Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Stealthflanker said:

This is why Surface scan radars are mostly in X or C band. as those bands have propagation advantages. It may still lost low altitude contact but can quickly regain it. Something of lower frequencies like S or L doesn't have. They're more suited for high-medium altitude area defense.

Click to expand...

Let's take the example of Mineral-ME , which gave rise to the Ukrainian Mineral-U. This radar is commonly used on Russian ships and is said to have an OTH capability of up to 250 km in active auto-refraction mode.

The reality is that a ship with this radar would not even need air assets to find OTH targets. I still don't quite understand how this works.

I don't understand how this is possible and until today I haven't found anyone to explain to me how an X-band (I-band) radar has OTH capability, which is characteristic of HF-band radars. Until you reach the HF band (A band) from band I, you have to go through bands B, C, D, E, F, G, H (or if you prefer: C, S, L, UHF, VHF).

The Mineral-M's active radar operates in the I-band range, but the passive radar operates in the I-band to the D-band. The Mineral-ME system's passive radar can detect radar emissions up to 450 km away. I also don't understand how this is possible.

Ship radars generally operate in the X, C, S, L bands, and they only travel in a straight line on the radar horizon according to their height on the mast. Some "thing" can interact with the atmosphere, refract, etc... and be perceived below the horizon, so the radar horizon is a little beyond the real horizon, but it would not be enough to be perceived by a passive system at a very long distance. long as 450 km from Mineral-M.

A ship at sea can have its radiation detected by a passive system hundreds of kilometers away by an aircraft as well as by satellites, the major powers have dedicated ELINT satellites for searching for ships at sea and are 1500 km high in orbit.

A ship in the middle of the ocean can only communicate with land through satellites (must have a line-of-sight communication satellite) or through a radio that operates in the HF band that reflects off the ionosphere or the sea surface. , since VHF communication is short-range and depends on the height of the antenna because it basically propagates in a straight line even in the atmosphere (with some degree of refraction...) . On the other hand, a VHF or UHF radio in an aircraft can reach hundreds of kilometers because it is high and in line of sight with different objectives.

The HF band is the same used by amateur radios and it can reflect in the ionosphere and reach enormous distances, far beyond the horizon. That's why OTH radars use this band. But this band is not used for ship radars, only for radio communication.

But in general it's just to defend the point that there's no way a passive system (passive radar) on the surface (like this Mineral-M radar) can perceive energy radiated by ship radars hundreds of kilometers away because ship radars don't operate at frequencies that allow the energy beam to curve or reflect in the ionosphere and the receiver (Mineral-M radar) being on the surface.

Until someone explains to me how this physics works I am still skeptical of these capabilities. All the sources I look for detail coastal defense for HF/VHF radars, not in D band or X band, like Mineral-U which is derived from Mineral-M, just like China has Type 366, I don't understand how it's possible have that search and surface tracking range.

Suetham said:

Let's take the example of Mineral-ME , which gave rise to the Ukrainian Mineral-U. This radar is commonly used on Russian ships and is said to have an OTH capability of up to 250 km in active auto-refraction mode.

Click to expand...

It works by something called "atmospheric ducting" or ducting phenomenon. Basically taking advantage of naturally occuring but unpredictable "duct" in the atmosphere.

Ducting itself is some form of "layer of air" which have favorable wave propagation and can be used to increase detection range. This phenomenon however was more of a nuisance than advantage as despite "increase detection range" It also can create shadow or skip zone where target may slip through undetected.

Example of duct is as follows :



Notice the ducting of the lower lobe which extend beyond the horizon. If the radar can take advantage of it like Mineral or Monolit, then yes. But if it's an air surveillance radar it will get clutter straight to her face and cannot detect target which she supposed to detect.

My three cents on the Moskva, tying in to a post from several pages ago:

Tam said:

I don't buy the distraction theory because ship radars are capable of tracking hundreds if not thousands of targets simultaneously. Even with an outdated radar it can still handle targets by the dozens. In order to blind the ship, the drone needs to be carrying ECM or throw chaff over the ship.

Another thing that despite the ship radars being obsolete, there are two search radars there that are back to back arrays. The smaller back array on the Top Pair and Top Sail radars have different and higher frequency, which you will also need to jam separately.

Click to expand...

When people think about Soviet or Russian air warfare vessels they instinctively imagine them as American AEGIS ships but AEGIS ships were developed specifically to counter Soviet supersonic AShM threat. Soviet ships at the time were developed to counter USN carriers and submarines. At the time there was no credible threat from long-range anti-ship missiles to Soviet navy. MM38 Exocet entered service in 1975 and had range of 42km. RGM-77A Harpoon entered service in 1977 with range of 80km.

But even as such threat emerged Soviet electronics industry struggled to develop a viable system that would copy the capabilities of AN/SPY-1. The Mars-Passat PESA radar was tested on Baku (4th Kiev-class) in the 1980s but despite being officially commissioned in 1989 there is no evidence that the radar ever achieved full operating capability and the ship relied on MR-710M-1 radar which was used as backup.

Mars-Passat arrays on the front of Baku's island:


Phased arrays were introduced because mechanical scanning provides both lower resolution and lower refresh rate for reliable signal processing against fast-moving small-RCS objects. Low-flying cruise missiles were the reason for PESA arrays in MiG-31 and S-300. Zaslon was very expensive and troublesome, and S-300 had a much simpler antenna.

What we must remember is that PESA arrays unlike AESA arrays are easy to manufacture. The problem lies in the computers that control the array and process the signal. The success of AEGIS and failure of Mars-Passat was determined by computers, not radars. Now computers are not a problem, but money is - which is why Marshal Ustinov (Northern) received two new radars, but Varyag (Pacific) just one.

So what was Moskva in terms of anti-air warfare?

1. Moskva had three main radars:

• MR-710 Fregat-M - designed as part of the Sarych (Sovremenny) destroyer program which was commenced in 1971.
• MR-600 Voshkod - used on Kondor (Moskva) cruisers which were built and commissioned in the 1960s.
• 3R41 Volna - naval version of S-300 targeting radar (1970s)

Fregat-M operates in in D/E bands (upper L/lower S) and has maximum range of 300 km against targets at 30km altitude, 40km against warship-sized surface targets and a minimum viewing range of 2 km. Fregat-M is a phased array but only for the purpose of steering the beam vertically.

Voshkod operates in C/D/E/F bands (L/S) and it is an even more primitive system with lower maximum range of 200km. The reason why it is used on the ship is task-sharing. Fregat-M has better range and resolution and is capable of tracking targets and providing that information to the illuminator. While Fregat-M is doing that Voshkod continues to scan the area in search mode because despite lower range it has wider band and thus provides more returns (false ones are not a problem).

Volna operates in I/J bands (X/Ku) and has range of 100km. If a low-RCS target is detected such as TB2 it would be most practical for the crew of Moskva to use Volna However it is very limited in capacity being only able to track 6 targets and engage 3 of them. It also has a single antenna with approximately 120 degrees beam range. It has therefore narrow field of view and limited ability to discern targets.

These three radars operated independently and information was shared between the crew. Signal processing was done by simple 1970s computers with hardware-defined programming which was optimized for detection of aircraft, rather than missiles.

2. Moskva had two independent layers of air defense:

• area defense - S-300F
• close defense - 4K33 Osa-M , AK-130, AK-630

From what I've found this is how those systems worked with radars:

• S-300F - 3R41 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning + MR-600 early warning
• Osa-M - 4R33 search & fire control + MR-710 early warning
• AK-130 - MR-184 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning
• AK-630 - MR-123 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning

Below you can see how the layout of the ship affects their performance in physical terms - the ship is Marshal Ustinov, after modernization:

• AK-630 covers a 180 degree area. Front and side are each protected by two AK-630 controlled by a single MR-123. Maximum range is 4km, effective 2km and below.
• AK-130 covers a wider area limited by P-500 launchers so at longer ranges it covers close to 270 degrees and at closer ranges 180 degrees from the front. Maximum range is 15km, effective range against missiles is 8km.
• Osa-M covers a 180 degree area. Both sides are protected by a single system. Maximum range is 9km.

If Volna is busy tracking TB2 Moskva would have the following ways of detecting and reacting against AShM:

• rear - 2x Osa-M (4R33)
• sides - 1x Osa-M (4R33) and 2x AK-630 (MR-710)
• front - 1x AK-130 (MR-710) and 2x AK-630 (MR-710)

If MR-710 failed to detect only Osa-M could could engage incoming missiles because it has an independent search radar but as you can see on the photo it's default "off" position is with the launcher covered and radars pointed along the axis of the ship, back or front. It is very likely that Moskva was operating with those systems off and in that case even if the threat was detected at closer ranges there is time necessary to warm the system up and put it into action, which the ship most likely didn't have.

Earlier cruisers with Shtorm (SA-N-3) missiles had two independent illuminators on bow and stern for avoiding blindspots. Kirov has similarly two illuminators for its S-300F. Slava has only one.

Moskva also had original "Side Globe" ECM system which is like all the radars on the ship was very well understood by Ukrainian designers of Neptun.

Tam said:

I can easily buy the accident theory because the Russian Navy has a well documented history of having fatal fires and deadly accidents. One that happens too often for a competent navy.

Click to expand...

Electronics is mechanics, just on a much smaller scale. Electronic components wear out just like every other machine does.

When Russians stopped maintenance on their fleet, with neglect reaching catastrophic scale, it affected the electronics as well and because the electronics manufacturers were among the hardest hit by the collapse of funding, there were no replacements available. The parts would be most likely cannibalized from older ships which were also in poor condition. At some point in the last 31 years there were no more parts available to maintain old systems.

For every act of neglect in maintaining ammunition or explosive fuel there are countless acts of neglect in maintaining electronic, electrical or hydraulic systems like the faulty sprinkler system that was never fixed when Moskva was in overhaul. The biggest hazard to crews during fires is not fire but fumes. Ventilation is not air conditioning so having a/c for missions to Syria is not the same as having emergency ventilation for dealing with large volume of toxic gas that will affect everyone without a breathing mask.

A faulty section of the search radar's array couldn't track the missile because of worn out parts. The self-defense systems weren't alerted and didn't react in time. The missile hit a portion of the ship that allowed for fire to spread to vulnerable areas and the faulty sprinklers couldn't stop it. Under-strength crew was unable to continue manning combat stations and fight the fire and damage. Etc.

Tiny acts of innocuous negligence combining to result in a catastrophic cascade effect. Much higher probability of this happening than a single case of mishandling of weapons or fuel i.e. things that people pay attention to because they kill instantly.

Stealthflanker said:

It works by something called "atmospheric ducting" or ducting phenomenon. Basically taking advantage of naturally occuring but unpredictable "duct" in the atmosphere.

Ducting itself is some form of "layer of air" which have favorable wave propagation and can be used to increase detection range. This phenomenon however was more of a nuisance than advantage as despite "increase detection range" It also can create shadow or skip zone where target may slip through undetected.

Click to expand...

I think I understand. So the radio horizon can propagate in an extended range because of the atmospheric ducts which can use the tropospheric dispersion method, in wikipedia there is the statement that the ideal frequency range is 2 GHz, exactly the same frequency range as the band D of the Mineral-M(Mineral-U) system.


Got it correctly?

Suetham said:

I think I understand. So the radio horizon can propagate in an extended range because of the atmospheric ducts which can use the tropospheric dispersion method, in wikipedia there is the statement that the ideal frequency range is 2 GHz, exactly the same frequency range as the band D of the Mineral-M(Mineral-U) system.

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Got it correctly?

Click to expand...

Yes, although X-band and higher frequency can be affected by the phenomenon too.

Stealthflanker said:

Yes, although X-band and higher frequency can be affected by the phenomenon too.

Click to expand...

Ship radars generally operate in the X, C, S, L bands, and in these frequency bands they only travel in a straight line, some emitted signals can interact with the atmosphere and refract, in this way the range below the horizon can be extended. The radio waves that normally propagate beyond the horizon are the HF down bands (HF, MF, LF, VLF) that go around the world reflecting off the ionosphere.

A coastal search and tracking complex such as Mineral-U that operates in passive mode from band I (X-band or SHF band) to D-band (L-band or UHF band) could use atmospheric ducts to passively search and track waves. emitted by on-board naval radars that also operate in this frequency band to detect and track their targets. Enemy radar location plays an important role in modern warfare.

For example, the AN/SPS-67(IFF antenna operates in the L-band - D-band or UHF band) and claims to have a detection range >104 km, this is the Arleigh Burke surface search radar but can also detect air targets at low altitudes and cruise missiles, it is found that the radar is at an altitude position of 30 to 40 meters on the ship, calculating the radar horizon for a radar position at 40 meters and the target also at a height than 40 meters, the horizon detection range is half the effective range of the radar which is >104 km. This means that naval radars propagate electromagnetic wave radiation through the troposphere generating "footprints" that an enemy radar could track and detect through atmospheric ducts.

I think that in the same way that a Mineral-M uses atmospheric ducts to extend the detection range, the AN/SPS-67 also does it in the same way, but its range is much smaller than the Mineral-M. In this way, a Mineral-U could passively detect the signal from enemy naval radars (L, S, C and X bands) at long distances.

MarKoz81 said:

My three cents on the Moskva, tying in to a post from several pages ago:



When people think about Soviet or Russian air warfare vessels they instinctively imagine them as American AEGIS ships but AEGIS ships were developed specifically to counter Soviet supersonic AShM threat. Soviet ships at the time were developed to counter USN carriers and submarines. At the time there was no credible threat from long-range anti-ship missiles to Soviet navy. MM38 Exocet entered service in 1975 and had range of 42km. RGM-77A Harpoon entered service in 1977 with range of 80km.

But even as such threat emerged Soviet electronics industry struggled to develop a viable system that would copy the capabilities of AN/SPY-1. The Mars-Passat PESA radar was tested on Baku (4th Kiev-class) in the 1980s but despite being officially commissioned in 1989 there is no evidence that the radar ever achieved full operating capability and the ship relied on MR-710M-1 radar which was used as backup.

Mars-Passat arrays on the front of Baku's island:
View attachment 87211

Phased arrays were introduced because mechanical scanning provides both lower resolution and lower refresh rate for reliable signal processing against fast-moving small-RCS objects. Low-flying cruise missiles were the reason for PESA arrays in MiG-31 and S-300. Zaslon was very expensive and troublesome, and S-300 had a much simpler antenna.

What we must remember is that PESA arrays unlike AESA arrays are easy to manufacture. The problem lies in the computers that control the array and process the signal. The success of AEGIS and failure of Mars-Passat was determined by computers, not radars. Now computers are not a problem, but money is - which is why Marshal Ustinov (Northern) received two new radars, but Varyag (Pacific) just one.

So what was Moskva in terms of anti-air warfare?

1. Moskva had three main radars:

• MR-710 Fregat-M - designed as part of the Sarych (Sovremenny) destroyer program which was commenced in 1971.
• MR-600 Voshkod - used on Kondor (Moskva) cruisers which were built and commissioned in the 1960s.
• 3R41 Volna - naval version of S-300 targeting radar (1970s)

Fregat-M operates in in D/E bands (upper L/lower S) and has maximum range of 300 km against targets at 30km altitude, 40km against warship-sized surface targets and a minimum viewing range of 2 km. Fregat-M is a phased array but only for the purpose of steering the beam vertically.

Voshkod operates in C/D/E/F bands (L/S) and it is an even more primitive system with lower maximum range of 200km. The reason why it is used on the ship is task-sharing. Fregat-M has better range and resolution and is capable of tracking targets and providing that information to the illuminator. While Fregat-M is doing that Voshkod continues to scan the area in search mode because despite lower range it has wider band and thus provides more returns (false ones are not a problem).

Volna operates in I/J bands (X/Ku) and has range of 100km. If a low-RCS target is detected such as TB2 it would be most practical for the crew of Moskva to use Volna However it is very limited in capacity being only able to track 6 targets and engage 3 of them. It also has a single antenna with approximately 120 degrees beam range. It has therefore narrow field of view and limited ability to discern targets.

These three radars operated independently and information was shared between the crew. Signal processing was done by simple 1970s computers with hardware-defined programming which was optimized for detection of aircraft, rather than missiles.

2. Moskva had two independent layers of air defense:

• area defense - S-300F
• close defense - 4K33 Osa-M , AK-130, AK-630

From what I've found this is how those systems worked with radars:

• S-300F - 3R41 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning + MR-600 early warning
• Osa-M - 4R33 search & fire control + MR-710 early warning
• AK-130 - MR-184 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning
• AK-630 - MR-123 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning

Below you can see how the layout of the ship affects their performance in physical terms - the ship is Marshal Ustinov, after modernization:

View attachment 87209

• AK-630 covers a 180 degree area. Front and side are each protected by two AK-630 controlled by a single MR-123. Maximum range is 4km, effective 2km and below.
• AK-130 covers a wider area limited by P-500 launchers so at longer ranges it covers close to 270 degrees and at closer ranges 180 degrees from the front. Maximum range is 15km, effective range against missiles is 8km.
• Osa-M covers a 180 degree area. Both sides are protected by a single system. Maximum range is 9km.

View attachment 87210

If Volna is busy tracking TB2 Moskva would have the following ways of detecting and reacting against AShM:

• rear - 2x Osa-M (4R33)
• sides - 1x Osa-M (4R33) and 2x AK-630 (MR-710)
• front - 1x AK-130 (MR-710) and 2x AK-630 (MR-710)

If MR-710 failed to detect only Osa-M could could engage incoming missiles because it has an independent search radar but as you can see on the photo it's default "off" position is with the launcher covered and radars pointed along the axis of the ship, back or front. It is very likely that Moskva was operating with those systems off and in that case even if the threat was detected at closer ranges there is time necessary to warm the system up and put it into action, which the ship most likely didn't have.

Earlier cruisers with Shtorm (SA-N-3) missiles had two independent illuminators on bow and stern for avoiding blindspots. Kirov has similarly two illuminators for its S-300F. Slava has only one.

Moskva also had original "Side Globe" ECM system which is like all the radars on the ship was very well understood by Ukrainian designers of Neptun.



Electronics is mechanics, just on a much smaller scale. Electronic components wear out just like every other machine does.

When Russians stopped maintenance on their fleet, with neglect reaching catastrophic scale, it affected the electronics as well and because the electronics manufacturers were among the hardest hit by the collapse of funding, there were no replacements available. The parts would be most likely cannibalized from older ships which were also in poor condition. At some point in the last 31 years there were no more parts available to maintain old systems.

For every act of neglect in maintaining ammunition or explosive fuel there are countless acts of neglect in maintaining electronic, electrical or hydraulic systems like the faulty sprinkler system that was never fixed when Moskva was in overhaul. The biggest hazard to crews during fires is not fire but fumes. Ventilation is not air conditioning so having a/c for missions to Syria is not the same as having emergency ventilation for dealing with large volume of toxic gas that will affect everyone without a breathing mask.

A faulty section of the search radar's array couldn't track the missile because of worn out parts. The self-defense systems weren't alerted and didn't react in time. The missile hit a portion of the ship that allowed for fire to spread to vulnerable areas and the faulty sprinklers couldn't stop it. Under-strength crew was unable to continue manning combat stations and fight the fire and damage. Etc.

Tiny acts of innocuous negligence combining to result in a catastrophic cascade effect. Much higher probability of this happening than a single case of mishandling of weapons or fuel i.e. things that people pay attention to because they kill instantly.

Click to expand...

I think PLA is watching closely since 054As, 051C and 052B all use a modernised copy of the Fregat if I'm not wrong

MarKoz81 said:

My three cents on the Moskva, tying in to a post from several pages ago:



When people think about Soviet or Russian air warfare vessels they instinctively imagine them as American AEGIS ships but AEGIS ships were developed specifically to counter Soviet supersonic AShM threat. Soviet ships at the time were developed to counter USN carriers and submarines. At the time there was no credible threat from long-range anti-ship missiles to Soviet navy. MM38 Exocet entered service in 1975 and had range of 42km. RGM-77A Harpoon entered service in 1977 with range of 80km.

But even as such threat emerged Soviet electronics industry struggled to develop a viable system that would copy the capabilities of AN/SPY-1. The Mars-Passat PESA radar was tested on Baku (4th Kiev-class) in the 1980s but despite being officially commissioned in 1989 there is no evidence that the radar ever achieved full operating capability and the ship relied on MR-710M-1 radar which was used as backup.

Mars-Passat arrays on the front of Baku's island:
View attachment 87211

Phased arrays were introduced because mechanical scanning provides both lower resolution and lower refresh rate for reliable signal processing against fast-moving small-RCS objects. Low-flying cruise missiles were the reason for PESA arrays in MiG-31 and S-300. Zaslon was very expensive and troublesome, and S-300 had a much simpler antenna.

What we must remember is that PESA arrays unlike AESA arrays are easy to manufacture. The problem lies in the computers that control the array and process the signal. The success of AEGIS and failure of Mars-Passat was determined by computers, not radars. Now computers are not a problem, but money is - which is why Marshal Ustinov (Northern) received two new radars, but Varyag (Pacific) just one.

So what was Moskva in terms of anti-air warfare?

1. Moskva had three main radars:

• MR-710 Fregat-M - designed as part of the Sarych (Sovremenny) destroyer program which was commenced in 1971.
• MR-600 Voshkod - used on Kondor (Moskva) cruisers which were built and commissioned in the 1960s.
• 3R41 Volna - naval version of S-300 targeting radar (1970s)

Fregat-M operates in in D/E bands (upper L/lower S) and has maximum range of 300 km against targets at 30km altitude, 40km against warship-sized surface targets and a minimum viewing range of 2 km. Fregat-M is a phased array but only for the purpose of steering the beam vertically.

Voshkod operates in C/D/E/F bands (L/S) and it is an even more primitive system with lower maximum range of 200km. The reason why it is used on the ship is task-sharing. Fregat-M has better range and resolution and is capable of tracking targets and providing that information to the illuminator. While Fregat-M is doing that Voshkod continues to scan the area in search mode because despite lower range it has wider band and thus provides more returns (false ones are not a problem).

Volna operates in I/J bands (X/Ku) and has range of 100km. If a low-RCS target is detected such as TB2 it would be most practical for the crew of Moskva to use Volna However it is very limited in capacity being only able to track 6 targets and engage 3 of them. It also has a single antenna with approximately 120 degrees beam range. It has therefore narrow field of view and limited ability to discern targets.

These three radars operated independently and information was shared between the crew. Signal processing was done by simple 1970s computers with hardware-defined programming which was optimized for detection of aircraft, rather than missiles.

2. Moskva had two independent layers of air defense:

• area defense - S-300F
• close defense - 4K33 Osa-M , AK-130, AK-630

From what I've found this is how those systems worked with radars:

• S-300F - 3R41 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning + MR-600 early warning
• Osa-M - 4R33 search & fire control + MR-710 early warning
• AK-130 - MR-184 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning
• AK-630 - MR-123 fire control + MR-710 search & early warning

Below you can see how the layout of the ship affects their performance in physical terms - the ship is Marshal Ustinov, after modernization:

View attachment 87209

• AK-630 covers a 180 degree area. Front and side are each protected by two AK-630 controlled by a single MR-123. Maximum range is 4km, effective 2km and below.
• AK-130 covers a wider area limited by P-500 launchers so at longer ranges it covers close to 270 degrees and at closer ranges 180 degrees from the front. Maximum range is 15km, effective range against missiles is 8km.
• Osa-M covers a 180 degree area. Both sides are protected by a single system. Maximum range is 9km.

View attachment 87210

If Volna is busy tracking TB2 Moskva would have the following ways of detecting and reacting against AShM:

• rear - 2x Osa-M (4R33)
• sides - 1x Osa-M (4R33) and 2x AK-630 (MR-710)
• front - 1x AK-130 (MR-710) and 2x AK-630 (MR-710)

If MR-710 failed to detect only Osa-M could could engage incoming missiles because it has an independent search radar but as you can see on the photo it's default "off" position is with the launcher covered and radars pointed along the axis of the ship, back or front. It is very likely that Moskva was operating with those systems off and in that case even if the threat was detected at closer ranges there is time necessary to warm the system up and put it into action, which the ship most likely didn't have.

Earlier cruisers with Shtorm (SA-N-3) missiles had two independent illuminators on bow and stern for avoiding blindspots. Kirov has similarly two illuminators for its S-300F. Slava has only one.

Moskva also had original "Side Globe" ECM system which is like all the radars on the ship was very well understood by Ukrainian designers of Neptun.



Electronics is mechanics, just on a much smaller scale. Electronic components wear out just like every other machine does.

When Russians stopped maintenance on their fleet, with neglect reaching catastrophic scale, it affected the electronics as well and because the electronics manufacturers were among the hardest hit by the collapse of funding, there were no replacements available. The parts would be most likely cannibalized from older ships which were also in poor condition. At some point in the last 31 years there were no more parts available to maintain old systems.

For every act of neglect in maintaining ammunition or explosive fuel there are countless acts of neglect in maintaining electronic, electrical or hydraulic systems like the faulty sprinkler system that was never fixed when Moskva was in overhaul. The biggest hazard to crews during fires is not fire but fumes. Ventilation is not air conditioning so having a/c for missions to Syria is not the same as having emergency ventilation for dealing with large volume of toxic gas that will affect everyone without a breathing mask.

A faulty section of the search radar's array couldn't track the missile because of worn out parts. The self-defense systems weren't alerted and didn't react in time. The missile hit a portion of the ship that allowed for fire to spread to vulnerable areas and the faulty sprinklers couldn't stop it. Under-strength crew was unable to continue manning combat stations and fight the fire and damage. Etc.

Tiny acts of innocuous negligence combining to result in a catastrophic cascade effect. Much higher probability of this happening than a single case of mishandling of weapons or fuel i.e. things that people pay attention to because they kill instantly.

Click to expand...

That’s for a comprehensive analysis.

How do you reconcile the above with claims from the Ukrainians that they had previously attacked Moskva with anti-ship missiles, but that time the ship shot down their missiles?

You left out from the analysis the presence of a storm during the attack. You do not think that played an important role?

Zichan said:

That’s for a comprehensive analysis.

How do you reconcile the above with claims from the Ukrainians that they had previously attacked Moskva with anti-ship missiles, but that time the ship shot down their missiles?

You left out from the analysis the presence of a storm during the attack. You do not think that played an important role?

Click to expand...

The storm very likely can play a role in making sea skimming missiles both difficult to detect and to engage. So in this sense the presence of a storm might tend to make any failing in Russian equipment seem comparatively less serious.

On the other hand, any competent naval commander should know rough sea can make a sea skimming missile a greater threat. If the Russians have already been informed of the presence of such a danger by an previous attack, then the presence of Moskva within the engagement envelope during a storm would tend to make any failing in Russian command competence seem comparatively more severe.

All together, this episold reinforces the impression created by the entire Russian performance during this campaign that the Russians were were much worse than merely initially overconfident in their own relative abilities compared to the task at hand. It seems to me that after a month of setbacks, either the idea that they Should rethink very carefully about what they are doing in light of capabilities actually demonstrated by their enemies still has not caught on, or more probably, they have been operating in a fog of confusions regarding what the true capabilities of their own men and equipment really are all along and continue to operate in the same fog and so can be expected to suffer further setbacks like these.

The word amateurish seems not possible to avoid.

Moskva sinking?