Type 022 Missile Boat

Ambivalent

Junior Member
For plawolf:
Uh, the E-3 I mention is the AWACS. Are you confusing this with the E-2C or D from the carrier? What do you think the radar horizon of an E-3 is?

"The E3 is a nice little bird, but its physical limitation means its not going to be able to match the range and power of far larger land based AWACS the PLAAF current operates."

And is your Chinese AWACS really so superior to it? I think you confused platforms with the Hawkeye. If so, you also greatly underestimate the capabilities of the Hawkeye. The E-3 won't be alone either, there will be the Rivet Joint and E-8 up there to complete the picture of the incipent battle space.
The CSG can maintain EMCON while the E-3 AWACS/Rivet Joint/E-8 searche the air and sea for threats and targets, locating and classifying all emitters and monitoring the movements of ships and even land vehicles. My point is that a land based surveillance plane flying around does not tip off the presence of a CSG. One may be there, or maybe not. In and of itself the E-3 says nothing about a CSG. But that E-3 and the other planes mentioned are terrific surveillance platforms for the CSG.
The deception van is an example of how threat sensors can be fooled into thinking a CSG is one place when it is not. The van broadcasts all the electronic emissions of a CSG, right down to voice comm. It will be DF'ed, and ELINT assets will study the emissions and most likely be fooled into thinking they have the carrier. At the very least they have to go out and take a look. In reality it is a support ship, the carrier is somewhere else on EMCON, unseen and unheard. The ruse will eventually be found out, but the idea is it buys time for the CSG to spring a surprise. We have done this before, and fooled the Soviets with all their OTH radars, Bears and satellites. You only need to buy hours this way, not days.
Yes, during EMCON the sensors of the CSG can operate in a passive mode and detect threat systems before the threat systems detect the CSG. As I said, there is a degree of azimuth accuracy but no range information. Nonetheless, just like a RWR, the sensors will pick up the presence of threat radars beyond the range those radars will acquire the ships in the CSG. This allows the CSG to maneuver without giving away it's presence, while still maintaining some situational awareness with it's sensors.
I stand by my critique of FAC's. They are not capable of effective blue water combat. Take the time to read the specs of various INCAT and Austal wave piercing cats. They do not possess the range for a thousand mile combat radius. Most could not make 1000 miles one way unless all their payload is sacrificed for fuel. To obtain the speeds they make takes a lot of power and have a high fuel burn. The Australians used one of their Incat wave piercing cats to transport troops the 450 nm from Darwin to East Timor. It could not make that round trip unrefueled at the ship's most economical speed. A thousand mile combat radius with a full load of missiles on that sized hull is not possible. Range and sea keeping are the primary drawbacks of such small vessels in blue water. FAC's are not a problem for a CSG in blue water. They aren't going to bring the CSG in close enough for them to be a threat. There is no reason to. They would not be a consideration in a confrontation with the PLAN.
By the way, you are ignoring the little detail the the USN would be operating with the USAF out of Okinawa, Japan, and Guam and perhaps Saipan. The USN would not operate alone against Chinese forces. You are also ignoring the capability of the US to shut down Chinese ports with mines dropped from airplanes. Lay a minefield down the Taiwan Straits and this buys an awful lot of time. From the air mines can be laid more quickly than they can be swept. Any airplane that can drop bombs can lay mines. This is how we mined the waters of Japan during WWII.
There would be no need to commit any ground forces to such a conflict. The USN/USAF operating together have more than enough capability to deter anything the PLAN and PLAAF might try to do.
 
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Infra_Man99

Banned Idiot
For plawolf:
Uh, the E-3 I mention is the AWACS. Are you confusing this with the E-2C or D from the carrier? What do you think the radar horizon of an E-3 is?

"The E3 is a nice little bird, but its physical limitation means its not going to be able to match the range and power of far larger land based AWACS the PLAAF current operates."

And is your Chinese AWACS really so superior to it? I think you confused platforms with the Hawkeye. If so, you also greatly underestimate the capabilities of the Hawkeye. The E-3 won't be alone either, there will be the Rivet Joint and E-8 up there to complete the picture of the incipent battle space.
The CSG can maintain EMCON while the E-3 AWACS/Rivet Joint/E-8 searche the air and sea for threats and targets, locating and classifying all emitters and monitoring the movements of ships and even land vehicles. My point is that a land based surveillance plane flying around does not tip off the presence of a CSG. One may be there, or maybe not. In and of itself the E-3 says nothing about a CSG. But that E-3 and the other planes mentioned are terrific surveillance platforms for the CSG.
The deception van is an example of how threat sensors can be fooled into thinking a CSG is one place when it is not. The van broadcasts all the electronic emissions of a CSG, right down to voice comm. It will be DF'ed, and ELINT assets will study the emissions and most likely be fooled into thinking they have the carrier. At the very least they have to go out and take a look. In reality it is a support ship, the carrier is somewhere else on EMCON, unseen and unheard. The ruse will eventually be found out, but the idea is it buys time for the CSG to spring a surprise. We have done this before, and fooled the Soviets with all their OTH radars, Bears and satellites. You only need to buy hours this way, not days.
Yes, during EMCON the sensors of the CSG can operate in a passive mode and detect threat systems before the threat systems detect the CSG. As I said, there is a degree of azimuth accuracy but no range information. Nonetheless, just like a RWR, the sensors will pick up the presence of threat radars beyond the range those radars will acquire the ships in the CSG. This allows the CSG to maneuver without giving away it's presence, while still maintaining some situational awareness with it's sensors.
I stand by my critique of FAC's. They are not capable of effective blue water combat. Take the time to read the specs of various INCAT and Austal wave piercing cats. They do not possess the range for a thousand mile combat radius. Most could not make 1000 miles one way unless all their payload is sacrificed for fuel. To obtain the speeds they make takes a lot of power and have a high fuel burn. The Australians used one of their Incat wave piercing cats to transport troops the 450 nm from Darwin to East Timor. It could not make that round trip unrefueled at the ship's most economical speed. A thousand mile combat radius with a full load of missiles on that sized hull is not possible. Range and sea keeping are the primary drawbacks of such small vessels in blue water. FAC's are not a problem for a CSG in blue water. They aren't going to bring the CSG in close enough for them to be a threat. There is no reason to. They would not be a consideration in a confrontation with the PLAN.
By the way, you are ignoring the little detail the the USN would be operating with the USAF out of Okinawa, Japan, and Guam and perhaps Saipan. The USN would not operate alone against Chinese forces. You are also ignoring the capability of the US to shut down Chinese ports with mines dropped from airplanes. Lay a minefield down the Taiwan Straits and this buys an awful lot of time. From the air mines can be laid more quickly than they can be swept. Any airplane that can drop bombs can lay mines. This is how we mined the waters of Japan during WWII.
There would be no need to commit any ground forces to such a conflict. The USN/USAF operating together have more than enough capability to deter anything the PLAN and PLAAF might try to do.

China's small, stealthy FACs have very limited capabilities in blue waters, but my Chinese news sources tells me China intends to use them for brown waters or local waters.

You do realize any nation with a decent military can operate decoys, right? The US military can use decoys for its ships, and China's military can use decoys for their ships. China's military has a long history of using decoys even in contemporary times.

In regard to other Chinese weapons, they supposedly can strike out at the US bases or territories in the Pacific and on the mainland.

The US could gain international support for war depending on the circumstances. Notice the word, "could." The same goes with China. China could gain international support for war depending on the circumstances.

Check out the nearby and relevant nations. I strongly doubt Russia, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and the European Union would blindly support the US or China in a war. China and the US have relationships in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Alliances depend on the circumstances.

Look at NATO. I believe most or all members of the EU should be completely and thoroughly backing the US military missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, but the EU is dragging its feet. The EU says they don't have the resources, but I doubt it. The EU has a formidable military (on paper, at least). I surmise the EU doesn't think it's worth it for them, so they make excuses.

Despite US government's propaganda, China's priority does NOT want to see Taiwan ruined. China wants a peaceful reunification or to take Taiwan's society (especially its economy) in perfectly working order. Taiwan's leadership doesn't want Taiwan to be ruined by war.

I strongly doubt the large majority US public wants a war with China on top of the other US wars. The same goes with China's public. Both nations and the rest of the world have major economic problems, and with modern warfare, the war between the US and China plus their allies could cause widespread military and economic damages.

I think you are way oversimplifying a war involving today's US and China.

Anyhow, I thought we weren't suppose to talk about Country A vs. Country B, because it leads to flame wars or keyboard wars of trivial value.
 

Violet Oboe

Junior Member
"The USN/USAF operating together have more than enough capability to deter anything the PLAN and PLAAF might try to do."

@Ambivalent:
So you are in a position to make secure assumptions about what PLA might potentially even try to do in a future armed conflict?
Interesting, how comes?:D (...perhaps you would not mind to borrow me your ´crystal ball´ but I presume it's in heavy usage for any time to come.:cool:)
 
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Gollevainen

Colonel
VIP Professional
Registered Member
That is based on nothing more then assumptions, and not very credible ones at that. China did not buy the Type022 off the shelf, they designed and built them from scratch. That means they can taylor it to have any specifications (within technological limits of course) they so choose.

Just because the sweds went one way with their FAC design to maximize their effectiveness in Swedish waters does not, by any stretch, means every other FAC of a similar size were designed with the same specifications.

Just compare the Type 022 to civilian ships of a similar displacement and you could see that 1000km combat radius is easily within reach if it was designed with long range patrols from the offset.

What more, if the PLAN sent out an Type 022 'screen', the boats would not be zooming straight to their intended target location at max steam, thus they will be able to achieve far great ranges then similar sized FACs doing classic hit and run maneuvers.

When will you lads learn? Just becouse you want in your own subjective reasoning PLAN to be able to do something, you cannot twist certain facts of life. And Pointplank is deathright: FACs are coastal warfare vessels. It doesen't matter wheter you are swedish, norweigian, finnish, israeli, russian or chinese for that matter. You cannot make up stuff which makes no sense to support your arguments.

Type 022 is a small, low-volumeus catamaran craft which sole edge is speed and stealth. It's not very well armed, and definetly not very well fitted with any other systems whatsoever. It's in fact quite antique in it's philosofy, remiding the wast waves of fast motor torbedo boats making dashes to enemyships from close range to it's home bases. Compared to almoust any other contempory FACs, Type 022 is suprisingly limited in it's possiple capabilities. Type 022 is mented to be produced in large numbers and to be used in large numbers. I bet it's rather cheap design as well.

Anyway, just becouse something is chinese doesen't give it superpowers. Learn to be bit more objective and loosen up the fanboyish.
 

joshuatree

Captain
I find it interesting that every time there is discussion of purpose and capability of the FACs, it's always depicted in a scenario against the USN. But I can think of other purposes for these FACs for the PLAN.

1) Cheap stopgap measure for current naval fleet. While we all enthusiastically observe, analyze, and follow the developments of PLAN's latest frigates and destroyers, they are really not in large numbers yet. 054 is about the only model in recent times where PLAN has started any meaningful mass production. So anytime you have these latest ships deploy (ie anti-pirate patrols, etc), there's a gap.

2) Last line of naval defense. In a worst case scenario where your navy is essentially crushed, these coastal boats could probably be the last asset on water.

3) Because of their limit in range and sea-state worthiness, they serve regional purposes such as any potential missions against close neighboring countries and their respective navies, ie Vietnam or Philippines. SK and NK could also be feasible but they have much bigger political implications.

4) If they ever get homeported to remote island outposts, they can serve as a disruptor to commerce sea lanes.
 
About the 022 being poorly armed, I beg to differ. While it is true it may not boost a capable sensor suite, its actual armament is rather potent. It carries the same anti-ship missile as severalPLAN destroyers/frigates (YJ-82). In fact, it carries the same number of missiles as the 054A frigates (which carries YJ-83, essentially same level of capability). Of course, it has extremely limited anti-air or anti-sub capabilities, but those roles are not part of its mission profile. I agree that the 022 is limited by its range, seaworthiness, size, and lack of sensors, but it is well armed for the role it is intened for: coastal denial and harassment of enemy naval forces in shallow waters (ie Spratly's, Paracels).
 

Geographer

Junior Member
I find it interesting that every time there is discussion of purpose and capability of the FACs, it's always depicted in a scenario against the USN. But I can think of other purposes for these FACs for the PLAN.
This is exactly what I was thinking of. Instead of discussing the E-3 which nobody but Japan and the US have, you should be discussing the navies of Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and North Korea. They are more likely adversaries than the USN. Against them FACs do rather well since their navies are generally outdated and airborne surveillance non-existent.
 

Troika

Junior Member
I find it odd that people keep talking about its poor seakeeping and short range.

Well, yeah, it's a FAC. You don't evaluate the capabilities of an assault rifle by belittling its ability to shoot down bombers.

Questioning the entire philosophy of still developing FACs is a completely different matter, but criticising the boat based on the fact that it is not a blue water vessel is wrong-headed and frankly barking up the wrong tree.
 

Violet Oboe

Junior Member
Type 022 FAC's are only one of the numerous components of PLAN's elaborate area interdiction strategy intended to deter USN/USAF intervention. Obviously FAC's have their limitations and PLAN is aware of that but make no mistake Type 022 is fast, comparatively stealthy and heavily armed with 8 YJ-82/83 SSM's and eventually the thing will appear in massive real time coordinated swarms (at least 80 units and still counting!:D).

(As for 022 firepower: Assume being confronted by a swarm of 40 022's being capable of firing up to 320 YJ-82/83 in a short timeframe. Any missile defense will be heavily busy after this kind of barrage and only 10% of incoming SSM's piercing the defense shield would wreak catastrophic havoc.)

Moreover the main element in deterring USN carrier groups from maneuvering in the Phillippine Sea eastwards of Taiwan is definitely DF-21D AShBM (3000 km range). Former USN Beijing military attache and retired rear admiral Eric McVadon said recently in an interview with Reuters:
"It is something big. It represents the ability to make the US think twice before sending carrier strike groups into the Western Pacific."

(I have to admit being indeed more guarded in my assumptions than rear admiral McVadon since I would not extend the new ´risk zone´ to the entire Western Pacific but ´only´ to the western and central parts of the Phillippine Sea and an adjacent zone E/NE of the Ryu Kyu's. Nevertheless McVadon could be certainly correct...who am I to argue with an rear admiral!:D)
 
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williamhou

Junior Member
Type 022 FAC's are only one of the numerous components of PLAN's elaborate area interdiction strategy intended to deter USN/USAF intervention. Obviously FAC's have their limitations and PLAN is aware of that but make no mistake Type 022 is fast, comparatively stealthy and heavily armed with 8 YJ-82/83 SSM's and eventually the thing will appear in massive real time coordinated swarms (at least 80 units and still counting!:D).

(As for 022 firepower: Assume being confronted by a swarm of 40 022's being capable of firing up to 320 YJ-82/83 in a short timeframe. Any missile defense will be heavily busy after this kind of barrage and only 10% of incoming SSM's piercing the defense shield would wreak catastrophic havoc.)

Moreover the main element in deterring USN carrier groups from maneuvering in the Phillippine Sea eastwards of Taiwan is definitely DF-21D AShBM (3000 km range). Former USN Beijing military attache and retired rear admiral Eric McVadon said recently in an interview with Reuters:
"It is something big. It represents the ability to make the US think twice before sending carrier strike groups into the Western Pacific."

(I have to admit being indeed more guarded in my assumptions than rear admiral McVadon since I would not extend the new ´risk zone´ to the entire Western Pacific but ´only´ to the western and central parts of the Phillippine Sea and an adjacent zone E/NE of the Ryu Kyu's. Nevertheless McVadon could be certainly correct...who am I to argue with an rear admiral!:D)


You were talking about a swarm of 40 022's VS USN carrier groups. How do you think they can approach the carrier groups and fire 320 missiles?
 
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