Commentary to something from a few pages ago:
You're comparing a 700 men structure against a 4000 men structure. If I split the ABCT into six smaller groups, those smaller groups would also be "effectively destroyed" under such losses.
This is misunderstanding of what Battalion Tactical Group is.
- BGT is not an equivalent of a reinforced battalion.
- BGT is a reinforced-battalion-sized equivalent of a brigade.
That's why TRADOC compares it to BCT.
To understand BGT we must go back to Anatoliy Syerdukov - the minister of defense from 2007 to 2012. The poor performance of conscript units during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war showed the need for professional force. Syerdukov designated VDV as the branch intended to become fully professional primary rapid reaction force. He then reorganized the ground forces into a flatter structure with brigades as basic unit and armies as operational commands. He proposed that
every army designate a number of high-readiness brigades which would be manned by contract-service troops while the remaining brigades would be manned by regular conscripts. Per Russian law
conscripts are not allowed to serve abroad so those contract units would be used in any foreign military interventions while conscript units would be used for training and mobilization.
This idea caused pushback from the cadres fearing loss of access to career opportunities and funding for officers of conscript units. Fundamental to Russian military culture was stealing of funds to augment income. It was illegal and at the same time widely accepted. It was just how the system worked. Professional units with significantly higher pool of funding would therefore create a separate caste in the military and that would be a ticking time bomb. There were other criticisms of the reform but this one was the most important. Especially that Syerdukov's cuts were following the previous series of cuts in 2004 that caused a lot of dissatisfaction.
Syerdukov was dismissed in 2012 and his replacement - Shoigu - came to a compromise with the generals. Instead of two types of brigades each brigade would field an improvised battalion-sized formation that would be manned by professional troops.
One BGT per unit was the baseline with some exceptions for Moscow-based units and a few others. It guaranteed
equal distribution of funds for contract troops and this made the officers happy. It also had unintended consequences in performance.
Because of the culture of graft and limited funding for contract service very few units managed to field a proper reinforced battalion of professional troops. Even those were augmented by conscripts which during 2014 intervention in Ukraine were forced to sign contracts for deployment. This is also why Russia used DPR and LPR militas so extensively - they simply didn't have necessary manpower. A BGT is as large as the commander decides to make it.
Technically a BGT is the substitute for a BCT. In reality it never met the minimum level.
The first thing that military told the Kremlin was that a shift from BGT to a regimental combat team was necessary for any major operation and for that - the shift away from brigade to division level. This is also why after 2014 Russia begins to recreate traditional divisions reverting from the previous brigade structure of the army. But with that came more officers... and more "augmentation of income". Even worse - because funds move downward the structure of command the professional artillery is on the division level while tank and motor-rifle regiments underfund their artillery. This means that the BGT fielded by divisions is more convoluted than deployed by brigades.
Then it got even worse. Because of the hysteria that erupted in the west following 2014 Kremlin decided that BGT might not be the best combat formation but it is a good
psychological weapon and required that RuMoD increase the number of BGTs available for deployments as deterrence. That was completely absurd because it couldn't be realistically done. Russian army struggled to get enough contract troops for regimental combat teams. So they did what Russians always have done in such situations - they faked the numbers and reports, staged the exercises and demonstrations. The commanders reported new BGTs as ready to Shoigu who proudly delivered the news to Putin and everyone was happy as long as no real fighting against peer enemy happened.
And then real fighting against peer enemy happened.
This is the technical explanation of why the invasion went so badly. For every brigade or regiment deployed there were reports of minimum of 3 BGTs and 4 BGT if reserve material component was attached. But there was only 1 at best 1,5 of BGT personnel on contract available. That meant that BGTs were undermanned even per standard BGT numbers which were deemed insufficient. This is why VDV was so widely and aggressively used. They were the only formation who could throw a "regiment" or a "brigade" into action.
Western intelligence knew this which is why there was such widespread disbelief before 24 February. Russia didn't have the manpower and everyone knew it. They went in anyway.
So whenever you see a map of the front and see a unit marker described as brigade or regiment it is at best a single BGT. Tons of weapons and not enough soldiers. Ukraine is the opposite - tons of soldiers and not enough weapons. As soon as they get the weapons they can exert pressure and begin to wear down Russians who can defend due to material superiority but not attack - because it requires manpower for basic offensive tactics. Instead it allowed certain UAF units like 1st Tank from Chernihiv to a halt because while numerically inferior on paper they were numerically superior in the field.
This is also why VDV have been absolutely ground to dust and the next batch coming in a few months to quickly fill in the slots is going to be undertrained. VDV were the only proper tactical formation. Every other unit had some fighting force but how much - that depended on how much the commander lied to his superiors. The rout from Izyum is the consequence of it as well. That and the fact that Russians decided to throw all remaining VDV units to Kherson. A timely deployment of a VDV airborne battalion could change a lot. Perhaps not the outcome of the operation but at least reduce the tempo and buy time. But if they didn't do it, then the offensive in the south would happen because geographically Russians put themselves in a corner.
Many argue that the dismissal of Syerdukov was the final nail in the coffin of Russian military. That was the last chance for a proper reform and it could only work with painful radical cuts. Those didn't happen and what we see today is the direct consequence.
