I have seen Strelkov refer to the need for a “national mobilization” or “partial mobilization” quite often. What does this entail and would it have any significant effect on the conflict?
Mobilisation is about increasing the manpower available to Russia's armed forces by bringing civilians in (via conscription, probably) and training them to become soldiers who can be deployed in the conflict.
Russia is currently fighting in Ukraine only with its existing (i.e. "peacetime") standing army. This stands in contrast to Ukraine, which at this point has mobilised much of its fighting-age male population, such that Ukraine now has more soldiers than Russia does. As the months wear on these new Ukrainian soldiers will become increasingly well trained and well equipped.
Unfortunately for Russia, its manpower issues go significantly beyond this basic distinction between a mobilised Ukraine and non-mobilised Russia. This is because some 30% of Russia's armed forces consist of conscripts who, by law, cannot be deployed outside Russia without a national declaration of war, which has not occurred (this is still a "special military operation"). There are indications that the military is using various means to get around this restriction such that there
are some Russian conscripts in Ukraine, but nonetheless this is a major constraint on Russian manpower availability. But it gets worse: Russia's BTGs (Battalion Tactical Groups) are
intentionally undermanned to begin with, because they were structured under the assumption that any major conflict would be accompanied by national mobilisation which would in turn disproportionately be used to fill out the ranks of infantry.
Without the conscript element of their force available, and without the national mobilisation that was anticipated to accompany any major conflict, Russia's armed forces are short on manpower and desperately short on infantry in particular: you have Russian BTGs at 50-60% overall manpower where the infantry component is at more like 30% strength. This leads to armoured units operating without effective infantry support, leaving them vulnerable to ambushes and consequently leading to the heavy attrition that we have observed.
National mobilisation is not a cure-all for Russia's woes in this conflict. Beyond allowing for existing conscripts (which are about to be discharged in line with peacetime practices!) to be sent to the front, it would take some months for this influx of civilians to be trained, equipped and organised for combat. As such, it only makes sense if the conflict is going to be a prolonged one, which seems increasingly probable. I suspect that Putin is awaiting results in the Donbas before making any decision.
The other side of national mobilisation is political-economic. Under conditions of war, the entire national economy can be geared to war production as occurred during the Great Patriotic War (WW2).
