You need port which is not guarantee that the Taiwanese will not dismantled it at the first sign of hostility now what?
How will they receive supplies from allies if they do that? You can’t completely rely on air lifts for this.
You need port which is not guarantee that the Taiwanese will not dismantled it at the first sign of hostility now what?
How will they receive supplies from allies if they do that? You can’t completely rely on air lifts for this.
I recall the plan back in 1996 was that a minimum of two existing harbour had to be captured to allow Ro-Ro ships to offload enough troops quick enough to push inland.You need port which is not guarantee that the Taiwanese will not dismantled it at the first sign of hostility now what?
Taiwan strait is choppy and prone to Typhoon hit. So artificial harbor is very vulnerable to storm. The mulberry was hit by the storm and completely mauled. But fortunately 2 Weeks after D day.I recall the plan back in 1996 was that a minimum of two existing harbour had to be captured to allow Ro-Ro ships to offload enough troops quick enough to push inland.
An option that did not exist back in 1996 is artificial floating harbour ala D-Day Mulberry harbour. PLA has done a lot of work in this regard so if a landing were to occur today instead of hard target of capturing two existing harbours with amphibious troops the target might be just 1 or even zero. Or more likely amphibious troops will still try to capture harbours while artificial harbours will be set up concurrently regardless of their progress just in case.
Lol what is a $200 million large-scale amphibious fleet?If US can dump $2.3 Trillion on Afghanistan, I'm sure China can spare $200 Million on a large-scale amphibious fleet for Taiwan, IF it truly cared about reunification with Taiwan via invasion.
Rather than trying to backwards justify why China should retain a conservative/limited amphibious landing fleet.... it's more credible to admit that China is more development-focused and has zero intentions of an amphibious landing invasion of Taiwan, therefore it doesn't bother with a large-scale peacetime amphibious landing fleet due to cost (however tiny relative to total defense budget).
Just admit China has zero intentions of invading Taiwan, so it lacks a large-scale amphibious fleet. I'd admire that much more than trying to backwards rationalize how it's more efficient use of China's dime and cents, and how 'X objective' can be achieved with less resources. This isn't a business deal, this is about 'reunification', therefore no expense should be spared IF China was truly seriously about it... which it is not.
A single major surface combatant costs $500 million. You can buy 40% of a destroyer or 20% of an LPD for $200 million. Me thinks you have no idea how naval combatant production or amphibious invasions work.If US can dump $2.3 Trillion on Afghanistan, I'm sure China can spare $200 Million on a large-scale amphibious fleet for Taiwan, IF it truly cared about reunification with Taiwan via invasion.
Rather than trying to backwards justify why China should retain a conservative/limited amphibious landing fleet.... it's more credible to admit that China is more development-focused and has zero intentions of an amphibious landing invasion of Taiwan, therefore it doesn't bother with a large-scale peacetime amphibious landing fleet due to cost (however tiny relative to total defense budget).
Just admit China has zero intentions of invading Taiwan, so it lacks a large-scale amphibious fleet. I'd admire that much more than trying to backwards rationalize how it's more efficient use of China's dime and cents, and how 'X objective' can be achieved with less resources. This isn't a business deal, this is about 'reunification', therefore no expense should be spared IF China was truly seriously about it... which it is not.
Taiwan strait is choppy and prone to Typhoon hit. So artificial harbor is very vulnerable to storm. The mulberry was hit by the storm and completely mauled. But fortunately 2 Weeks after D day.
Airpower alone can never decide the outcome of war campaign. airborne is limited by the fact that resupply is difficult Sooner or latter they will run out of food, munition, medicine, etc. No one attempt large airborne operation again after the failure of market garden campaign. You need boot on the ground
All the operations that you mention are pitting an advanced army fight against peasant army with sandal and ak 47. It does not apply in Taiwan contingency where you are up against well equipped army with IAD. Of course the caveat is will Taiwan army fight? But you should never assume they won't. so you are comparing apple and orange!Actually wrong. The reason airborne (parachutist and glider) based forces have declined precipitously is because helicopter-borne motorized assaults are better in almost every regard and situation.
List of successful parachute assaults since Operation Market Garden.
--Operation Machbesh by the IDF during the Suez crisis
--Operation Musketeer by the French and British paratroop forces during the Suez crisis
--Indian parachutists cut off the Pakistani army's route of retreat during the fall of East Pakistan in 1971
--1975 Indonesian invasion of East Timor, a concurrent marine and paratroop assault
--Operation Junction City, US Army Airborne in the Vietnam war
--Rhodesian Fire-force strategies in the Rhodesian Bush war relied on concurrent helo-mobile and parachutist assault
--Initial Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by the VDV and Spetsnaz
--US forces used extensive parachute forces in Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan
--French forces parachuted into Mali to capture Timbuktu in 2013
I could go on. Point is you are wrong.
And even if you want to quibble, I will point out that both Russia and the US maintain divisional sized airborne formations and the PLA is saying it will build 1000 Y-20 air lifters which implies divisional sized airborne formations.