Ukrainian War Developments

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Richard Santos

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Scott Ritter writes op-eds for Russia Today. i.e. he is a paid Russian shill. As well as a paedophile.
and people who write for western press by crafting analysis to fit the rabid popular sentiment du jour are, not paid western shills?

BTW, aren’t you the one did the remarkably undignified keyboard skit about russians running away?

don’t you at least owe us a similarly gleeful skit in reverse now that people who must in your opinion not be paid shills seem to think they are running away but redeploying?
 
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Stealthflanker

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Scott Ritter writes op-eds for Russia Today. i.e. he is a paid Russian shill. As well as a paedophile.

You dont seem to understand basic rules in debating. You discredit His message not the person himself.

You attack his statetements, point out where he is wrong and such. But i guess you slave your brain to something else so.. i don't know.
 

Mohsin77

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Posted by Scott Ritter @RealScottRitter, the ex-USMC, on 29 March 2022

1/ Big Arrow War—a primer. For all those scratching their heads in confusion, or dusting off their dress uniforms for the Ukrainian victory parade in Kiev, over the news about Russia’s “strategic shift”, you might want to re-familiarize yourself with basic military concepts.

2/ Maneuver warfare is a good place to start. Understand Russia started its “special military operation” with a severe manpower deficit—200,000 attackers to some 600,000 defenders (or more). Classic attritional conflict was never an option. Russian victory required maneuver.

3/ Maneuver war is more psychological than physical and focuses more on the operational than on the tactical level. Maneuver is relational movement—how you deploy and move your forces in relation to your opponent. Russian maneuver in the first phase of its operation support this.

4/ The Russians needed to shape the battlefield to their advantage. In order to do this, they needed to control how Ukraine employed it’s numerically superior forces, while distributing their own smaller combat power to best accomplish this objective.

5/ Strategically, to facilitate the ability to maneuver between the southern, central, and northern fronts, Russia needed to secure a land bridge between Crimea and Russia. The seizure of the coastal city of Mariupol was critical to this effort. Russia has accomplished this task.

6/ While this complex operation unfolded, Russia needed to keep Ukraine from maneuvering its numerically superior forces in a manner that disrupted the Mariupol operation. This entailed the use of several strategic supporting operations—feints, fixing operations, and deep attack.

7/ The concept of a feint is simple—a military force either is seen as preparing to attack a given location, or actually conducts an attack, for the purpose of deceiving an opponent into committing resources in response to the perceived or actual actions.

8/ The use of the feint played a major role in Desert Storm, where Marine Amphibious forces threatened the Kuwaiti coast, forcing Iraq to defend against an attack that never came, and where the 1st Cavalry Division actually attacked Wadi Al Batin to pin down the Republican Guard.

9/ The Russians made extensive use of the feint in Ukraine, with Amphibious forces off Odessa freezing Ukrainian forces there, and a major feint attack toward Kiev compelling Ukraine to reinforce their forces there. Ukraine was never able to reinforce their forces in the east.

10/ Fixing operations were also critical. Ukraine had assembled some 60,000-100,000 troops in the east, opposite Donbas. Russia carried out a broad fixing attack designed to keep these forces fully engaged and unable to maneuver in respect to other Russian operations.

11/ During Desert Storm, two Marine Divisions were ordered to carry out similar fixing attacks against Iraqi forces deployed along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border, tying down significant numbers of men and material that could not be used to counter the main US attack out west.

12/ The Russian fixing attack pinned the main Ukrainian concentration of forces in the east, and drove them away from Mariupol, which was invested and reduced. Supporting operations out of Crimea against Kherson expanded the Russian land bridge. This phase is now complete.

13/ Russia also engaged in a campaign of strategic deep attack designed to disrupt and destroy Ukrainian logistics, command & control, and air power and long-range fire support. Ukraine is running out of fuel and ammo, cannot coordinate maneuver, and has no meaningful Air Force.

14/ Russia is redeploying some of its premier units from where they had been engaged in feint operations in northern Kiev to where they can support the next phase of the operation, namely the liberation of the Donbas and the destruction of the main Ukrainian force in the east.

15/ This is classic maneuver warfare. Russia will now hold Ukraine in the north and south while its main forces, reinforced by the northern units, Marines, and forces freed up by the capture of Mariupol, seek to envelope and destroy 60,000 Ukrainian forces in the east.

16/ This is Big Arrow War at its finest, something Americans used to know but forgot in the deserts and mountains of Afghanistan and Iraq. It also explains how 200,000 Russians have been able to defeat 600,000 Ukrainians. Thus ends the primer on maneuver warfare, Russian style.
[END]

Then a well-thought question to an actual ex-military man from someone there:

How has your position towards the future developments of the war changed during the time? Anything that surprised you and made you change your mind from the initial analysis?

The slow pace of operations. I never thought Russia would depart from its doctrine of overwhelming firepower and mass to preserve civilian life and property. The evidence clearly shows they have.

The credit Ritter gives to the US's performance in '91 is misplaced. With all the frontal engagements that took place in that war, and the uncoordinated stumbling maneuvers, it was not well executed given US capabilities.

However, I wouldn't throw praise on Russia's operational performance yet either, like Ritter is doing. He needs to wait for more data before declaring Russia has been brilliant. Questions could be asked: Were the UKR formations pinned due to Russian efforts, or was UKR planning to stay dug-in to begin with? How effective has Russian Air/Army been in directly reducing UKR formations and interdicting its logistics so far? We still need data to measure this. And regardless of whether the 'feint' was real, Russia still has to finish the job. UKR formations have not surrendered yet and their leadership hasn't submitted yet either. One or the other needs to happen.

The only thing we can say right now is that UKR forces are barely a military at this point. If you can't maneuver with combined arms, you're not a modern military, you're a militia. But are they even a combat effective militia at this point? We simply don't know yet.

On the strategy side, my concern for Russia once it launched this war was always what would happen after major combat operations are concluded i.e. whether there would be an insurgency or not. If they get bogged down in an insurgency, then strategically, that's a loss, regardless of operational and tactical gains. But if they can secure UKR's neutrality + avoid an insurgency, that's a win. So again, we have to wait to see what happens. I would've preferred Russia to secure more (i.e. the neutralization of NATO via its 'gas-diplomacy,') it failed at that, but whatever. Let's see if it can secure UKR's neutrality at least, which is a more immediate problem.

As for the claims and counter-claims about Russia's performance in maneuver warfare... they're alright, given Russia's resources, relative to the US, but I don't see any genius here either. The fact is this: Neither the American nor Russian officer corps has ever been known for elegance in war planning and execution, historically or presently. Some good analytical books have been written on this. Neither side is known to produce genius generals. Linear dogmatic behavior is encouraged and 'out of the box' thinking is discouraged in both militaries, which is a systemic problem that most militaries have.
 
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Bill Blazo

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Interesting that Southfront map shows that Izyum already captured by the Russian forces

View attachment 86208
There is very strong evidence that Izium has been mostly or entirely captured by the Russians, including geolocated images of Russian troops in the city and the fact that humanitarian convoys from the west haven't gotten through in over a week (because there's major fighting in the regional vicinity).
 
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