The biggest mistake made by Russia is not invested in modern command, control and communication systems. I think someone here said the OODA loop for Russian forces is 6+ hours which is total unacceptable for a modern army.
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The War in the Ukraine
- Thread starter SampanViking
- Start date
Tons of videos of Russian drones spotting an enemy, and Russian artillery spammed within minutes, even within a minute, or killer drone sent, says otherwise.
In other news,
Russian artillery here is hitting what appears to be a Ukrainian supply convoy at Dzerzhinsky.
Russia's new Marker robot. This may already have seen action in Kremennaya.
Krab SPG taken out by Lancet.
Grad taken out by Lancet-3.
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These videos are a collage of different short videos put together.
Russian artillery hit a Ukrainian armored column and some strongholds while FAB glided bomb hit a stronghold in Avdiivka.
Russia brings out it's old stocks of MT-12 Rapiras. To be fair Ukraine has already brought out their own stocks of Rapiras and has been using them to some effect already, with Russia MoD claiming to destroy some numbers. Perhaps the effectiveness of this old weapon in Ukrainian use help convince the Russians to bring out theirs.
Ukrainian vehicular convoy fell under fire at night by Russian ATGMs in Makeevka. An ATGM hit the leading vehicle and the collateral damage destroyed the second vehicle nearby.
Russian artillery hit a Ukrainian armored column and some strongholds while FAB glided bomb hit a stronghold in Avdiivka.
Russia brings out it's old stocks of MT-12 Rapiras. To be fair Ukraine has already brought out their own stocks of Rapiras and has been using them to some effect already, with Russia MoD claiming to destroy some numbers. Perhaps the effectiveness of this old weapon in Ukrainian use help convince the Russians to bring out theirs.
Ukrainian vehicular convoy fell under fire at night by Russian ATGMs in Makeevka. An ATGM hit the leading vehicle and the collateral damage destroyed the second vehicle nearby.
The modern integrated comms systems do exist. They are just not spread out to 100% of troops and equipment. There is way too many non-upgraded or modern comms equipment in use. The comms upgrades started like a decade ago, but were done at a snail's pace.
Pretty sure Wagner has some sort of upgraded equipment. In order to do what they do, working in small DRGs, spotting a fortification, then call their own artillery or Russian Airborne or DPR artillery regiment to shell them, requires a closed fast loop. Not just Wagner that does this, as other Russian units often do so, like Airborne, Marines, and special artillery and drone regiments.
Also to communicate with low flying drones, where radio line of sight is obscured by buildings, hills, trees and the general horizon, you are going to need a special drone that acts like an intermediate relay between the controller and the observing drone or kamekaze drone. If the loitering ammunition or kamekaze drone has a live optical feed like the Lancets, this communication is fast, high bandwidth and digital. A relay drone would have to be either a large quadcopter or a winged drone with a long wingspan. You would need a fast loop to ID targets and approve the attack, quickly send the killer drone over, before the target shoots and scoots as often SPGs do. The fact that Lancets often catch SPGs still shooting, sometimes scooting, shows a loop that's quick and works in real time.
Such kind of communication wasn't apparent early in the war but a few months into it, the Russian forces evolved with the situation. For example Lancets began use around July and August of 2022 but widespread use only around October. I think it's not just improving software and introducing new variants, but the communication infrastructure to the loitering drones, using ground stations and relay drones.
Both Russian and Ukrainian armies are not the same armies they started out a year ago.
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With so many leopard 1 tanks and 1 million rounds of Artillery Ammo, I think this will be difficult for Russia. Ukraine possibly take a lot of ground this spring. They have 200K extra fresh troops ready. It will be difficult for Russia with such a low number of forces they have at 300K for the whole war. In the front Ukraine will attack, Russia probably has less than 50K.
Why is Russia not mobilizing more troops when the situation is so bad for them? They have made no progress in the past few months, They lost more than half their captured territories.
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This news here for example has a video with the Russian Aerospace forces Andromeda-D command and control system.
A command post can be deployed in 6 hours.
The Russians also have the Strelets system as part of Ratnik. This is basically a tablet which integrates sensor information and can coordinate fires on targets.
A command post can be deployed in 6 hours.
The Russians also have the Strelets system as part of Ratnik. This is basically a tablet which integrates sensor information and can coordinate fires on targets.
Soldiers came across a Chinese armored plate in Bakhmut - it withstood a machine-gun bullet
Soldiers of the Ivanovo airborne unit continue to destroy fortifications, equipment and manpower
Video from the front. Russian soldiers storm the fortified area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces
The only S-300s came from Slovakia - a single battery with limited ammunition. No Buks were delivered. Poland provided Osa launchers and missiles, later Newa and Kub. Other ex-WP countries delivered missiles from their stocks. Only in October/November did any meaningful help began with the delivery of NASAMS, IRIS-T etc but it also took time.
The failure to suppress Ukrainian air defenses lies solely with VKS because Ground Forces use of drones and artillery gives better results.
Russia is incapable of identifying transports from NATO countries and eliminating them when they enter Ukraine. It's an obvious and blatant shortcoming of military capabilities and military capabilities alone. Successful interdiction of those transports would severely limit the ability of NATO to provide aid at minimal cost to Russia in military terms. It is therefore a highly desirable solution in political terms but Russia is simply incapable of it.
Russia invaded with its entire Ground Force, VDV and Naval Infantry. It attacked Kiyv with the express purpose of instituting regime change as stated by Putin in his address. The formations were understaffed because conscripts couldn't be used legally but even so mobilization would give Ukraine time and excuse to mobilize which it did after invasion began.
Invasion starts 24 Feb (T+0). Negotiations on 28 Feb (T+5), 3 Mar (T+8), 7 Mar (T+13), 10 Mar (T+16), 14 Mar (T+19). Russia only beings negotiations only its operational plan fails spectacularly. There was never an intention to negotiate until they were forced to by failure.
Russia's inefficient command structure is public knowledge in Russia. There were propositions to reform it and introduce a more modern joint command structure but they were resisted by the cadres.
The internal rivalry in Russian armed forces is intense because position in hierarchy provides much greater benefit than any position outside of it because those are taken up by secret services. For US generals military career is a jumping-off point to business career during retirement. For Russian generals military is all there is. This is why Russian command structure is irrationally inefficient in military terms - it is rationally efficient in political terms.
Russian intervention protected Russian interests in Syria first, provided air support for SAR forces and a allies (Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed militias) second.
The forces that contributes most to the survival of SAR were - ironically - the western intervention forces and Kurds. The Peshmerga bore the brunt of fighting in the pivotal and most important battle over Mosul a (2m+ metro) and ISIL's main support centre. Without that nothing else would play out in the remaining territory of Syria as it did.
Proof:
- US and allies begin direct military intervention in Syria on 22 Sept 2014
- Russia begins intervention in Syria on 30 Sept 2015
- Turkey invades Syrian territory (Euphrates shield) on 24 Aug 2016
- Battle of Mosul ends on 20 Jul 2017 but the city is cut off in in November of 2016.
Control on 1-4:
SAA only expands territorial control when ISIL collapses around Raqqa subsequent to loss of Mosul governorate. Main population centers of Syria never fell to ISIL. Mosul was the key and battle of Mosul was the largest urban battle since WW2.
The mistaken impression that Russian intervention turned the tide of war arose because regular people attribute the outcome of the war to what they saw online. Russia used information warfare very well in western social media while western support to SDF or Peshmerga was deliberately under-reported.
Wisely they removed the one asset that gave Russia clear and uncontested advantage over Ukraine and left it to the asset that Ukraine can most easily balance and counter???
The real reason is that Russian air force fell behind in doctrine, technology or training during 1991-2007. When the modernization began in 2007 the primary focus was to maintain production and technological capacity. Russia was buying aircraft at a rate which left nothing for training or munitions procurement.
New Su-35S/Su-30SM/Su-34 only:
- 2013 - 36
- 2014 - 44
- 2015 - 50
- 2016 - 44
- 2017 - 40
- 2018 - 34
- 2019 - 22
Russian military is not "joint" but is subordinate to rigid territorial ground force hierarchy. The air force should be not subordinate to military districts. Such structure effectively cuts its wings off.
However the fault of the air force is undeniable. It was the most rapidly and radically reformed formation after 2007. It should have been reformed with practicality and efficiency in mind and that reform was informed by what the air force said. They simply did not want to reform or more likely didn't even know how to reform.
This estimate is based off procedures and doesn't account for problems with performance or deliberate obstruction and natural inertia. For example Russian air force regularly strikes targets 24hrs late because of purely human and political factors at play in the command structure. It is not a matter of technology because e.g. US forces in Europe during WW2 had shorter reaction time than 6 hrs for support of ground forces. It's purely human and institutional factors which are characteristic o Russian military culture historically.
Case in point of how fundamentally flawed Russian mindset is:
Russia entered a conflict with Ukraine in 2014 and for the next eight years did not prepare for a potential conflict against Ukrainian air defenses because they never assumed it would be necessary. The same problem as lack of unified theater command.
Navy was under-utilised as well. E.g why did Baltic Fleet keep six fast landing craft and two large hovercraft when it can only use them against NATO/EU territory?
Alligator - 5000t, 17kts, 20 MBTs
Ropucha - 4000t, 17kts, 10 MBTs
Dyugon - 280t, 40kts, 3 MBTs
Serna - 100t, 35kts, 1 MBT
Ondatra - 120t, 11kts, 1 MBT
Zubr - 550t, 55kts, 3 MBTs
Black Sea Fleet:
2x Alligator LST
4x Ropucha LST
2x Serna LCM
2x Ondatra LCM
Caspian Flotilla:
1x Dyugon LCM
4x Serna LCM
1x Ondatra LCM
Baltic Fleet:
4x Ropucha LST
3x Dyugon LCM
3x Serna LCM
3x Ondatra LCM
2x Zubr LCAC
Not that those would help much but I did once an outline of an amphibious assault at Zatoka/Dniestr and how it could open Transnistria as a front. But it shows that Russia lacks elementary understanding of how existing military assets can be used to gain advantage. The lack of ability to innovate or reform is a much harder problem so it should come as no surprise that Russia fails here as well.