Self Propelled Gun/Rocket Launcher

vincent said:

Not good enough for time-sensitive targets like SPGs.

Click to expand...

That's something that's already been done hundreds of times over two years of hard war. Something that's done every day, if not every hour.

Something like Supercams and it's successor the ZALA-16 has called strikes on hundreds if not thousands of vehicles and then recorded the results.

The same means are done to for the targeting and recording of FAB strikes.

vincent said:

The UAV may be able to fly 240km or transmit video for 100km, but I doubt it can do both at the same time.


This can be solved by multiple ways. Blocking Russian IP is one, turning off cell towers in the front is another one.

Click to expand...

Except that it's been already done. You can do that with a communication tower set at high ground, or with the use of relay drones. Targeting, recording and the confirmation of Iskander results are an example.

vincent said:

Yes, Ukrainian had to because they don’t have good alternatives. NATO and Chinese forces will not have that problem.

Tam is arguing SPG is worst than towed artillery due to the existence of small UAVs as a universal fact. I just want to point out the Ukrainian theatre examples may not apply to other theatres because the belligerents lacks high-end systems other players have.

Click to expand...

I 100% agree. Looking at the Russian-Ukranian war to gauge optimal solutions is probably a very bad idea. We are talking about two nations that have been locked at a very bloody stalemate here. Both are very desperate. They are of course going to pull everything out from the reserves and produce whatever they can. I haven't seen anything that suggest they prefer towed guns over SPGs.

vincent said:

Yes, Ukrainian had to because they don’t have good alternatives. NATO and Chinese forces will not have that problem.

Tam is arguing SPG is worst than towed artillery due to the existence of small UAVs as a universal fact. I just want to point out the Ukrainian theatre examples may not apply to other theatres because the belligerents lacks high-end systems other players have.

Click to expand...

Ukraine entered the war with the second best and most numerous AD system in Europe after the Russians. Within a year, it was gravely depleted. Other than China, every other belligerent has far way worst and quantitatively less SAMs.

Drones either strike the systems on the ground or simply soak up the opponent missiles by out numbering and producing them. Drones also provide target coordinates to ballistic missiles that take out the AD systems.

Tornado-S takes out NASAMS. Note the drone recording the event, likely the same that provided the target coordinates.



S-300 system gets taken out. Note the drone lasing or taking target coordinates, which is used to guide the strike missile.



High end systems don't solve the drone problem. They exacerbate it with exponentially more expensive missiles taking out cheap drones the cost of an economy car, much less those that cost only in the four figures. That's like Ferraris trying to win a derby against Corollas. In fact MANPADS themselves are more expensive than many of these drones. But at least they are able to close the price gap.

It already being argued or studied, the best way to deal with a drone is to develop small cheap interceptor drones.

Mobile artillery has become a hazard on its own and the proof of that are the massed vehicle cemeteries in Ukraine's roads close to the front.

The need for sheer fire volume means SPGs cannot fill that requirement either, and is forced to resort to large stocks of vintage towed artillery and even antitank guns, e,g. M198, M-46, MT-12 guns and so on.

Let me list high end systems Russian and Ukrainians don’t have:

• EA-18G/J-16D to suppress enemy AD system.
• Aerial jammers (manned and unmanned) that can jam UAV communication systems.
• Aerial ELINT platforms that can pinpoint UAV control nodes.
• Aerial SAR platforms that can monitor movements behind enemy lines and guide mobile artillery to take out anything that moves.
• Probably inefficient number counter-battery radars to locate enemy artillery (far deadlier to tow artillery than self-propelled ones).
• Mature mobile laser-based anti-UAV systems.

Builder said:

Hello everybody. In this discussion about spg does anyone know if the PLA use guided artillery rounds, like Krasnopol, for their 122 mm spg? Or some kind of sensor fuzed rounds for the same 122 mm? It is well known that the 120 mm mortar can fire sensor fuzed munitions, so why not for the 122 mm?

Click to expand...

PLA should have some Krasnopol copies of their own, as the shell was developed initially during the waning days of the Soviet Union. If not, they have seen the results and should be scrambling on their own.

What's new later in the Krasnopol development is the combination of having a GPS guided inertial system to the laser semi active one, creating a true dual mode guided round. Without the GPS system, the effective range is limited. The dual mode system is better for SPGs that have greater range, such as the 155mm for export MSTA-S, or the MSTA-SM2 with the 2A79 cannon which has greater range than the 2A64 cannon of the MSTA-S. As well as for the Koalitsya-SV with it's 2A80. With such a round, range can exceed 70km

vincent said:

Let me list high end systems Russian and Ukrainians don’t have:

• EA-18G/J-16D to suppress enemy AD system.
• Aerial jammers (manned and unmanned) that can jam UAV communication systems.
• Aerial ELINT platforms that can pinpoint UAV control nodes.
• Aerial SAR platforms that can monitor movements behind enemy lines and guide mobile artillery to take out anything that moves.
• Probably inefficient number counter-battery radars to locate enemy artillery.
• Mature mobile laser-based anti-UAV systems.

Click to expand...

Jammers are heavily range dependent. Let's start with that and the number of jammers taken out by Lancets show how effective is that.

UAV control nodes and communications can have ECCM and LPI features.

Ukraine has plenty of counterbattery radars. WAS the operational word, they themselves gets wiped out by Lancet drones.

Laser based batteries are just as vulnerable to drones as SAMs are. This becomes whoever sees each other first kills the other first affair. They are also expensive, power supplies give thermal signatures that give them away, and they don't work well in bad and foggy weather.

You don't need aerial ELINT to find UAV control nodes. Ground ELINT is fine but in coordination with scouting and targeting drones. Already a tactic used by both sides. You then send a Krasnopol, an Excalibur, a HIMARS, a Tornado-S or even an Iskander to the site. It's a fight fire with fire affair.

vincent said:

Not good enough for time-sensitive targets like SPGs.

Click to expand...

And where are these SPGs with over 100 km range? Unicorn ramjet rounds which no one uses. Like I said the radio link of the Supercam can do 100 km without repeaters or anything. Most SPG artillery in Ukraine is 40 km range or lower.
The reason the Russians developed the repeaters in the first place was to strike long range MLRS like the HIMARS with GMLRS-ER, Tochka ballistic missiles, Patriot SAM systems and the like. Not SPGs which were within range already.

BoraTas said:

Lastly, Shahed isn't effective munition at all. It has a warhead of 50 kilos and its accuracy is very meh compared to more expensive munitions. There are a fair number of videos of them hitting residential buildings, which I believe Russia wouldn't target knowingly. You could defeat Shahed-like munitions with just hardened aircraft shelters.

Click to expand...

The Russians modified the Shahed to have less range and a larger warhead. It is not like they need the range to hit Israel from Iran in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Tam said:

Jammers are heavily range dependent. Let's start with that. The number of jammers taken out by Lancets show how effective is that.

Click to expand...

If UAV‘s communication system can reach 100km, then aerial jammers should work with that range too. Lancets can’t hit aerial targets.

Tam said:

UAV control nodes and communications can have ECCM and LPI features.

Ukraine has plenty of counterbattery radars. WAS the operational word, they themselves gets wiped out by Lancet drones.

Click to expand...

each counter battery radar can be guarded by PGZ04A/95, PGZ09 or Type 625 SPAAG, or laser systems

Tam said:

Laser based batteries are just as vulnerable to drones as SAMs are. This becomes whoever sees each other first affair. They are also expensive, power supplies give thermal signatures that give them away, and they don't work well in bad and foggy weather.

Click to expand...

We know little about Western and Chinese laser systems.

Tam said:

You don't need aerial ELINT to find UAV control nodes. Ground ELINT is fine but in coordination with scouting and targeting drones. Already a tactic used by both sides. You then send a Krasnopol, an Excalibur, a HIMARS, a Tornado-S or even an Iskander to the site. It's a fight fire with fire affair.

Click to expand...

Ground based ELINT can locate emission sources over the horizon (for command nodes for UAVs that have ranges over 40km)?

gelgoog said:

And where are these SPGs with over 100 km range? Unicorn ramjet rounds which no one uses. Like I said the radio link of the Supercam can do 100 km without repeaters or anything. Most SPG artillery in Ukraine is 40 km range or lower.

Click to expand...

For real-time video feeds that can reach tens of kilometers don’t you need high power VHF antenna? Transmissions that can be jammed. When I was small our TVs rely on antennas and that can be affected by the weather easily.

Tam said:

UAV control nodes and communications can have ECCM and LPI features.

Click to expand...

Maybe for control channels. Unlikely for real-time video feeds.

BoraTas said:

First of all, we don't have a concrete number on the price of the Shahed. The number is going lower and lower but we don't have any evidence to support those low numbers. According to the only semi-confident numbers we have, Russia got them for $193k each. They expect the price to decrease to $49k after full localization.

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Click to expand...

Remember this is the price because Russia was desperate for drones.

As a comparison, note how the price of artillery shells in Europe has also jumped 4x from 2000euro to 8000euro.

Plus the Chinese price is going to be a lot lower.

BoraTas said:

Second of all, Tamir isn't the cheapest SAM possible. It is Israeli (not a cheap country, at all), is active-radar guided, it has kinematics good enough to defend a town from a 155 mm shell. A Shahed is an incomparably easier target than a 155 mm shell.

Click to expand...

So what is the cheapest SAM possible?

BoraTas said:

Third, if we talking about the defense of something as small and valuable as an airbase then SPAAG, EW and lasers are in the question. You could easily ring fence an airbase with these assets. EW is particularly important to mention here because getting something EW resistant is expensive.

Lastly, Shahed isn't effective munition at all. It has a warhead of 50 kilos and its accuracy is very meh compared to more expensive munitions. There are a fair number of videos of them hitting residential buildings, which I believe Russia wouldn't target knowingly. You could defeat Shahed-like munitions with just hardened aircraft shelters.

Click to expand...

Yes, a hardened aircraft shelter will defend against small warheads.

But remember that Shaheeds are the low-end cruise missile used against soft, fixed targets. And there are thousands of such targets.

Then you have the DF-17 (~$2Mn) and the CJ-10 (~$1Mn) which are the high-end missiles which would be used against a hardened aircraft shelter (~$4 Mn)

Again, in a competition between low-cost offensive missiles and expensive defensive hardened shelters, the missiles win.

===

We have the CCTV7 newsreel on Youtube, where they take journalists to a factory capable of 1000 cruise missiles per day. This alone would be sufficient to deplete all the defensive SAMs.

That means China would have control of the medium and high altitude airspace, and could take out SPAAG, EW and lasers at its leisure.

You can boil it down to 2 scenarios.

1. If there aren't any air defences, the Shaheeds will target soft, fixed targets easily.

2. If there are still air defences, and a Shaheed is destroyed by a SAM, it will have done its job. The SAM costs a lot more than a Shaheed and those SAMs won't be available to shoot down aircraft or expensive cruise missiles.