Type 022 Missile Boat

A

Ambivalent

Junior Member
joshuatree said:
Different in mission parameters but different how in the physical aspect? It's basically an island fortress serving as an unsinkable carrier which can still be subjected to tropical storm surges.
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No, the southern half of that island was washed over by a wave several years before I served there. All the trees were flattened by it. The reefs wouldn't begin to stop a storm surge, the runway is only two meters above sea level. Fortunately it's close proximity to the equator makes large cyclones very rare. A large enough tsunami would destroy the island's military infrastructure with no problem. Diego Garcia is exceedingly vulnerable to nature. As a military outpost it works as long as the defenders can maintain air superiority over it, and an open sea lane to reinforce and resupply it. It is a fantastic support base for operations in West Asia, and no one in the region has sufficient power projection ability to seriously threaten Dodge. A stronger adversary bordering the IO could change that calculus.
 
A

Ambivalent

Junior Member
crobato said:
And you know how canceling works? For it to work, the crest and the valley of the canceling wave must be in perfect offset of the original wave. That means not just a perfectly matched frequency, but also in phase and modulation. If the spoofing wave managed to match the original wave in frequency and wave form, a simple change in phase modulation would still have defeated that spoof.

Let's put it this way. If there are a million pseudo random signals that differ in phase and frequency modulation, and you put all of them into a single frequency not a single one of them would jam each other.
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But that in fact is how modern stealth works, by active wave cancellation. The problems are exactly as you mentioned regarding phase and modulation, and aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 are stealthy exactly because their on board processors are powerful enough to solve the problems you mention. Similar techniques are used in other forms of modern jamming. Great ELINT is a necessary prerequisite, knowing the characteristics of the many threat systems. It is possible to know the logic of the threat systems being countered. This is the evolution of modern countermeasures. It is no longer always discreet jamming, though that is still done, but managing the entire spectrum.
 
crobato

crobato

Colonel
VIP Professional
Please don't spout marketing media.

Modern stealth does not work by active wave cancellation plain and simple.

Wave cancellation is simple when the wave forms are simple like most 70s and 80s radio sets. The one spoofing and jamming knows exactly, and I mean exactly what the threat waveform.

When the waveform is varying randomly by modulation in phase and frequency, coupled with extremely tight beam forms with ultra low sidelobs and with spread spectrum, the wave form is mathematically extremely difficult to detect, differentiate from noise, much less predict, to create a canceling wave. Simply said, the originating set is the only one that knows what the original waveform is, which constantly varies in random fashion in frequency, frequency modulation, and in phase modulation. When you have multiple factors working, match probabilities become exponential.

If wave cancellation fails, then the attempting to cancel wave only serves as a beacon to threat receivers.

There is no modern processors that is fast enough to match a pseudo random form because every bit of processing creates latency. Latency means you cannot make a complete alignment of the crests and valleys of the waves to form a cancellation.
 
R

RedMercury

Junior Member
Perhaps this discussion should be moved to a radar thread.

Theoretically, assuming you could detect the entire waveform (spread spectrum and all) and process/playback fast enough and predict the echo your aircraft/ship would generate, you can use a played back copy to cancel the echo, without needing to predict the waveform, making cryptographic protection of the waveform irrelevant.

Practically this seems extremely difficult. The two biggest problems would be playing back the waveform fast enough and at the correct strength. You can imagine an antenna that is closer to the source emitter than the main radar reflecting surfaces of the aircraft/frame and using this brief distance to trade for time for processing. It isn't a lot, say antenna is 3 meters out, so you have 6 meters of time, which is covered by light in 2e-8 sec, a mere 20 nanosec, or 60 cycles on a 3 Ghz processor.

The even harder part would be to match the echo of the aircraft/ship frame, I think. You could precompute the echo for each frequency and solid angle and just use a lookup table. But this assumes you know the direction the wave is coming from, accurately. This all has to be done at the antenna, since sending the signal to the main body of the ship/plane would not be faster than c.

If the radar was an old obsolete set which had predictable waveforms, of course it is asking to be jammed. Who still uses non-frequency hopping, non-encrypted waveforms these days? And how would ELINT help at all when it can't sample the war reserve modes?
 
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rhino123

rhino123

Pencil Pusher
VIP Professional
Actually I think the main strategy of the FAC is very simple and really not as complicated as all this stuff about detection, radars and stuff like that.

There is a bunch of FAC, close to a hundred even, not really needing the newest Type 022, each of them armed with 4 to 8 anti-ship missiles and travelling pretty fast toward adversaries. With close defence from coastal base weaponries, radars and stuffs, and from land base aircrafts.

They get close enough to launch their missiles then fire.

This is the typical scenario that you would get if you try to attack the chinese soil. The FAC by itself is pretty useless, and without any aerial support they are also pretty useless. However with support from frigates, land base systems, land base fighters, bombers, etc, they are pretty potent and also they will wear down enemies' defences for the Chinese's destroyers and frigates.
 
W

Wolverine

Banned Idiot
Roger604 said:
The principle of defending coastline with small ships armed with deadly missiles is not new, but the Type 022 fits this philosophy like a glove.

It can probably do battle 200-250 km out from the coast. And it carries 8 very advanced missiles. Within 400 km from the Chinese coast, these ships are a huge menace.

And realistically, 40 ships are not needed. Each AB requires at least 10 incoming simultaneously to get a hit, and to really disable it maybe 15. A carrier group has about 5 AB's, so 65 missiles need to be launched. Add in another 15 missiles for the carrier itself, that's 80.

So you really need only a wolf pack of 10 ships firing simultaneously to overwhelm one carrier group. In a conflict China can deploy 8 or more of these wolf packs.


Relatively speaking, the Type 022 is just maybe 1/5 or 1/4 of the maritime denial ability package of the PLA.
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Where are you getting these numbers from, like "10" or "15" missiles? A single Arleigh Burke, especially the IIA's, will have up to 32 ESSM and maybe 60+ SM-2MR Block III+, which means they will be able to attack OTH targets, assuming an AWACS is alive and kicking. And they never operate alone, especially if entering a war zone. No, a carrier group will require several hundred - maybe upwards of a thousand in the case of the forward-deployed USS George Washington carrier group - incoming enemy missiles to deplete escorts' air defense missiles and score hits on the carrier and escorts. And I mean deplete the escorts' missiles, not overwhelm Aegis.

OTOH, I do agree that the 022 will be an effective deterrant that adds another layer of pain for the USN at 200-250km range from the coast of China. The latest TEL-based YJ-62's will add a layer of defense at 300km range. Ships a little more than that, and strike aircraft and H-6's still further out. The alleged Chinese ASBM would add the final layer of deterrance.
 
V

Violet Oboe

Junior Member
Moreover around 40 SSK and SSN (Kilo, Song, Yuan, 091G, 093, soon 095) lurking off the Chinese coast and around Taiwan would add an invisible but nonetheless lethal layer of protection.

(Please do not try to tell me USN would actually conduct ASuW 200 miles off the Chinese coast...!:nono:)
 
A

Ambivalent

Junior Member
crobato said:
Please don't spout marketing media.

Modern stealth does not work by active wave cancellation plain and simple.

Wave cancellation is simple when the wave forms are simple like most 70s and 80s radio sets. The one spoofing and jamming knows exactly, and I mean exactly what the threat waveform.

When the waveform is varying randomly by modulation in phase and frequency, coupled with extremely tight beam forms with ultra low sidelobs and with spread spectrum, the wave form is mathematically extremely difficult to detect, differentiate from noise, much less predict, to create a canceling wave. Simply said, the originating set is the only one that knows what the original waveform is, which constantly varies in random fashion in frequency, frequency modulation, and in phase modulation. When you have multiple factors working, match probabilities become exponential.

If wave cancellation fails, then the attempting to cancel wave only serves as a beacon to threat receivers.

There is no modern processors that is fast enough to match a pseudo random form because every bit of processing creates latency. Latency means you cannot make a complete alignment of the crests and valleys of the waves to form a cancellation.
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Crobato, I work in this business. You are out of your depth and simply do not know the latest technologies.

rhino123 said:
Actually I think the main strategy of the FAC is very simple and really not as complicated as all this stuff about detection, radars and stuff like that.

There is a bunch of FAC, close to a hundred even, not really needing the newest Type 022, each of them armed with 4 to 8 anti-ship missiles and travelling pretty fast toward adversaries. With close defence from coastal base weaponries, radars and stuffs, and from land base aircrafts.

They get close enough to launch their missiles then fire.

This is the typical scenario that you would get if you try to attack the chinese soil. The FAC by itself is pretty useless, and without any aerial support they are also pretty useless. However with support from frigates, land base systems, land base fighters, bombers, etc, they are pretty potent and also they will wear down enemies' defences for the Chinese's destroyers and frigates.
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The range of their weapons is too short for your scenario to work. These ships and aircraft would have to be well inside the carrier's screen to get within range of their weapons. This would be suicide. They would be under sustained attack hundreds of miles out by the carriers air wing, engaged with Hellfire by the air wing's helos and engaged with missiles and guns closer in by the escorting destroyers. The Soviets considered such attacks by their forces to be suicide, why would be any less so for Chinese forces.
 
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W

Wolverine

Banned Idiot
Ambivalent said:
The range of their weapons is too short for your scenario to work. These ships and aircraft would have to be well inside the carrier's screen to get within range of their weapons. This would be suicide. They would be under sustained attack hundreds of miles out by the carriers air wing, engaged with Hellfire by the air wing's helos and engaged with missiles and guns closer in by the escorting destroyers. The Soviets considered such attacks by their forces to be suicide, why would be any less so for Chinese forces.
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No, you forget these boats are coastal and their mission is not to go on the offense in the high seas against a carrier group. They are another layer of deterrance to prevent a carrier group from unopposedly approaching the Chinese coast to within 200-300km, just like the land-based YJ-62 TELs. The Chinese military is transitioning from a green water navy to a blue water navy, and the 022 is simply another new layer of naval coastal defense, not one that by itself can stop an approaching carrier group, but as part of a coordinated defense in depth it can certainly add several hundred missiles to the fray should, for example, a carrier group decide to try and sail the American flag through the Taiwan Strait again during a conflict. It is certainly not easy to pick out amongst the radar scatter of the coastline and the multitude of civilian boats and shipping in those areas.
 
A

Ambivalent

Junior Member
Violet Oboe said:
"If you study the history of naval missile warfare, few if any missiles have ever required the use of a point defense weapon to defeat, deception jamming has worked when it has been employed. Study what happened to the Egyptian and Syrian navies in 1973 and the Iranian Navy during Operation Praying Mantis. The Israelis decoyed upwards of 24 missiles in one engagement using 1973 jammer technology. The Iranian Navy had multiple missiles in the air aimed at our ships, all of which were successfully decoyed. We never needed to use CIWS, and the Iranians were firing Mach 2+ missiles at us inside 25 nm. At least two Exocets fired by the Argentines against the Royal Navy were successfully decoyed by chaff, missing an RN carrier. One of these continued on and locked onto the Atlantic Conveyor, striking that ship and setting fire to it's cargo of aircraft, vehicles and artillery."

Another example of extremely selective interpretation of ´facts´ by Ambivalent and I do not want to harp on the fact that the archaic ´oldtimer´ Chinese Silkworms employed by IRGC were certainly not Mach 2+ missiles!;)
Of course USN was capable to disrupt Iranian Silkworm operations effectively during operation Earnest Will/Nimble Archer/Praying Mantis since USN's ECM was equipped to handle them.

Nevertheless the SLQ-32 ECM suite of USS Stark was completely ineffective as the frigate was hit by two latest batch AM-39 Exocet AShM fired by an Iraqi Mirage F1-EQ5 during nighttime on May 17, 1987. Fortunately the warhead of the first missile did not detonate and the ship did not sink but 37 USN sailors were killed and USS Stark hat to be repaired for the staggering cost of $ 142 million.

After the shock the DoD frantically rushed to obtain the frequency codes of the AM-39 batch delivered to Saddam's Iraq by NATO ´partner´ France and promptly USN ships operating in the Gulf were now able to protect themselves against the Exocet menace. Interestingly Washington pressured Baghdad even after updating USN's electronic defenses to cancel Mirage/Exocet missions in February 1988 after at least three near miss incidents had occurred with AM-39's since September 1987. May be some guys in the Pentagon had indeed second thoughts about ´foolproof´ ECM gadgets protecting against deadly inbound missiles since there is inherently not the slightest margin for error allowed...:D
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No, the Iranians were firing Mach 2+ Standards at our ships from inside 25 nm, not Silkworm, meaning the engagements were very rapid. These were the dedicated anti-surface version of Standard, although all versions of Standard have an anti-surface mode. Countermeasures alone defeated these attacks. We in fact used our Standards to attack the Iranians, not Harpoons as is often mistakenly reported. No Harpoons were used by US forces, they were considered too costly to use against a threat that only had weapons capable of a 25 nm range, so the only missiles fired at Iranian forces were Maverick and Standard.
Stark had her countermeasures shut off and the CIWS was in a standby mode. Pretty hard to criticize the effectiveness of systems that are not turned on. The Captain failed to maneuver the ship to bring it's weapons to bear or attempt to engage the missile with any weapon. The Captain was relieved of command and Courts Martialed for this. Who is dealing in fabrications here? Stark returned to the US under her own power after fighting her fires, a little better performance than the Royal Navy's Sheffield, which was lost due to bad damage control ( go ahead and read the official investigation, it is available in redacted form from the MoD on line )
Btw, it was not night when Stark was attacked. Official sundown was only minutes prior to the attack and there was still plenty of daylight, as the many photos of her immediately after the attack will attest.
You also didn't bother to acknowledge the Israelis defeating over forty missiles with ECM alone. The IDF did not even have a point defense weapon at the time.
 
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