Given Ukraine’s geography, the original Russian pincer movement from north and south along Deniper river and reservoir chain was the probably the best chance Russia had to cut off large parts of Ukraine from anything relatively quickly. A further pincer movement to the west will be increasingly longer more difficult to supply. Unfortunately Russia’s capability proved far short of what is required to meet up even along the deniper.
Basically, Russian army needed to have the capability to advance rapidly about 300-400km along two axis while both protecting the flanks of the advance and retaining major offensive capability at the tip of each advance to affect a rapid defeat of Ukraine that would not give up unless militarily defeated. Evidence seem to suggest Russian mobile formations runs out of both offensive strength at the tip and capacity for ensuring its own flank security at about 100-150km from staging point.
So Russian military’s actual mobile offensive capability is probably much less than 1/3 of was required to quickly overcome Ukrainian resistance if Ukraine was determined to fight.
Whatever the forthcoming military operation the Russians had in mind, we should probably also expect no further offensives that attempts to penetrate more than 50-100km into Ukraine held positions at a stretch, followed by extended pulse to move logistic bases forward and secure it against attack.
This makes me think securing a credible partial victory by victory day on may 8th is unlikely.
