It is not necessarily the case that the Russian command 'desires' a counteroffensive. That is not the defensive-attrition based Svechin approach (Gerasimov advocates) which puts economic & political house before military.
The main mystery to me is 'when will the reserves be ready and when they will they be deployed'? Both sides consider approx. half of the ground forces Russia has against Ukraine. At this rate it is looking like the Rus/Ukr are periodically making noise about Russian offensives that don't happen since fall 2022.
To create a new & larger second invasion army like Feb 2022 against Ukraine may take an extremely long time, far longer than anybody has anticipated. It would require Russian military production and training to proceed much faster than losses at the front to create a ready reserve with reformed & modernized combat doctrine that integrates all the experiences of Ukraine 2022-2023.
The main mystery to me is 'when will the reserves be ready and when they will they be deployed'? Both sides consider approx. half of the ground forces Russia has against Ukraine. At this rate it is looking like the Rus/Ukr are periodically making noise about Russian offensives that don't happen since fall 2022.
To create a new & larger second invasion army like Feb 2022 against Ukraine may take an extremely long time, far longer than anybody has anticipated. It would require Russian military production and training to proceed much faster than losses at the front to create a ready reserve with reformed & modernized combat doctrine that integrates all the experiences of Ukraine 2022-2023.