Re: PLAN submarines Thread II
More importantly I had a thought the other day, China could develop a 'new' class of submarine! I am thinking a bland of attack and ballistic sub. Instead of carrying the long range strategic missiles such as the JL2 why not build a smaller sub carrying intermediate ranged missile such as the DF-25. Currently China possess the technology and know how to build such class of sub, and what is more is its strategic significance once the system of ASBM becomes mature and fully functional i.e. the detection and tracking etc. And the US has already demonstrated that you can convert a SSBM into a cruise missile carrier thus the sub can vary its operational requirements as seen fit. There are many other advantages however what I would like to know what disadvantages are there.
Well Terrain Empire has already mentioned the biggest issue with IRBM armed SSBNs, which is that the reduced missile range would force the sub to have to get closer to their targets to attack. However, considering that your main use for those IRBMs would be anti-shipping rather that strategic nuclear strike, the reduced range may not necessarily mean the subs have to venture further from home waters if their targets are marauding close by anyways.
The other major issues with such a sub would be things like:
1) Cost. An LA class attack sub is estimated to cost around $1bn, while the same generation Ohio Class SSBN are reported to cost as much as $2bn apiece. I would not expect your hybrid sub to cost much less than a full blooded SSBN (will explain later), so the question comes down to whether you want 1 hybrid or two SSNs for the same price.
2) Unclear why such a special class is needed at all. The DF25 is estimated to be around 14m in length, which is the same, if not slightly longer than the JL2 ICBM. The DF25 would have a much smaller diameter (~1.4m v 2+m for the JL2), so the same sized sub can carry more DF25 missiles than JL2s, but not by much.
Considering you would need to develop a new sub launched variant of the DF25 and a specialist new sub class, it just seems like a lot of extra effort when you would just adapt the guidance and terminal maneuvering technology from the ASBM programme for the JL2 missile (which would have been a sensible thing to do anyways as a means to counter missile defense interceptors and generally improve the accuracy of the missiles) to give you a new sub launched ASBM with far greater range and payload than the DF25 based ASBM. You can then just use your existing SSBN fleet to take a mixed load of ASBMs and ICBMs and give them an added long range anti-ship capability to supplement their existing nuclear deterrence role.
If the PLAN wants to expand their SSBN fleet to maintain the same number of nuclear armed missiles available for launch, the additional ships would benefit from economies of scale in production cost reductions as well as shared logistics and training to help reduce operational costs.
3) Increased risk of miscalculation/understanding. The only way someone is going to know if a missile is carrying a nuclear or conventional warhead is when it hits. Countries are generally willing to give things like cruise missiles the benefit of the doubt and assume they are conventionally armed unless they have evidence to the contrary. But when you start popping off ballistic missiles, people start to get a whole lot more jumpy, especially if those missiles came out of boomers.
Say China does develop a sub launched ASBM and fires off a large wave of such missiles at an incoming enemy fleet, the missiles' flight paths can easily look like they are heading for the home country of the enemy fleet, and it will take critical minutes for the missiles' course to be accurately plotted. But in the meantime, what happens if the enemy gets too nervous and launches a full nuclear armed ballistic missile wave of their own 'in retaliation'?
China now has minutes to decide if they need to launch their nukes.
Best case, the Chinese ASBMs hit in the middle of the ocean and it becomes obvious China did not launch a nuclear first strike and the enemy self destructs their nukes. But what happens if there is a break down in communications or trust? How long does China give the enemy to self-destruct their nukes before China thinks the enemy actually wants to take advantage of the confusion and launch a nuclear first strike?
Say China sets a deadline or draws a line is space warning that if the enemy ICBMs are not self-destructed by then, China would launch a full nuclear strike. A canny enemy with a much bigger nuclear arsenal could deliberately choose to ignore the deadline and goad China into launching. Then self-destruct their nukes, and demand China do the same or they launch another wave of nukes. What does China do then? Self-destruct their nukes and leave their nuclear arsenal severely depleted or go full M.A.D? What happens if China self destructs their nukes, and the enemy launches a second full wave of nuclear ICBMs?
With the small nuclear arsenal that China has, it really does not want to get sucked into such an extreme game of brinkmanship, and it would be so much easier to accidentally set off a chain of events that might lead to the kinds of extreme measures as set out above by using SLBMs for anti-shipping, and if it came down to playing games with nuclear armed ICBMs China is at a massive disadvantage because of its small arsenal size. That is not even taking into account the very real possibility that no one self destructs their nukes and we blow up half the world with the rest freeing in a new ice age.