Indeed, they can! However, can they crank up defense production as quickly and substantially? That’s what I’d like to see, and particularly, right now, in ICBM production.
Taiwan Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
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Hello, Taliban! Congratulations on defeating the “Great Satan”!
There are several levels to answer that questions, some of which require classified information that we don't have access to, but many you can make some educated guess based on open sources. At the highest level, we can look at the barriers, bottlenecks and capacity to scale the production for different categories of armaments and platforms.
Strategic weapons - There are no technology barriers. DF-41/DF-31AG are ready and deployed; JL3 has been successfully tested and is likely close to deployment (pending on 096). Silo expansion and construction have been clearly on-going for a few years now. Weapon grade materials at least are enough for additional 1,000 war heads if not more initially. I would give it 5-10 years to substantially enlarge the strategic forces (x2, x3, x4 or more).
Navy - I posted some credible rumors last years about the 14th Five-Year plan, which include 8 075 (total), 8 055, 20 054A, and more 071, 052D. For carriers, we can all see where 003 is and I expect we'll be seeing another 003 class carrier emerging in the next few years. SSN & SSBN are most difficult to know since it's hard to get any public information unlike surface warships, but from the bits and pieces that have leaked over the years, it appears that 2025 would be the year 095 and/or 096 would either be launched or even commissioned. I expect the surface fleet will be significantly expanded in the first half of the decade, while the more strategic part of the fleet (carriers and nuclear submarines) will be meaningfully expanded in the second half of the decade. The issues with QC-70, the gas turbine engine for Type 726 LCAC, have been resolved and Type 726s are ready for volume production, which are clearly very important for the Taiwan contingency.
Air Force - The biggest barriers for PLAAF over the years have been engines, of all types. But that barriers are essentially no more, at least for the current generation aircraft. WS-10s are mature and stable; its various variants have become the default engines for all PLAAF primary aircraft: J-10C, J-16, J-20 and soon Y-20. Z-20, which will be the main helicopters for all branches of PLA, has the indigenous engine WZ-10 and have been in volume production. Both WS-15 and WS-19 are progressing well, particularly if you compare them with what WS-10 has gone through. Since WS-10B's thrust is close to 15 tons, the urgency for WS-15 is less now. WS-15 will likely to be ready by 2025, with a thrust that is significantly larger than the original goal (15-16 tons), likely above 18 tons. J-15T will be ready and we may have at least a squadron to be in service by 2025. J-31 will be commissioned around 2025 and have meaningful numbers in service in the second half of the decade. All told, I expect total 300 J-20s, 600 J-16s, and 500 J-10Cs around 2027, the centenary of PLA which Xi Jinping specifically set as a milestone for PLA and it was written into the formal party document.
Missiles - Mainly short-, medium- and intermediate-range conventional missiles of all kinds: ballistic, cruise and hyper-sonic. Hyper-sonic missiles will be the main developments here. We've already seen DF-17 and DF-100. We may see the expansion of the inventory and also new types, for example DF-27 and DF-37. There are no or manageable technology barriers, since China has already achieved the breakthroughs. No major issues for scaled production either.
As I said elsewhere at SDF, we will see a burst of all the major strategic platforms and big-ticket items for PLA in the coming decade. The exact production will be determined by the perceived threat level and the political will. There are essentially no major barriers or constraints in technology, finance or capacity. Not any more.
Have you trained with Taiwanese?
I don't know if this is true or not, but I've seen photos circulated on social media of Taiwanese reservist training and they are shooting on padded gym mats from prone and have umbrellas to shade them. These are sent to me by a friend who is anti-Taiwan, so I'm not sure I believe everything he sends me. It was also accompanied by an article (that I could not read all of) with comments from a retired visiting Chinese American USMC Officer who said it was "too unrealistic and useless".
Of course I would not expect any solider to get heat stroke, but umbrellas is a bit much.
You posted such a long and thoughtful reply, but I must say, the Taiwan miltary situation can be summed up quite simply as "See no evil, hear no evil".
On paper you always hear "millions strong reserve!", then comes the repeated international fellating (excuse the crude language, but really it is the only way to say it) by people like David Axe, which they point to as credibility for their claims, leading to no impetus to change. All the bad things are said behind closed doors or in hushed tones, but for the public, it will be ignored.
Here's the real question, when Ma Ying Jeou ended conscription, was he merely tearing down what he believed to be a facade? He is on the record as saying ROC Military cannot stand up against the PLA. He clearly believed that good relations with the mainland was the best way to protect the island. Better than weapons… naive or realistic?
My key takeaway from this essay is that you really, really hate the Tomorrow War.
@weig2000 An excellent post! It was a joy to read.
How confident are you of this assessment? Both the timeline and the thrust figure, and do you have any idea what the dry thrust of the WS-15 is likely to be?
That's why I'm hoping for a Trump comeback in 2024.
"When we look at the pro-independence movement in Taiwan, we see ridiculous argument. DPP (pro-independent party) claimed in its 1999 resolution that they would not push forward independence because it had already been a internationally recognized sovereignty state. Recent survey conducted by United Daily News this march says that only 20 percent of the respondents are willing to fight for the independence. Another survey conducted by Sinica (Taiwan’s top research institute, under the administration of its top leader) in October 2015 said that while 46.4% wanted independence, 16.1% for unification and 37.5% in the middle, 49.7% believed that unification is inevitable. Even for those who wanted independence, 37% expected inevitable unification in the future.
A more academic survey conducted by Professor Chen Lu-huei at National Chengchi University and Emerson Niou at Duke University last year showed more insights (a summary of some findings, in Chinese: ): of those who supported independence unconditionally, 47% didn’t believe Mainland would attack Taiwan, 70% believed that America would defend Taiwan under an attack from Mainland, and 73% believed that Taiwanese would resist; of those who supported independence under certain conditions, 28% for no Mainland attack, 62% for American intervention and 63% for resistance in Taiwan. The most hilarious results are the following: when asked about what would you do if the independence of Taiwan provoked a war, of those who supported independence unconditionally, 26% chose “go with the flow”, 26% for “joining the military for resistance”, 14% for “escaping to other countries” and 22% for no response; of those who supported independence under certain conditions, 32% for “go with the flow”, 23% for “escaping to other countries” and 20% for no response. When I asked about the implications of these results, Professor Chen said that Taiwanese dramatically underestimate the risks of independence movement.
From our perspective, the situation is clear: a large number of Taiwanese, especially those pro-independence forces, either don’t understand the consequences, or don’t accept the fact even though they understand the consequences, or they don’t want to fight for it, so they hide themselves into their imagined reality, or hope to protract the process, instead of thinking about a solution."
Written by Xiao Han on Quora.
You can read the article in full here:
A more academic survey conducted by Professor Chen Lu-huei at National Chengchi University and Emerson Niou at Duke University last year showed more insights (a summary of some findings, in Chinese: ): of those who supported independence unconditionally, 47% didn’t believe Mainland would attack Taiwan, 70% believed that America would defend Taiwan under an attack from Mainland, and 73% believed that Taiwanese would resist; of those who supported independence under certain conditions, 28% for no Mainland attack, 62% for American intervention and 63% for resistance in Taiwan. The most hilarious results are the following: when asked about what would you do if the independence of Taiwan provoked a war, of those who supported independence unconditionally, 26% chose “go with the flow”, 26% for “joining the military for resistance”, 14% for “escaping to other countries” and 22% for no response; of those who supported independence under certain conditions, 32% for “go with the flow”, 23% for “escaping to other countries” and 20% for no response. When I asked about the implications of these results, Professor Chen said that Taiwanese dramatically underestimate the risks of independence movement.
From our perspective, the situation is clear: a large number of Taiwanese, especially those pro-independence forces, either don’t understand the consequences, or don’t accept the fact even though they understand the consequences, or they don’t want to fight for it, so they hide themselves into their imagined reality, or hope to protract the process, instead of thinking about a solution."
Written by Xiao Han on Quora.
You can read the article in full here:
No. We do not train with the Taiwanese. That we train on their soil is already a political minefield. We sometimes come across them out in the field and we've watched them through our optics, across the valley, and I'm sure they've watched us too.
We also train in areas where there is a significant civilian presence and I have on numerous occasion, while out on uncontrolled exercise, sought shelter (illegally) in Taiwanese homes/businesses and passed the night drinking tea and chatting with the owners who are invariably ex-servicemen. On hindsight it's pretty foolhardy as we could have quite easily been set upon and relieved of our rifles and other sensitive stuff ... but in the southern country (Tainan) where we train, the hospitality and warmth is a great memory I have.
My observation is strictly anecdotal. It's a general image borne from maybe 5~6 nights of conversation with Taiwanese ex-conscripts and servicemen. The stories they share though, consistently paint a depressing picture of a poorly led and funded military. Being a conscript is demoralising enough already. Being a conscript and being put through sub par, under funded training makes it even worse as it gives a sense of futile time wasted. There are a few units where we heard the training and morale is excellent but these are exceptions rather than the rule.
It does go to show that for all the glossy PR images that the ROCAF rolls out, it is very likely that these images will serve the political purpose of soothing the mindless masses but won't change the fact that that dog won't hunt. It's a similar danger that the PRC camp in this forum needs to be wary of. Glossy PR and a nice looking TO&E chart does not substitute for effective training and leadership.
Before I get flamed, I am not saying the PLA is like the ROCAF. The truth is often somewhere between what is promised by the dog and pony shows (which we can all see and the fan boys fap over) and the dim dark reality (which in the case of the PLA is rather opaque). I have faith that the PRC is on the right path. Just looking at the infrastructure and logistics network in modern China functioning flawlessly is strong indication that this leadership knows the need to execute on it's promises.