From a strategic perspective, given the scale of the Taiwan challenge, you wouldn't want to devote unnecessary resources to complex high-end amphibious operations for distant seas.
We can also see that the US Navy LHDs are grossly over-specified (in terms of amphibious capabilities) for what they actually end up doing in real life.
Hence the US Navy is adding AFSBs (converted tankers) to operate amphib forces in those low-threat environments.
At the same time, the US Marine Corps is moving away from large ships for high-contested amphibious operations close to a hostile shore.
And that the shortage of big carrier decks is compelling the US Navy to use those LHDs as small (expendable) carriers.
So maybe the Chinese Navy is just ahead of the game in making the LHD primarily a sea control platform, with amphibious assault a secondary role.
Actually I would argue that the 075 and 076 are somewhat unsuited for the Taiwan contingency and are better suited for longer distance and potentially even higher intensity amphibious operations.
That isn't to say that they wouldn't still contribute their fair share to a Taiwan contingency, however my point is that I think looking at the amphibious assault procurement that the PLAN is doing and what the 076 is being said to be like, the PLAN likely considers it necessary to develop complex high end amphibious operations in more distant seas.
Building on that, I think that for amphibious operations in high intensity environments where you are unable to be easily supported by land based air power, the requirement for conducting high intensity strike and ISR against a well defended high technology target is a fundamental prerequisite to allow an amphibious assault to take place in the first place.