Agreed that the shoot-the-archer strategy may be the best defense against them. But it would be much harder to target and rapidly neutralize them if they're road mobile or under hardened bunkers vis-a-vis aircraft that require substantial logistical infrastructure. This dramatically shortens the window to optimally minimize the BM threat following the opening stages of a hypothetical Taiwan conflict. And that is not entertaining the possibility of Taiwanese BMs being scattered and hidden beforehand (e.g. as a natural response in a period of heightened tensions).
Once that window passes, you're left with costly and ineffective "Scud hunting" strategies that were of mixed results during the Gulf War. Of course, Taiwan's limited geography offers a slightly different playing field in this scenario.
Those are just the usual caveats of "shoot the archer," but which are significantly diminished in the specific Taiwan contingency, for three main reasons:
- proximity; Taiwan is just so close to the mainland, that the PLA's ability to conduct offensive and defensive missions, as well as surveilling and striking pop-up targets even after conflict occurs, will be far greater than almost any other sort of similar "ballistic missile TEL hunting" in history, assuming they are not all knocked out in the opening rounds of conflict
- lack of strategic depth; Taiwan is so small, that the resources to actually surveil, identify and track locations and TELs is far less demanding
- system of systems overmatch in all domains; that is to say, Taiwan pulling a reverse uno wrt ballistic missiles is unlikely in context of superior PLA scale and sophistication of that domain and every other offensive and defensive and sensor domain
None of this is to say that it doesn't make sense for the PLA to have a robust missile defense system (though it's the US which is more of the reference threat), and by all accounts they have developed/are developing it.
But the notion that Taiwan developing "hard to track" ballistic missile TELs seems to pretend that the PLA doesn't already have the intent and capability to surveil, track and strike at smaller, more mobile ground based targets as part of their overall requirements for conducting a Taiwan contingency.
I suppose if one really wants to take something away from this Iranian strike and apply it to the Taiwan contingency, it is that Iran lacked many of the advantages that the PLA would have (supporting aerial fixed wing launched fires, CM fires, EW, ISR, BDA, CAP) -- while Israel possessed many advantages which Taiwan would not have (significant distance from launch sites to targets, friendly defenses between launch sites to targets, technological overmatch, intelligence overmatch).
Doesn't work terribly well against Hezballah.
Mobile launchers, vegetation/cities and extensive underground infrastructure in mountainous regions make it difficult to execute.
Plus, one really has to have something wrong in their heads to target civilians the way Israel does. Add at least some caution and proportionality check - and it becomes more difficult still.
Not directly relevant to what I'm describing, considering Israel's success against Hezbollah, and the forces Hezbollah has in play versus the targets the PLA would go after in a Taiwan contingency.
