Type 022 Missile Boat

Re: New Chinese UAV

tphuang said:

why do you people have to do this to me, I moved it to the right thread.

btw, just to give you an idea of 022's low signature. It has to travel in civilian area with a radar deflector for fear of colliding into other ships (even in broad daylight). The digital camo patterns are done in a way to fool modern sensors from what I read. I uses the so called "mist of rain" to reduce visual and IR signature. It uses EO trackers for targeting rather than an active radar sensor. It has teeth like edges on all the windows to reduce reflection from that. USN has classified 022 as having very low radar signature and also very hard to track through sonar at low speed. The only thing that's really non-stealthy about it is the fact that the Chinese sensors generally don't have the most stealthy shaping.

Just thought of additional things. It uses diesel engines instead of gas turbine, I think that should help IR signature a little bit, the engine exhaust are between hulls point into the water I think, so that would reduce the IR signature even more compared to similar FACs. And let's not forget that PLAN can always mobilize a bunch of civilian fishing boats, so you have to distinguish it from boats with similar/slightly greater signatures.

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1. I will point out that civilian navigational radar's aren't as capable as purpose built naval search radar. Not much has changed in the civilian navigational radar front for the past couple of decades while military search radar's have made significant strides in accuracy, detection range, and resolution in that time period.

2. Diesel engines still produce a lot of heat; I remember that on the Pacificat fast ferries, the radiant heat from the diesel engines caused the air on vehicle decks to become uncomfortably warm. And this was through a aluminum/steel hull. Not as much heat as a gas turbine, but still a lot of heat.

Re: New Chinese UAV

Pointblank said:

1. I will point out that civilian navigational radar's aren't as capable as purpose built naval search radar. Not much has changed in the civilian navigational radar front for the past couple of decades while military search radar's have made significant strides in accuracy, detection range, and resolution in that time period.

2. Diesel engines still produce a lot of heat; I remember that on the Pacificat fast ferries, the radiant heat from the diesel engines caused the air on vehicle decks to become uncomfortably warm. And this was through a aluminum/steel hull. Not as much heat as a gas turbine, but still a lot of heat.

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I totally agree with everything you are saying. This is one of those things where only PLAN and USN would know the distance at which these FACs could be tracked and then figure out a SOP that would work.

Re: New Chinese UAV

tphuang said:

I totally agree with everything you are saying. This is one of those things where only PLAN and USN would know the distance at which these FACs could be tracked and then figure out a SOP that would work.

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The major drawback of FAC's is that their performance is severely degraded in a swell. Somewhere in the INCAT website there is a page that shows the speeds it's ferries can maintain in different sea states. Their maximum speed falls off quickly as sea state rises, where ocean going ships like a DDG are less affected. That same sea state degrades sensor effectiveness as well. These FAC's are not very effective hundreds of miles out in blue water, and they will be detected long before their own sensors are able to pick out targets. The US Navy fooled around with the Ashville Class gunboats and various hydrofoils over the years and determined there was no way to make them work in deep water. They became a drag on the other surface ships, requiring daily replenishment, fresh water and other services larger ships provided themselves. Life for the crew was miserable, and operating them in blue water was tough work. The end result was for the US Navy to abandon FAC's and develop the LCS instead. This will be a true ocean going warship, but still able to go inshore and mess with those Type 022's in green water, only the LCS brings MH-60's and VTUAV's with them.

Re: New Chinese UAV

Ambivalent said:

The major drawback of FAC's is that their performance is severely degraded in a swell. Somewhere in the INCAT website there is a page that shows the speeds it's ferries can maintain in different sea states. Their maximum speed falls off quickly as sea state rises, where ocean going ships like a DDG are less affected. That same sea state degrades sensor effectiveness as well. These FAC's are not very effective hundreds of miles out in blue water, and they will be detected long before their own sensors are able to pick out targets. The US Navy fooled around with the Ashville Class gunboats and various hydrofoils over the years and determined there was no way to make them work in deep water. They became a drag on the other surface ships, requiring daily replenishment, fresh water and other services larger ships provided themselves. Life for the crew was miserable, and operating them in blue water was tough work. The end result was for the US Navy to abandon FAC's and develop the LCS instead. This will be a true ocean going warship, but still able to go inshore and mess with those Type 022's in green water, only the LCS brings MH-60's and VTUAV's with them.

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Yeah, it's impossible to have something like FAC in USN due to the missions that USN would require. But without being sidetracked, I do think it would've made more sense to create a successor to OHP rather than LCS, which is turning out to be a glorified MCM ship.

Re: New Chinese UAV

Ambivalent said:

The major drawback of FAC's is that their performance is severely degraded in a swell. Somewhere in the INCAT website there is a page that shows the speeds it's ferries can maintain in different sea states. Their maximum speed falls off quickly as sea state rises, where ocean going ships like a DDG are less affected. That same sea state degrades sensor effectiveness as well. These FAC's are not very effective hundreds of miles out in blue water, and they will be detected long before their own sensors are able to pick out targets. The US Navy fooled around with the Ashville Class gunboats and various hydrofoils over the years and determined there was no way to make them work in deep water. They became a drag on the other surface ships, requiring daily replenishment, fresh water and other services larger ships provided themselves. Life for the crew was miserable, and operating them in blue water was tough work. The end result was for the US Navy to abandon FAC's and develop the LCS instead. This will be a true ocean going warship, but still able to go inshore and mess with those Type 022's in green water, only the LCS brings MH-60's and VTUAV's with them.

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Indeed, that's why see a move from FAC's towards corvettes or even frigates, as in the case of Germany with the K130 Braunschweig class corvettes. More seaworthy, and more endurance.

One of the key advantages of carriers is their mobility and stealth. Not F22 kind of stealth, but one of the key tactics of carrier operations is the ability of the carrier to loose itself in the vast oceans. And to do that, sensor discipline is a key requirement as a ship can easily be found if its broadcasting its position with military sensors blazing at max power.

But thats exactly what a carrier battle group will need to do in order to have any chance of locating Type 022s lurking about far from shore.

The key role of the Type 022 is not to go out and kill carriers by themselves, but to make the carriers' job that much harder and risky, it all adds up and once a tipping point is reached, the USN's own risk assessment will demand more carriers be on station before committing to battle. That means delays in an US response over flashpoints like Taiwan even if we assume the US has the will and stomach to go to war with China.

That translates to more time for the PLA to take Taiwan and head off US action altogether. To defeat your enemy's armies without having to fight is one of the greatest victories a general can achieve according to the Art of War, and no Chinese military commander would have not read that timeless work.

The Type 022s are one piece of the overall strategy, not a silver bullet in itself.
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Edit: Pointblank,

I think you are comparing apples and oranges a little. During the height of the cold war when faced with the might of the USSR, were the sweds building corvettes or FACs?

Different times bring different challenges and requirements. Just because one navy, facing completely different missions and threats are going with one choice does not make that the best course of action for all navies.

plawolf said:

One of the key advantages of carriers is their mobility and stealth. Not F22 kind of stealth, but one of the key tactics of carrier operations is the ability of the carrier to loose itself in the vast oceans. And to do that, sensor discipline is a key requirement as a ship can easily be found if its broadcasting its position with military sensors blazing at max power.

But thats exactly what a carrier battle group will need to do in order to have any chance of locating Type 022s lurking about far from shore.

The key role of the Type 022 is not to go out and kill carriers by themselves, but to make the carriers' job that much harder and risky, it all adds up and once a tipping point is reached, the USN's own risk assessment will demand more carriers be on station before committing to battle. That means delays in an US response over flashpoints like Taiwan even if we assume the US has the will and stomach to go to war with China.

That translates to more time for the PLA to take Taiwan and head off US action altogether. To defeat your enemy's armies without having to fight is one of the greatest victories a general can achieve according to the Art of War, and no Chinese military commander would have not read that timeless work.

The Type 022s are one piece of the overall strategy, not a silver bullet in itself.
---------------

Edit: Pointblank,

I think you are comparing apples and oranges a little. During the height of the cold war when faced with the might of the USSR, were the sweds building corvettes or FACs?

Different times bring different challenges and requirements. Just because one navy, facing completely different missions and threats are going with one choice does not make that the best course of action for all navies.

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Type 022's won't be sailing anywhere near the CSG. Too far out to sea for something that small to be useful. Vessels like the Type 022 are only useful in coastal waters or confined areas. For a nation like Sweden that would be fighting a defensive war in the Baltic and the narrow island straits between the Baltic and North Seas, FAC's make perfect sense. Like their subs, patrols are of very short duration, and there is plenty of terrain to mask their movements with. Their shore line is perfect for short range hit and run tactics. For blue water naval combat they are useless. They would literally have to sail inside the carrier's destroyer screen to launch their weapons, not a credible scenario. The two star commanding the CSG is not going to worry too much about them at the ranges the carrier operates at. Subs and aircraft and the missiles they shoot will be his primary concerns.
Btw, when the CSG is EMCON, all those radars are still on and listening in a passive mode. They have good azimuth discrimination but no range discrimination when in a passive mode. However, the characteristics of any threat radars noted can tell them some things about what is out there and how close. If a targeting radar is lit off, and especially if one of the CSG is illuminated, it takes no time for the CSG's radars to go active and counter the threat.
There is also a van that may be mounted to the deck of a support ship that generates a simulation of all the various electronic signals a CSG generates. To an ELINT platform this van looks just like a carrier, but it is chained to the deck of an oiler or other such non-combat ship. The CSG goes one way under EMCOM while the ship with the broadcasting van goes another direction. This spoof only has to work long enough for the carrier to achieve tactical surprise.
One last point, an E-3 can orbit the region with it's radar on, finding enemy surface combatants and relaying this information to the CSG without giving the CSG's presence, or absence, away to an interested adversary. Just because an E-3 is up there does not mean a carrier is nearby.

Ambivalent said:

Type 022's won't be sailing anywhere near the CSG. Too far out to sea for something that small to be useful. Vessels like the Type 022 are only useful in coastal waters or confined areas. For a nation like Sweden that would be fighting a defensive war in the Baltic and the narrow island straits between the Baltic and North Seas, FAC's make perfect sense. Like their subs, patrols are of very short duration, and there is plenty of terrain to mask their movements with. Their shore line is perfect for short range hit and run tactics. For blue water naval combat they are useless. They would literally have to sail inside the carrier's destroyer screen to launch their weapons, not a credible scenario. The two star commanding the CSG is not going to worry too much about them at the ranges the carrier operates at. Subs and aircraft and the missiles they shoot will be his primary concerns.

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That is based on nothing more then assumptions, and not very credible ones at that. China did not buy the Type022 off the shelf, they designed and built them from scratch. That means they can taylor it to have any specifications (within technological limits of course) they so choose.

Just because the sweds went one way with their FAC design to maximize their effectiveness in Swedish waters does not, by any stretch, means every other FAC of a similar size were designed with the same specifications.

Just compare the Type 022 to civilian ships of a similar displacement and you could see that 1000km combat radius is easily within reach if it was designed with long range patrols from the offset.

What more, if the PLAN sent out an Type 022 'screen', the boats would not be zooming straight to their intended target location at max steam, thus they will be able to achieve far great ranges then similar sized FACs doing classic hit and run maneuvers.

Btw, when the CSG is EMCON, all those radars are still on and listening in a passive mode. They have good azimuth discrimination but no range discrimination when in a passive mode. However, the characteristics of any threat radars noted can tell them some things about what is out there and how close. If a targeting radar is lit off, and especially if one of the CSG is illuminated, it takes no time for the CSG's radars to go active and counter the threat.

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I fail to see how this is relevant at all. The Type 022 does not carry any long range senors. Its radars are for navigation and targeting for the AK. There is no way any passive electronic sensor is going to pick them up when they are operating under combat conditions.

There is also a van that may be mounted to the deck of a support ship that generates a simulation of all the various electronic signals a CSG generates. To an ELINT platform this van looks just like a carrier, but it is chained to the deck of an oiler or other such non-combat ship. The CSG goes one way under EMCOM while the ship with the broadcasting van goes another direction. This spoof only has to work long enough for the carrier to achieve tactical surprise.

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And such elaborate measures would be rendered pointless if the carrier and its escorts need to turn on active sensors to hunt down Type 022s that may be lurking within missile range of the carrier or one of its escorts.

One last point, an E-3 can orbit the region with it's radar on, finding enemy surface combatants and relaying this information to the CSG without giving the CSG's presence, or absence, away to an interested adversary. Just because an E-3 is up there does not mean a carrier is nearby.

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Again, based on a very unrealistic set of assumptions that the Type 022s will be operating out there on their lonesomes when the very design of these FACs demand that they be used in conjunction with a host of other assets.

With Type 022s carrying the heavy AShMs, PLAAF and PLANAF fighters can be freed up to carry lighter AA loads and run CAP for the FACs and other recon assets while supported by land based AWACs.

The E3 is a nice little bird, but its physical limitation means its not going to be able to match the range and power of far larger land based AWACS the PLAAF current operates.

It the E3 is running on active, then its going to be far easier for the PLAAF to find and track them and they can vector in long range fighters to try and shoot the E3 down.

What more, the limitations of radar search mode would mean that the E3 would be forced to either scan for air threats or search for surface contacts. That will make it a very risky decision to use surface search mode when there are hostile fighters hunting for you.

The PLA does not need to hunt down and kill the USN carriers, it just need to keep them out of range of Taiwan long enough for the land forces to take the island. And even if the USN can find a way past the fighter and FAC screen, it will slow them down and quite probably inflict losses on the USN, and thats the point - to raise the risk and cost of intervention for the US and also be decrease the likelihood of success by making it harder for the US to be able to respond in time.

At some point, if current trends continue, the USN will reach the conclusion that to try and intervene in Taiwan would, statistically speaking, cost them a great deal in lives and treasure with a very high chance that by the time the USN has punched through the PLA screen to get within reach of Taiwan, the ground war would have already been over. Then the entire nature of the mission changes from support to taking a hostile island.

The US will have to bring the bulk of its entire military might to have any chance of success in such a scenario, and even if such a move does not trigger a nuclear exchange, the cost in lives will be reminiscent of korea and WWII. That is not a price anyone but the delusional will see the US willing to pay over Taiwan.

As I said at the start, the Type 022 is not some magical silver bullet that will spell the doom of carriers everywhere. They are just another threat that the USN will have to try and deal with if they want to get involved in Taiwan. And the PLAN is clearly very impressed by the performance of these boats. Just look at the speed and number the PLAN is equipping them.

So what actual scenario is Ambivalent referring to?

A whole bunch (3, 4 or even 5??) of carrier groups cruising around in central parts of the Phillippine Sea about halfway between Guam and Taiwan? Assuming PACCOM would actually be bold enough to conduct that kind of maneuver, what would that achieve operationally? (Furthermore the concentration of five CVN's comparatively close to the Chinese mainland would inevitably trigger massive attacks on PRC onshore targets and that would rapidly escalate into full scale war with China. So are we in an unexpected World War III setting precipitated by a botched show of force to deter China from militarily taking Taiwan??)

Engaging the enemy is only effective if tactical and strategic success go hand in hand and ´winning´ a skirmish with PLAN forces in the Phillippine Sea is completely irrelevant as long as Taiwan is swiftly taken and secured by PLA.

plawolf said:

That is based on nothing more then assumptions, and not very credible ones at that. China did not buy the Type022 off the shelf, they designed and built them from scratch. That means they can taylor it to have any specifications (within technological limits of course) they so choose.

Just because the sweds went one way with their FAC design to maximize their effectiveness in Swedish waters does not, by any stretch, means every other FAC of a similar size were designed with the same specifications.

Just compare the Type 022 to civilian ships of a similar displacement and you could see that 1000km combat radius is easily within reach if it was designed with long range patrols from the offset.

What more, if the PLAN sent out an Type 022 'screen', the boats would not be zooming straight to their intended target location at max steam, thus they will be able to achieve far great ranges then similar sized FACs doing classic hit and run maneuvers.

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FAC's are terrible boats to sail in rough weather on the open seas. By the time they even reach firing position, the crew is probably too sea sick to do anything anyways, or would have suffered weather damage due to their small size and propensity to get thrown around. In the more coastal or sheltered waters, they are definitely a more viable option. Out in the open seas, expect the crews to be barfing over the sides of the boats at least.

I remember being on a BC Ferries ferry sailing across the Georgia Strait on a 11,600 ton ferry getting caught in a gale warning (wind speeds in the range of 34 to 47 knots). Even though the ferry was a fairly large and stable boat, many of the passengers were feeling very queasy during the 2 hour voyage. The ferry was rocking side to side ever so slightly and everyone felt it.

Another example: the World War II Flower class corvette. A 900 ton warship, but it was a miserable sea boat due to the small size in the North Atlantic. The ships were cold, very wet, often swamped with water, and rolled very heavily due to their small size. They were barely adequate for the ocean escort duty for these very reasons alone, and when the Allies could, they were supplanted by the larger frigates and sloops (1,100 tons or more).

plawolf said:

I fail to see how this is relevant at all. The Type 022 does not carry any long range senors. Its radars are for navigation and targeting for the AK. There is no way any passive electronic sensor is going to pick them up when they are operating under combat conditions.

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That radar for the AK-630 radiates a signature that is for the most part unmistakable. Furthermore, any navigation radar is also another ESM source to be identified. You can determine any potential threat by looking at the specific combination of sensor's and you can definitely bet that the Americans are definitely snooping around to look at the various sensor fits of all of the PLAN's ships.

plawolf said:

And such elaborate measures would be rendered pointless if the carrier and its escorts need to turn on active sensors to hunt down Type 022s that may be lurking within missile range of the carrier or one of its escorts.

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Doesn't mean that the decoy is also escorted; the USN can place another couple of vans on that decoy to emulate the signature of the escorts, or there could be a couple of escorts themselves.

plawolf said:

Again, based on a very unrealistic set of assumptions that the Type 022s will be operating out there on their lonesomes when the very design of these FACs demand that they be used in conjunction with a host of other assets.

With Type 022s carrying the heavy AShMs, PLAAF and PLANAF fighters can be freed up to carry lighter AA loads and run CAP for the FACs and other recon assets while supported by land based AWACs.

The E3 is a nice little bird, but its physical limitation means its not going to be able to match the range and power of far larger land based AWACS the PLAAF current operates.

It the E3 is running on active, then its going to be far easier for the PLAAF to find and track them and they can vector in long range fighters to try and shoot the E3 down.

What more, the limitations of radar search mode would mean that the E3 would be forced to either scan for air threats or search for surface contacts. That will make it a very risky decision to use surface search mode when there are hostile fighters hunting for you.

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I don't even think that any FAC will operate that far away from shore; lack of endurance and seaworthiness is a major factor. No, if the Chinese are intent on trying to intercept a carrier group that far out, they will need to use their larger frigates and destroyers to do so. No one uses a FAC that far out from shore; they may do long cruises along the coast, but that's the limit. Any combat warship under 1,000 tons is primarily a green water craft, it's too small to be effective out on the open ocean.

PLAN and PLAAF fighter flying that far away from the coast are usually at the limits of endurance; they may have used up most of their fuel already, and may not have much in the way of loitering time without tanker support. And we all realize that the Chinese have very limited numbers of tankers. Not enough to support a round the clock CAP unlike the numbers of KC-135's and KC-10's the American's have.

The E-3 Sentry is not a bird to be dismissed lightly; its one of the best AWACS aircraft out there. It also has a very long endurance, which is extended even further with air to air refueling. Furthermore, the Americans have more of them in operation, along with the carrier based E-2 Hawkeye, with the new E-2D Hawkeye is under testing. Together, they can cover a very large area with radar coverage. No need for the carrier groups to have their radars lit up when they have a circling Hawkeye or Sentry nearby doing that for them.

plawolf said:

The PLA does not need to hunt down and kill the USN carriers, it just need to keep them out of range of Taiwan long enough for the land forces to take the island. And even if the USN can find a way past the fighter and FAC screen, it will slow them down and quite probably inflict losses on the USN, and thats the point - to raise the risk and cost of intervention for the US and also be decrease the likelihood of success by making it harder for the US to be able to respond in time.

At some point, if current trends continue, the USN will reach the conclusion that to try and intervene in Taiwan would, statistically speaking, cost them a great deal in lives and treasure with a very high chance that by the time the USN has punched through the PLA screen to get within reach of Taiwan, the ground war would have already been over. Then the entire nature of the mission changes from support to taking a hostile island.

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Ah, but the Chinese don't have the ability to even conduct sea denial operations in blue water; they definitely have that ability in green and brown water, but not in blue water. The Americans will be more than comfortable operating roughly 500km off the coast of Taiwan; their aircraft have the range to do it, not to mention the large numbers of tanker aircraft they have available. Not to mention the many American subs that may prowl off Taiwan's coast, and the very limited ASW capabilities of the Chinese...