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Withdraw AND Win: Gaining Insight from Defeat
Commander John T. Kuehn, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Proceedings, December 2006
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The Vietnam War provides clues to a successful disengagement from Iraq.
"First, convince our Iraqi partners that our strategy is to Iraqify, not cut and run. Our record is not all that good."
—Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, USA (Ret.)
DoD
In Guam for talks in March 1967 at the height of the Vietnam War, Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu (front row, left), President Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky salute the playing of the U.S. and South Vietnamese National Anthems in welcoming ceremonies. The latter days of that war may offer a strategy for American disengagement from Iraq.
There are vast differences between the American involvement in Iraq and the U.S. experience in Vietnam. Nevertheless, failing to pay heed to what worked, what didn't work, what might have worked, or what should have been given a chance to work in that benighted conflict is probably a mistake. The Vietnam experience offers more than just a lesson in hubris; it offers valuable insight about forming a coherent policy vis-à-vis a region of the world that we abandon, as some would like us to, at our peril. And a perusal of this history suggests a flexible strategy that encompasses a phased, reversible withdrawal that both furthers U.S. national interests and does not abandon the Iraqi people to a situation worse than that prior to the U.S.-led invasion.
First we must identify—in a clearheaded manner—the national interests of the United States in Iraq. There are three primary ones: Defense, economic well-being, and credibility. These interests might be more specifically catalogued in relative order of importance:
Neutralize the potential for al-Qaeda-like extremist/insurgent sanctuaries to develop in a warlord-controlled or civil war-torn Iraq.
Ensure regional stability for the global oil supply.
Reclaim the credibility of the United States as a global leader.
It seems patently obvious, then, that the transmutation of Iraq into a "safe area" for extremist training, planning, and power projection of the type sponsored by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is to be avoided at all cost. One sad fact of our presence in Iraq is that that beleaguered nation has the potential to become more dangerous to the United States and its citizens than it may in reality have been under the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. A long-running civil war in Iraq may contribute to such an outcome just as easily as might the establishment of a hostile and extremist government.

U.S. NAVY (EBEN BOOTHBY)
The USS Chosin (CG-65), a guided-missile cruiser, patrols near an oil terminal in the Persian Gulf. The United States has a major national interest in ensuring regional stability for the global oil supply, a stability the author says is unlikely to endure if American forces are hastily and completely withdrawn from Iraq.
Civil war may be the lesser of the two evils because the extremists would be fighting a sort of multi-front war—one for control and/or defense of their "turf" and another against the West, primarily the United States. Even so, the Taliban and al Qaeda managed to do just this from their sanctuary in Afghanistan: the Taliban fought the Northern Alliance (among others) while al Qaeda handled the global terror offensive. The confluence of the various terror organizations with extremist insurgents (or a hostile extremist government) in a Sunni Triangle-like sanctuary might roughly approximate such a condition should the United States massively withdraw from the region. Complete control of Iraq by insurgent forces may not be necessary in order to achieve a sanctuary for terrorists.
Instability Breeds More Instability
The second national interest is economic. Regional instability in the Arabian Gulf naturally leads to instability in markets. This is because a consistent flow of oil leads to confidence in a stable oil supply that in turn leads to lower prices. Less stability not only affects market confidence but also insurance rates for means of transshipment. A prime example might be the heightened insurance premiums for oil tankers that were passed on to global consumers at the pump because of Iranian mining of the Strait of Hormuz in 1987. Instability in the supply of energy to the global economic engine erodes confidence and leads to economic stagnation, recession, and worse. This interest is not that of the United States alone. There is a coming together of national and global interests, especially with China as an energy debtor. Enhanced regional stability favorably serves both the United States and international entities.
Finally, the international standing of the United States is in jeopardy. That this nation has lost its credibility in the eyes of both global and some domestic audiences is not in doubt. However, regaining a measure of credibility would be most unlikely under a policy that abandons Iraq to its own devices without options for support. In Vietnam abandonment equated to a concerted policy—post-Paris Peace Accords—of military, economic, and political neglect.
The differences between the situation in Vietnam in the early 1970s and that existent today in Iraq must be highlighted in order to gain useful insights. The U.S. engagement in Vietnam was in support of a client regime against both an insurgency and an "external" government in Hanoi. The strategic situation in Vietnam was worse than what exists today in Iraq. When the United States signed the Paris Peace Accords in 1973 it was understood by Saigon that this nation would continue to provide financial support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as well as guarantee the adherence of Hanoi to the terms of the treaty by the threat of re-intervention using air and naval power.1
Unfortunately, these assurances did not have the support of Congress. Thus, when the Nixon and Ford administrations tried to make good on these promises, Congress stifled their efforts through the budget process. The first insight from Vietnam might be: do not withdraw so completely that you cannot reapply other forms of military and national power in support of the government you helped establish.
Air and Naval Power Crucial
During the Vietnam conflict the United States learned that air and naval power were critical in blunting aggression and stimulating the diplomatic process. Air and naval power were critical in the defeat of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) by the ARVN during the 1972 Easter Offensive. This offensive was an attempt by Hanoi to win the war prior to the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. The intent was to present the Nixon administration with a fait accompli on the battlefield.
U.S. ground forces played a much smaller role in 1972 than is generally understood. That year the bulk of the ground force combat was performed by a much-improved ARVN. However, U.S. advisors (such as John Paul Vann), naval power, and air power were still needed. The new and improved ARVN and U.S. air and naval firepower proved a rude awakening to Hanoi when its offensive failed to achieve its operational and strategic objectives.2 Without the LINEBACKER II campaign that included bombing North Vietnamese targets and mining Haiphong harbor, the United States might not have been able to get the North Vietnamese representatives to agree to return to the table in Paris.
The United States effectively abandoned its ally in Saigon and abrogated President Richard Nixon's secret promises to the Thieu regime to employ air and naval power to enforce the provisions of the treaty meant to keep the NVA at bay. Congress worsened this situation by refusing to authorize any financial support and aid for Saigon, resulting in an ARVN "hollow army."3 It seems with the recent election turnover in Congress that we risk going down this very same path once again.

U.S. NAVY (DAVID DANALS)
A phased withdrawal strategy that limits the involvement of Marines and Soldiers while increasing reliance on air and naval power, as illustrated here by the launching of an F/A-18F Super Hornet from the flight deck of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), may be the most productive way to disengage from Iraq.
Nonetheless, it was almost three years before the NVA felt it was strong enough and Saigon weak enough to again assume the offensive. Without U.S. support, and with an army demoralized by lack of equipment, South Vietnam collapsed in the face of an overwhelming conventional offensive by the well-equipped NVA in 1975. One wonders what General Vo Nguyen Giap's tanks would have done if they had been attacked by aircraft and naval gunfire as they attempted to race down the coast highway—or how Hanoi might have reacted to a renewal of bombing and naval mining in response to its violations of the terms of the treaty. Public reaction in 1972-73 was comparatively muted precisely because air and naval power were regarded as more "acceptable" compared to the reinsertion of ground forces. This is arguably still the case, especially given our experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo.4
What we now know is that reinsertion of ground forces after 1973 was probably not politically feasible for the United States for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the massive loss of credibility by the executive branch in the Watergate scandal.5 Thus, the national interest that involves credibility—especially that of the President—is perniciously influenced over time by protracted conflict.
Phased Withdrawal?
However, we have hopefully learned something from our mistakes. If the American people are properly prepared, then a protracted presence in only a portion of Iraq might be acceptable to the American public over the long haul. Such was the case in Korea in the 1950s, where a long-term military presence (to include ground forces) in South Korea exists to this day. This action was in the context of the global Cold War and the situation today is somewhat analogous in terms of the so-called Global War on Terrorism. This course of action is to be preferred to the simplistic "all or none" sorts of solutions we get from either end of the political spectrum. "Cut and Run" or a hasty decision to do so, may be the worst possible course of action. However, some sort of phased or partial withdrawal may be all that is politically feasible.6
In Vietnam, with the defeat of the 1972 NVA Easter Offensive, the United States and South Vietnam had indeed finally created, in a perverse fashion, the regime and environment for political success that a limited application of American power could sustain. What may have contributed to eventual success was buy-in for a strategy for re-intervention. In the Vietnamese situation re-intervention was politically impossible. President Nixon had been disgraced, and Congress refused to honor his policy commitments.
According to William Colby, the late head of the Central Intelligence Agency and one of the architects of the pacification program in South Vietnam, a strategy of re-intervention would have implemented lessons acquired from over a decade of hard schooling. Colby cites the case of Korea as a historical precedent. That case seemed to indicate that sustained presence combined with clear limits on the scope of the war could allow for a managed application of power that would not lead to the complete subjugation of Vietnam by the communists. Today, unlike the Vietnam conflict, the hard schooling has lasted three years. Circumstances today might be more favorable in terms of the military and political challenges posed in Iraq. American domestic support in 2006, while problematic, is not the lost cause it was in 1973 for Vietnam—yet.
Learning from Failure
American policy formulation seems to follow a process that learns only from success and not from failure. This tendency must not deter us from the insight that study of losing/lost conflicts can bring to a strategic discussion of continuing engagement and partial withdrawal from Iraq. With the creation of a task force to reassess U.S. strategic options under former Secretary of State James Baker and former congressman Lee Hamilton the time seems ripe to reverse this trend.7 The following potential general roadmap is proposed for a withdrawal and re-intervention policy that serves U.S. interests:
First, withdraw only partially from the country and only under U.S. terms—favorable terms. The purpose is to ensure and assure the Iraqi government of our commitment to them as well as our commitment to the region. This method also sends a powerful message to the global audience.
Maintain a ground presence somewhere in the country with the concurrence of the government—perhaps only in the Kurdish north, in the sparse desert area in the west, or in the south.
Make sure any remaining presence has as multinational a flavor as possible, as is currently the case in Afghanistan.
Get over the idea that any withdrawal by any means represents a permanent and irretrievable step. Flexible re-intervention serves the additional purpose of maintaining the strategic initiative. If asked by the legitimate government of Iraq, the United States would be obligated to re-engage as necessary, possibly using more flexible military instruments such as air power and/or special operations forces.
Do not limit re-intervention to ground-only and U.S.-only forces.
Finally, ensure the strategy is articulated and reiterated to the American and Iraqi publics on an ongoing basis. There is the real danger of a withdrawal gathering its own momentum. However, clearly stating that re-intervention is an option as well as maintaining some sort of residual or semi-permanent presence should ameliorate some of this danger. The key will be stability of the Iraqi government so as not to de-legitimize it as it struggles to assume more of the administrative and military burdens.
Now is precisely the time to consider the strategy and articulate it. The United States may find after having done so that key strategic and operational advantages can be gained by beginning a modest withdrawal early, especially as a means to undercut criticism of our presence. As the United States withdraws and the Iraqis assume additional responsibility, a principal raison d'etre for the insurgency—the overt U.S. presence—is marginalized and eventually rendered irrelevant. As for supporting a coup against the current regime in Baghdad, this writer has only one thought—Ngo Dinh Diem.
A "Scalable" Force
Bottom line: What is needed is a flexible strategy, one that encompasses a phased, reversible withdrawal tied to the achievement of goals rather than a strict timeline. Such a strategy furthers U.S. national interests and signally promises to improve the lot of the Iraqi people. A better term for such a strategy might be "scalable," a word often used for the employment of naval force deterrent packages—which normally come and go as the situation dictates from a position of strength vice weakness.8 Such a strategy would not abandon the Iraqi people to another couple of generations of brutal, repressive rule that is potentially worse than that existent prior to the U.S.-led invasion of 2003.
The United States intervened in Iraq to ensure—among other things—both our own national safety (by putting to rest a perceived fear of the intersection of Iraqi WMD with terrorists) and improve the lot of the Iraqi people. A strategy that encompasses both phased withdrawal and re-intervention might better serve our interests, allay our fears, and meet the requirements of national honor. To do less would be a betrayal of the tens of thousands that have died or been scarred, both civilian and military, by the violence in Iraq—not to mention the hundreds of thousands in the region who have died as a direct result of Saddam Hussein's expansionist and domestically cruel Baathism.
1Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 136. back to article
2George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam: 1950-1975, Second Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 246-249. back to article
3Lind, 136. To be fair, Lind still finds the Vietnam case hopeless in terms of victory at that stage due to our complete withdrawal. The term "hollow army" also refers obliquely to the U.S. military's state after Vietnam when units were dangerously weak in terms of equipment maintenance and troop readiness. ARVN readiness, especially for ammunition, was far worse. back to article
4Herring, 248. For public perceptions re: Kosovo see Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), passim. back to article
5Lind, passim chapter 6. Lind identifies loss of credibility and drawing false conclusions as results of the perception of defeat. See also 136 for the influence of Watergate. back to article
6David Ignatius, "Time is a Weapon," The Washington Post, 11 January 2005, 15. Ignatius sees, as do most commentators from Anthony Cordesman to Jeffrey Record, that time is the key issue-especially in terms of sustaining public support for our engagement of ground forces in Iraq. See Jeffrey Record, "Is the War on Terrorism Sustainable?" U.S. N aval Institute Proceedings, December 2003, 44-46,. and Cordesman, et.al. Strengthening Iraqi Military and Security Forces, working draft, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December, 2004), iii. More recently see Cohen, "Plan B," passim. back to article
7Sharon Behn, The Washington Times, 1. See also Michael Abramowitz and Thomas E. Ricks, "Major Change Expected in Strategy for Iraq War," The Washington Post, 20 October 2006, 1. back to article
8OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3501.316A, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, p. 2. back to article
Commander Kuehn teaches military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He is currently writing his dissertation to complete a Ph.D. from Kansas State University.

A Spy Left Out in the Cold
Ronald J. Olive, Special Agent, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (Retired)
Proceedings, November 2006
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In Capturing Jonathan Pollard, a new book from the Naval Institute Press, former NCIS special agent Ronald Olive recounts how a shocking breakdown in security within the U.S. Navy allowed analyst Jonathan Pollard to sell military secrets to Israel and details the struggle to bring this unlikely spy to justice.
In early June 1984, a bespectacled nearly thirty-year-old man with a dimpled chin, chubby cheeks, and wavy, receding hair left his modest apartment in Washington, D.C., and walked two blocks to the fashionable Hilton Hotel, spread across seven manicured acres at 1919 Connecticut Avenue. In the lobby, a sumptuous space lit up by a massive crystal chandelier, he glanced around and located the person he had come to meet for lunch, a stranger to him until now. After a quick consultation, the two decided to eat in the Hilton's refurbished coffee shop, at a corner table where no one would overhear their conversation.
It was a watershed moment in the life of this man—the first step in the culmination of a lifelong dream. For the guardians of America's national security, it was a disaster in the making. Jonathan Jay Pollard, a naval intelligence analyst, had recently been temporarily assigned to the ATAC [Anti-Terrorist Alert Center], a newly established division of the NIS [Naval Investigative Service]. As a watch stander, he was responsible for answering phones, interpreting classified information about potential terrorist activity, and writing draft reports for review before they were disseminated to the fleet. His position gave him access to the most highly classified material the defense intelligence community possessed.
His lunch partner, Israeli air force colonel Aviem Sella, was a striking, articulate man with a slightly pointed chin and a lean, trim build. A famed fighter jock and an Israeli national hero, he was the exact opposite of the bookish, baby-faced Pollard, who had been a social outcast for much of his life. Some said that Pollard was a wise guy and a troublemaker, a flamboyant, loose-lipped person who invited insults and basked in attention, whether positive or negative. The analyst claimed he was harassed because he was Jewish. Whatever the case, he had spent much of his life on the sidelines, and like many a sidelined youth, over the years he developed an active fantasy life. During his undergraduate years at Stanford University he told a lot of far-fetched tales, most notably, bragging to acquaintances about working for the Israeli foreign-intelligence agency Mossad and being a colonel in an elite Israeli army outfit. He dreamed of someday becoming a real spy. Now, after years of longing for it, his opportunity had arrived.
In the annals of spy lore, the encounter at the Hilton would have been laughable had it not led to such a disastrous result. Both the analyst and the air force colonel were wet behind the ears. Though, in the past, Pollard had tried to pass classified information off to various people, his attempts had been bungled. Despite all the big talk about working for Mossad, there is no indication that up to this point he had ever given someone classified information for money. As for Sella, he was a pilot and a student, not an intelligence operative. Currently he was attending New York University, working on his doctorate in computer science and raising money for Israeli bonds by lecturing about his combat missions. Sella was an excellent speaker, well known throughout the New York Jewish community for the riveting accounts he gave of his legendary exploits. But he knew little about the art of recruiting a spy.
When the two men met for lunch, both were nervous. Colonel Sella didn't know what to expect from the figure sitting across the table from him. Sure, someone had sung Pollard's praises, saying that he was a brilliant man and an ardent Zionist, but the person who made this claim was just a passing acquaintance. Was the colonel doing the right thing? Sella made up his mind not to say much of anything other than impressing the analyst with his background. He would just listen to what Pollard had to say and report it to his superior at the Israeli consulate in New York City, Yosef Yagur.
Although Pollard had his own reasons for being cautious, by nature he was less inclined to hold back. No sooner had they met than he pegged his lunch companion as the Chuck Yeager type, and his nerves began to settle. Before long, Sella was telling Pollard that he had shot down Soviet-piloted MiG aircraft over the Suez in 1969, and Pollard was addressing Sella as Avi. Anyone with Russian blood on his hands is all right with me, Pollard thought, and he began giving Sella a detailed description of the high-level access he had working for the ATAC.
Pollard cited specific examples of what he could get his hands on, including documents classified TS for top secret and SCI for sensitive compartmented information, the U.S. government's highest classification level. He had access to classified materials housed at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC), the Naval Intelligence Support Center (NISC), and the National Photographic Interpretations Center (NPIC), among others, and he knew how to exploit security "chasms." The analyst was blunt: he wanted to work as an undercover agent for Israel. His ultimate goal, he admitted, was to immigrate to Israel, but for now he was willing to stick with his job and exploit holes in the U.S. intelligence system on behalf of the Jewish homeland.
Sella was stunned. What this fellow was telling him was so incredible and so bold that, thinking it must be a setup, the Israeli glanced around the room to see if anyone was watching. "I can't believe that security is so lax in the U.S. government," he said with a skeptical look.
Pollard, a nonstop talker, kept chattering away about his access, claiming that he could get signal intelligence in addition to technical information. His manner was so convincing that Sella in turn began to relax. No one could be this bold and sincere at the same time. Pollard must be telling the truth. The colonel had already been authorized by Yagur to set up another meeting as well as a clandestine communications plan, but only if he believed Pollard to be sincere. By now, Sella was sold. This was a golden opportunity, one that he couldn't let slip through his fingers.
Leaning forward on his elbows, Sella said they were going to set up a communications link using pay phones near Pollard's apartment. The analyst should locate several phones and write down their numbers. Not wasting a second, Pollard catapulted out of his seat and told his companion to wait right there, he would be back soon. About twenty minutes later, he returned to the coffee shop with the numbers scribbled on a piece of paper and handed it over. Sella assigned each phone number a one-letter code from the Hebrew alphabet. The plan was that the colonel would ring Pollard up at his residence at a specific time and give him the code letter that corresponded to a given pay phone. As soon as Pollard heard the Hebrew letter, he was to hang up, go to the appropriate phone, and wait for Sella to call with further instructions.
The colonel told him to bring to their next meeting anything he could get his hands on about Saudi Arabia and Soviet air defense systems. He needed several samples of the types of classified material to which Pollard had access. Then Sella began pushing the button to test his companion. In June 1981 the colonel had led a raid on a nuclear reactor facility in Tuwaitha, Iraq. He had been only verbally briefed following the mission and was dying to see the damage inflicted. Could Pollard produce satellite photos of the outcome? Sella figured that if there were any such photographs being held by the United States, they were probably coded top secret. That would be a good test of Pollard's claims.
When lunch was finished, the two men parted ways with a warm handshake. Sella promised he would soon be in touch.
If the meeting had started with nervousness on both sides, it ended with joint elation. The colonel was under the impression that he would be Pollard's operational case officer. This was far different from downing Soviet MiGs, but it was thrilling just the same. As for Pollard, he was in his glory.
Although the issue of pay had not been mentioned, for years he had been dreaming about espionage, and now here he was, exiting the Hilton with a secret code already established, an Israeli war hero as his handler, and a virtual warehouse of highly sensitive defense material to disclose. And this was only his first meeting. . . .
Barely keeping his joy in check, he hurried home. Pollard had a girlfriend, Anne Henderson, with whom he shared everything. Before his encounter with Sella he had told her about it, saying this was his big chance to help Israel, and she had encouraged him to go forward with the meeting. Now, as soon as he walked through the door of his apartment, he spilled everything to Anne. His dream was coming true. Not only was he about to become a spy for Israel but also, he was convinced—though no promises had been made—Israel was going to pay him. He and Anne were on their way to a better life.
Mr. Olive spent 30 years in law enforcement, including 22 with NCIS. Since retiring in 1999, he has run his own consulting and confidential investigations company. A former Marine, he was awarded the Bronze Star with combat "V" for valor while serving in Vietnam.

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The U.S. Navy will name its next aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford in honor of the president who was buried Wednesday in his home town, officials said.

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FuManChu said:

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Your thoughts, Popeye?

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I wish the USN would use the more traditional names for CVN's. But that ended 43 years ago when JFK was assainated....I also wish they would change the names of CVN's 70,74 & 75. I do not have any problems with the other names.

I like the RN's name on their former CV's.."Invincble", "Illustrious", "Formidable etc..The USN cancelled CV-35 was to be named Reprisal.

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bd popeye said:

I hate this. And hate is a word that I seldom use. This subject has long been a discussion in my yahoo USN groups.

I feel the next class of CVN's should be named America or Enterprise. There was a petition give to SecNAVY Winters asking the USN name CVN-78 America. Problem is the US congress passed an add on resoultion to the 2007 US DoD budget reccomending that CVN-78 be named Gerald R Ford. SecNAVY makes the final decision on this matter.

This is what I said in another thread.

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/showpost.php?p=45851&postcount=52


The traditional or historic names are now assigned to LHA/LHD's and CG's.

You know there is nothing in writing that says CVN's are to be named after Presidents.

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Obi Wan Russell said:

I've long believed this is mostly about politicians perpetuating their own belief that they are the most important people on the planet, when we all know they are amongst the least valuable (along with real estate agents and used car salesmen). I have nothing against Gerald Ford personally, having heard a brief overview of his career he seems to have been a fairly decent and honest sort of guy, but to name the lead ship of the most important class of warship the world will see in the next fifty years after him is wholly inapropriate, and considering he was an unelected leader commemorating him is hardly a good advertisement for democracy.

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Bush revamps US military in Iraq
President George W Bush is to make a number of key changes in the US military leadership as part of his fresh strategy for Iraq, officials say.
There will be a new head of US Central Command and a new ground commander.

Mr Bush is expected to deliver a speech next week unveiling a strategy that could include thousands more US troops.

It comes as control of the US Congress passed for the first time in 12 years to the Democrats, who want to apply pressure for a phased Iraq withdrawal.

Mr Bush also spoke by video link to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, discussing the security situation in Baghdad and calling for an investigation of the circumstances of Saddam Hussein's execution.

Baghdad deployment

The White House and Pentagon have not confirmed the changes but US media and administration officials have said they will be:


Adm William Fallon to replace Gen John Abizaid as head of Central Command for Iraq and Afghanistan

Lt Gen David Petraeus to take over from Gen George Casey as the leading ground commander in Iraq

US ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to replace John Bolton as US ambassador to the UN

Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to Pakistan, to replace Mr Khalilzad in Baghdad
On Friday, Mr Bush confirmed he had named retired Vice Admiral and intelligence official Michael McConnell to replace John Negroponte who has been appointed deputy secretary of state.

Good relations

Adm Fallon is currently the top military commander in the Pacific and, if confirmed, the move will put a navy man in charge of two land wars.

Leading Democrat Senator Daniel Inouye said Adm Fallon was "well educated and respected" and that his nomination would "go flying through" Congress.

A senior White House official said Mr Bush might make the official announcement on Mr Khalilzad as early as Friday.

Mr Khalilzad would have to be confirmed by the Senate, but analysts say he has maintained good relations with the Democrats.

The BBC's Sarah Morris in Washington says the new strategy could include a deployment of 20,000 fresh troops to be stationed mostly in and around Baghdad with the intention of disarming the militia groups there.

But Mr Bush said he needed to hold further consultations before he outlined the strategy.

Some members of the new Congress have been invited to the White House on Friday for discussions, the Associated Press news agency said.

'Responsible redeployment'

Correspondents say the Democrats, newly installed in power in both houses, will not be supportive of the strategy.

And the new Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, called for a plan to start a troop pull-out.


"It is the responsibility of the president to articulate a new plan for Iraq that ... allows us to responsibly redeploy our troops," she said in her inaugural address.

The BBC's Adam Brookes in Washington says Mrs Pelosi's views appear to represent a growing consensus among Democrats that the US should start scaling down its commitment in Iraq.

But there is no sign that the president will be talking about troop withdrawals, our correspondent says.

In a two-hour teleconference with Mr Maliki on Thursday Mr Bush agreed there should be "sufficient" security forces in Baghdad, the White House said.

The US president said he had sought and received assurances from Mr Maliki that he had the will to do what was necessary to protect Iraqis against increasing sectarian violence.

Mr Bush said: "One thing is for certain: I will want to make sure that the mission is clear and specific and can be accomplished."

The president also said he wished the execution of ex-Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein had been more dignified and that there should be a "full investigation".

However, he said Saddam Hussein had been given justice that "the thousands of people he killed had not".


Story from BBC NEWS:

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French President Jacques Chirac, meanwhile, said the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq destabilized the entire Middle East and caused terrorism to spread, adding that the problems in Iraq justified France's strong opposition to the war.
"As France foresaw and feared, the war in Iraq caused upheavals whose effects have not yet finished unraveling,"

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bd popeye said:

Amen! I agree with your statement 100%.

Gerald Ford was a fine man. Very honest and upright. But that's all.

The man was never elected president. Instead he was appointed Vice President when that crook Spiro Agnew resigned the vice presidency. He rose to the presidency when Nixon resigned in August 1974...

His WWII service is admirable but what he did was no diffrent that what thousands of other sailors have done in their navy careers..save their ship! None of them have a CV named after them.

I bet if he were still alive and asked what he thought of this whole situation he would not want his name on the ship. He very well may say name it America...

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