South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

kwaigonegin said:

That was an asinine remark by tillerson. It absolutely gained nothing and created a new and totally unnecessary rift between the US and China.

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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met his Australian counterpart Malcolm Turnbull in Sydney on Saturday where the pair agreed to deepen defense ties through joint military training and exercises.

Abe's visit to Australia is the first since Turnbull became prime minister in late 2015, and comes amid heightened regional tension as China asserts its claims over disputed territory in the South China Sea.

"We have confirmed our commitment to the rule of law, free trade and open markets in our region," Turnbull told reporters at a joint press conference on Saturday.

Abe said the increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape made the relationship between Japan and Australia more important than ever.

"It is important to guard and increase the robustness of the free, open and rules-based international order," Abe said.

The two leaders announced the signing of an Acquisition and Cross‑Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which will increase cooperation in combined exercises, training and peace-keeping operations. The agreement is expected to be finalised by the end of 2017.

The announcement comes nearly nine months after Australia chose a French bid over a Japanese design for a new fleet of submarines.

The loss of the $40 billion contract was a major blow for Abe's ambitions to develop Japan's defense export capabilities as part of a more muscular security agenda.

Japan, as well as Australia, is looking to protect its strategic and trade interests in Asia-Pacific, especially as China becomes increasingly assertive in the South China Sea.

Both leaders also reaffirmed the importance of their respective security alliances with the United States on Saturday.

China's recent naval exercises in the South China Sea and the building of islands there, with military assets, has unnerved its neighbours and risks a fallout with the United States.

U.S. president-elect Donald Trump's nominee for secretary of state, Rex Tillerson, has said China should be denied access to islands it has built in the South China Sea.

China claims most of the resource-rich South China Sea through which about $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. Neighbours Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam also have claims.

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Jura said:

now noticed (dated Sat Jan 14, 2017 | 4:25am EST)

"We have confirmed our commitment to the rule of law, free trade and open markets in our region," Turnbull told reporters at a joint press conference on Saturday.

source is Reuters

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Is Tillerson Willing to Go to War Over the South China Sea?
The Exxon boss has shown before he can take Beijing to the limit — but as Secretary of State the stakes will be far higher.

BY BILL HAYTONJANUARY 13, 2017

Rex Tillerson, the former Exxon chief, didn’t get where he is by being nice to China. When Beijing tried to force his company to abandon a gas exploration project in the waters off Vietnam in 2008, ExxonMobil showed it the finger. BP, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and several others caved to Chinese pressure. ExxonMobil is still there, drilling on a Vietnamese license in waters also claimed by China.

Is Tillerson about to do the same on behalf of the United States? On Wednesday, the secretary of state-designate seemed ready to give China the finger again. He called on the incoming Trump administration to deny China access to the seven artificial island bases it has built in the southern part of the South China Sea.

In response to a question about whether he would support a more aggressive posture in the South China Sea, he told his Senate confirmation hearing, “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.” The jaws of the Asia policy-watching community hit the floor.

The implications are obvious. The only way the United States could block Chinese access to its existing island bases is by deploying warships and threatening the use of force. Is Tillerson really prepared to risk outright conflict between the two superpowers over the fate of these seven reefs?

Most observers are assuming that he misspoke. The exchange came after about five hours of testimony in front of the Foreign Relations Committee. A minute earlier, Tillerson had said $5 trillion worth of trade passed through the South China Sea each day — he meant $5 trillion a year. We all make mistakes. But what if he meant what he said?

From satellite photographs published by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of the Center for Strategic and International Studies we know that China’s island-building in the Spratly archipelago — disputed in whole or part between China (both of them), Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei — has already stopped. The bases are still being finished, but the terraforming is done. However, there’s still a strong suspicion that China’s ultimate intention is to build another massive base on the Scarborough Shoal, to the northeast of the Spratly Islands. The reef was firmly under Philippine control until the United States closed its bases in the country in the early 1990s. Since April 2012, Chinese vessels have been in charge. Sen. John McCain is convinced that China “is intent on seizing and reclaiming the Scarborough Shoal as the third military position in the South China Sea triangle of influence.” Combined with existing Chinese bases in the Spratlys and the Paracels, such a triangle would make Chinese control of the strategic waterway significantly easier.

Reports and rumors from Washington suggest that in early 2016, the United States made clear to China that it was prepared to physically deter any attempts to build on the Shoal. It deployed ships and aircraft to the South China Sea and bases in the Philippines to back up the threat. Tillerson may therefore have been simply stating that he wants this strategy to continue — stopping any island-building on Scarborough Shoal by denying construction vessels access to it.

But perhaps he did mean the United States should deny access to the existing seven artificial islands. James Kraska, professor of international law at the U.S. Naval War College, has testified in front of the House Armed Services Committee that it would be entirely legal to do so. In his reading, the United States “can and should challenge China’s rights to access its artificial islands as a lawful countermeasure in international law to induce China to comply with its obligations of the Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law.” This, Kraska says, was the basis of President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 Oceans Policy.

In other words, Washington could make China’s access to the bases conditional on Beijing’s agreeing to abide by the ruling given by the international Arbitration Tribunal in June 2016. China would, in effect, have to accept that it has no rights to regulate navigation or control fish or mineral resources beyond the areas allowed by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It would have to consent, for example, to the Philippines’ drilling for gas on the Reed Bank, about 60 nautical miles from the massive Chinese base at Mischief Reef; rein in the Chinese fishing fleets causing conflicts near Indonesia’s Natuna Islands; and, above all, give up any attempts to block U.S. naval ships transiting, exercising, or gathering intelligence in the South China Sea.

The blockade strategy would fit with other hints we have heard from the Trump camp about future China strategy. In November, two Trump advisors, Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, outlined a strategy of “peace through strength” in Foreign Policy. James Woolsey, who then described himself as a senior advisor to Donald Trump, suggested a “grand bargain in which the U.S. accepts China’s political and social structure and commits not to disrupt it in any way in exchange for China’s commitment not to challenge the status quo in Asia.” Logically, respecting the status quo would probably entail a commitment not to occupy any new reefs or deploy new military forces to the existing bases.

For some time, such senior Republicans as McCain and Dan Sullivan have been pressing for the United States to seize the initiative in the South China Sea, rather than merely responding to Chinese actions. It may well be that Tillerson is signaling the arrival of just such a strategy. Rather than waiting for the provocation, we could see an attempt to push back against China’s recent advances and pressure Beijing into accepting that UNCLOS rules apply everywhere in the South China Sea.

China won’t see it that way — unless Washington explains what’s going on extremely carefully — nor will most of the rest of the world. There are many risks to consider. China could call Washington’s bluff and provoke a confrontation. Ships could be sunk, lives lost, and the crisis would spill over into trade and every other area of international policy. A close observer of South China Sea developments, professor Julian Ku of Hofstra University Law School, notes that while it might be legal, the strategy “would start a war.”

Another risk is that the United States might lose the support of its allies, partners, and friends in Southeast Asia and beyond. None want conflict — they need the United States and China to get along so they can develop in peace. Although most seek a robust U.S. presence to counter China’s advances, they don’t want to be forced to choose sides. The United States would risk looking hypocritical: Having long championed the cause of freedom of navigation in the region, it would be deliberately restricting it, albeit in the wider interests of freedom of navigation.

Finally, there’s always the risk that, with naval resources spread thinly around the world and regional governments unwilling to grant access to ports and logistics bases for political reasons, the United States might find it difficult to actually enforce the policy against the full force of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Any failure to go through with the blockade, once declared, would be catastrophic for the reputation of a superpower. The commander of U.S. Naval Forces recently suggested that the PLAN “couldn’t fight their way out of a wet paper bag.” However, other analysts, such as Lyle Goldstein of the China Maritime Studies Institute, have been warning about its growing anti-ship missile capabilities for some time. If both sides of a potential confrontation believe they can win, the likelihood of conflict increases dangerously.

So far the official Chinese response to Tillerson’s comments has been notably mild. The foreign ministry spokesperson made a point of agreeing “with Mr. Tillerson at one point where he recognized disagreements but also intertwined interests and consensus.” Beijing appears to be holding to its “wait and see” position on the Trump administration for the time being. It was left to the nationalistic Global Times to warn, “Unless Washington plans to wage a large-scale war in the South China Sea, any other approaches to prevent Chinese access to the islands will be foolish.”

In 2008, Chinese officials threatened ExxonMobil with painful consequences if it pursued its projects with Vietnam. (I outlined the story in Chapter 5 of my 2014 book.) But the company held a strong hand, not least gas exports from Russia’s Sakhalin region that China was very keen to access. Tillerson held his nerve, called China’s bluff, and won. Will he do it again?

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Beijing views the December phone call between President-elect Donald Trump and the Taiwanese president as “a very worrisome indicator,” three experts on cross-strait relations said Tuesday.

The call between Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen and Trump muddies intentions about possible independence or separation and future United States’ commitment to an almost 40-year-old “One-China policy,” they said.

“This is a very critical moment” in the Asia-Pacific filled with uncertainty as Trump takes office, Liu Shih-chung, of the Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect Foundation, said. In addition to the change of American administrations, he cited future China-Taiwan-U.S. relations, political instability in South Korea, the unpredictability of North Korea and now the Philippines as matters of concern for China’s leaders.

In combination, all these circumstances “stir the uneasiness” politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily.

Also speaking at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, David Brown said in response to the call Beijing stepped up pressure on the Taiwanese business community, launched military aircraft that flew patterns encircling the island, dispatched its only aircraft carrier on its first patrol through the straits and leaned on governments such as Nigeria to downgrade commercial ties with Taipei.

“This worries them,” referring to Beijing’s political leadership because her support on the island reflects “the changing dynamics of Taiwan politics” where much of the electorate is younger, born on the island, and no longer has direct ties to China. China’s “emphasis [has been] on preventing independence and separation.”

The adjunct professor at the School for Advanced and International Studies at the Johns Hopkins University pointed out Tsai “stopped short of [endorsing] ‘One China'” in earlier speeches but “said she not going to go any further” in describing her views of the future. Much of her support in her recent election came from pro-independence or separation parties and organizations.

While “most of us here in the U.S. think [Taiwan independence] is off the table,” Beijing worries she might encourage the Trump administration to abandon the policy and encourage Taipei’s allies in Congress to further their support.

Taiwan’s leaders, however, recognize “it is a small power lodged between two large powers,” Brown added, so treads carefully.

Dan Blumenthal, of the American Enterprise Institute, said, “We’re living with the messiness of the normalization process” of the policy and changes in Taipei and now in Washington. The United States and China have competing interests and the “One-China policy” is “worth fresh eyes.”

“Why is it we have gone so far to accept China’s interpretation” of that policy that he said allows them to view their borders in the Asia Pacific as identical to the Qing Dynasty of the 17th century, he asked.

“Trump was very well briefed about the ‘One-China policy’ before the call,” he said. Going forward, “the ‘One-China policy’ is the bargaining chip,” not the future of Taiwan. He pointed to American “frustration with China” over its moves in the East and South China Seas and its reluctance to pressure Pyongyang over its missile and nuclear weapons programs. China “is breaking rules” of accepted international behavior by reclaiming reefs and turning them into militarized artificial islands and “by writing its own rules” to get its way in territorial disputes.

Blumenthal said he expects the new administration “won’t say there are two Chinas,” but will pursue opportunities for more cooperation with Taiwan, a democracy with a strong economy and a commitment to shoring up its deterrent and defensive capabilities.

Among these steps would be more general officer visits and more robust arms sales.

“There is room to improve U.S. relations,” but it “needs to be done quietly, not rubbing Beijing’s nose into it,” Brown said. “That’s what worries me” about the Trump administration.

Liu said Taiwan, by committing three percent of its gross domestic product to its own security, is trying to “combine defense development with economic development.” He added Tsai’s government will roll out its first Quadrennial Defense Review this spring. He predicted the review would show Taipei’s willingness to “pursue asymmetric capabilities” — cruise missiles, mines and submarines — for coastal defense. He stressed in security matters Taiwan “is not a free rider,” but willing to invest and pay for its defense.

“This is a game of patience,” Liu said as both Taiwan and China are for now more focused on domestic issues.

Blumenthal said, there is “something to be said for being bold early” for an incoming Trump administration in developing future relations with Taiwan and China.

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Hendrik_2000 said:

I thought this is an excellent piece . But all in all Obama administration did well to maintain the turbulent relation with China on even keel basis rhetoric aside. It bought 8 years of relative piece. There is always competition but still manageable. With the new administration all bet are off
From Diplomat

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It is impossible to know what a president’s foreign policy legacy will be until long after they have left office. But there is good reason to believe that the “pivot to Asia” will come to be seen as President Barack Obana’s greatest foreign policy mistake.

Obama once referred to himself as

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and the pivot is

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that properly rebalanced America’s foreign policy focus away from costly interventions in the Middle East to Asia, the prophesied center of the 21st century economy. The reality is that the pivot was a failure that caused serious negative side effects in other parts of the world.

The pivot was based on a series of flawed assumptions, namely: That U.S. foreign policy had previously neglected the Asia Pacific, that Asia’s rising importance in the global economy called for the assignment of more military resources to the region, and that the United States could afford to pull back from the Middle East and other regions. By taking the approach it did, the Obama administration managed to make tensions in the Asia-Pacific worse while also allowing the Middle East and Europe to fall into even deeper chaos than before as a result of neglect.

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First, it is simply wrong that the United States was ignoring the Asia Pacific when Barack Obama came to office. Far from being neglectful, the Bush administration’s Asia policy was a success. The Bush administration helped get

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. It concluded free trade agreements with Australia, South Korea, and Singapore and

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). It also concluded a civilian nuclear agreement with India and forged a new relationship with that country while simultaneously managing to build a partnership with Pakistan to deal with Afghanistan. Some of these policies were later repackaged by the Obama administration as part of the pivot.

The pivot did include some new diplomatic initiatives (such as the rapprochement with Myanmar) but the real problem was the shift in security and defense policy. By putting Asia at the center of its security strategy, the Obama administration inadvertently made the entire enterprise seem to Beijing like an effort to contain China militarily. This led China to respond by becoming more aggressive, helping to undo the general tranquility that existed before 2008.

Emblematic of this mistake was the roll-out of the Air-Sea Battle doctrine. First outlined in a then-classified memo in 2009, ASB became official doctrine in 2010.

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and then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates openly discussed the need to counter China’s growing military capabilities. The signal received in Beijing was the United States had hostile intentions toward China and was trying to contain it militarily. The result was that the entire pivot was seen by Beijing as part of a broader effort to encircle China.

If the first flaw in the pivot was the prominence of its military component, the second flaw was that there wasn’t a compelling reason to have a military component at all. The premise of the pivot was that Asia was more important relative to other parts of the world because it was home to a rising proportion of global GDP and was now at the center of the world economy. But this called for an economic response to take advantage of an opportunity, not a military response to counter threats. Yet, the pivot to Asia contained a robust military component.

This led China to view the entire enterprise, not just its military components, as part of a broader effort at containment. For example, when the TPP was finalized in 2015, Obama said,

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Even trade deals were being presented as a way to counter the threat from China. It is no mystery why Beijing believed U.S. strategy in the region centered on containing China’s rise. The United States publicly said this is exactly what it was doing.

It didn’t have to be this way. One obvious opportunity for a different approach was

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. The United States refused to participate and even

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. As Leland Lazarus explained for The Diplomat,

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. If the United States had pursued the Trans-Pacific Partnership by publicly emphasizing it hoped China would one day join while also joining the AIIB, the entire perception of any pivot in Beijing would have been radically different. Instead of appearing to be a strategy to undermine China it would simply appear to be an effort to take full advantage of the economic opportunities presented by Asia’s dynamic economic growth. Instead, the United States chose a path that heightened military tensions and missed out on economic opportunities.

The third grave error was the United States took its eye off the ball in Europe and the Middle East. The Obama administration appears to have believed that the United States could not walk and chew gum at the same time and focusing on Asia meant losing focus somewhere else. This was both untrue and highly dangerous. American neglect of Europe was followed by Russian adventurism in Ukraine, an increased threat to the Baltic states, and the erosion of democracy in Poland and Hungary. After America pulled back from the Middle East, the Syrian Civil War displaced 11 million people and caused a refugee crisis, Islamic State moved into Iraq, and America’s relationships with its Gulf allies frayed as Iranian influence expanded throughout the region.

The final tally is not pretty. The pivot did not contain the rise of China. Instead, China became more aggressive, pressing its claims in the South China Sea and to the Senkakus. China also continues to close the gap in military capabilities with the United States. Its economy continues to grow, as does its share of global GDP. The TPP looks to be dead in Congress while China pursues trade deals of its own with key countries in the region. The pivot failed to achieve its key goals in Asia while inattention helped make matters worse in Europe and the Middle East. The pivot to Asia has been a failure on all fronts. Given the importance of the Asia-Pacific, this failure is likely to be remembered as President Obama’s greatest mistake in foreign policy.

John Ford is a Captain in the U.S. Army JAG Corps who studied at Peking University. He has previously written for The Diplomat on China’s economy and its maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The views expressed here are his own. You can follow him at @johndouglasford on twitter.

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