Ukrainian War Developments

Lethe said:

I want to come back to this point that I made a few weeks ago. Recently we have seen footage and heard reports of atrocities committed by Russian forces against Ukrainian civilian populations. We should rightly condemn these actions, but we should not be surprised by them. In war the darkest aspects of humanity are unleashed and evil stalks the land. This is why policy makers on all sides should go to great lengths to avoid war, and more broadly should discharge their duties in full cognizance of the weight of their responsibilities.

Which brings us to

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article from the Wall Street Journal. As

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:



To this @MarkAmesExiled makes a

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I have previously described how Ukraine's constitution was modified in 2019 to enshrine its quest to join NATO, and how it specifically enjoins the President and Parliament of Ukraine to pursue that goal. The German chancellor Scholz surely knows this, and moreover the political balance of power within the Ukrainian government and the pressures and constraints on Zelenskiy.

So why, as @MarkAmesExiled asks, didn't Scholz, Biden, Macron, etc. make it much easier for Zelenskiy to sell such a shift at home by publicly declaring what was already private NATO policy, i.e. that Ukraine would not join NATO? Zelenskiy would then be able to say to his people that it is out of our hands and we must forge a different path.

Unfortunately the answer is very clear. Even on the brink of war, the governments of each and every NATO member judged it more important to save face than to avert this catastrophic conflict. NATO did not want to be seen to be revising its strategic posture in the face of Russian threats (even though they were!) and this was evidently judged to be more important than avoiding tens of thousands of deaths, crimes against humanity, mass displacement of communities, and all the other forms of human suffering that have occurred and are still to come.

There is a lot of blame to go around here.

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If you are a little more cynical you'd think what I think, some "element" in NATO actively instigated this war.

Below are excerpts from

The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis
By G.D. Bakshi


The Russian build up was SLOW AND METHODICAL and MUCH LESS RUSHED than in the 1994 First Chechen War. Troops had been systemically prepared for mountain warfare in a divisional battle school in Siberia (over 7000 personnel were sent from here).

North Chechnian terrain is flat and open till the River Terek. The Russians initially concentrated some 50,000 troops for the offensive. A corps sized invasion force was backed by about 20,000 troops in the reserve. (subsequently the total Russian Force levels committed were in the region of 93,000) Elite Spetsnaz and Paratrooper units spearheaded the attacks.

*** My own Notes: 93,000 personnel for an area of 17,300 km². They saw the build up for Ukraine was less than 200,000 troops. For those thinking that Russia could actually take Kiev, let alone the entirety of Ukraine with less than 50,000 personnel committed to Kiev if the Ukrainians were determined to fight are so badly informed ***

*** " North Chechnian terrain is flat and open till the River Terek " , that is the northern third of Chechnya. That means little cover. By contrast the northern portion of the Kiev Oblast (the entire oblast having an area of about 28,000 sq km) is heavily forested. That is the route via the Russians entered from Belarus via Chernobyl. That means lots of cover for infantry with ATGMS, and lots of personnel and vehicular losses for convoys that assume it will be a cakewalk and do not make the necessary defensive precautions. ****

*** I share all this in service of informed debate, because the Chechen Wars are the most recent lengthy duration land wars that the Russians have fought in, and as such most of the tactics and in some ways the strategies involved in Chechnya are applicable (they should be) to Russia's Ukraine campaign. With this information one can compare and contrast what Russia did in the 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars, in the Battles of Grozny, with what it is doing and why it has done in the Ukrainian War. The Ukrainian bare many similarities to the Chechen Rebels in that they have proven to be a determined decently equipped and armed force, going against an enemy that has much greater fire power and aerial assets, that is ready to fight, instead of rolling over at the first sight of Russians at the outskirts of their capital ***

To be continued...

Weaasel said:

Below are excerpts from

The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis
By G.D. Bakshi

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The Russian build up was SLOW AND METHODICAL and MUCH LESS RUSHED than in the 1994 First Chechen War. Troops had been systemically prepared for mountain warfare in a divisional battle school in Siberia (over 7000 personnel were sent from here).

North Chechnian terrain is flat and open till the River Terek. The Russians initially concentrated some 50,000 troops for the offensive. A corps sized invasion force was backed by about 20,000 troops in the reserve. (subsequently the total Russian Force levels committed were in the region of 93,000) Elite Spetsnaz and Paratrooper units spearheaded the attacks.

*** My own Notes: 93,000 personnel for an area of 17,300 km². They saw the build up for Ukraine was less than 200,000 troops. For those thinking that Russia could actually take Kiev, let alone the entirety of Ukraine with less than 50,000 personnel committed to Kiev if the Ukrainians were determined to fight are so badly informed ***

*** " North Chechnian terrain is flat and open till the River Terek " , that is the northern third of Chechnya. That means little cover. By contrast the northern portion of the Kiev Oblast (the entire oblast having an area of about 28,000 sq km) is heavily forested. That is the route via the Russians entered from Belarus via Chernobyl. That means lots of cover for infantry with ATGMS, and lots of personnel and vehicular losses for convoys that assume it will be a cakewalk and do not make the necessary defensive precautions. ****

To be continued...

Click to expand...

*** I share all this in service of informed debate, because the Chechen Wars are the most recent lengthy duration land wars that the Russians have fought in, and as such most of the tactics and in some ways the strategies involved in Chechnya are applicable (they should be) to Russia's Ukraine campaign. With this information one can compare and contrast what Russia did in the 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars, in the Battles of Grozny, with what it is doing and why it has done in the Ukrainian War. The Ukrainian bare many similarities to the Chechen Rebels in that they have proven to be a determined decently equipped and armed force, going against an enemy that has much greater fire power and aerial assets, that is ready to fight, instead of rolling over at the first sight of Russians at the outskirts of their capital ***

Continued

Below are excerpts from

The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis
By G.D. Bakshi

Russian Command Structure in the Second Chechen War

The Operations were controlled by the Joint Grouping of Russian Forces in the North Caucasus (ONG) headed by Col Gen Victor Kazantsev, Commander of the North Caucasus Military District. He had been Gen Kavashnin’s deputy in the First Chechen War and hence was eminently qualified to lead this campaign. Under him were:

(a) The Eastern Grouping: Under Lt Gen Gennady Troshev. He was an ethnic Russian of Chechen extraction, knew the terrain well and proved to be the most daring field commander on the Russian side. He was the deputy commander of Russian Forces in Chechnya.

(b) The Western Grouping: Under Maj Gen. V. Shamanov.

(c) The Northern Grouping: Under Gen. Thachev.

(d) The Southern Grouping: Under Maj. Gen. Mukhridin Ashurov. This was organised in January 2000 as an anvil to block the escape of the Chechen rebels via the southern mountains and passes. This comprised some 5000 troops from the Airborne Forces, Naval Infantry and Border Guards.



(e) Grozney Grouping (Later Argun Grouping): Under Lt. Gen V. Bulgakov. Under him was Major Gen. Mikhail Maloteyew. (One of the Russian Army’s star commanders) He was reportedly killed when leading an assault by MVD troops in Grozney.

Invasion–Phase One: This lasted from late September 99 to mid October 1999. It involved the isolation of Chechnya by Joint Forces Grouping East and Joint Forces Grouping West. Major offensives were launched by Joint Forces Grouping North to occupy a so called Security Zone north of the River Terek. It was a rapid two pronged mechanised advance by Joint Forces Grouping North in the direction of Kauskaya and Salkovskaya. This was complemented by an equally rapid thrust by. Joint Forces Grouping East from Kiziyar towards the Terek river. By mid October 1999 the line of Terek river had been secured in a rapid air-land blitzkrieg.

Phase Two–The Encirclement of Grozney: This phase lasted from mid October to late December 1999. The Western and Eastern Group of Forces launched massive three pronged attacks to isolate and then invest the capital city of Grozney. In the first Chechen War, Russian troops had dashed into the Grozney city center only to be ambushed, sniped at and shot up over the months. This time the Russians were far more methodical and cautious in this phase.

Initial Russian attacks in Grozney met with very stiff resistance. Russian Maj. Gen. Mikhail Malofeyev was killed in the bitter fighting. The Russians carried out a brief tactical pause in which they subjected Grozney to intense fire assaults using Grad Rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery along with heavy and continuous air strikes. These caused heavy casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population and led to the exodus of over 220,000 Chechen refugees to Ingushetia and Georgia.

KYli said:

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How will this help?
The shutdown valve is in Russia not in Germany, so no gas input why do you need refineries and storage xD

Weaasel said:

*** I share all this in service of informed debate, because the Chechen Wars are the most recent lengthy duration land wars that the Russians have fought in, and as such most of the tactics and in some ways the strategies involved in Chechnya are applicable (they should be) to Russia's Ukraine campaign. With this information one can compare and contrast what Russia did in the 1st and 2nd Chechen Wars, in the Battles of Grozny, with what it is doing and why it has done in the Ukrainian War. The Ukrainian bare many similarities to the Chechen Rebels in that they have proven to be a determined decently equipped and armed force, going against an enemy that has much greater fire power and aerial assets, that is ready to fight, instead of rolling over at the first sight of Russians at the outskirts of their capital ***

Continued

Below are excerpts from

The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis
By G.D. Bakshi

Russian Command Structure in the Second Chechen War

The Operations were controlled by the Joint Grouping of Russian Forces in the North Caucasus (ONG) headed by Col Gen Victor Kazantsev, Commander of the North Caucasus Military District. He had been Gen Kavashnin’s deputy in the First Chechen War and hence was eminently qualified to lead this campaign. Under him were:

(a) The Eastern Grouping: Under Lt Gen Gennady Troshev. He was an ethnic Russian of Chechen extraction, knew the terrain well and proved to be the most daring field commander on the Russian side. He was the deputy commander of Russian Forces in Chechnya.

(b) The Western Grouping: Under Maj Gen. V. Shamanov.

(c) The Northern Grouping: Under Gen. Thachev.

(d) The Southern Grouping: Under Maj. Gen. Mukhridin Ashurov. This was organised in January 2000 as an anvil to block the escape of the Chechen rebels via the southern mountains and passes. This comprised some 5000 troops from the Airborne Forces, Naval Infantry and Border Guards.



(e) Grozney Grouping (Later Argun Grouping): Under Lt. Gen V. Bulgakov. Under him was Major Gen. Mikhail Maloteyew. (One of the Russian Army’s star commanders) He was reportedly killed when leading an assault by MVD troops in Grozney.

Invasion–Phase One: This lasted from late September 99 to mid October 1999. It involved the isolation of Chechnya by Joint Forces Grouping East and Joint Forces Grouping West. Major offensives were launched by Joint Forces Grouping North to occupy a so called Security Zone north of the River Terek. It was a rapid two pronged mechanised advance by Joint Forces Grouping North in the direction of Kauskaya and Salkovskaya. This was complemented by an equally rapid thrust by. Joint Forces Grouping East from Kiziyar towards the Terek river. By mid October 1999 the line of Terek river had been secured in a rapid air-land blitzkrieg.

Phase Two–The Encirclement of Grozney: This phase lasted from mid October to late December 1999. The Western and Eastern Group of Forces launched massive three pronged attacks to isolate and then invest the capital city of Grozney. In the first Chechen War, Russian troops had dashed into the Grozney city center only to be ambushed, sniped at and shot up over the months. This time the Russians were far more methodical and cautious in this phase.

Initial Russian attacks in Grozney met with very stiff resistance. Russian Maj. Gen. Mikhail Malofeyev was killed in the bitter fighting. The Russians carried out a brief tactical pause in which they subjected Grozney to intense fire assaults using Grad Rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery along with heavy and continuous air strikes. These caused heavy casualties and collateral damage to the civilian population and led to the exodus of over 220,000 Chechen refugees to Ingushetia and Georgia.

Click to expand...

Continued...

Below are excerpts from

The War in Chechnya: A Military Analysis
By G.D. Bakshi

Phase Three–Fighting in Built Up Area: The Reduction of Grozney (December 25, 1999 to mid February 2000). Initially it appeared that the Russian operational design was to drive in deep and encircle all the major population centers. Casualties would then be inflicted on the rebels by artillery fire assaults and heavy air strikes on the cities where they were holed up. There was a possibility that based upon the experience of the First Chechen war, the Russians would not like to get involved in fighting in built up areas, where operations can be very slow and result in enormous casualties. Acting President Valdimir Putin was however quite blunt “Our aim is not to encircle the terrorists. Our aim is to destroy them and bring them to justice”. Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev said that his forces would fulfill the task of liquidating armed groups and terrorist bands in Chechnya. Historically the Russians have the most extensive experience of fighting in built up areas. During World War II, Leningrad and Stalingrad had become household names. The dogged and determined Russian attacks made a dent in the Grozney defences. Russian forces pushed into Grozney along five main thrust lines. In the northeast (from the Sunzha river direction) in the east along the airport and Khankhela (where major battles of the Minutka Square took place). From the south and southwest and along the northwestern road. By February 1, 2000 the back of the Chechen resistance in Grozney was broken. Lechi Dudayev (the Mayor of Grozney and a nephew of former President Dudayev) was killed. Shamil Basayev, the top Chechen warlord was badly wounded. 140 Chechen terrorists surrendered and Russian troops gained control of 40 per cent of Grozney, including the famous Minutka Square.

Anne Nivat, a correspondent of Quest France, reported that on February 1, some 2200 Chechen rebels were seen in Alkhan Khale, one of the suburbs of Grozney, trying to break out and escape towards the hills of the southeast. They found a gap between the Russian southern and southwestern thrust lines and tried desperately to exploit it. The Russians were trying their best to intercept and destroy this band and were planning to methodically flush out the 3500 Islamic fighters in the southeastern hills. Though a lot of hard fighting still lay ahead, the kernel in Grozney had been broken by mid February 2000 and heavy casualties inflicted on the Islamic rebels.

*** Further personal commentary:


The Russians were thoroughly hubristic if they truly believed, and it is seemed as though certain members of the highest echelons of leadership, including Putin himself, that the Ukrainians would just capitulate at the first signs of Russians at the foot of Kiev.

The rush towards Kiev seems to have been undertaken with that assumption with a large extent of confidence and the Russians did not prepare their combat units that made the advance with the necessary supplies and logistics and nor did they undertake the necessary defensive actions.

Unlike the 2nd Chechen War in which the Russians were very cautious, deliberate, and methodical in their advance and knew very well that they would meet the utmost resistance, the Russians in this Ukrainian War gambled big time on a long shot speed rush that failed spectacularly.

Had the Russians adopted the attitude of the 2nd Chechen War, taking into consideration the need for much greater caution because of the advances in military technology that exist since then that have brought much more effective ATGMS and drones which they certainly knew that Ukrainians were much in possession of, they would have been equally as cautious or even more cautious in their approach to Kiev, knowing full well their own (Russia's) limitations and vulnerabilities. And as such the Russians would have suffered much fewer casualties and would not be forced to make such a humiliating retreat from Kiev, gaslighting the entire operation as a feint. ***

Weaasel said:

Russia will go all out in the Donbasd Region, seeking to obtain a victory to prove that their debacle in the North was due to their underestimation of the Ukrainians and hence not having put the necessary resources into that front. That is still a an indictment on them for having poorly planned based on that assumption.

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In 1943, Hitler appointed Guderian to reconstruct the depleted Panzerwaffe.
Guderian wanted the Wehrmacht to stay on the strategic defensive on the Ostfront in 1943, hoping to resume offensive
campaigns with a reinvigorated Panzerwaffe in 1944.

Hitler insisted that it was imperative for Germany to launch a major offensive (upon the Kursk salient) in 1943.
He made essentially an argument based upon prestige. Hitler would lose face if Germany did not attack.
Guderian retorted: "How many people in the world even know where Kursk is? It's a matter of indifference to the world
whether Kursk is held by us or the Russians." In the end, Hitler rolled the dice with Operation Citadel.

My point is that military campaigns tend to get into trouble when decisions are made based upon political prestige.

Lapin said:

My point is that military campaigns tend to get into trouble when decisions are made based upon political prestige.

Click to expand...

This whole war has been a mess due to Putin's illogical political decisions, so you aren't wrong on what you are saying

Lapin said:

In 1943, Hitler appointed Guderian to reconstruct the depleted Panzerwaffe.
Guderian wanted the Wehrmacht to stay on the strategic defensive on the Ostfront in 1943, hoping to resume offensive
campaigns with a reinvigorated Panzerwaffe in 1944.

Hitler insisted that it was imperative for Germany to launch a major offensive (upon the Kursk salient) in 1943.
He made essentially an argument based upon prestige. Hitler would lose face if Germany did not attack.
Guderian retorted: "How many people in the world even know where Kursk is? It's a matter of indifference to the world
whether Kursk is held by us or the Russians." In the end, Hitler rolled the dice with Operation Citadel.

My point is that military campaigns tend to get into trouble when decisions are made based upon political prestige.

Click to expand...

Do you believe that Russia will give up now?

Slovakia, the first domino...



Slovakia is willing to pay for Russian gas in rubles to keep its gas supply, the country's Economy Minister Richard Sulik said on national television on Sunday.

"If there is a condition to pay in rubles, then we will pay in rubles," Sulik said, adding that the EU member state relies on Russian gas for around 85 percent of its demand, RT reported on Sunday.

"We cannot be cut off from gas," Sulik emphasized.

The minister added that Slovakia would continue to work on a common approach with the EU, Reuters reported on Sunday.
Slovak state gas company SPP paid its March invoice for gas in euros, as stipulated in its contract, Reuters reported.
Sulik said the country still had six weeks to find a solution before the next gas payment is due on May 20, but Slovakia could not go without deliveries, according to Reuters.

Last week Russia demanded all "unfriendly" countries, including EU members, pay for gas in rubles.

The decision was made to secure Russia's ability to trade and to ensure that its producers receive their money despite Ukraine-related Western sanctions, Dmitry Peskov, press secretary to Russian President Vladimir Putin, said on Friday, according to RT.