The War in the Ukraine

plawolf said:

NATO support and money was and is fundamental in allowing Ukraine to resist thus far, so Russian strategy is to erode and erase that support. Without it, it’s troops will be able to March into any and every Ukrainian city with minimal resistance and the SMO becomes a policing and counter insurgency exercise.

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No kidding. The West is spending more money in Ukraine than Russia spends in terms of military budget. It is not just spending for the military as well. Since the whole Ukrainian economy is basically on life support. The West is paying pensions and government salaries. And if you look at it, most of the places which Russia captured don't have that much population to begin with. The West need to feed the majority of the Ukrainian population which did not leave basically.

Initially NATO were sending mostly surplus equipment. But increasingly they are sending expensive systems they have no replacement for as well. Patriot or NASAMS for example. Leopard 2s which could have been upgraded. These systems are also in some cases the latest version they have. Like Patriot PAC-3. There is a high risk that the Russians will capture these missiles. And substantially degrade Western anti-air missiles for years to come as counter measures are developed. Russia already has examples of basically any anti-tank missile the West owns in high numbers.

The more high end systems they send to Ukraine the more systems Russia will have access to in order to develop counter-measures or make analogues. Just like in the Spanish Civil War when the Germans initially sent biplanes and parasol winged aircraft, which got destroyed by Soviet I-16 low wing aircraft with retractable undercarriage, which led to a faster introduction into service of the German Bf-109. Which was the backbone of their air force during WW2.

This conflict already led Russia to speed up development of glide bombs and long range artillery. While those projects had been stagnant for over a decade as the government refused to spend significant amounts of money on them. Investment into drones was also massively ramped up.

Probably should see how Mariupol was taken.

Something happened in Selidovo, rumours are circulating on pro-Russian side that AFU troops were concentrating there in preparation for counterattack in Avdiivka and was hit big time with airstrike.

Massive precision strikes on Selidovo, where Ukrainian reinforcements to Avdiivka are being accumulated.


An AFU Mi-8 helicopter was taken down by ATGM in the Rabotino area.


Probable AFU UAV control point inside this building, hit by Kh-38ML missile. The observation post used by the AFU was also destroyed.


AFU ATGM installation hit by FPV drone from the Beaver detachment. In the frame is a previously knocked out Bradley and other equipment.


This Ukrainian landing boat isn't lucky when an arty shell explodes right next to it, leaving it burning and aimlessly drifting.


Ukrainian SPG lased by an Orlan-30 and knocked out by Krasnopol. This might be a Krab in the Kupyansk area.


Dramatic rescue. Ukrainian evacuate the retreating and the wounded with a Mitsubishi L200 pickup. A Russian FPV drone lands nearby but the pickup escapes on the skin of it's teeth.


Captured CV-90 of the AFU in the Berkovka area.


BMP-3 loaded with antidrone protection.


Ukrainian logistics train carrying vehicles destroyed by Iskander strike. Aftermath.


Avdiivka being hit with FABs.

Temstar said:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1757365187995218014

Something happened in Selidovo, rumours are circulating on pro-Russian side that AFU troops were concentrating there in preparation for counterattack in Avdiivka and was hit big time with airstrike.

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Any troop concentrations from both sides are getting targetted and destroyed. How can you manage a quick offensive without concentration of troops and firepower.

Atomicfrog said:

Any troop concentrations from both sides are getting targetted and destroyed. How can you manage a quick offensive without concentration of troops and firepower.

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You can’t. The offensive maneuver phase was in the opening 24 hours of the war when the Ukrainian military was caught off guard by overwhelming precision strikes and mechanized columns surging on all sides, freezing their second echelons of strategic reserves and allowing breakthroughs all over the front lines.

Because major cities such as Kharkov, Kiev, Sumy, Chernihiv and Mykolaiv solidified themselves as strongpoints to prepare a counterattack - which was their intended purpose in an invasion scenario going back to Soviet doctrine - and because the Zelensky regime refused to negotiate relatively lenient terms, it was inevitable that the war would turn into a long and grinding affair with no knockout blows possible without Russia committing genocide on the scale we see Israel waging in Gaza, and therefore losing their diplomatic and political support from the global community.

What western commentators refuse to accept is that Russian leadership did not gamble on a decisive maneuver phase deciding the outcome of the war but was prepared for both scenarios; a war of annihilation and a war of attrition. Their economy, military, and diplomatic ties were all prepared well in advance to withstand a long limited war waged economically.

Russian offensive operations following the defeat of the Ukrainian summer offensive are tactical battles across the whole front meant to keep continuous pressure on the front line and not allow any operational pause from the Ukrainian army. They are forced to keep feeding reserves forward where they can be defeated by superior firepower. Cauldrons are formed and then held for the exact same reason; force the Ukrainians to maneuver reserves forward where fire defeats can be inflicted relatively cheaply on battlefields devoid of civilians.

Russian have managed to cut the Coke plant from the main city. So now the ukrainians are left with dirt road under fire control+drones surveliance. Reminds me of Sun Tzu suggesting to leave an exit for the enemy when surrounding them.

Stealthflanker said:

Probably should see how Mariupol was taken.

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can you elaborate more on what you mean?

Syrsky's much younger days, on parade in Moscow in the Red Square.


Shots from the village of Tsukurino, south of Selidovo. Aftermath of a combined cluster munitions and conventional strikes in one particular area most likely by Iskanders. Part of a broader scale attack on Selidovo which sent cluster munitions against a force of 1500 people. Also struck was Konstantinovka and Kurakhovo. Attack was double tap, meaning as Ukrainian reinforcements arrive to sift the debris for survivors, the same place gets hit again, potentially doubling the casualties.


"Destroyed:

- 2 BMP;
- 4 trucks with ammunition and equipment;
- 2 minibuses and 4 pickups with personnel;
- warehouse of military-technical equipment;
- up to 30 people of the enemy's living force."


Ukrainian SPG gets taken out by Lancet. Towed and self propelled artillery are not easily replaced and getting decimated by a combination of Lancet and Krasnopol strikes.


More UMPK arrives at Ukrainian positions in Avdiivka.


Successful Russian tank recovery operation despite being under fire.


Varvarovka, Kharkhiv region. AFU hangers containing equipment gets treated with FABs with UMPK.


Exhausted Ukraine struggles to find men for the front line, writes the BBC.


Ukrainian MT-12 Rapira gets destroyed by a Lancet. Rapira is a direct fire antitank gun, the kind thats popular in WW2. But it's use has been popular for both sides, simple, reliable and most importantly accurate.


Lancet hit takes out a Ukrainian T-72 tank in Tyaginka, Kherson.


Lvovo, Kherson. Ukrainian howitzer gets taken out by Lancet.


Ukrainian BRDM-2 gets taken out by Lancet in the Yuzhno Donetsk direction.


Destroyed French VAB APC in the Kherson area.


Captured British NLAW.


Right bank of Dniepr. Mortar hits an abandoned building used by AFU troops and drone operators.


This guy has shot down his 17th Baba Yaga in Artemovsk.


FABs hitting rotation and evacuation areas of the AFU in Avdiivka. Hitting Ukrainian reinforcements.


Call sign "Abrek"' was part of PMC Wagner until contract termination. Now he is commander of the special forces battalion 'Arbat' part of the international brigade Pyatnashka, which led crucial assaults in the south of Avdiivka. Pyatnashka consists of foreign volunteers. Here Abrek explains the difference between the fighting between Avdiivka and Bakhmut, a point made in the constant evolution of the war.


Ukrainian tank taken out by Lancet from the 98th VDV. Bakhmut direction.


Also in the Bakhmut direction, APC carrying AFU troops gets hit head on by FPV drone.

Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024, Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, 13 February 2024​

Main takeaways from section "Russian Military Capacity" describing "Russian Group of Forces" in Ukraine.

Ammunition supply:

• Russian MoD estimated that significant territorial gains in 2025 will require manufacture of 4 million 152mm and 1,6 million 122mm shells in 2024.
• Russian industry reported to MoD a planned increase of 152mm round production from 1 million in 2023 to 1,3 million in 2024 and production of 800 thousand 122mm rounds in 2024.
• Russian MoD estimates that a significant increase in production of artillery shells will require new factories and additional raw material production with lead time of beyond five years.
• Russia must draw on existing stocks of increasingly poor quality ammunition to close the 3 million gap.
• Russia has signed contracts with Belarus, Iran, North Korea and Syria for production of artillery shells. Syria is only capable of producing casings.
• North Korea delivered 2 million 122mm rounds in 2023.
• Significant shortage of 152mm shells.

Troop numbers:

• January 2023 - 360 000
• June 2023 - 410 000
• January 2024 - 470 000

Equipment levels:

• 1000 self-propelled artillery
• 3780 towed artillery
• 1130 rocket artillery
• 2060 tanks
• 7080 other AFVs (MT-LB, BMP, BTR)
• 110 attack helicopters
• 180 other helicopters
• 310 combat aircraft

note: reliability of above numbers is not confirmed

Russian industry is delivering approx. 1500 tanks annually of which approx. 80% are refurbished and modernised tanks from war stocks, and approx. 3000 AFVs of other types (likely at similar proportion of new and refurbished).

~2000 tanks and ~7000 AFVs is respectively 60% and 50% of 2021 active stock.

From:


This is table of equipment stocks according to The Military Balance for 2016 and 2021, Polish publicist Jaroslaw Wolski (YT) for 2016, and Institute Action Resilience for 2021, as well as combat losses and remaining equipment (TMB 2021 minus losses) by Oryx and estimates of reserves and withdrawals in 2023 by Covert Cabal (YT).




note: towed artillery has errors in sums of losses.

Self-propelled artillery
~1000 currently, ~2500 in 2021, ~650 combat losses, ~1500 withdrawals from stocks: ~2400 self-propelled pieces lost to wear.

Towed artillery
~3780 currently, ~780 in 2021, ~300 combat losses, ~5500 withdrawals from stocks: ~2200 towed pieces lost to wear.

Some of it could be attributed to additional losses not confirmed photographically.

Alternative explanation may however be that differences in ammunition availability of 152mm and 122mm forced swap in equipment. There is no reason for keeping 152mm systems at the front if the units are not going to receive 152mm ammunition.

Assuming RUSI estimates are correct, and with total of ~790 2S19/2S33 and ~900 2S5 remaining in line and storage 2S3 are unlikely to be used as they use D-20 with standard range of just 17km, worse rate of fire and barrel quality than either 2S19 or 2S5. Standard range is 30km for 2S5, 25km for 2S19 but 2S5 is less mobile and has no protected cabin so it's difficult to guess what proportion is used.

Russia has sufficient 2S1 stocks to replace most 2S3 but it only solves the issue of ammunition, not of range. Standard range of D-30/2S1 is 15km and 2S1 is a poor self-propelled artillery piece. It may be therefore possible that 2S1 are not used, at least extensively, in favour of cheaper D-30s which can be used in pre-positioned firing spots while longer-ranged 152mm systems perform counter-battery fire. This is however my own speculation.

All in all while Ukraine seems to have an unresolved serious manpower crisis, Russia's equipment situation is looking abysmal, especially considering that by end of 2024, even with a hypothetical collapse of the Ukrainian front due to Russian offensive, the wear will be tremendous.

Russia has effectively lost an entire "echelon" (per doctrine: ~3000) of tanks i.e. which would take a decade to replenish, and is now using a mix of "first echelon" and "second echelon" and reactivated long-term reserves or "third echelon" as its primary force. Any remaining reserves require complete refurbishment before being put to service. Interestingly many of those are tanks were moved to reserve during T-72B3/B3M modernisation program which technically replaced older tanks in active units with tanks from reserve stocks that were upgraded to B3/B3M standard. The replaced tanks would receive basic overhaul and would be placed in reserve. Now they are being returned to service. Russia is dramatically shortening the lives of all heavy equipment by sheer mismanagement.

Before the war Russia's stocks of war materiel were the main cause of apprehension in NATO. It allowed for scaling or sustainment of intensive operations despite losses. By end of 2024 Russia will have lost ~3000 tanks to combat losses and after three years of fighting and 1-2 overhauls another 3000 will be good only for scrapping. That's close to 6000 tanks, many of better quality, written off along with 4500 AFVs (+ more for wear), hundreds of engineering and auxiliary vehicles etc. This will effectively prevent Russia from launching any offensive operation on large scale in a decade at minimum but only if wartime production is maintained

And that may be what others need to enact their own ambitious plans:


Watch out for Zanzegur. It is likely to happen 2024 or 2025 at the latest unless there is miraculous collapse of Ukrainian state this year.
The consequences are likely as described.