Myth #4: The dynamic East Asian economy determines that the South China Sea is a “core” U.S. national security interest.
One of the most common, but silliest ideas floating about on the South China Sea is that the area’s economic dynamism implies that the U.S. must maintain unchallenged military supremacy in these waters. Taken to a bizarre extreme, this logic even claims that the entire global trading system (the “rule-based order”) is under grave threat from Chinese actions in the South China Sea. In short, stand up to China or watch the global economy come crashing down. Good luck finding a credentialed economist or even a Wall Street analyst, who would agree with this assessment. What makes this line of argumentation so specious, of course, is that China has been the major driver for this region’s extraordinary economic dynamism. The argument that maritime trade (and with it the global economy) will crash if China gains additional strategic influence in the South China Sea is, at best, a 19th century anachronism in our collective discourse. At worst, it is simply foolish drivel that makes for fine-sounding political rhetoric. Washington would be better served taking a page from Beijing’s playbook and attempting to turn its own backyard into a dynamic force in the global economy. The U.S.-Cuba rapprochement is a hopeful start towards such a project.
Myth #5: If it comes to a fight in the end, the U,S, will “clean China’s clock.” Among all the myths outlined above, none is quite as dangerous as this one.
If one believes in this highly uncertain notion, then it follows that there are few risks and little need for restraint. One need only parade some hardware about now and then – even daring to come up to within 500 meters of China’s built up outposts – and Beijing will surely stand down, overawed by Washington’s legendary military prowess. There are so many reasons to doubt the veracity of this conventional assessment (
, a plethora of new classes of advanced supersonic cruise missiles, plentiful strike aircraft, surface combatants, submarines, sea mines, hardened bases, etc.) but the most basic reality of military strategy very simply holds that a “home game” is infinitely simpler than an “away game.” Chinese Navy unofficial spokesman Admiral Yin Zhuo (PLA Navy, ret.) made this point when he said recently: “如果未来中美发生冲突,可能就是在中国家门口打. 不客气的说, 在家门口打仗, 我们谁都不怕.” [
.] Other supposed advantages for the U.S., for example combat experience, also fade away for the most part when it is realized that counter-insurgency and anti-terrorist operations have little in common (and may indeed be at cross-purposes) with high intensity air-sea operations that would be at the heart of any hypothetical U.S.-China war. This is not defeatism, but rather a clear-eyed understanding that a U.S.-China war is absolutely not a “cake walk” for American forces and really nobody knows for sure how such a conflict would end.
Not surprisingly, there has been little appetite on the campaign trail to talk sensibly about the South China Sea or U.S.-China relations. Don’t expect much from Hillary Clinton in the way of presenting creative diplomatic solutions to the
Gordian Knot of the South China Sea, since one of her main legacies as Secretary of State seems to have been a dramatic increase in tensions in the South China Sea and elsewhere along China’s periphery after she focused on the issue in mid-2010. Interestingly, Donald Trump seems to have offered one of the most sensible comments on the issue recently,
:
Shooting wars appeal less. Asked about China building runways on reclaimed land in the South China Sea, he calls it a hostile move. “However, it is very far away, and we have a lot of problems, OK? And they are already built.”
In other words, he seemed to be saying that these moves are objectionable, but hardly a ‘big deal’ given other pressing issues. Maybe part of Trump’s appeal is his pragmatism and refusal to buy into neo-conservative and neo-liberal orthodoxies.
is Associate Professor in the (CMSI) at the in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S. Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.