The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
S300 less in number and far from the frontlines... number of kits available is probably the other part of it.
We have seen weapon coming and going too. We didn't see a Izdeliye 305 footage for quite a while. Stockpile declined or lancet replaced them for a lot of targets.
initially set up cost for injection molding is probably prohibitive for something like this, since you'll need to create a mold for the actual shell, whereas you can stand up a large amount of 3D printers relatively hassle free. if they want to go further in the fast and cheap sense I suppose they can start using plastic drink bottles and soda cans.
This is the top rated comment for that video, I believe it describes the speaker's background:
罗援，男，1950年出生，四川省广元市苍溪县人，少将军衔。毕业于中国人民解放军国际关系学院、中国人民解放军石家庄高级陆军指挥学院、中国人民解放军国防大学。曾任军事科学院世界军事研究部副部长、博士生导师。【11】【12】【14】现任中国军事科学学会常务理事兼副秘书长，中国战略文化促进会常务副会长兼秘书长。
Last edited:
One factor is just that they only managed to perfect their JDAMski kits only recently. The first strikes of the bombs at Avdiivka and Sumy seemed to me they have an experimental but test it in battle quality to it. The second factor is the deterioration of Ukrainian air defenses throughout the front lines as these are either attrited away by missile or drone, especially Lancet strikes, or forced to be relocated inwards to defend against Kaliber and Geran strikes.
The third factor is General Surovikin. While he did and is still leading ground forces in battle, Surovikin is also the head of the Russian Air Force. While in Syria, Surovikin led the VKS to do high altitude bombing against ISIS and Syrian rebels, which proved to be decisive in crushing them. These includes attacks against command posts, troop concentrations and deployments, infrastructure, supply, fuel and ammo depots. These attacks which no doubt brought their share of collateral casualties and damage to society and population, earned him the nickname 'General Armageddon'. He has brought the same MO to Ukraine.
Long wingspan Lancet strikes against radars and AA systems done their part. These particular variant did not appear until late summer or fall of last year and allowed the Russians to strike deeper behind the front lines. Russians have yet to formally disclose this Lancet variant to this day.
The formulation of strategic objectives should be in line with the current strength of the army, and it is clear that Kiev is not a viable target for Moscow. A more feasible plan for the Russians would be to annihilate the heavy Ukrainian group in the Donbas to force Kiev to surrender.
Taking a step back, the Russian army's indecision in Kiev is also a reflection of its lack of clear strategic objectives: there was no proper assessment of the operational capabilities of the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade defending Kiev; Naval troops and tanks actually arrived at the Andenov airfield the same day as VDV occupied the airfield , but they did not attack for three days, and the chance was lost; If Russia decides to attack Kiev then they had to destroy the Ukrainian artillery batteries located in the Kiev substation, and even I knew that there were 2S7 operating in the city of Kiev, but the Russians spent three days for doing NOTHING. NOTHING ！
A series of hesitations is a concrete manifestation of the lack of clear strategic objectives, do not look at what the Russians say, but what they do in concrete terms.
You are assuming they meant to go into the city in the first place. They sent too few troops and too little equipment to go into a city that size to begin with. The token force they sent would have only been enough if they had help from the inside, which they clearly did not.
What is way more likely is that they did the movement so that Ukraine would not send troops from Kiev to reinforce the other areas.
It is typical Russian tactic, at least since WW2, attack on a wide front and push where the enemy line is weakest, pulling back when they encounter resistance.
What is way more likely is that they did the movement so that Ukraine would not send troops from Kiev to reinforce the other areas.
It is typical Russian tactic, at least since WW2, attack on a wide front and push where the enemy line is weakest, pulling back when they encounter resistance.
I don’t think you can attribute any military reasoning to what Russia did in the beginning. It reeked of an intelligence operation rather than a military operation. If they were going to fight a war, they wouldn’t have sent in half empty BMDs to Kiev. The original plan had to have been regime change. They contacted Ukrainian city leaders and military officers to allow the passage of troops. They could’ve succeeded at Gostomel if one of these collaborators hadn’t turned against them in the end (). Another interesting thing is that Reznikov claims the Ukrainian command post was meant to be at Gostomel (coincide?). He’s not a very reliable source though, so make of that what you will ().
Ukrainian counterattack with APCs as seen in Wagner POV in the Road of Life or Road of Death depending your point of view, technically highway 0506 between Chasov Yar and Bakhmut. Wagner appears to be in control of the road after a surge. There are still other roads in and out to Bakhmut only a lot muddier given the rains have come again.
Destroyed Ukrainian vehicles along the Road of Death to Khromovo.
Burning Ukrainian tank along the Road of Death.
Lancet takes out yet another M777.
There are rumors of revolts and protests among Ukrainian units in Chasiv Yar and Konstantinovka, and ones that are also echoed by Prigozhyn. My instincts are to take it with a pinch of salt and never to underestimate the Ukrainian fighting spirit, though they maybe questioning the wisdom of their leaders to send them on the Road of Death.
Destroyed Ukrainian vehicles along the Road of Death to Khromovo.
Burning Ukrainian tank along the Road of Death.
Lancet takes out yet another M777.
There are rumors of revolts and protests among Ukrainian units in Chasiv Yar and Konstantinovka, and ones that are also echoed by Prigozhyn. My instincts are to take it with a pinch of salt and never to underestimate the Ukrainian fighting spirit, though they maybe questioning the wisdom of their leaders to send them on the Road of Death.
Last edited: