping's re-election in 2027 as party leader and in 2028 as head of the country - until 2032-2033, inclusive.

However, it is true that the election cycle has been launched not only for the leader, but also, firstly, for the future premier and, secondly, for the successor, who is expected to be appointed in 2027-2028 as vice-president of the PRC (according to the existing model). More precisely, in the next 2 years, the first round of the game of selecting a successor will take place - the "selection" of those who definitely will not enter, without getting into the Politburo.

The game of the successor may be complicated by a major administrative reform and the reform of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; for example, the post of Chairman of the Central Committee will appear, like Mao's, the post of General Secretary will become vacant, there will be a Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee, etc.

For now, the obvious successor is the party boss in Shanghai, Chen Jining. But he could, for example, be retained as premier in place of the current Li Qiang.

Otherwise, almost the entire Politburo youth group is ready for endless party games for the next two years, and then for Xi Jinping’s five-year plan.

…And he just didn’t leave in 2033. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao had many favorites and confidants for this role, from the military man Lin Biao to the head of the personal guard Wang Dongxing, who became Mao’s deputy (he ruled the party for 30 years) and could always replace him. There was Mao’s wife, the actress Jiang Qing, etc. For example, children—children in a hereditary monarchy—are the norm. There are people who are not on Xi’s side—that’s a completely different story.
Dunno about all that.

However I like the current premier, he has been doing a good job so far
 
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