One type of ship ADM Zumwalt proposed was the Sea Control Ship (SCS), a small, austere aircraft carrier. Congress did not approve construction, believing that this small carrier could not perform its designed mission. ADM Elmo Zumwalt became the Chief of Naval Operations on 01 July 1970, believing that the United States was experiencing a time of great military crisis. The US was spending most of its defense budget on the Vietnam conflict, and the President and Congress refused to increase appropriations to match continuous Soviet military expansion. A large number of ships were reaching block obsolescence (where a large number of similiar ships -- a block -- become obsolescent within a few years), requiring either replacement or costly, short term repairs. Simultaneously, the Soviets were greatly increasing the size and sophistication of their fleet.
ADM Zumwalt later wrote in 1976: "Her price was to be 100 million 1973 dollars, about one-eighth the cost of a nuclear carrier. Her principal peacetime purpose was to show the flag in dangerous waters, especially the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific ... so that the big carriers ... could withdraw ... and deploy out of reach of an enemy first strike, thus putting themselves in a favorable position to respond to such a strike--and therefore to deter it. ... In a wartime situation the positions ... would be reversed: the big, powerful ones would fight their way into the most dangerous waters, destroying opposition beyond cruise missile range with their planes, and the sea control ships would serve in mid-ocean."
The large carriers have "far too much offensive capability to waste on convoy duty." However, in any actual conflict, ADM Zumwalt. continued: "... there might be at sea as many as 20 convoys of merchantmen, troop transports, and naval auxiliaries in need of air protection from the time they left the reach of land-based air until they entered areas where the deployed carriers were operating .... Eight vessels capable of that mid-ocean job could be built for the price of one full-fledged carrier, which in any case, if it was assigned to convoy duty, could protect only one convoy instead of eight. Moreover the SCS would be fast and easy to build.... Clearly SCS was a good investment..."
VADM Frank H. Price, director of Navy ship acquisition and improvements, contended that "We consider that the concept is fully validated and that the design features will give us an effective, less expensive, but fully capable sea-based air support platform.... The SCS is the most cost effective means of replacing dwindling sea-based air support assets, those that are required in defense of our sea lines. ... we have formulated a ship which can provide effective air support when the presence of a carrier is neither practical nor possible. Like the World War II escort carrier, or CVE, the SCS can be produced in sufficient numbers to provide the requisite protection in the many low threat open ocean areas."
The first request for funds for the SCS, for $29.4 million, was in the FY74 budget. The plan was to request one in FY75, three in FY76, and Lhen two per year for next two FYs, for a total of eight SCSs. Ralph Preston, the chief counsel for the House Appropriations Committee, was against the SCS and swayed Rep. Mahon, the Chairman, against it -- the House approved no money. Several senators of the Senate Appropriations Committee, including Senators McClellan and Young, strongly favored the SCS and the entire High-Low Concept--the Senate approved the $29.4 million. In conference, Congress agreed to retain, but freeze the money, pending a report by the General Accounting Office. The report, submitted after ADM Zumwalt retired, was negative [this according to ADM Zumwalt's memoirs, though there is no evidence of such a report]. Congress refused to fund SCS due to limited size, capability and speed.
The Sea Control Ship was quite controversial. The idea of an austere warship deeply troubled some, like ADM Rickover and the nuclear power community, who feared it was an alternative to nuclear powered large aircraft carriers. Others, like the naval aviation community, believed this ship might replace the large-deck carrier regardless of propulsion plant. Still others, like civilian naval analysts Norman Friedman and Norman Polmar, questioned the ship's mission. Norman Polmar, a noted naval analyst and participant in some of the planning, in 1977 wrote: "The logic of this approach is valid. In fact, there does not appear to be any better alternative. The concept has been reaffirmed by Admiral Holloway and Secretaries of Defense Schlesinger and Rumsfeld .... There can be useful questioning of specific types with the high-low mix. For example, I questioned -- before congressional committees and in print -- the validity of the sea control ship. However, an additional, dedicated aviation ship of less capability (and cost) than the CVN was, and still is, required."
The SCS was not built by the US Navy and no dedicated, fixed-wing-aircraft-capable ship exists to fill the mission of open-ocean ASW and convoy escort. The design of the SCS was sold to Spain in 1977, where, with some modifications, it was used to build the Principe de Asturias. The layout of the Principe de Asturias, an aircraft carrier that has been in service with the Spanish Navy since 1988, was partly derived from the design of the US Navy Sea Control Ship. The hull was laid down in 1979 and the ship was launched in 1982.
In 1981 the LHA-4 Nassau undertook a proof of concept demonstration of the Sea Control mission, operating 19 [or 20, depending on the source] Harriers. Nassau again embarked 20 Harriers in 1990 for operations in Iraq. And during Opeation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, both LHD-5 Bataan and LHD-6 Bon Homme Richard each operated 24 Harriers
