Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

manqiangrexue

Brigadier
Ultimately it is not about what each side "should" do but rather what each side is "capable" of doing.

It's technically not impossible that the ROC military just folds after the initial exchange of fires, but it would be prudent for the PLA to assume that they would try to fight with resolve and will in accordance with the capabilities they possess, and thus the PLA would carry out their own preparations and strategies accordingly.


Putting it another way, it should be assumed that all parties in a conflict have high resolve and believe they are just in their cause and are willing to fight and die for it, until proven otherwise. For observers, it means we shouldn't simply assume one side will just fold after losing the first one or two rounds, but rather to assume each side's requirement is at minimum to destroy the other side's ability to wage war, militarily act, or resist with arms.
That should of course be the PLA assumption since they are the ones in the driver's seat; they should also assume full American and NATO engagement and dedication and make their calculations based on that.

But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about what's likely to happen and what would make sense. I don't have that burden or responsibility on my shoulders where if I call a most likely scenerio, then something worse happens, I become the reason for mucking up the preparations of the PLA. Preparing for the worst is a different issue and one that must absolutely be carried out by the CCP on this matter.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
That should of course be the PLA assumption since they are the ones in the driver's seat; they should also assume full American and NATO engagement and dedication and make their calculations based on that.

But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about what's likely to happen and what would make sense. I don't have that burden or responsibility on my shoulders where if I call a most likely scenerio, then something worse happens, I become the reason for mucking up the preparations of the PLA. Preparing for the worst is a different issue and one that must absolutely be carried out by the CCP on this matter.

I don't see why that shouldn't be our set of assumptions as well. Otherwise, discussions just become a matter of trying to diminish the resolve/valor/will/etc of the side one is arguing against, and it is a weak basis of argument and it becomes only two steps away from exchanging insults about each side's character and courage.

Discussing hypothetical conflicts (any hypothetical conflicts, not just this scenario) where the end state is the breaking of the opfor's resolve to fight, is uninteresting. Instead, the end state should be destruction of the opfor's material capability to fight.
 

Gloire_bb

Captain
Registered Member
Those are just the usual caveats of "shoot the archer," but which are significantly diminished in the specific Taiwan contingency, for three main reasons:
- proximity; Taiwan is just so close to the mainland, that the PLA's ability to conduct offensive and defensive missions, as well as surveilling and striking pop-up targets even after conflict occurs, will be far greater than almost any other sort of similar "ballistic missile TEL hunting" in history, assuming they are not all knocked out in the opening rounds of conflict
- lack of strategic depth; Taiwan is so small, that the resources to actually surveil, identify and track locations and TELs is far less demanding
- system of systems overmatch in all domains; that is to say, Taiwan pulling a reverse uno wrt ballistic missiles is unlikely in context of superior PLA scale and sophistication of that domain and every other offensive and defensive and sensor domain
-Taiwan is way further away than Hezbollah/Lebanon(more like Crete), which are right over the border and within a couple of dozen km from nearby air bases;
-I frankly doubt that it's possible to have more thorough surveillance than that of Lebanon with IDF forces, supported by all available US resources. It's just a transparent country.
Moreover - in the Taiwan conflict, there's a good chance that the best available means of observation will be targeted.
-Taiwan is way deeper than Lebanon, and in terms of air defense, it's more like Israel rather than absolutely defenseless Hezbollah, which can't even remove MALEs.

Thus I strongly advise caution.
Not directly relevant to what I'm describing, considering Israel's success against Hezbollah, and the forces Hezbollah has in play versus the targets the PLA would go after in a Taiwan contingency.
Israel had success decapitating Hezbollah - arguably, not the least because the letter thought it wouldn't happen.
Israeli success in actually removing Hez forces, let's put it mildly, leaves much to be desired.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
-Taiwan is way further away than Hezbollah/Lebanon(more like Crete), which are right over the border and within a couple of dozen km from nearby air bases;
-I frankly doubt that it's possible to have more thorough surveillance than that of Lebanon with IDF forces, supported by all available US resources. It's just a transparent country.
Moreover - in the Taiwan conflict, there's a good chance that the best available means of observation will be targeted.
-Taiwan is way deeper than Lebanon, and in terms of air defense, it's more like Israel rather than absolutely defenseless Hezbollah, which can't even remove MALEs.

Thus I strongly advise caution.

Israel had success decapitating Hezbollah - arguably, not the least because the letter thought it wouldn't happen.
Israeli success in actually removing Hez forces, let's put it mildly, leaves much to be desired.

Are you comparing Israeli goals to strike/remove Hezbollah's capability to launch rocket attacks across their border with the previous discussion about PLA targeting ROC missile TELs?
I certainly agree that if the PLA were trying to target weapons on Taiwan that were similar in size and scale to the weapons that Hezbollah are utilizing against Israel, that would be a much more difficult endeavour.

However against missile TELs that carry proper SRBMs or IRBMs or proper cruise missiles, the scale is rather different, especially in terms of the associated logistics tail that proper missile TELs require. (This situation is one whereby the initial phase of conflict has concluded and the PLA has air superiority)


All of which isn't to say that TEL hunting for the PLA would be easy per se, and I fully expect some successful launches to occur even after the initial exchange of fires. But this is also far from "coalition hunting for scuds in Iraq during gulf war" in terms of distances, assets, geography/depth involved (which was the original situation I was comparing those metrics to)
 

Index

Senior Member
Registered Member
Being "too small" (whatever that means) doesn't prevent them from utilizing a hard-to-track offensive weapon to launch retaliatory attacks. Just as the proximity of the mainland to Taiwan offers the former the advantage of surprise, it also gives China much less time to respond to missiles going the other way. Your premise that most of these launches will be targeted may be true but there will likely be missiles that slip through the cracks; you saw what a mere 15-20 BMs could do to an airbase like Nevatim. Another question is the effectiveness of Chinese BMD systems (HQ-19, DN-3, HQ-9B, etc.) against these missiles.
For what's it worth, the Fujian/Taiwan region is on average signficantly more heavily defended than even Nevatim. China can surge most of its more numerous and more advanced air defenses there, it has ships over the missile flight paths and unlike Israel, a permanent air presence.

It's not impossible that a single wave of 300-500 could yield a dozen hits on a single airbase despite these precautions, but ROCA wouldn't be in a position to repeat the strike.
While it's hard to deny that Israel has higher GBAD density than Taiwan and mainland is a lot closer to Taiwan than Iran is to Israel, there are people who still try to argue PLARF is weaker than IRGC Aerospace Forces.
In fact there are people who argue PLARF is weaker than Houthi's missile force and run it as such in their wargames.
No way, there's no way someone is so delusional and not accessing the internet from the inside of a mental ward. Any source?

PLA counteroffensive initial barrage will be historic. You're looking at around 100 000-200 000 munitions a day, adding up to 100s of kilotons.

It'd look nothing like Gaza where people can reasonably hide. A more accurate estimate would be like the Soviet opening barrage during the battle of Berlin. It's going to delete anyone remotely close to the impact areas and create new forms of noise related brain damage and ptsd in anyone within earshot.

If anything, bringing the full force of PLA to fire on KMT would be challenging because Beijing wouldn't want to hit it's own undercover assets. It's believed that ROC is very extensively compromised by MSS.

So practically speaking, the PLA can maybe only fire without restraint into imminent landing zones and defense positions around them.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
PLA counteroffensive initial barrage will be historic. You're looking at around 100 000-200 000 munitions a day, adding up to 100s of kilotons.

Up to 200K munitions per day seems very, very high.

My guess is that they wouldn't even get up to 10K per day. That adds up to 100K aimpoints after just 10 days, which should be more than enough for Taiwan.
 

MwRYum

Major
Up to 200K munitions per day seems very, very high.

My guess is that they wouldn't even get up to 10K per day. That adds up to 100K aimpoints after just 10 days, which should be more than enough for Taiwan.
In order to fulfill "2300萬總玉碎" will require more, though if that's the quality of their militia...
1728274541597.jpeg
... then perhaps much of the munitions would not get the chance be utilized.
 

Index

Senior Member
Registered Member
Up to 200K munitions per day seems very, very high.

My guess is that they wouldn't even get up to 10K per day. That adds up to 100K aimpoints after just 10 days, which should be more than enough for Taiwan.
Russia peaked at something like 40k.

By putting most MLRS in Fujian, moving hundreds of ships, 1000s of planes making several sorties a day, 1000s of drones doing the same, then a ton of shorter legged suicide drone carried by cargo ships, at least 100 000 should be possible.

Practically however, fighting might not be that intense for many days in a row, because China also needs to let the infiltrators do something.
 
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