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Blitzo said:

Ultimately it is not about what each side "should" do but rather what each side is "capable" of doing.

It's technically not impossible that the ROC military just folds after the initial exchange of fires, but it would be prudent for the PLA to assume that they would try to fight with resolve and will in accordance with the capabilities they possess, and thus the PLA would carry out their own preparations and strategies accordingly.


Putting it another way, it should be assumed that all parties in a conflict have high resolve and believe they are just in their cause and are willing to fight and die for it, until proven otherwise. For observers, it means we shouldn't simply assume one side will just fold after losing the first one or two rounds, but rather to assume each side's requirement is at minimum to destroy the other side's ability to wage war, militarily act, or resist with arms.

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That should of course be the PLA assumption since they are the ones in the driver's seat; they should also assume full American and NATO engagement and dedication and make their calculations based on that.

But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about what's likely to happen and what would make sense. I don't have that burden or responsibility on my shoulders where if I call a most likely scenerio, then something worse happens, I become the reason for mucking up the preparations of the PLA. Preparing for the worst is a different issue and one that must absolutely be carried out by the CCP on this matter.

manqiangrexue said:

That should of course be the PLA assumption since they are the ones in the driver's seat; they should also assume full American and NATO engagement and dedication and make their calculations based on that.

But that's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about what's likely to happen and what would make sense. I don't have that burden or responsibility on my shoulders where if I call a most likely scenerio, then something worse happens, I become the reason for mucking up the preparations of the PLA. Preparing for the worst is a different issue and one that must absolutely be carried out by the CCP on this matter.

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I don't see why that shouldn't be our set of assumptions as well. Otherwise, discussions just become a matter of trying to diminish the resolve/valor/will/etc of the side one is arguing against, and it is a weak basis of argument and it becomes only two steps away from exchanging insults about each side's character and courage.

Discussing hypothetical conflicts (any hypothetical conflicts, not just this scenario) where the end state is the breaking of the opfor's resolve to fight, is uninteresting. Instead, the end state should be destruction of the opfor's material capability to fight.

Blitzo said:

Those are just the usual caveats of "shoot the archer," but which are significantly diminished in the specific Taiwan contingency, for three main reasons:
- proximity; Taiwan is just so close to the mainland, that the PLA's ability to conduct offensive and defensive missions, as well as surveilling and striking pop-up targets even after conflict occurs, will be far greater than almost any other sort of similar "ballistic missile TEL hunting" in history, assuming they are not all knocked out in the opening rounds of conflict
- lack of strategic depth; Taiwan is so small, that the resources to actually surveil, identify and track locations and TELs is far less demanding
- system of systems overmatch in all domains; that is to say, Taiwan pulling a reverse uno wrt ballistic missiles is unlikely in context of superior PLA scale and sophistication of that domain and every other offensive and defensive and sensor domain

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-Taiwan is way further away than Hezbollah/Lebanon(more like Crete), which are right over the border and within a couple of dozen km from nearby air bases;
-I frankly doubt that it's possible to have more thorough surveillance than that of Lebanon with IDF forces, supported by all available US resources. It's just a transparent country.
Moreover - in the Taiwan conflict, there's a good chance that the best available means of observation will be targeted.
-Taiwan is way deeper than Lebanon, and in terms of air defense, it's more like Israel rather than absolutely defenseless Hezbollah, which can't even remove MALEs.

Thus I strongly advise caution.

Blitzo said:

Not directly relevant to what I'm describing, considering Israel's success against Hezbollah, and the forces Hezbollah has in play versus the targets the PLA would go after in a Taiwan contingency.

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Israel had success decapitating Hezbollah - arguably, not the least because the letter thought it wouldn't happen.
Israeli success in actually removing Hez forces, let's put it mildly, leaves much to be desired.

Gloire_bb said:

-Taiwan is way further away than Hezbollah/Lebanon(more like Crete), which are right over the border and within a couple of dozen km from nearby air bases;
-I frankly doubt that it's possible to have more thorough surveillance than that of Lebanon with IDF forces, supported by all available US resources. It's just a transparent country.
Moreover - in the Taiwan conflict, there's a good chance that the best available means of observation will be targeted.
-Taiwan is way deeper than Lebanon, and in terms of air defense, it's more like Israel rather than absolutely defenseless Hezbollah, which can't even remove MALEs.

Thus I strongly advise caution.

Israel had success decapitating Hezbollah - arguably, not the least because the letter thought it wouldn't happen.
Israeli success in actually removing Hez forces, let's put it mildly, leaves much to be desired.

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Are you comparing Israeli goals to strike/remove Hezbollah's capability to launch rocket attacks across their border with the previous discussion about PLA targeting ROC missile TELs?
I certainly agree that if the PLA were trying to target weapons on Taiwan that were similar in size and scale to the weapons that Hezbollah are utilizing against Israel, that would be a much more difficult endeavour.

However against missile TELs that carry proper SRBMs or IRBMs or proper cruise missiles, the scale is rather different, especially in terms of the associated logistics tail that proper missile TELs require. (This situation is one whereby the initial phase of conflict has concluded and the PLA has air superiority)


All of which isn't to say that TEL hunting for the PLA would be easy per se, and I fully expect some successful launches to occur even after the initial exchange of fires. But this is also far from "coalition hunting for scuds in Iraq during gulf war" in terms of distances, assets, geography/depth involved (which was the original situation I was comparing those metrics to)