The Mali situation

Subedei

Banned Idiot
Nigeria: NAF Deploys F7 Supersonic, Alpha Jets to Mali
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

according to this article, it's 2 alpha jets.

NAF Deploys 2 Fighter Jets To Mali
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


Not sure how much CAS experience they have with those

well, according to the article you referenced, "... the Alpha jet fighter aircraft ... fast tracked the surrender of the rebels in both the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars."

seems like they may, indeed, have some cas experience.
 
Last edited:

delft

Brigadier
Pepe Escobar is as always interesting. Here is his description of the Malian situation:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

THE ROVING EYE

Burn, burn - Africa's Afghanistan
By Pepe Escobar

LONDON - One's got to love the sound of a Frenchman's Mirage 2000 fighter jet in the morning. Smells like... a delicious neo-colonial breakfast in Hollandaise sauce. Make it quagmire sauce.

Apparently, it's a no-brainer. Mali holds 15.8 million people - with a per capita gross domestic product of only around US$1,000 a year and average life expectancy of only 51 years - in a territory twice the size of France (per capital GDP $35,000 and upwards). Now almost two-thirds of this territory is occupied by heavily weaponized Islamist outfits. What next? Bomb, baby, bomb.

So welcome to the latest African war; Chad-based French Mirages and Gazelle helicopters, plus a smatter of France-based Rafales bombing evil Islamist jihadis in northern Mali. Business is good; French president Francois Hollande spent this past Tuesday in Abu Dhabi clinching the sale of up to 60 Rafales to that Gulf paragon of democracy, the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The formerly wimpy Hollande - now enjoying his "resolute", "determined", tough guy image reconversion - has cleverly sold all this as incinerating Islamists in the savannah before they take a one-way Bamako-Paris flight to bomb the Eiffel Tower.

French Special Forces have been on the ground in Mali since early 2012.

The Tuareg-led NMLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), via one of its leaders, now says it's "ready to help" the former colonial power, billing itself as more knowledgeable about the culture and the terrain than future intervening forces from the CEDEAO (the acronym in French for the Economic Community of Western African States).

Salafi-jihadis in Mali have got a huge problem: they chose the wrong battlefield. If this was Syria, they would have been showered by now with weapons, logistical bases, a London-based "observatory", hours of YouTube videos and all-out diplomatic support by the usual suspects of US, Britain, Turkey, the Gulf petromonarchies and - oui, monsieur - France itself.

Instead, they were slammed by the UN Security Council - faster than a collection of Marvel heroes - duly authorizing a war against them. Their West African neighbors - part of the ECOWAS regional bloc - were given a deadline (late November) to come up with a war plan. This being Africa, nothing happened - and the Islamists kept advancing until a week ago Paris decided to apply some Hollandaise sauce.

Not even a football stadium filled with the best West African shamans can conjure a bunch of disparate - and impoverished - countries to organize an intervening army in short notice, even if the adventure will be fully paid by the West just like the Uganda-led army fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

To top it all, this is no cakewalk. The Salafi-jihadis are flush, courtesy of booming cocaine smuggling from South America to Europe via Mali, plus human trafficking. According to the UN Office of Drugs Control, 60% of Europe's cocaine transits Mali. At Paris street prices, that is worth over $11 billion.

Turbulence ahead
General Carter Ham, the commander of the Pentagon's AFRICOM, has been warning about a major crisis for months. Talk about a self-fulfilling prophecy. But what's really going on in what the New York Times quaintly describes as those "vast and turbulent stretches of the Sahara"?

It all started with a military coup in March 2012, only one month before Mali would hold a presidential election, ousting then president Amadou Toumani Toure. The coup plotters justified it as a response to the government's incompetence in fighting the Tuareg.

The coup leader was one Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who happened to have been very cozy with the Pentagon; that included his four-month infantry officer basic training course in Fort Benning, Georgia, in 2010. Essentially, Sanogo was also groomed by AFRICOM, under a regional scheme mixing the State Department's Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership program and the Pentagon's Operation Enduring Freedom. It goes without saying that in all this "freedom" business Mali has been the proverbial "steady ally" - as in counterterrorism partner - fighting (at least in thesis) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Over the last few years, Washington's game has elevated flip-flopping to high art. During the second George W Bush administration, Special Forces were very active side by side with the Tuaregs and the Algerians. During the first Obama administration, they started backing the Mali government against the Tuareg.

An unsuspecting public may pore over Rupert Murdoch's papers - for instance, The Times of London - and its so-called defense correspondent will be pontificating at will on Mali without ever talking about blowback from the Libya war.

Muammar Gaddafi always supported the Tuaregs' independence drive; since the 1960s the NMLA agenda has been to liberate Azawad (North Mali) from the central government in Bamako.

After the March 2012 coup, the NMLA seemed to be on top. They planted their own flag on quite a few government buildings, and on April 5 announced the creation of a new, independent Tuareg country. The "international community" spurned them, only for a few months later to have the NMLA for all practical purposes marginalized, even in their own region, by three other - Islamist - groups; Ansar ed-Dine ("Defenders of the Faith"); the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Meet the players

The NMLA is a secular Tuareg movement, created in October 2011. It claims that the liberation of Azawad will allow better integration - and development - for all the peoples in the region. Its hardcore fighters are Tuaregs who were former members of Gaddafi's army. But there are also rebels who had not laid down their arms after the 2007-2008 Tuareg rebellion, and some that defected from the Malian army. Those who came back to Mali after Gaddafi was executed by the NATO rebels in Libya carried plenty of weapons. Yet most heavy weapons actually ended up with the NATO rebels themselves, the Islamists supported by the West.

AQIM is the Northern African branch of al-Qaeda, pledging allegiance to "The Doctor", Ayman al-Zawahiri. Its two crucial characters are Abu Zaid and Mokhtar Belmokhtar, former members of the ultra-hardcore Algerian Islamist outfit Salafist Group for Predication and Combat (SGPC). Belmokhtar was already a jihadi in 1980s Afghanistan.

Abu Zaid poses as a sort of North African "Geronimo", aka Osama bin Laden, with the requisite black flag and a strategically positioned Kalashnikov featuring prominently in his videos. The historical leader, though, is Belmokhtar. The problem is that Belmokhtar, known by French intelligence as "The Uncatchable", has recently joined MUJAO.

MUJAO fighters are all former AQIM. In June 2012, MUJAO expelled the NMLA and took over the city of Gao, when it immediately applied the worst aspects of Sharia law. It's the MUJAO base that has been bombed by the French Rafales this week. One of its spokesmen has duly threatened, "in the name of Allah", to respond by attacking "the heart of France".

Finally, Ansar ed-Dine is an Islamist Tuareg outfit, set up last year and directed by Iyad ag Ghali, a former leader of the NMLA who exiled himself in Libya. He turned to Salafism because of - inevitably - Pakistani proselytizers let loose in Northern Africa, then engaged in valuable face time with plenty of AQIM emirs. It's interesting to note in 2007 Mali President Toure appointed Ghali as consul in Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia. He was then duly expelled in 2010 because he got too close to radical Islamists.

Gimme 'a little more terrorism'

No one in the West is asking why the Pentagon-friendly Sanogo's military coup in the capital ended up with almost two-thirds of Mali in the hands of Islamists who imposed hardcore Sharia law in Azawad - especially in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, a gruesome catalogue of summary executions, amputations, stonings and the destruction of holy shrines in Timbuktu. How come the latest Tuareg rebellion ended up hijacked by a few hundred hardcore Islamists? It's useless to ask the question to US drones.

The official "leading from behind" Obama 2.0 administration rhetoric is, in a sense, futuristic; the French bombing "could rally jihadis" around the world and lead to - what else - attacks on the West. Once again the good ol' Global War on Terror (GWOT) remains the serpent biting its own tail.

There's no way to understand Mali without examining what Algeria has been up to. The Algerian newspaper El Khabar only scratched the surface, noting that "from categorically refusing an intervention - saying to the people in the region it would be dangerous", Algiers went to "open Algerian skies to the French Mirages".

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Algeria last October, trying to organize some semblance of an intervening West African army. Hollande was there in December. Oh yes, this gets juicier by the month.

So let's turn to Professor Jeremy Keenan, from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at London University, and author of The Dark Sahara (Pluto Press, 2009) and the upcoming The Dying Sahara (Pluto Press, 2013).

Writing in the January edition of New African, Keenan stresses, "Libya was the catalyst of the Azawad rebellion, not its underlying cause. Rather, the catastrophe now being played out in Mali is the inevitable outcome of the way in which the 'Global War on Terror' has been inserted into the Sahara-Sahel by the US, in concert with Algerian intelligence operatives, since 2002."

In a nutshell, Bush and the regime in Algiers both needed, as Keenan points out, "a little more terrorism" in the region. Algiers wanted it as the means to get more high-tech weapons. And Bush - or the neo-cons behind him - wanted it to launch the Saharan front of the GWOT, as in the militarization of Africa as the top strategy to control more energy resources, especially oil, thus wining the competition against massive Chinese investment. This is the underlying logic that led to the creation of AFRICOM in 2008.

Algerian intelligence, Washington and the Europeans duly used AQIM, infiltrating its leadership to extract that "little more terrorism". Meanwhile, Algerian intelligence effectively configured the Tuaregs as "terrorists"; the perfect pretext for Bush's Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative, as well as the Pentagon's Operation Flintlock - a trans-Sahara military exercise.

The Tuaregs always scared the hell out of Algerians, who could not even imagine the success of a Tuareg nationalist movement in northern Mali. After all, Algeria always viewed the whole region as its own backyard.

The Tuaregs - the indigenous population of the central Sahara and the Sahel - number up to 3 million. Over 800,000 live in Mali, followed by Niger, with smaller concentrations in Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya. There have been no less than five Tuareg rebellions in Mali since independence in 1960, plus three others in Niger, and a lot of turbulence in Algeria.

Keenan's analysis is absolutely correct in identifying what happened all along 2012 as the Algerians meticulously destroying the credibility and the political drive of the NMLA. Follow the money: both Ansar ed-Dine's Iyad ag Ghaly and MUJAO's Sultan Ould Badi are very cozy with the DRS, the Algerian intelligence agency. Both groups in the beginning had only a few members.

Then came a tsunami of AQIM fighters. That's the only explanation for why the NMLA was, after only a few months, neutralized both politically and militarily in their own backyard.

Round up the usual freedom fighters
Washington's "leading from behind" position is illustrated by this State Department press conference. Essentially, the government in Bamako asked for the French to get down and dirty.

And that's it.

Not really. Anyone who thinks "bomb al-Qaeda" is all there is to Mali must be living in Oz. To start with, using hardcore Islamists to suffocate an indigenous independence movement comes straight from the historic CIA/Pentagon playbook.

Moreover, Mali is crucial to AFRICOM and to the Pentagon's overall MENA (Middle East-Northern Africa) outlook. Months before 9/11 I had the privilege to crisscross Mali on the road - and by the (Niger) river - and hang out, especially in Mopti and Timbuktu, with the awesome Tuaregs, who gave me a crash course in Northwest Africa. I saw Wahhabi and Pakistani preachers all over the place. I saw the Tuaregs progressively squeezed out. I saw an Afghanistan in the making. And it was not very hard to follow the money sipping tea in the Sahara. Mali borders Algeria, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Guinea. The spectacular Inner Niger delta is in central Mali - just south of the Sahara. Mali overflows with gold, uranium, bauxite, iron, manganese, tin and copper. And - Pipelineistan beckons! - there's plenty of unexplored oil in northern Mali.

As early as February 2008, Vice Admiral Robert T Moeller was saying that AFRICOM's mission was to protect "the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market"; yes, he did make the crucial connection to China, pronounced guilty of " challenging US interests".

AFRICOM's spy planes have been "observing" Mali, Mauritania and the Sahara for months, in thesis looking for AQIM fighters; the whole thing is overseen by US Special Forces, part of the classified, code-named Creek Sand operation, based in next-door Burkina Faso. Forget about spotting any Americans; these are - what else - contractors who do not wear military uniforms.

Last month, at Brown University, General Carter Ham, AFRICOM's commander, once more gave a big push to the "mission to advance US security interests across Africa". Now it's all about the - updated - US National Security Strategy in Africa, signed by Obama in June 2012. The (conveniently vague) objectives of this strategy are to "strengthen democratic institutions"; encourage "economic growth, trade and investment"; "advance peace and security"; and "promote opportunity and development."

In practice, it's Western militarization (with Washington "leading from behind") versus the ongoing Chinese seduction/investment drive in Africa. In Mali, the ideal Washington scenario would be a Sudan remix; just like the recent partition of North and South Sudan, which created an extra logistical headache for Beijing, why not a partition of Mali to better exploit its natural wealth? By the way, Mali was known as Western Sudan until independence in 1960.

Already in early December a "multinational" war in Mali was on the Pentagon cards.

The beauty of it is that even with a Western-financed, Pentagon-supported, "multinational" proxy army about to get into the action, it's the French who are pouring the lethal Hollandaise sauce (nothing like an ex-colony "in trouble" to whet the appetite of its former masters). The Pentagon can always keep using its discreet P-3 spy planes and Global Hawk drones based in Europe, and later on transport West African troops and give them aerial cover. But all secret, and very hush hush.

Mr Quagmire has already reared its ugly head in record time, even before the 1,400 (and counting) French boots on the ground went into offense.

A MUJAO commando team (and not AQIM, as it's been reported), led by who else but the "uncatchable" Belmokhtar, hit a gas field in the middle of the Algerian Sahara desert, over 1,000 km south of Algiers but only 100 km from the Libyan border, where they captured a bunch of Western (and some Japanese) hostages; a rescue operation launched on Wednesday by Algerian Special Forces was, to put it mildly, a giant mess, with at least seven foreign hostages and 23 Algerians so far confirmed killed.

The gas field is being exploited by BP, Statoil and Sonatrach. MUJAO has denounced - what else - the new French "crusade" and the fact that French fighter jets now own Algerian airspace.

As blowback goes, this is just the hors d'oeuvres. And it won't be confined to Mali. It will convulse Algeria and soon Niger, the source of over a third of the uranium in French nuclear power plants, and the whole Sahara-Sahel.

So this new, brewing mega-Afghanistan in Africa will be good for French neoloconial interests (even though Hollande insists this is all about "peace"); good for AFRICOM; a boost for those Jihadis Formerly Known as NATO Rebels; and certainly good for the never-ending Global War on Terror (GWOT), duly renamed "kinetic military operations".

Django, unchained, would be totally at home. As for the Oscar for Best Song, it goes to the Bush-Obama continuum: There's no business like terror business. With French subtitles, bien sur.

Pepe Escobar
is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His most recent book is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009). He may be reached at [email protected]

(Copyright 2013 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
 

Subedei

Banned Idiot
best solution might be to renegotiate the border between mali and azawad, promote international recognition of azawad, and help strengthen both against further incursions. the tuareg seem to have more confidence in fighting the islamists than do the malians, so, why not lend them some support?
 

navyreco

Senior Member
This is is more of a political issue, but do our US members agree with the washington post?

Stiffing an ally in Mali
.../...
Under those circumstances, the Obama administration’s foot-dragging in providing support to an ongoing French intervention in Mali is baffling — and disturbing. This week the White House grudgingly agreed to help transport a French mechanized unit and its equipment from France to Mali. But Paris will be required to pay the $20 million cost of the operation, and officials are still sitting on a week-old French request for U.S. help with surveillance and aerial refueling.
The administration’s balking might be more understandable if there had been no previous U.S. involvement in the north African state. But the United States already has spent years and millions of dollars attempting to stem Islamic extremism in Mali — and its failures helped to precipitate the current crisis. Last year counterterrorism forces trained by the United States defected to a rebel movement of ethnic Tuaregs, which then allied itself with al-Qaeda and its local allies. The rebellion was boosted by Tuareg fighters who streamed into Mali after the regime of Moammar Gaddafi, which employed them, was deposed thanks to an intervention by NATO. Meanwhile a U.S.-trained officer led a coup against Mali’s democratic government.
.../...
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
 

bd popeye

The Last Jedi
VIP Professional
This is is more of a political issue, but do our US members agree with the washington post?

Stiffing an ally in Mali

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

The Obama administration seems to drag it's feet on this. However there were legal issues to tackle. A WP article from the 16th describing the legal issues.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


Actually the US will now as of this coming Monday will provide some airlift for the French. I don't think any combat assets will be moved in to the situation. That was a stumbling block for any aid.

Click the link for the whole article.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


American officials had urged the Algerians to go slow, out of concern for the safety of the hostages, but that advice was ignored.

"They didn't let the terrorists dig in," said Richard Clarke, a former White House counterterror advisor and now an ABC News consultant. "They didn't negotiate. They moved quickly."

The attack has led the US and its allies to marshal resources to track down the alleged mastermind, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who operates from a safe haven in the northern part of the country of Mali, a thousand miles away.

French military aircraft were already taking action against Belmokhtar even before the Algerian attack, according to ABC News correspondent Bazi Kanani, who is in Mali's capital, Bamako.

In southern Mali, according to Kanani, "there's limited information coming down from the north where journalists aren't allowed to go, but we do know one of the first targets of the French war planes that arrived one week ago was the headquarters of the leader of the terror group involved in the Algerian hostage crisis. "

U.S. officials say they won't send troops to Mali, but they are sharing intelligence with France, and by Monday, the U.S. Air Force will be helping to fly French troops and equipment here.

U.S. officials say they will work with the French and others to make sure Belmokhtar pays a price.

"Those who would wantonly attack our country and our people will have no place to hide," said Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.
 

Subedei

Banned Idiot
out of respect for the variety of interpretations of islam, and not wanting to offend any adherent of islam that does not identify with them, i've chosen to refer to the 'ideology' of the coalition of forces aligned against the malian gov't as shiariaism, and its adherents as shiariaists.

although supporting frontal assaults against shiarist forces in diabaly and konna was expedient under the circumstances, this strategy has allowed the shiarists forces to withdraw.

now, that the crisis has passed, the french led campaign will settle down into a planning phase. it could take several weeks for the french and ecowas forces to develop tactical baselines and then a strategic plan.

however, i'm not certain that the coalition of shiariaist forces will stay around to see what the french are planning.

they could withdraw farther to the northeast and dig in, but having seen the capabilities of ordinance targeted by a variety of advanced targeting technologies, they may recognize the ultimate futility of that strategy.

unfortunately, the reactionary nature of this operation might have allowed the shariaists to slip into mauritania, algeria, and niger, in order to simply wait out the french led operation.

alternatively, should the international community interpret the recent malian and algerian crises as elements of a systemic crisis, and respond with sufficient resources and cooperation, the tracks these shariaists leave in the saharan sands, will lead that very same technologically advanced targeted ordinance right to them, leaving them no place to hide.
 
Last edited:

delft

Brigadier
WP is probably the best source about the views in Washington and these will be as diverse as in other places in the World. Here's today's article, which btw was written in London:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Algerian stance spoils U.S. strategy for region
By Craig Whitlock, Saturday, January 19, 3:10 AM

LONDON — The hostage crisis in Algeria has upended the Obama administration’s strategy for coordinating an international military campaign against al-Qaeda fighters in North Africa, leaving U.S., European and African leaders even more at odds over how to tackle the problem.

For months, U.S. officials have intensively lobbied Algeria — whose military is by far the strongest in North Africa — to help intervene in next-door Mali, where jihadists and other rebels have established a well-defended base of operations. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and other high-ranking U.S. officials made repeated visits to Algiers in the fall in a bid to persuade the oil-rich country to contribute troops to a U.N.-backed military force in Mali.

But Algeria’s unilateral decision to attack kidnappers at a natural gas plant — while shunning outside help, imposing a virtual information blackout and disregarding international pleas for caution — has dampened hopes that it might cooperate militarily in Mali, U.S. officials said. The crisis has strained ties between Algiers and Washington and increased doubts about whether Algeria can be relied upon to work regionally to dismantle al-Qaeda’s franchise in North Africa.

“The result is that the U.S. will have squandered six to eight months of diplomacy for how it wants to deal with Mali,” said Geoff D. Porter, an independent North African security analyst. “At least it will have been squandered in the sense that the Algerians will likely double down on their recalcitrance to get involved. They’ve already put themselves in a fortress-like state.”

Obama administration officials have said that a multinational military intervention is necessary to stabilize Mali but that such a campaign must be led by African countries and is unlikely to succeed without Algerian involvement. Algeria’s military is the heavyweight of the region, and its intelligence services are the most knowledgeable about the murky Islamist networks that have taken root.

Algeria is also the birthplace of al-Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa, known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM. Most of the group’s leaders and allies are Algerian, including the suspected ringleader of the hostage plot, a one-eyed desert bandit named Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

The group has expanded its activities beyond Algeria to Mali, Mauritania and Niger. But Algeria has been reluctant to fight AQIM outside its borders. The reasons are complex, but Algerian leaders say they are under little obligation to help other countries facing the problem — such as Mali — given that no one came to their aid in the 1990s when they fought their own grueling civil war against insurgents.

U.S. officials offer mixed reviews of Washington’s overall ties with Algiers on counter-terrorism. One senior U.S. diplomat, speaking on the condition of anonymity to talk freely about the relationship, called it “solid, not spectacular. It’s not carte blanche by any stretch of the imagination.”

As the extremist threat has become more acute in recent years, the U.S. military has repeatedly pressed Algeria for overflight permission so its long-range reconnaissance planes can reach northern Mali from U.S. bases in Europe.

Algiers has agreed at times, but it only approves flights on a case-by-case basis and often requires extensive advance notice, U.S. officials said. It withheld blanket permission unless Washington promises to share intelligence from the flights, including what they observe while over Algerian territory. U.S. officials said they are legally barred from doing so because of concerns that Algeria might misuse the intelligence to target people who are political opponents, not terrorists.

The Algerian military and security services have a history of brutality and extrajudicial killings. During the civil war in the 1990s, one faction of Algerian generals earned the nickname “the eradicators” for their insistence on eliminating enemies instead of negotiating.

“It’s closer to a police state than anything, and cooperation is on again, off again,” said Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. “They are fairly tight about it.”

At the same time, the United States has become dependent on Algerian intelligence to sort out a blurry constellation of jihadi groups, desert bandits, ethnic rebels and other groups. While some profess allegiance to al-Qaeda, most are focused on local grievances or criminal rackets.

“As is obvious to you, we are not from this region,” Army Gen. Carter F. Ham, the commander of U.S. forces in Africa, told reporters during a September visit to Algiers, his fourth stop there in 18 months. “We do not have the same understanding of the various actors in the region.”

U.S. officials estimate that AQIM has about 250 to 400 dedicated fighters in its ranks. But it often makes common cause with other militant groups, making its true strength difficult to pinpoint.

An enduring example of failed U.S. attempts to persuade Algeria to play a regional counterterrorism role can be found in Tamanrasset, a remote Algerian garrison town in the heart of the Sahara.

In 2010, at the behest of U.S. military officials, Algeria agreed to establish a regional intelligence-sharing and joint-operations center in Tamanrasset to track al-Qaeda fighters and other cross-border militants responsible for an epidemic of hostage-takings. Security forces from Mali, Niger and Mauritania were invited to participate and, it was hoped, organize joint patrols in the desert.

Three years later, however, the Tamanrasset center is still a bare-bones operation where military leaders from the four countries meet only sporadically, U.S. officials said. Algeria has also rebuffed requests to host U.S. military or intelligence officers at Tamanrasset, to the disappointment of the Pentagon and CIA.

Algeria’s precise motives remain a puzzle to U.S. officials, but some analysts said its leaders have shown they are willing to tolerate jihadists in the region as long as they confine themselves to the wastelands of the Sahara, thousands of miles away from Algiers, the capital, and the Mediterranean coast where most of the country’s population lives.

Additionally, jihadists’ migration to Mali and other countries may make them less of a problem for Algeria. “It more or less has kept the neighbors off balance and allowed Algeria to remain the regional hegemon,” said J. Peter Pham, an adviser to the U.S. military and an Africa expert at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

Algerian officials have denied such suggestions. In discussions with U.S. officials, they have blamed Mali for allowing the terrorist threat to fester, accusing its leaders of being corrupt and cutting secret deals with AQIM, according to classified diplomatic cables made public by the anti-secrecy group WikiLeaks.

In a February 2010 meeting, frustrated U.S. officials prodded Nourredine Ayadi, the Algerian ambassador to Mali, to hasten the opening of the joint operations in Tamanrasset.

Ayadi bluntly replied that the Malians couldn’t be trusted, according to a U.S. cable summarizing the meeting. He charged that Malian officials had tipped off AQIM about a pending joint Malian-Algerian military operation and that the Malian government had refused to extradite “high-level” al-Qaeda suspects to Algiers.

“It seems likely that efforts to bring Mali and Algeria closer to fight AQIM, though necessary, will continue to be a very uphill battle,” Gillian Milovanovic, the U.S. ambassador to Mali, said in a cable to officials in Washington.

More recently, Algeria has been even more hostile to the idea of sending troops to Mali to fight alongside the French, who have sent about 1,400 troops to rescue the weak Malian central government and its tattered armed forces. France was Algeria’s colonial master, and the two sides fought a prolonged, bitter war before Algeria won independence in 1962.

Algerian officials also have resented the willingness of Mali and European countries to pay huge ransoms to Islamic militants. Although kidnappings of Americans had been rare prior to this week, several dozen Europeans and Canadians have been taken hostage in North and West Africa in recent years, generating tens of millions of dollars in revenue for insurgent groups.

“They are the best-funded al-Qaeda franchise in the world, and probably the best armed,” said Bruce Riedel, a former CIA official who is an analyst at the Brookings Institute. “This is not going to be a cakewalk.”

Feelings also remain raw in Algeria over the NATO-led military intervention in Libya. Although the campaign successfully toppled longtime ruler Moammar Gaddafi, the United States and its NATO allies did little to contain the aftershocks.

The region was destabilized by a flood of weaponry and armed Tuareg nomads who had fought for Gaddafi but escaped across Libya’s borders. Many of those mercenaries have since teamed with AQIM to take control of the northern half of Mali.

“This has just been an utter disaster. It was eminently foreseeable,” the senior U.S. diplomat said of the ripple effects from Libya. “It was the infusion of that additional manpower and weapons . . . that enabled this to happen.”



Anne Gearan, Greg Miller and Joby Warrick in Washington contributed to this report.
I added the bold accent at the end of the article.

In the nineteenth century the British were strong enough to get to control a quarter of the land surface of the Earth by "defending" themselves. The US has been defending itself in West Africa for twelve years ( while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan for most of the same time ) but they operate in a very different strategic environment and, while they are undoubtedly stronger than the British were then, the opposition is also stronger. I read a few years ago that nowadays only the US and Israel still believe in the efficacy of war. They should think again. An existing government has responsibilities that make it amenable to diplomatic pressure. Going further and buying a government will let it loose legitimacy. Buying the military leads to a coup, as it did in Mali. Occupying a country is even more expensive.
I don't think the US want to occupy Mali but does it want France to do so? And does France now believe in the efficacy of this war?
 

Subedei

Banned Idiot
the article below confirms my criticisms of the french strategy and my fears about the shariaist response.

Vive La France:’ Quick Islamist retreat raises questions about Mali’s army

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


according to a resident of diabaly, 49 pick-ups, two larger trucks, and two heavy armored vehicles successfully retreated from diabaly, without either malian army pursuit, or french air interdiction. those guys will be back.

as i suggested in my first post here, it seems that france is starting off on the wrong foot!
 
Last edited:

Equation

Lieutenant General
WP is probably the best source about the views in Washington and these will be as diverse as in other places in the World. Here's today's article, which btw was written in London:
Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!


I added the bold accent at the end of the article.

In the nineteenth century the British were strong enough to get to control a quarter of the land surface of the Earth by "defending" themselves. The US has been defending itself in West Africa for twelve years ( while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan for most of the same time ) but they operate in a very different strategic environment and, while they are undoubtedly stronger than the British were then, the opposition is also stronger. I read a few years ago that nowadays only the US and Israel still believe in the efficacy of war. They should think again. An existing government has responsibilities that make it amenable to diplomatic pressure. Going further and buying a government will let it loose legitimacy. Buying the military leads to a coup, as it did in Mali. Occupying a country is even more expensive.
I don't think the US want to occupy Mali but does it want France to do so? And does France now believe in the efficacy of this war?


"The group has expanded its activities beyond Algeria to Mali, Mauritania and Niger. But Algeria has been reluctant to fight AQIM outside its borders. The reasons are complex, but Algerian leaders say they are under little obligation to help other countries facing the problem — such as Mali — given that no one came to their aid in the 1990s when they fought their own grueling civil war against insurgents."

I don't think the Algerian government can't afford another civil war. They will battle Al Queda in their turf but not anyone elses.
 
Top