Ukraine receives intelligence from NATO so nothing that Russia does on an operational or strategic scale is secret unless elaborate deception is employed and Russia has no resources left for any type of large-scale operational deception anymore.
Russia lost over 1500 MBTs, 3000 IFV/APCs, 600 artillery and 150 rocket launchers. Rule of thumb is that for each lost vehicle another should be assumed to be out of service due to damage and wear. This means that if the entire ground force, naval infantry and VDV were deployed then from initial strength it has remaining: ~0% MBTs (!), ~60% IFV/APCs, ~80% artillery. Obviously those numbers are notional only and are reinforced by equipment brought out of storage but it shows why Russia can't perform any significant offensive operation. There's simply not enough equipment available to be sent into combat while the rest is being restored to combat readiness.
Also note the proportion of lost equipment. If the war resembles WW1 it is because that's what's available - infantry and artillery.
Another issue is manpower. Russia wasted needlessly contract personnel in the first phases of invasion because it refused to mobilize first immediately after declaring SMO and second immediately after retreating from the north. It therefore lost its most valuable personnel which is only now (since september) being replaced by reservists who need to be re-trained first. Because the mobilization was ordered only after Ukraine successfully recaptured parts of territory it had to be immediately put to use which lowered its effectiveness. Untrained reservists were thrown into battle with disastrous results. Also because Russia deployed almost its entire ground force to Ukraine approximately half of all the mobilized in the first wave had to be deployed to the units that were moved to Ukraine so that the garrisons are not empty.
Only now the numbers are getting to where sustained offensive operations are possible but their scale is debatable because training takes time and the first wave has been at the front for less than 6 months. Russian conscript model is intended to maintain manpower for defensive purposes. For all other purposes contract service was established but in the ground forces it never reached above 30-40% with majority of contract soldiers being specialists. VDV and Naval Infantry have higher ratio which is why they are being used as shock troops. Mobilization also helps to plug shortages of auxiliary troops which are necessary for sustainment and maneuver. You need approximately three men in the rear for each man fighting - and that's just the deployed force. Russian casualties are estimated to be as high as 200k total including wounded.
All those factors combined are why military analysts pointed to February/March as the earliest time for a potential Russian offensive with spring being more likely. A stable front with minimal offensive action from the enemy allows to recuperate forces but that has only been ~4 months.
All of this above explains why Russia can barely afford to push along the existing frontline. Any large-scale deception requires extra forces to be diverted away from the frontlines and placed in one area (exposed) for deception and another for attack (concealed).
So the only type of deception that Russia has at its disposal is a feint using maneuver. And for that Russian ground forces are woefully ill-suited because it fights with cold war structure, equipment and doctrine. An IBCT or SBCT type of formation could successfully perform such feint but Russia has no such unit. It has motor rifle BTGs.
This is a motor rifle BTG:
Note that the logistical detachment is only intended for frontline support. It distributes supplies inside the BTG. All the materiel that is delivered to the BTG has to be brought by another logistical unit.
This is ~142 vehicles and the absolute minimum number of soldiers is ~400. Now imagine hiding this in the field.
Now imagine moving this formation over 100km from point A to B considering that over long distances a tank can reliably move on the road only at about 40km/h and the standard marching loss is 5-8% meaning that many vehicles will break down during march over 100km. It takes three hours just to move from A to B, additional time is necessary for preparation before and some time for preparation before deployment if someone is willing to risk going to battle directly from march. While on the move formation will form a visible column that can be detected by satellites - and likely more than once considering orbiting time.
Detected formation entering within effective artillery range will be attacked meaning that it can be struck at ~40km from the frontline by GMLRS and then at ~20km by howitzers and Grads. See the failed assault at Vuhledar from 6 Feb. or the failed crossing across Donets in April/May (?) for reference.
Russia began the invasion in such a ridiculous manner because it was the only way to hide from the US and NATO when and where they would attack, what forces would be used, what were the objectives etc. There was no mobilization, fielded units were dispersed along the entire border as BTGs, resources were insufficient for any prolonged campaign even for portion of the force. This was why nobody believed there would be an invasion because all the intelligence indicated that an invasion would fail. And it did.
Another alternative would be helicopter assault but such operation requires trained troops and those are only in VDV which is used as stopgap and assault force along the front. Russia doesn't have three or four VDV brigades available for helicopter assault because it requires at least double that for rotation, reserves etc. The helicopter losses are also high but equipment is not as limiting as lack of trained manpower. 3-4 brigades could perform an operation that could easily break the front in 1-2 places but then what?
Fundamentally your soldiers won't fight unless they have no other option or they know they will win. If you start an offensive operation and it fails and people die, nobody will join another one. That was the problem that Russia encountered following the disaster in February/March. Ukrainians had no other option but Russians had the option of not fighting and this is why Russian army stumbled so badly in April. The army as a collective might be convinced it will win if everyone does their job because of numbers but the soldiers are convinced that they will die and so they don't do their job and the army loses.
Allegedly Russians are massing for another offensive with sigificant forces prepared but so far no details are being given. Perhaps Russians are still in pre-deployment stage. Perhaps the numbers refer to total figures of assets including those at the front. In latter case the offensive won't have the necessary power to do more than to capture Donbas and at a significant cost. If those are additional assets then their quality is debatable.
This was from 2016. "TAK" - yes, "NIE" - no.
Since 2016 the production should match the numbers from TMB in the first table.
Considering losses and replacement, whatever comes extra - especially in thousands - in this upcoming offensive will be even more "cold war" than the current modernized force. There's some probability that these vehicles will be upgraded to an extent but not much.
All in all those are not conditions for any large scale operations with elaborate operational deception. It will by just a brute force push and possibly the one variable is the speculated takeover of Belarus opening the front there (and also likely resistance). Lukashenka has still not shown himself since his plane returned from Moscow. I don't see options for anything else but we'll see.
Monty Python had the sketch about a joke that was so funny that it killed everyone who heard it.
This joke is so unfunny that it kills the will to live in anyone who has the mental faculty to understand it.
The possibility that this is not a joke is too horrifying to consider.
Now if everyone could excuse me. I need to kill myself.
