i think that is merely a standard story designed to highlight the conventional narrative that Hitler was a overreaching strategic incompetent. Hitler was often a reaching strategic incompetent, but on this Occassion he was not nearly as incompetent as narrative made him out to be, and Guderian certainly had a narrow field commander’s mind and most certainly was clueless about Germany’s overall predicament as opposed to the operational challenges on the eastern front.
Basically, 1943 was likely the last opportunity Germany has to dictate the course of a campaign season in the east. 1944 will likely see Anglo-american invasion of France, Italy and possibly Norway. Germany’s relative material strength vs the USSR would in any case have declined sharply even without accounting for the diversions to address these very potent new challenges to Germany’s land strength. There was no way Germany would have the strength to launch a major strategic offensive in the east after 1943. In 1943 Germany had one last chance to decisively improve her defensive position and depth to face what would likely be at least 2-3 upcoming years of pure defensive operation on the east against a now very experienced and much stronger red army
Alternatives to zitedelle for Germany in 1943 all depends on the German army at the operational level holding the same advantage over the Soviet army derived from the tightness of their OODC decision loop. They would need to keep the same advantage throughout 1943 that they had held in 1942 and the beginning of 1943. Hitler could see the Soviets learn from their mistakes and are tightening up their own OODC loop. So it would be even more risky to give up large territories to the Soviets essentially for free, and then count on the Soviets making the same mistakes and exhibit the same slow reactions to German maneuvers as during the follow up of Stalingrad to gain them back.
So prestige was not the driving force for hitler’s decision to commit to the Kursk battle. The fact that Germany was back against a wall and out of other real options was.
I have noticed that you have a record of making questionable (at best) comments (which I may lack time to address) on
military history in addition to underrating my knowledge (which does not come from popular books or documentaries).
I concur that, after the war, many German generals liked to blame Hitler alone for all the misfortunes of war, which was unfair.
Indeed, sometimes Hitler's judgement was better than the "experts'". For instance, Hitler was right in June 1940 to order that
the Panzerkampfwagen III be armed with the 50 mm / L60 gun, but his order was ignored until early 1941 by 'experts' who
thought that the 50 mm / L42 gun (with lower muzzle velocity) was adequate.
I find it surprising that any historically knowledgeable person now believes the Operation Citadel was Germany's best or
even only strategic option in the summer of 1943.
"Guderian certainly had a narrow field commander’s mind."
In fact, Guderian last held a field command (2nd Panzer Army) in December 1941, when Hitler dismissed him.
In 1943, Guderian became the Inspector General of Armored Troops, assigned the mission of reconstructing the Panzerwaffe.
(In early 1943 (after the Battle of Stalingrad), the Wehrmacht reportedly had fewer than 500 operational tanks on the Ostfront.)
After his appointment, Guderian (understandably) liked to start on a note of optimism (whether or not he privately believed it)
in order to reassure others (particularly Hitler) that he was the right man for the task. So Guderian's hopeful statement that
the Wehrmacht should prepare to resume offensive campaigns in 1944 should not be taken too literally.
Manstein also apparently favored remaining on the strategic defensive, hoping to entice the RKKA into overextending itself
through offensives and striking back with 'backhand blows' (as in the counteroffensive that took Kharkov in February 1943).
Manstein's hope was that if the RKKA suffered enough losses through German 'backhand blows', it could become weakened
enough that Stalin would consider a negotiated settlement. Did Manstein also have a "narrow field commander's mind"?
Friedrich von Mellenthin made the comment that the great German General Staff could think of nothing better to do with
its Panzer divisions than to hurl them in a frontal assault against the strongest field defenses (Kursk salient) in the world.
According to recent historical scholarship, the Battle of Kursk was less of a 'decisive defeat' for Germany than many earlier
writers (such as Martin Caidin in his ignorant _The Tigers Are Burning_) claimed. Indeed, the Germans may well have won
a tactical victory by many measures. But Guderian believed that the Wehrmacht's almost irreplaceable armored reserve
should not be committed to battle prematurely, not until a potential victory would result in decisive strategic consequences.
By the way, even as the RKKA was advancing into Poland in 1944 and the Wehrmacht was long past its prime, Guderian
remained a respected, if not almost feared, adversary for the Soviet generals. Even the suspicion that Hitler might give
Guderian a free hand to command Panzer forces in a counterattack might well have given some pause to the RKKA.
Indeed, in a battle that has been long covered up, the Germans (though outnumbered perhaps 3 to 1 in AFV) evidently
successfully counterattacked and cut off most of a Soviet tank army. This stinging defeat may have contributed (in
addition to logistical difficulties and political considerations) to the RKKA slowing down its advance westward.
