Significance of the Chinese military contribution to World War 2 disputed.

lightspeed said:

. in addition, if the Japanese showed signs of defeating the Kuomintang in Chungking, the Soviets would invade China from Central Asia and divide up China jointly between them and Japan. .

Click to expand...

I find it highly doubtful that after the fall of France to Germany in May 1940, the Soviet Union would have had much appetite for committing sizeable forces in the far east.

I find it even more doubtful that Japan would have had any inclination whatsoever towards allowing Soviet interests forces into China and thus improving Soviet Union's starting position if it should chose to attack vital Japanese interests in Manchuria.

I think Soviet Union wanted Japan bogged down in China as much as possible, and make Japan commit any surplus energy it has left towards attacking the British and the Americans, in order to remove a threat to its eastern flank, and would have no interest whatsoever in letting Chang collapse even if it gave Soviet Union a highly extended and nearly impossible to defend sphere of interest in China when the Germans were ranning amok in Europe. The only thing splitting China with Japan would give the USSR at that time would be increased temptation for Japan to focus its attention on the USSR rather than on the British and Americans, and also gang up on USSR to take Soviet share of China away from the USSR should war break out between USSR and Germany break out in the west.

solarz said:

More importantly, what would bombing Yan'an have accomplished? Unlike the rest of the NRA, the Eighth Route Army was divided into independent regiments operating on their own. Neither was Yan'an an important economic center like Chongqing. Yan'an was the political center of the CPC, but had little military value. If the Japanese put a concerted effort into destroying Yan'an, the CPC leadership would have simply moved elsewhere. I'm pretty sure the Japanese were well aware of these facts.

Click to expand...

Yan’an was strategically important to some degree during the war. if the Japanese captured Yan’an, they would advance their land position by a significiant distance to capture Xi’an and Tungkwan pass, a vital northwest gateway to Hunan and the West. Hu Zongnan’s troops had massed at Xi’an to protect the transport lines and Tungkwan pass there. furthermore, new Japanese units coming from the Great Wall often took the Yan’an and its immediate areas routes to its bases elsewhere. the Japanese would want to ensure the safety of those routes therefore they would find value in capturing Yan’an and i believe they can capture Yan’an without much difficulty.

why the Japanese didn’t attack Yan’an ? according to Soviet diplomat Peter Vladimirov who spent almost every day with Mao Zedong for years during the war. Mao was never worried about the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Yan’an at all but he was real worried about Xi’an Hu Zongnan attacking Yan’an though. Mao of course knew the real reason why the Japanese will not attack Yan’an. Vladimirov would eventually understand Mao’s reason with much disgust at the end of his days in Yan’an.

chuck731 said:

I find it highly doubtful that after the fall of France to Germany in May 1940, the Soviet Union would have had much appetite for committing sizeable forces in the far east.

I find it even more doubtful that Japan would have had any inclination whatsoever towards allowing Soviet interests forces into China and thus improving Soviet Union's starting position if it should chose to attack vital Japanese interests in Manchuria.

I think Soviet Union wanted Japan bogged down in China as much as possible, and make Japan commit any surplus energy it has left towards attacking the British and the Americans, in order to remove a threat to its eastern flank, and would have no interest whatsoever in letting Chang collapse even if it gave Soviet Union a highly extended and nearly impossible to defend sphere of interest in China when the Germans were ranning amok in Europe. The only thing splitting China with Japan would give the USSR at that time would be increased temptation for Japan to focus its attention on the USSR rather than on the British and Americans, and also gang up on USSR to take Soviet share of China away from the USSR should war break out between USSR and Germany break out in the west.

Click to expand...

the Soviets had made advances into Xinjiang during the early years of the China-Japan war. i agree that the Soviets would prefer Japan bogged down in China and Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalists not to be defeated. but if the Japanese would defeat the Nationalists, the Soviets would want a huge share of interests in China. the Soviets were just exploring their options and opening up the possibilities for their best interests then.

think the Japanese were well aware of the fact that the powers would never allow Japan to complete the conquest and control all the resources of China. this is why Japan had those secret agreements with the powers: to convince them that their interests in China would not be harmed if Japan won the war.

according to author Freda Utley. the British presumably reached an understanding with the Japanese in 1938 that they would not oppose and interfere with Japan’s domination of China’s Yellow River North. in return, Japan would protect the British's economic interests in Southern China, namely Guangdong and they would not invade British Hongkong.

lightspeed said:

Yan’an was strategically important to some degree during the war. if the Japanese captured Yan’an, they would advance their land position by a significiant distance to capture Xi’an and Tungkwan pass, a vital northwest gateway to Hunan and the West. Hu Zongnan’s troops had massed at Xi’an to protect the transport lines and Tungkwan pass there. furthermore, new Japanese units coming from the Great Wall often took the Yan’an and its immediate areas routes to its bases elsewhere. the Japanese would want to ensure the safety of those routes therefore they would find value in capturing Yan’an and i believe they can capture Yan’an without much difficulty.

why the Japanese didn’t attack Yan’an ? according to Soviet diplomat Peter Vladimirov who spent almost every day with Mao Zedong for years during the war. Mao was never worried about the possibility of a Japanese invasion of Yan’an at all but he was real worried about Xi’an Hu Zongnan attacking Yan’an though. Mao of course knew the real reason why the Japanese will not attack Yan’an. Vladimirov would eventually understand Mao’s reason with much disgust at the end of his days in Yan’an.

Click to expand...

That the only reason you can find for the Japanese to attack Yan'an is to fight another fortified Chinese position, or to protect transport lines that were largely unthreatened, pretty much proves my point.

If the Japanese had the manpower, they probably would've loved to attack every strategic location. The fact is, they didn't, so they had to prioritize targets, and Yan'an was far down the list. It doesn't take a conspiracy theory to explain the Japanese strategy.

solarz said:

That the only reason you can find for the Japanese to attack Yan'an is to fight another fortified Chinese position, or to protect transport lines that were largely unthreatened, pretty much proves my point.

If the Japanese had the manpower, they probably would've loved to attack every strategic location. The fact is, they didn't, so they had to prioritize targets, and Yan'an was far down the list. It doesn't take a conspiracy theory to explain the Japanese strategy.

Click to expand...

i correct myself. the Japanese's capture of Yanan would not be advantageous to take Xian or Tungkwan pass. it seems that the Japanese had to get past Yan Xishan’s position in Shanxi, and Hu Zongnan's Weinan in Shaanxi in order to get to Yanan. but still Yanan was only about 100 miles away from the Japanese’s lines. the political significance of Yanan would be worthwhile for them to capture it. the Japanese must have considered the agreements with the Soviets and refrained from attacking CCP capital Yanan during the war.

lightspeed said:

i correct myself. the Japanese's capture of Yanan would not be advantageous to take Xian or Tungkwan pass. it seems that the Japanese had to get past Yan Xishan’s position in Shanxi, and Hu Zongnan's Weinan in Shaanxi in order to get to Yanan. but still Yanan was only about 100 miles away from the Japanese’s lines. the political significance of Yanan would be worthwhile for them to capture it. the Japanese must have considered the agreements with the Soviets and refrained from attacking CCP capital Yanan during the war.

Click to expand...

How so? Like we've noted, the communists represented less than 10% of China's fighting force. Furthermore, before the 100 Regiment offensive, everybody thought the communists were *much* smaller. Why would the Japanese bother with such a small issue when they have millions of Nationalist troops and dozens of high value targets to contend with?

Also note the "Three All" retaliation policy in response to the 100 Regiment offensive. The Japanese focused on destroying communist guerilla's supply bases and chain of command. They were well aware that Yan'an played little role in the actual military operations of the communist forces. In fact, it is arguable whether they even *cared* that the Eighth Route was communist. To them, they were just Chinese insurgent forces that needed to be wiped out.

solarz said:

How so? Like we've noted, the communists represented less than 10% of China's fighting force. Furthermore, before the 100 Regiment offensive, everybody thought the communists were *much* smaller. Why would the Japanese bother with such a small issue when they have millions of Nationalist troops and dozens of high value targets to contend with?

Also note the "Three All" retaliation policy in response to the 100 Regiment offensive. The Japanese focused on destroying communist guerilla's supply bases and chain of command. They were well aware that Yan'an played little role in the actual military operations of the communist forces. In fact, it is arguable whether they even *cared* that the Eighth Route was communist. To them, they were just Chinese insurgent forces that needed to be wiped out.

Click to expand...

the CCP’s presence in the war certainly benefited the Japanese's cause to a large degree. it is known that the KMT and CCP fought each other a great deal, amid dealing with the Japanese invasion. their united front to fight the Japanese was almost non existent. the Communists had huge success, largely wiping out the KMT’s last lines in Hebei and Shandong and taking over those areas by 1940. the Communists also prevented the KMT’s guerrillas operating effectively behind the Japanese’s lines. in contrary to popular belief, not all guerrilla fighters were the Communists and not all guerrilla fighting were done by the Communists. in fact, the KMT’s guerrilla fighters were the ones doing the real intelligence and sabotage missions against the Japanese. very little is known of the KMT’s guerrilla force. the KMT’s guerrillas, the Communist guerrillas, local militias and the Puppet troops subsisted and strove for their purposes under real terrible conditions in the Japanese occupied areas. CCP intelligence agent Pan Hannian’s establish of contacts with Nanking puppet leader 李士群 and Japanese intelligence chief 岩井公馆 岩井英一 shouldn’t be overlooked too. this is probably an important turning point in CCP-Japanese relations during the war.

the KMT-CCP fight: militarily or politically, was a positive for the Japanese. the Communist troops avoided direct or indirect confrontation with the Japanese troops as much as possible. the CCP did very little to negatively affect the Japanese's position. the CCP was the Soviet’s protege. the Japanese would not want to antagonize the Soviets by destroying the CCP. the CCP was very useful to the Japanese in the bigger picture. the Japanese not attacking Yanan then were their goodwill gesture to the Soviets and CCP leaders.

i understand your pov which i largely agree too.

lightspeed said:

the CCP’s presence in the war certainly benefited the Japanese's cause to a large degree. it is known that the KMT and CCP fought each other a great deal, amid dealing with the Japanese invasion. their united front to fight the Japanese was almost non existent. the Communists had huge success, largely wiping out the KMT’s last lines in Hebei and Shandong and taking over those areas by 1940. the Communists also prevented the KMT’s guerrillas operating effectively behind the Japanese’s lines. in contrary to popular belief, not all guerrilla fighters were the Communists and not all guerrilla fighting were done by the Communists. in fact, the KMT’s guerrilla fighters were the ones doing the real intelligence and sabotage missions against the Japanese. very little is known of the KMT’s guerrilla force. the KMT’s guerrillas, the Communist guerrillas, local militias and the Puppet troops subsisted and strove for their purposes under real terrible conditions in the Japanese occupied areas. CCP intelligence agent Pan Hannian’s establish of contacts with Nanking puppet leader 李士群 and Japanese intelligence chief 岩井公馆 岩井英一 shouldn’t be overlooked too. this is probably an important turning point in CCP-Japanese relations during the war.

the KMT-CCP fight: militarily or politically, was a positive for the Japanese. the Communist troops avoided direct or indirect confrontation with the Japanese troops as much as possible. the CCP did very little to negatively affect the Japanese's position. the CCP was the Soviet’s protege. the Japanese would not want to antagonize the Soviets by destroying the CCP. the CCP was very useful to the Japanese in the bigger picture. the Japanese not attacking Yanan then were their goodwill gesture to the Soviets and CCP leaders.

i understand your pov which i largely agree too.

Click to expand...

This smacks of anti-CCP propaganda than anything else, given how much these claims are derived from anti-CCP sources to begin with. Stalin in fact preferred the KMT over the CCP (much like how he undermined Spanish Republicans in Spain) given that he had much less control over Mao and co compared to the relative weakness of Chiang and the KMT politically speaking.

montyp165 said:

This smacks of anti-CCP propaganda than anything else, given how much these claims are derived from anti-CCP sources to begin with. Stalin in fact preferred the KMT over the CCP (much like how he undermined Spanish Republicans in Spain) given that he had much less control over Mao and co compared to the relative weakness of Chiang and the KMT politically speaking.

Click to expand...

anti-CCP propaganda ? we shouldn’t believe all CCP’s claims nor we should believe all KMT’s claims too. they had plenty of accusations against each other during their bitter struggle and not all of it is true by any means.

regarding the CCP’s participation in the anti-Japanese war. there are the KMT and CCP sides of the story, and the Japanese, American and Soviet accounts of the war too. we should read and consider all sides of the argument to have a better perspective on things.

the Soviets used the CCP as a significant leverage tool in their relations with KMT then. but the survival of the CCP mattered little to the Soviets who would undermine the CCP’s interests to improve their relations with KMT for their best interests. i don’t interpret it as Stalin favoring the KMT over the CCP.

lightspeed said:

anti-CCP propaganda ? we shouldn’t believe all CCP’s claims nor we should believe all KMT’s claims too. they had plenty of accusations against each other during their bitter struggle and not all of it is true by any means.

regarding the CCP’s participation in the anti-Japanese war. there are the KMT and CCP sides of the story, and the Japanese, American and Soviet accounts of the war too. we should read and consider all sides of the argument to have a better perspective on things.

the Soviets used the CCP as a significant leverage tool in their relations with KMT then. but the survival of the CCP mattered little to the Soviets who would undermine the CCP’s interests to improve their relations with KMT for their best interests. i don’t interpret it as Stalin favoring the KMT over the CCP.

Click to expand...

Stalin would undoubtedly prefer to,install a pliant communist government in china that the Soviet Union can control. * But the immediate need of the USSR to win the war with Germany and then enjoy a decade or two of peace afterwards to rebuild outweigh that desire. *

Stalin favored KMT over CCP because it is KMT that could and did tie down the bulk of Japanese regular forces in china, and crippling Japan's ability to stab the USSR in the back as USSR fights for its existence against Germany. Stalin also had to favor KMT because it is the KMT that had the power to negotiate a peace settlement with japan that would stick and thus totally upset USSR's entire strategic posture after 1940. Finally Stalin must favor KMT over CCP because for much of the war, Stalin needed the solidarity of the US and UK, and the later considered KMT China's legimate government and would take a dim view of Soviet Union propping up a communist regime in china and thus upsetting their own plans for east Asia after the war.

In any case in orthrodox Marxist Leninist theorey Soviet Union embraced China's semi-feudal agrarian society is the type of society least suitable and least prepared by for proper communism, and therefore made the least promising candidates for successful communist takeover. Furthermore Stalin had his agents in yan'an and was in no doubt about Mao being pliant to soviet wishes. Mao would not have been stalin's preferred candidate for leading Chinese communist party onto a russocentric course. So this further devalued CCP in Stalin's eyes after Mao's takeover at Yan'an around 1942.

Stalin stabbed Mao in the back pretty clearly in 1945, when in return for KMT acquiescing to soviet sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia, the Soviet Union gave KMT full recognition as sole legitimate government of china, and gave KMT most of what the KMT wanted, including departure of soviet influence in xingjian, recognition that former soviet prewar possessions in manchurian belonged to kmt's china, and gave CCP almost no military support.