The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
Wow! That tank is real deal.
The radar is TAM/IQ=65 and the launcher is PACK-4-GTFO.
A single launcher and a single radar in the middle of a clearing is a decoy!!!
Leaving just the radar and launcher is an obvious bait for Russians relying on limitations of human psychology. The people operating the Iskander launcher get their information from drone operators. Both are Ground Forces personnel with likely very limited intel skills and operating under stress. Russian Ground Forces are familiar with Russian Ground Force air defense systems - Buk or S-300V which are self-propelled and have different architecture compared to Air Force's S-400 or Patriot. For RuGF personnel a launcher and a radar in the field looks plausible because that's what Russian/Soviet army SAMs look like. Buks are also the primary target for Ground Forces recon in this conflict since that's what Ukraine used as their primary GBAD asset until late 2023. This is not Patriot but it looks like a Buk and that may be just enough to trigger the wrong reaction.
Training of an US Army Patriot fire unit - without launchers deployed - in Poland.
1 - radar, 2 - electric power unit, 3- engagement control station, 4 - radio relay, 5 - command & communication
AN/MPQ-65
Note the tarp at the back of the antenna which protects cables etc. because AN/MPQ-65 uses analog technology with travelling-wave tubes.
AN/MPQ-65A
Note the two small side arrays which are integral part of any A version radar. Note the lack of the tarp because A variant is fully digital.
AN/MPQ-65 uses a PESA antenna. AN/MPQ-65A uses GaN AESA antenna but it only began entering service with the US Army in 2017 and is delivered only with the latest fully-digital PDB8 (CONFIG3+) variant.
One of the reasons why Poland didn't buy Patriot earlier, despite having no medium/long range air defense at all was the outdated technology used in Patriot pre CONFIG3+. Patriot is very expensive and while PAC-3 is indeed very good the radars and control systems are not because PAC-3 has active homing so main radar is not as important as for PAC-2 which uses TVM. US Army already had Patriots so it only needed minor upgrades for missile integration. LM's PAC-3MSE was initially intended for LM's MEADS but budget cuts in 2011 ended the program and PAC-3MSE was handed over to Patriot which needed to be ugpraded. Poland also planned to buy MEADS (as was Germany) but when MEADS got cancelled in DC it became financially unviable and we had to wait for PDB8.
Ukraine doesn't have AESA radars with their Patriots. They got the older version that uses PAC-3 which is over 25 years old right now. That's how they managed to combine systems from Netherlands, Germany and USA.
Anyway:
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This is a table of Russian equipment losses based on my periodic updates of Oryx's list. I chose dates that approximate a 6-month interval in fighting. The first date from the war is 23 April 2022 because that's when I made my first list. I have earlier ones but they may not be reliable at all as the first month of fighting was too chaotic. By April Oryx crew got their OSINT into something of a predictable pattern and they began to be methodologically viable, just with all the usual caveats required for OSINT crowd online.
It gives an interesting view of just how stable the level of losses of equipment are regardless of whether there is a temporary high or low in intensity of combat. The same does not hold for human casualties which vary more visibly depending on the period.
qty - recorded losses in category
% - percentage of active force in 2020-2021 by TMB2021
diff - difference from the previous period
Categories other than tanks do not list all types. Tanks lack the few T-54/55 (current total is 3000)
Russia lost 550 tanks in the first two months but afterward it loses ~550 tanks every ~6 months. IFV/APC losses are similar although there is a significant drop in 2023 for the period of Ukrainian offensive. Tanks were used very actively as counters but for obvious reasons not personnel carriers. Artillery of all types is lost at a constant rate.
I wish I did the same for Ukrainian losses but Ukrainian army is not an interesting case study so mostly ignore it.
Russia lost: 3000 MBTs, 6000 IFV/APCs, 1000 artillery, 300 MLRS. With two years of use another 3000 tanks and 3000-6000 apcs must be in overhaul in factories and frontline repair units. The Russian offensive that is very plausibly coming any day now - today's incursion is likely a probing/shaping operation - will be mostly infantry and drones judging by the current size of Russian army (150% pre war at minimum).
It will be very interesting to see what they come up with, but I expect a modern rendition of Kaiserschlacht + Stosstruppen. They simply can't have the necessary number of working vehicles. The math refuses to make it so.
This is why they're pushing around Kharkiv. They really need Ukrainian lines to break on their own due to insufficient force density. At current rate Russia loses 500 MBT, 1000 IFV per 6 months. During an offensive any failure to achieve full success may result in 2x losses (3-9/2022) or as high as 3x, even if Ukraine has to withdraw from portion of currently held territory. Kharkiv won't fall because it's a 1,5m city. Russia won't reach Dnipro unless Ukrainian force collapses entirely. Which is not guaranteed since withdrawal shortens supply lines and front length for Ukraine and extends them for Russia.
So for now data suggests a very slow and steady offensive, potentially across the entire front. Similar to Ukrainian failed attempt in 2023, except that Russia doesn't need to break through.
And I just want to mention that if you plot the events of WW1 on a timescale it looks eerily similar to this war - includig the duration of all the stages. In 2022 we had Schlieffen Plan (SMO), 1st Marne (Kiyv) Race to the Sea (Karkiv) and 1st Ypres (Kherson). In 2023 we had Artois/Aubers Ridge (Bakhmut) and failed attempts on each side, a Shell Crisis and development of aviation (drones). So in 2024 we're at 1916 which is... Verdun and Somme.
This pattern must be obvious to someone on either side so I wonder if they conclude that this time history won't repeat itself... which almost inevitably leads to history repeating itself.
Of course it's a decoy so much so nobody posted it in here for hours until Tam took the bait.The radar is TAM/IQ=65 and the launcher is PACK-4-GTFO.
A single launcher and a single radar in the middle of a clearing is a decoy!!!
View attachment 129384
Leaving just the radar and launcher is an obvious bait for Russians relying on limitations of human psychology. The people operating the Iskander launcher get their information from drone operators. Both are Ground Forces personnel with likely very limited intel skills and operating under stress. Russian Ground Forces are familiar with Russian Ground Force air defense systems - Buk or S-300V which are self-propelled and have different architecture compared to Air Force's S-400 or Patriot. For RuGF personnel a launcher and a radar in the field looks plausible because that's what Russian/Soviet army SAMs look like. Buks are also the primary target for Ground Forces recon in this conflict since that's what Ukraine used as their primary GBAD asset until late 2023. This is not Patriot but it looks like a Buk and that may be just enough to trigger the wrong reaction.
Training of an US Army Patriot fire unit - without launchers deployed - in Poland.View attachment 129385
1 - radar, 2 - electric power unit, 3- engagement control station, 4 - radio relay, 5 - command & communication
AN/MPQ-65
Note the tarp at the back of the antenna which protects cables etc. because AN/MPQ-65 uses analog technology with travelling-wave tubes.
AN/MPQ-65A
Note the two small side arrays which are integral part of any A version radar. Note the lack of the tarp because A variant is fully digital.
AN/MPQ-65 uses a PESA antenna. AN/MPQ-65A uses GaN AESA antenna but it only began entering service with the US Army in 2017 and is delivered only with the latest fully-digital PDB8 (CONFIG3+) variant.
One of the reasons why Poland didn't buy Patriot earlier, despite having no medium/long range air defense at all was the outdated technology used in Patriot pre CONFIG3+. Patriot is very expensive and while PAC-3 is indeed very good the radars and control systems are not because PAC-3 has active homing so main radar is not as important as for PAC-2 which uses TVM. US Army already had Patriots so it only needed minor upgrades for missile integration. LM's PAC-3MSE was initially intended for LM's MEADS but budget cuts in 2011 ended the program and PAC-3MSE was handed over to Patriot which needed to be ugpraded. Poland also planned to buy MEADS (as was Germany) but when MEADS got cancelled in DC it became financially unviable and we had to wait for PDB8.
Ukraine doesn't have AESA radars with their Patriots. They got the older version that uses PAC-3 which is over 25 years old right now. That's how they managed to combine systems from Netherlands, Germany and USA.
Anyway:
--------
This is a table of Russian equipment losses based on my periodic updates of Oryx's list. I chose dates that approximate a 6-month interval in fighting. The first date from the war is 23 April 2022 because that's when I made my first list. I have earlier ones but they may not be reliable at all as the first month of fighting was too chaotic. By April Oryx crew got their OSINT into something of a predictable pattern and they began to be methodologically viable, just with all the usual caveats required for OSINT crowd online.
It gives an interesting view of just how stable the level of losses of equipment are regardless of whether there is a temporary high or low in intensity of combat. The same does not hold for human casualties which vary more visibly depending on the period.
qty - recorded losses in category
% - percentage of active force in 2020-2021 by TMB2021
diff - difference from the previous period
View attachment 129386
Categories other than tanks do not list all types. Tanks lack the few T-54/55 (current total is 3000)
Russia lost 550 tanks in the first two months but afterward it loses ~550 tanks every ~6 months. IFV/APC losses are similar although there is a significant drop in 2023 for the period of Ukrainian offensive. Tanks were used very actively as counters but for obvious reasons not personnel carriers. Artillery of all types is lost at a constant rate.
I wish I did the same for Ukrainian losses but Ukrainian army is not an interesting case study so mostly ignore it.
Russia lost: 3000 MBTs, 6000 IFV/APCs, 1000 artillery, 300 MLRS. With two years of use another 3000 tanks and 3000-6000 apcs must be in overhaul in factories and frontline repair units. The Russian offensive that is very plausibly coming any day now - today's incursion is likely a probing/shaping operation - will be mostly infantry and drones judging by the current size of Russian army (150% pre war at minimum).
It will be very interesting to see what they come up with, but I expect a modern rendition of Kaiserschlacht + Stosstruppen. They simply can't have the necessary number of working vehicles. The math refuses to make it so.
This is why they're pushing around Kharkiv. They really need Ukrainian lines to break on their own due to insufficient force density. At current rate Russia loses 500 MBT, 1000 IFV per 6 months. During an offensive any failure to achieve full success may result in 2x losses (3-9/2022) or as high as 3x, even if Ukraine has to withdraw from portion of currently held territory. Kharkiv won't fall because it's a 1,5m city. Russia won't reach Dnipro unless Ukrainian force collapses entirely. Which is not guaranteed since withdrawal shortens supply lines and front length for Ukraine and extends them for Russia.
So for now data suggests a very slow and steady offensive, potentially across the entire front. Similar to Ukrainian failed attempt in 2023, except that Russia doesn't need to break through.
And I just want to mention that if you plot the events of WW1 on a timescale it looks eerily similar to this war - includig the duration of all the stages. In 2022 we had Schlieffen Plan (SMO), 1st Marne (Kiyv) Race to the Sea (Karkiv) and 1st Ypres (Kherson). In 2023 we had Artois/Aubers Ridge (Bakhmut) and failed attempts on each side, a Shell Crisis and development of aviation (drones). So in 2024 we're at 1916 which is... Verdun and Somme.
This pattern must be obvious to someone on either side so I wonder if they conclude that this time history won't repeat itself... which almost inevitably leads to history repeating itself.
Ukrainian KUB air defense system gets hit by Lancet.
Ukrainian field ammunition depot gets hit by artillery from the 238th, Krasnogorovka area.
M777, M109 and D20 howitzers gets taken out by Lancets.
This time the kamekaze drone is a ground one, sent to Ukrainian position.
D-20 howitzer at Pokaliane near the border gets hit by Lancet.
Russians have entered the southern part of Staromayorsky.
Ukrainian ammo depots and deployment points in Volchansk getting hit by artillery.
Frankenstein Buk (Buk with AIM-7 missiles) spotted entering a vehicular hanger. The entire hanger and likely its contents gets destroyed with a subsequent strike.
Kharkhiv region. A Ukrainian Bogdan 155mm wheeled SPG gets hit by a Lancet. The equipment burned after the hit.
Leopard 2A4 gets Krasnopoled.
Polish Krab SPG gets Krasnopoled.
Another Frankenstein Buk. First it got Krasnopoled, then the Lancet came late and hit what's left of it anyway. Kharkhiv region.
There appears to be other vehicles burning that were hidden in the forest and burning after the alleged Patriot strike and the appearance of firefighting and evacuation vehicles. There appears to be follow up strikes.
Assault on Staromayorsky. One vehicle appears down under heavy fire but the turtle tank keeps advancing and firing.
Ukrainian Gvozdika gets hit by a Lancet in the Seversk direction.
LMUR used against a Ukrainian tank could be T-64BV or T-72EA. Still shots to indicate the missile. The LMUR is not typically used for antitank although it has that capability but this indicates a change.
ATACMS strike in Lugansk near an agricultural area.
Humvee gets hit by ATGM at night.
Lancet hit on an M198 and other howitzers.
Oil depot in the LPR hit by Ukrainian strike.
Zhmil-17 drones work with thermal imagers and appears highly EW resistant. Despite the EW activity, this drone still manages to find it's target, a Bukhanka ferrying Ukrainian troops. This in Krynki so it appears the Ukrainians are landing equipment.
Looks like a burning Ukrainian supply truck was struck and ammo contents within detonated. Rabotino area.
Crossing on the Seversky Donetsk Donbass canal, an observation post and a tank destroyed by Smelchak guided 240mm mortar shells.
Ukrainian field ammunition depot gets hit by artillery from the 238th, Krasnogorovka area.
M777, M109 and D20 howitzers gets taken out by Lancets.
This time the kamekaze drone is a ground one, sent to Ukrainian position.
D-20 howitzer at Pokaliane near the border gets hit by Lancet.
Russians have entered the southern part of Staromayorsky.
Ukrainian ammo depots and deployment points in Volchansk getting hit by artillery.
Frankenstein Buk (Buk with AIM-7 missiles) spotted entering a vehicular hanger. The entire hanger and likely its contents gets destroyed with a subsequent strike.
Kharkhiv region. A Ukrainian Bogdan 155mm wheeled SPG gets hit by a Lancet. The equipment burned after the hit.
Leopard 2A4 gets Krasnopoled.
Polish Krab SPG gets Krasnopoled.
Another Frankenstein Buk. First it got Krasnopoled, then the Lancet came late and hit what's left of it anyway. Kharkhiv region.
There appears to be other vehicles burning that were hidden in the forest and burning after the alleged Patriot strike and the appearance of firefighting and evacuation vehicles. There appears to be follow up strikes.
Assault on Staromayorsky. One vehicle appears down under heavy fire but the turtle tank keeps advancing and firing.
Ukrainian Gvozdika gets hit by a Lancet in the Seversk direction.
LMUR used against a Ukrainian tank could be T-64BV or T-72EA. Still shots to indicate the missile. The LMUR is not typically used for antitank although it has that capability but this indicates a change.
ATACMS strike in Lugansk near an agricultural area.
Humvee gets hit by ATGM at night.
Lancet hit on an M198 and other howitzers.
Oil depot in the LPR hit by Ukrainian strike.
Zhmil-17 drones work with thermal imagers and appears highly EW resistant. Despite the EW activity, this drone still manages to find it's target, a Bukhanka ferrying Ukrainian troops. This in Krynki so it appears the Ukrainians are landing equipment.
Looks like a burning Ukrainian supply truck was struck and ammo contents within detonated. Rabotino area.
Crossing on the Seversky Donetsk Donbass canal, an observation post and a tank destroyed by Smelchak guided 240mm mortar shells.
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You base your assumption on bogus numbers from Oryx. You are totally discarding counting or estimating how many tanks the Russians either produced or refurbished.
Garbage in, garbage out.
Aleppo was was a 2m city. So what?
Except those Ukrainian supplies have to cross over the Dnipro. And the Russian supplies do not.
FriedRiceNSpice
Captain
Has got to be fake.
1 - Your “oryx numbers” are the less objetive numbers you can find in internet. Uncountable times has been proved that oryx count one destruction several times.
Also is pretty obvious that ORYX is basically created and supported by people from countries that are in a semi state of war (or at least hate) with Russia.
Non the most objetive people I would say.
If Oryx would be managed and operated by people of Saudi Arabia and Argentina maybe it’s numbers could be taken more seriously.
Like it is now is blantant propaganda.
2 - You don’t seem to understand the strategic reasons of the German defeat in WWI. Germany German resources and industrial power pale against natural resources of the British empire and manufacturing power of the colossus that was the U.S. at that time.
Russia has access to unlimited natural resources and has a clear advantage there against the West(Ukraine) and it has friendly access to the current industrial leviathan that is China.
3 - If you wait for any kind of Russian collapse I fear that you are going to suffer a bitter wake up. It’s a level of idealism that truly shocks me.
Historically all states mobilise all resources they have available to fight wars consider existencial.
Russian political elite clearly see this as existencial and Russian folks seems to agree.
I don’t think they need it based in what we see in the battlefield, but don’t doubt that if needed they can get into the same debt that Ukraine have (they have a lot of margin since Russia debt is around 17% GDO), they could buy weapons directly from China if needed, ask credit from China…
The possibilities of a Russian collapse are simply 0, and NATO hardliners would do better accepting such reality and planning according to it instead of fooling themselves with the same triumphalist absurd narratives we have seen these 2 years
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