South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

vesicles said:

I'm not sure if we can distinguish China's strategies for the SCS vs. others. Whenever China does something in the SCS, others will respond and vice versa. Do we have to switch back and forth between this thread and the one for others? That sounds very inconvenient...

Since the issue with the SCS is about disagreement / conflict between China and others, both parties are always involved. You can't talk about a potential conflict only focusing on one party. As such, it makes no sense to me that we have to talk about China in one thread and then go to another thread to talk about others.

It's like a coffee shop only serves coffee. You'll have to go to another shop to get sugar and another one for spoons...

My suggestion is to combine the two threads into one. It will get long. So my suggestion is to split them into years like how we do it with the Chinese photos threads. My 2-cents

PS, just now, I was completely confused as to which thread (China's or others) I just posted... I thought I was posting in the China one...

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vesicles said:

I'm not sure if we can distinguish China's strategies for the SCS vs. others. Whenever China does something in the SCS, others will respond and vice versa. Do we have to switch back and forth between this thread and the one for others? That sounds very inconvenient...

Since the issue with the SCS is about disagreement / conflict between China and others, both parties are always involved. You can't talk about a potential conflict only focusing on one party. As such, it makes no sense to me that we have to talk about China in one thread and then go to another thread to talk about others.

It's like a coffee shop only serves coffee. You'll have to go to another shop to get sugar and another one for spoons...

My suggestion is to combine the two threads into one. It will get long. So my suggestion is to split them into years like how we do it with the Chinese photos threads. My 2-cents

PS, just now, I was completely confused as to which thread (China's or others) I just posted... I thought I was posting in the China one...

Click to expand...

Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who had expressed serious reservations about Rex Tillerson, President Trump’s nominee to be Secretary of State, said Sunday afternoon they would vote for him, pretty much assuring his elevation. The

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was about how to handle a rising China’s actions in the South and East China Seas — comments which

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— so I asked Dean Cheng, one of the top experts on the Chinese military, to parse Tillerson’s comments and give readers a sense of what should be done. Read on. The Editor.

During his confirmation hearings for Secretary of State, nominee Rex Tillerson compared Chinese island building to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and said the United States needed to send a “clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands also not going to be allowed.”

Not surprisingly, these comments aroused a heated response from Beijing, which reiterated its claims to the South China Sea. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has ignored a legal finding by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague which found that China’s Nine Dash Line provides no legal basis for its claims in the South China Sea.

If Tillerson meant to signal that the United States will blockade the various artificial islands, this would constitute a most serious threat. A blockade is an act of war under international law. But just as President Kennedy chose to invoke a “quarantine” during the Cuban Missile Crisis, rather than a blockade, there are presumably other means to affect Chinese efforts to secure the South China Sea short of ringing the islands with US Navy ships.

Financial and Economic Measures

It may be useful to keep in mind that Tillerson has spent all of his life in the private sector, and specifically at ExxonMobil Corporation. He possesses little experience with the vagaries of diplomatic language or convention, though he has operated around the world as a businessman. This suggests that he is apt to be thinking more in terms of economic and financial, rather than military, courses of action. Moreover, as head of a company with $270 billion in revenues, with global operations, and one that operates with long time-lines in the construction and operation of major infrastructure projects, it is quite likely that he is more familiar with economic and financial vulnerabilities.

With this in mind, then, it may well be that Tillerson’s first choice would be to focus efforts on discouraging companies that are part of China’s land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea — not on military intervention. If the United States were to deny any company that participates in Chinese artificial island building access to the American market, that could well prove a substantial deterrent to working for China. This would be even more true if the U.S. could persuade other states to impose comparable restrictions. One Chinese company, CCCC Dredging, for example, is reportedly extensively involved in Chinese land reclamation efforts. It is apparently also intent on establishing a worldwide presence in the dredging business. A concerted effort by the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe to deny the company access to their markets would compel CCCC Dredging to choose between South China Sea activities and its global ambitions.

Another means of influencing Chinese companies may be to deny them the ability to list on the American stock exchanges. Listing is not only a means of raising capital, but is also often seen as a stamp of approval, since it requires complying with American rules about financial stability and transparency. Limiting Chinese companies’ access to American (and Western) capital markets and denying them legitimacy could prove an effective instrument.

Similarly, the dozens of dredgers that have been photographed in the Spratlys are all complex pieces of equipment, involving equipment such as trailing suction hopper dredgers and the like. Some of these systems are imported, while others use parts and sub-systems supplied from a variety of commercial vendors, rather than specially fabricated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). If the United States and key allies (e.g., Japan, Western Europe) were to impose sanctions on any companies that were found to be providing support to Chinese reclamation efforts in the South China Sea, it would certainly affect China’s ability to sustain such activities in the future.

This would not prevent the PRC from manufacturing its own dredging equipment, but, again, the market for such items could be limited if Mr. Tillerson were to spearhead a global effort to deny Chinese companies market presence in Europe, Japan, North America, and Australia, or their use by Western companies in contracts abroad (e.g., the Middle East, South America).

Such efforts would likely find support from the U.S. Congress. Sen. Marco Rubio, for example, late last year introduced legislation that would require the president to impose an array of measures, including denying visas, on Chinese individuals and entities “who contribute to construction or development projects, and those who threaten the peace, security, or stability of the South China Sea (SCS) or East China Sea (ECS).” As Secretary of State, Tillerson might directly punish corporate entities that participate in South China Sea reclamation efforts, including providing equipment and other support, or who are financially involved, as a complement to the measures that Senator Rubio proposes.

Conversely, the United States could, in the coming years, help expand deep sea exploration by other claimants to the South China Sea region. As the head of ExxonMobil, Mr. Tillerson would be well aware that China has been striving to exclude all other states from engaging in oil exploration in this area, even as it pursues it. The 2014 incidents involving Chinese oil rig HY981 saw China deploy its deep sea oil rig to disputed waters off Vietnam. This move was supported by statements by senior Chinese officials that oil rigs are “mobile national territory.” American efforts to help local states develop their own “mobile national territory” could serve as a means of challenging China’s excessive claims—and not only in the South China Sea.

US Government Measures

Economic and financial actions are not a substitute for more traditional displays of American support for freedom of the seas. Even there, however, Tillerson may have a more expansive view of the available instruments to reinforce the message of American presence in the South China Sea as a counter to China’s excessiveclaims.

One would be to employ non-military US governmental assets, such as the United States Coast Guard, to challenge excessive Chinese claims. Even before Russia employed “little green men” to help seize Crimea, China was employing fishing boats and “little white ships,” maritime law enforcement vessels, to press its claims in the East and South China Sea. China now fields one of the world’s largest coast guard fleets, including the world’s largest coast guard cutters (displacing 10,000 tons, the size of World War II cruisers), which patrol its claimed waters and help enforce its claims through intensive patrolling and intimidation. By countering these Chinese forces with American Coast Guard ships, Washington can rebut Chinese claims while avoiding the charge of “militarizing” the problem. Moreover, deployed U.S. Coast Guard cutters can also train with local law enforcement vessels, enhancing their ability to engage in maritime law enforcement—and countering Chinese claims.

Backing any Coast Guard presence would be the United States Navy. It is likely that the Trump Administration will seek to reverse the pattern of its predecessor, who suspended FONOPS in the Spratlys area for three years, and then conducted only four publicly known FONOPS between 2015 and 2017. A more robust FONOPS schedule, especially one specifically undertaken around the Chinese artificial islands rather than in disputed territories with multiple claimants, would put Beijing on notice that its actions would at least face challenges.

To support this increase in FONOPS, the US Navy will likely need to be expanded to avoid prolonged deployments, which leads to neglected maintenance and eroded personnel morale. A key campaign promise of the Trump campaign was to support an expansion of the US Navy to 350 ships. Fulfilling this promise would provide a concrete signal of intent regarding support for forward deployments, including in the South and East China Seas.

Having been in office for less than a week, it is probably too early to tell exactly what policies the Trump Administration will pursue. Nonetheless, Tillerson’s testimony has raised both expectations and concerns. He clearly has the opportunity to reverse what has been a negative trend over the past four years.

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Jura said:

it's a dubious article

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but since I read it, I post it:

source is BreakingDefense

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vesicles said:

The only country with a booming construction industry is China. Especially with the new Silk road initiative, many American and Western companies linked to construction hope to benefit from the amazing construction boom in China. Applying an embargo on construction equipment will likely backfire on the US. China equally can prevent American companies from participating in many lucrative projects along the new Silk road. Also, those companies currently exporting construction equipment will be hit very badly in case of an embargo. What is to prevent companies from other Western nations to take advantage of the void? Most of these nations did not heed the America's call not to join the AIIB.

Now, what about China? Will China be affected by such embargo? The answer would be much less likely. These construction equipment is much less sophisticated than advanced weapons. If China can figure out how to construct carriers and develop stealth fighters, construction equipment would be a piece of cake. An embargo will likely slow them down by a few months at the most. On the other hand, a decreased export to China will likely bankrupt many construction equipment companies in the US (again, since China is the only country still doing a ton of large-scale construction and is most likely one of the major customers of these companies)...

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advill said:

Will Tillerston the about to be appointed Secretary of State carry out his verbal threat of NOT allowing the PLA-N into China's claimed territories in the South China Sea? Is "Mad Dog" Mike, the new Defence Secretary willing to risk a war with China over the South China Sea? This Trump Cabinet like the President himself appears to be sending contradictory signals. As of now, America appears to be heading towards aggressive self-interest trade and security policies, unlike previous US Administrations. China and Asia wait for clarifications, and any US aggressive actions can expect forceful Chinese rebuttals/actions. No one wins if there are hostilities, and would be disastrous for all Parties. Hopefully it's only like Trump's past variety shows - all sound and fury. Time will tell. On the other hand China and ASEAN & others (India, EU, Africa, Latin America etc.) will carry on with trade cooperation like RCEP, One Belt One Road, AIIB, & leave US to its own devices if does not want to cooperate with the other nations of the world.

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If the US ever went to war with China, it would be a Trump distraction technique
Isaac Stone Fish

There is no indication that the US president wants a war. But, if he did get into one, it would be to direct attention away from his incompetence

Wednesday 25 January 2017 12.13 EST

First, the good news. Donald Trump almost certainly does not wish to go to war with China over the disputed islands in the South China Sea. Yes, in his Senate confirmation hearing in mid-January, secretary of state nominee Rex Tillerson provocatively compared Beijing’s moves in the sea to “Russia’s taking of Crimea” and said its “access to these islands also is not going to be allowed”. And on Monday, White House press secretary Sean Spicer pledged to defend “international territories” in the South China Sea.

But the simplest – and, frankly, more believable – explanation is that both men misspoke.

In the same hearing, Tillerson mistakenly said $5tn in trade passes through the South China Sea daily – it’s yearly. Trump’s team is new, relatively inexperienced in foreign policy and less reliant on expert briefings. As Dennis Wilder, the top White House Asia adviser to George W Bush, put it: “Tillerson and the new press secretary are just not yet steeped in the arcane nature and legal niceties of the South China Sea issue.”

Moreover, blockading the islands is not only “literally an act of war”, but “operationally almost impossible” an American South China Sea expert, who asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the situation, told me. And that, he said, indicates “it is a temper tantrum” – one that Trump may be using with the intention of trying to exert trade concessions from China – and “not a believable threat”.

That is the good news.

The bad news is that if in the coming months or years Trump faces an ignominious end to his presidency through scandal or mismanagement, a national crisis – involving China, or Isis or another foreign actor – could allow him to cling to power.

After national crises involving foreign actors, presidents often enjoy a bump in popularity. John F Kennedy, for example, saw his popularity shoot up after the Cuban missile crisis, while after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, George W Bush’s approval rating jumped from the mid-50s to a record high of 92%. In December 1979, the Republican presidential candidate John Connally reversed his earlier criticism of Jimmy Carter’s handling of the ongoing Iranian hostage crisis. “We have only one president,” Connally said. “Now is the time to rally behind him and show a solid front to Iran and the world.”

Political scientists call this the “rally round the flag effect”, and there are two schools of thought for why it happens, according to the scholars Marc J Hetherington and Michael Nelson.

There’s the “patriotism” school, where the president embodies the spirit of the nation, earning himself a place above criticism, and the “opinion leadership” school, where “leaders’ unwillingness to criticize leaves journalists with nothing to report – and citizens with nothing to read, see or hear – that is not supportive of the president”.

Trump surely understands this, and may be tempted to aggravate a national crisis in order to protect himself. He is a keen student, not of history – he said recently that his two favorite books were ones that he himself wrote – but of human psychology, and especially of mass appeal.

If Trump exacerbating a tense situation into a national crisis, or even a war, in order to save his presidency sounds far-fetched, consider his palpable insecurity, and how he obsesses over signs of his popularity. Trump’s White House continues to insist that his inauguration crowd was the largest ever, and that he only lost the popular vote because of massive election fraud – both obvious lies. For Trump, public acclaim seems to justify his existence.

Also, Trump enters office beleaguered. His approval rating is the lowest for a new president since Gallup begun surveying the issue in the Dwight D Eisenhower era. And his myriad financial interests, his refusal to release his tax returns, his impulsiveness, his penchant for nepotism, and his willingness to mix business and pleasure greatly increase the chance for an impeachable scandal.

Moreover, Trump has shown himself masterful at hijacking the national conversation to redirect attention away from his scandals and incompetence: “the Distractor in Chief”, in the words of the Washington Post’s Paul Farhi. A state of national emergency following an Isis attack, or a war with China to, say, “steal our jobs back” would follow that same pattern – only amplified. We underestimate his desire to maintain that popularity, and the tactics he would employ to do so, at our own peril.

Yes, the rally round the flag effect is temporary – lasting only a few weeks to several years, depending on the nature of the crisis. And presidential popularity can suffer when a war imposes financial and societal costs. But its effect is real.

If Trump is voted out of office, or impeached and convicted, it does not matter what threat the US is facing. It does not matter if we find ourselves enmeshed in a war with China, or scrambling to respond to an unprecedentedly devastating terrorist attack. He must go.

“In times of national crises,” Hetherington and Nelson wrote, “Americans rally to the president as the anthropomorphic symbol of national unity – a kind of living flag.” In some ways, our national nightmare would be a Trump dream: a period where his acclaim is absolute and unimpeachable.

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Jura said:

now I read Spicer South China Sea Comments Draw Negative Beijing Response

it's USNI News

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...
“I think the U.S. is going to make sure that we protect our interests there. So it’s a question of if those islands are in fact in international waters and are not part of China proper then yeah we’re going to make sure we defend international territories from being taken over by one country,” he said on Monday.

Spicer’s comments are more moderate than those of Trump secretary of state nominee Rex Tillerson, who told the Senate on Jan. 11 the U.S. could use military power to block Chinese access to the string of artificial islands Beijing has built in the Spratlys off of the Philippines.
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“The United States does not take a position on the question of territorial sovereignty, but we do take a position on whether maritime claims accord with the international law of the sea, as well as the manner in which countries pursue such claims,” a Defense Department spokesman told USNI News on Monday.
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kwaigonegin said:

Personally I do not like this game because it is creating an artificial environment whereby 'mistakes' can be easily made with very serious consequences.

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