The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
How would they dig trenches and tunnels in unfamiliar territory while being constantly under fire around the clock? Not to mention supply lines into an area 30km deep inside Russia, where there were no previous Russian fortifications/cover built.
Maybe Ukraine was thinking Russia would negotiate once they can bring something in Kursk within range? It seems delusional, and if Russia doesn't negotiate, what Ukraine achieved is letting Russia milk a far more lopsided casualty ratio than the Donbass front.
Not just the 10-25k that would be trapped, but the issue is that as long as they remain inside Russia, Ukraine has to send columns of supplies over large stretches of area overflown by Russians.
Numbers of Ukrainian vehicles were hit by Lancets around Sudzhe.
Iskander cluster munition hit on a Ukrainian vehicle column in the Kursk region. Russians confident no one came out of that alive. Allegedly 37 soldiers in that column.
The big explosion comes from a Marder as it was hit in the rear from a Lancet. The smoke grenade launchers blew.
Russian D-30 howitzer hits a Ukrainian improvised field ammo depot in the Kursk region. This old cannon never gets old.
Ukrainian forces assembly area in the Sumy region is hit by multiple FABs.
Commander of tank battalion of the 92nd Brigade of the AFU, killed near Kharkhiv.
Ukrainian PVD in Liman gets hit by FABs.
Russian flag up in Sergiivka.
Two Ukrainian vehicles destroyed by artillery or Krasnopols near Malaya Locnya, already 15km from the border. Another vehicle destroyed by Ka-52.
Tornado-S strikes against hidden Ukrainian equipment at the Kursk border.
Wagners returning from Africa. Likely headed to the Kursk region.
Identified units of the AFU in the Kursk offensive. Probable use of Challengers.
Lukashovka in the Sumy region and Sonitsky Kazachok in the Kharkhiv region falls to the Russians.
Ukrainian tank taken out by Lancet in Chasiv Yar.
Bradley taken out by FPV drone by the Vega SPN.
Another LMUR strike at a house in Prechystivka. As a note the primary targets in occupied houses are Ukrainian UAV or drone control crews.
RBK-500 cluster munition deployed on Ukrainian positions in the Ugledar sector.
FPV drones and Krasnopol strikes on Ukrainian PVDs and warehouses by Group East.
FPV drone operators vs FPV drone operators. FPV drones from the Kaira unit hit the repeater antenna used by a Ukrainian UAV unit, then their mode of transportation.
Ukrainian tank and IFV taken out by Lancets from Group North.
Iskander cluster munition hit on a Ukrainian vehicle column in the Kursk region. Russians confident no one came out of that alive. Allegedly 37 soldiers in that column.
The big explosion comes from a Marder as it was hit in the rear from a Lancet. The smoke grenade launchers blew.
Russian D-30 howitzer hits a Ukrainian improvised field ammo depot in the Kursk region. This old cannon never gets old.
Ukrainian forces assembly area in the Sumy region is hit by multiple FABs.
Commander of tank battalion of the 92nd Brigade of the AFU, killed near Kharkhiv.
Ukrainian PVD in Liman gets hit by FABs.
Russian flag up in Sergiivka.
Two Ukrainian vehicles destroyed by artillery or Krasnopols near Malaya Locnya, already 15km from the border. Another vehicle destroyed by Ka-52.
Tornado-S strikes against hidden Ukrainian equipment at the Kursk border.
Wagners returning from Africa. Likely headed to the Kursk region.
Identified units of the AFU in the Kursk offensive. Probable use of Challengers.
Lukashovka in the Sumy region and Sonitsky Kazachok in the Kharkhiv region falls to the Russians.
Ukrainian tank taken out by Lancet in Chasiv Yar.
Bradley taken out by FPV drone by the Vega SPN.
Another LMUR strike at a house in Prechystivka. As a note the primary targets in occupied houses are Ukrainian UAV or drone control crews.
RBK-500 cluster munition deployed on Ukrainian positions in the Ugledar sector.
FPV drones and Krasnopol strikes on Ukrainian PVDs and warehouses by Group East.
FPV drone operators vs FPV drone operators. FPV drones from the Kaira unit hit the repeater antenna used by a Ukrainian UAV unit, then their mode of transportation.
Ukrainian tank and IFV taken out by Lancets from Group North.
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plawolf
Lieutenant General
The timing of this new offensive seems awfully convenient just as the first F16s are officially handed over, so odds are high that there is a political element to this offensive. The big question is whether that is at the behest of Ukrainian or NATO. But to be frank, on the grand scheme of things it doesn’t matter, because this whole Kursk misadventure seems like a giant strategic miscalculation.
To understand the nature and purpose of the Kursk incursion, we can do a quick scenario map.
So either 1) it’s a small scale propaganda focused hit and run op; or 2) it’s a large scale strategic offensive intended to take a hold significant ground for broader strategic purposes (eg pressure Russian northern group logistics).
On the flip side, either A) the Russians completely didn’t noticed this Ukrainian build up on its board; or B) they noticed it and chose not to act against it.
While the Russians are by no means beyond making strategic errors and/or getting caught napping, still scenario 2A, where the Ukrainians concentrated a huge force and the Russians totally missed it stretches believability to breaking point. Yet it is also the only scenario where this whole offensive can have any realistic chance of ending up being a net gain for Ukraine. It’s up to you if you want to believe an extremely low probability eventuality.
1A is most likely but makes this a pure optics based propaganda op with minimal to zero strategic benefit for Ukraine.
1B is likely but would suggest this being a Russian ambush.
2B is less likely (but still significantly more likely than 2A) and would be the optimal outcome for Russia to have baited Ukraine into a big trap.
But even if we give Ukraine the maximum benefit of the doubt and go with 2A, it’s still incredibly hard to see how they can turn this into a strategic win, as doing so would require them to be able to hold what they took long term, if not actually take even more territory to be able to seriously threaten Russian logistics.
We are expected to believe that while Ukraine cannot hold ground deep within its own territory that it has fortified while enjoying the full benefit of home field advantage in terms of air defence, logistics and NATO intelligence, can suddenly take and hold ground inside Russian territory. Sure.
On the battlefield strategic level, this feels like a massive overreach by Ukraine at best, and then willingly jumping into a Russian trap at worse. But the bigger damage is done on the geopolitical level, as this basically kills all prospects of a negotiated peace since Ukraine is demonstrating its gleeful eagerness to attack Russian home soil given the slightest opportunity. That means Russia now has a very justifiable case that any buffer zone Ukraine surrenders will have to be along the entire Ukraine-Russia boarder and not just limited to the 4 oblasts that started all this. If Ukraine doesn’t like that deal, they can keep fighting the Russians on the battlefield. Which is what Russia wants but doesn’t want to take the political cost of admitting. Now they don’t have to.
To understand the nature and purpose of the Kursk incursion, we can do a quick scenario map.
So either 1) it’s a small scale propaganda focused hit and run op; or 2) it’s a large scale strategic offensive intended to take a hold significant ground for broader strategic purposes (eg pressure Russian northern group logistics).
On the flip side, either A) the Russians completely didn’t noticed this Ukrainian build up on its board; or B) they noticed it and chose not to act against it.
While the Russians are by no means beyond making strategic errors and/or getting caught napping, still scenario 2A, where the Ukrainians concentrated a huge force and the Russians totally missed it stretches believability to breaking point. Yet it is also the only scenario where this whole offensive can have any realistic chance of ending up being a net gain for Ukraine. It’s up to you if you want to believe an extremely low probability eventuality.
1A is most likely but makes this a pure optics based propaganda op with minimal to zero strategic benefit for Ukraine.
1B is likely but would suggest this being a Russian ambush.
2B is less likely (but still significantly more likely than 2A) and would be the optimal outcome for Russia to have baited Ukraine into a big trap.
But even if we give Ukraine the maximum benefit of the doubt and go with 2A, it’s still incredibly hard to see how they can turn this into a strategic win, as doing so would require them to be able to hold what they took long term, if not actually take even more territory to be able to seriously threaten Russian logistics.
We are expected to believe that while Ukraine cannot hold ground deep within its own territory that it has fortified while enjoying the full benefit of home field advantage in terms of air defence, logistics and NATO intelligence, can suddenly take and hold ground inside Russian territory. Sure.
On the battlefield strategic level, this feels like a massive overreach by Ukraine at best, and then willingly jumping into a Russian trap at worse. But the bigger damage is done on the geopolitical level, as this basically kills all prospects of a negotiated peace since Ukraine is demonstrating its gleeful eagerness to attack Russian home soil given the slightest opportunity. That means Russia now has a very justifiable case that any buffer zone Ukraine surrenders will have to be along the entire Ukraine-Russia boarder and not just limited to the 4 oblasts that started all this. If Ukraine doesn’t like that deal, they can keep fighting the Russians on the battlefield. Which is what Russia wants but doesn’t want to take the political cost of admitting. Now they don’t have to.
Several reports of Ukranians engaging in war crimes around the Kursk region.
Severians and Sotnitsky have been cleared, though
Seems the AFU forgets about the concept of concealment as soon as they cross the border, driving and stopping on open roads. Probably due to not being familiar with the area
It is probably guaranteed at this point they will lose Sumy, Chernigov and Kharkov, as buffer zones.
Severians and Sotnitsky have been cleared, though
Seems the AFU forgets about the concept of concealment as soon as they cross the border, driving and stopping on open roads. Probably due to not being familiar with the area
It is probably guaranteed at this point they will lose Sumy, Chernigov and Kharkov, as buffer zones.
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Before discussing nuclear weapons use, I think that Russia should consider finally doing another mobilization, and a big one this time.
Russia is literally being invaded right now. The weaknesses in Russia's political system make mobilization politically difficult for Putin, but I think being invaded by tens of thousands of troops fully justifies mobilization. There should be enough popular support for it now, if it is the right military strategy. (Maybe the mobilized troops should be used only to defend pre-2014 borders?)
My understanding is that manpower is still evenly matched in this war, which if true is ridiculous.
Russia is literally being invaded right now. The weaknesses in Russia's political system make mobilization politically difficult for Putin, but I think being invaded by tens of thousands of troops fully justifies mobilization. There should be enough popular support for it now, if it is the right military strategy. (Maybe the mobilized troops should be used only to defend pre-2014 borders?)
My understanding is that manpower is still evenly matched in this war, which if true is ridiculous.
No, Russia has a significant manpower advantage.
In fact, I'd say they probably have a qualitative advantage as well. For one thing, they're not press-ganged into service like most Ukrainian conscripts seem to be these days.
Gotta admit this is kinda funny.
These brave pro-independence fighters show that the people of Kursk want to return to Ukraine, their historical homeland.
They have absolutely no connection with the Ukrainian army. After all, anybody can go to a store in Kursk and buy an army uniform and a Leopard 2 tank.
These brave pro-independence fighters show that the people of Kursk want to return to Ukraine, their historical homeland.
They have absolutely no connection with the Ukrainian army. After all, anybody can go to a store in Kursk and buy an army uniform and a Leopard 2 tank.